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Abstract
The rationale for Washington’s enduring and often forbearing commitment to Israel has 
long been a puzzle. During the Cold War it was argued that Israel, a “bastion of 
democracy” amidst a world of semi-authoritarian and often pro-Soviet states, was a 
natural ally. But the Cold War is over, and the Arab world awash with oil, a resource that 
is always in short supply in the US. Yet the American commitment to Israel, a small 
state that is largely oil free, and of little tangible economic benefit, remains. An 
alternative view is that the US commitment is underwritten by the Jewish lobby which 
exercises a disproportionate influence on American policy. Yet the Jews comprise little 
more than six million out o f a total of nearly 300 million people. Even when combined 
with the influence of Protestant fundamentalists who for largely religious reasons, 
increasingly support Israel, it is still questionable whether interest group politics could 
determine American foreign policy to such an extent. Yet irrespective o f transitions 
between Republican and Democratic presidents, bureaucratic support for Israel remains 
relatively constant indicating that support for Israel is not a product o f partisan politics 
but a given firmly ingrained in the political agenda and discourse.
This thesis examines some of the commonplace theories of explanation and finds them 
wanting. Instead it proposes to explain the American commitment to Israel in terms of a 
somewhat imprecise and yet still serviceable concept -  that o f political culture. For 
reasons that are elaborated in this thesis, the concept best solves the puzzle of an 
American commitment that is often costly in both economic and diplomatic terms. This 
thesis does not seek to argue that political culture is the sole explanatory factor in the 
development of US policy toward Israel, but that it has played a key role in serving to 
shape and define the American approach to foreign affairs, thus contributing to decisions 
and operations that cannot easily be explained solely in geopolitical, economic or military 
terms. It is argued that in perceiving their society to be a beacon o f what they like to call 
‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’, in a world in which these values are largely absent, 
Americans have been encouraged to believe that they share a political kinship with 
societies similarly imbued and that they have an obligation to assist where such values
are under threat. It is this belief that sets Israel apart from other nations and forms the 
bedrock of the US-Israeli ‘special relationship.’
The relevance of the concept of political culture in accounting for US policy toward 
Israel is examined in a series of case studies. These focus on crisis decision-making 
during the presidencies of Johnson, Nixon, Reagan and Bush Sr., when domestic and 
organisational constraints were somewhat relaxed and decision-makers tended to act on 
pre-existing values and beliefs. In comparing and contrasting US decision-making both 
during and following the Cold War, the thesis attempts to provide an explanation for the 
relative continuity in US policy toward Israel in times of significant international and 
domestic change.
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Chapter 1 
The Origins of the US-Israeli Special Relationship
For many decades, political rhetoric and public sentiment has accorded Israel a special 
status in American foreign policy that no other state, with the possible exception of Great 
Britain, has achieved. This chapter explores the nature of US-Israeli relations, the 
concept and attributes of a special relationship and examines whether it is indeed valid to 
describe the US-Israeli relationship as such.
The Special Relationship
We have deepened our relationship to the point where it is probably the closest that we have 
with any o f our friends and allies anywhere in the world ... We support Israel because it is our 
major democratic ally with strategic and ideological and cultural ties that grow stronger each 
year ... As we work to achieve the goal of peace in the Middle East, we are guided by the 
fundamental principle which forms the basis for the peace process: our absolute commitment to 
Israel’s security and to close U.S.-Israeli relations ... The security of Israel is important to us, 
and we make no bones about it. ... The U.S. stands by Israel in an unshakeable partnership for 
peace.
Vice President A1 Gore 
“U.S. Middle East Policy: A New Era of Cooperation,”
35th Annual AIPAC Policy Conference,
Washington, DC, 13 March 19941
The idea that states, like people, can have a special relationship with one another, is now 
over half a century old, but the concept o f a ‘special relationship’ remains under­
theorised and under-conceptualised. The terms themselves are commonly employed with 
inverted commas to denote significance, but so far little theorisation or interpretation has 
been offered. Generally, by way o f conceptualisation, we are left with little more than
1 Quoted in Bernard Reich, Securing the Covenant: United States-lsrael Relations After the Cold War 
(Westport, Connecticut & London: Praeger Publishers, 1995) p. 1.
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the assertions of politicians that the relevant relationship “is special. It just is. And that’s 
that.”2
The notion of a ‘special relationship’ between two countries was coined by Winston 
Churchill to describe and if possible consolidate and make enduring the wartime alliance 
between Britain and the United States. His rhetoric created the belief that the relationship 
was indeed ‘special’ and this rhetoric both preceded and outlasted the formal wartime ties 
between the two countries. More than any other individual it was Churchill who 
advertised what he saw as the benefits of the relationship and used the notion o f a ‘special 
relationship’ to dramatise its possibilities in his own lifetime. Before his death but after 
the end of the Second World War, the relationship may be said to have returned to a more 
conventional form, with Washington consulting London less frequently on foreign affairs 
than had been the case during the exigency of hostilities. The closeness of the 
relationship dissipated in the absence o f careful nurturing, but was to be rekindled under 
the leadership of, first, Harold MacMillan and John F. Kennedy, perhaps most notably 
under Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan3 and later under Tony Blair and Bill Clinton 
and most recently under Blair and George W. Bush.
As a starting point for a discussion of what makes an inter-state relationship in some 
senses ‘special’ we might begin with a quotation from the former US Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson. For him what was important was not the emotional but the functional:
I shall not bother you by doing what is done so often on occasions like this, of talking about all that 
we have in common: language, history, and all of that. We know all that. What I wish to stress is 
one thing we have in common, one desperately important thing, and that is we have a common fate.4
2 Margaret Thatcher, speech in Washington, 21 February 1985, quoted in H.C. Allen “A Special 
Relationship?” Journal of American Studies 19, 1985, p. 407.
3 Christopher Bartlett, ‘The Special Relationship’: A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 
1945 (London & New York: Longman, 1992) p. 145.
4 Talk to British-American Parliamentary Group, 26 June 1952, Acheson Papers, Box 67, Truman Library, 
quoted in Alex Danchev On Specialness: Essays in Anglo-American Relations (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1998) p. 2.
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A common fate implies common enemies, and a common interest in defeating or 
containing them. For example, the Anglo-American relationship was an alliance for a 
purpose -  first a pax anti-Germanica and then a pax anti-Sovietica -  a partnership based 
on utility not sentimental attachment.5 Its creation and continuation was not a forgone 
conclusion, despite the fact that the US had its origins in Britain. It did not evolve 
organically from an existential sense of community but was constructed and renewed 
during particular historical periods.6 The relationship had to be nurtured and above all 
negotiated. The Anglo-American special relationship was a construct and largely a 
British or to be more precise a Churchillian one at that.7
Despite its relative decline since the Second World War, the Anglo-American 
relationship is often still alluded to or tacitly acknowledged in rhetoric, if nothing else, as
Q
‘special’. Many commentators, politicians and academics have considered the bond 
between America and Britain to be unique and thought it to embody properties different 
from those found in relations between other states. The close alliance between the US 
and Britain in the wars o f 2001-02 in Afghanistan and 2003 in Iraq is a testament to the 
endurance o f this ‘special relationship.’ However, the language that was once the 
exclusive preserve of those describing Anglo-American relations, has been recently 
applied in diplomatic or even academic discourse to descriptions o f America’s relations 
with other states. This raises the question of whether a state can have more than one 
‘special relationship’ simultaneously and if  all those inter-state relationships their leaders 
claim as ‘special’ can actually adhere to established and agreed criteria of ‘specialness’? 
Undoubtedly these relationships are unique because the entities that comprise the 
component parts contain properties that are not identically replicated by any other entity. 
But are they ‘special’ in the sense that ‘special’ implies bonds that go beyond utility to a 
deeper sense of affinity that transcends, and may on occasions even appear to be 
detrimental to, the national interest of one o f the parties?
5 Ibid.. p. 3.
6 John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After (London: 
MacMillain, 2001) p. 9.
7 Danchev, op.cit. p. 3.
To begin with, is it possible to define “special”? The Oxford English Dictionary offers 
the following definition: “of such a kind as to exceed or excel in some way that which is 
usual or common; exceptional in character, quality or degree ... admitted to particular 
intimacy; held in particular esteem ... marked off from others of the kind by having some 
distinguishing qualities or features; having a distinct or individual character.”9 This 
criterion is highly subjective and is purely qualitative. All these categorisations are 
relative. There is no definitive article of the special relationship and therefore no 
overarching standard or fixed requirement.10
However, it is possible to offer criteria o f distinguishing qualities or features one would 
expect a special relationship to embody, and here Alex Danchev’s volume on 
‘specialness’ is particularly instructive.11 The first attribute is ‘transparency* which 
implies openness in the interaction between decision-making processes of the two 
governments. For example, it would be assumed that one state would not take significant 
international action in the absence of consultation, if not agreement, with the other. The 
second is ‘informality’, which creates a feeling of casualness and ease in relations 
between the representatives of each state. Informality is also a product of personal 
interaction and will fluctuate in accordance with the chemistry and understanding 
between the individuals involved. However, the overriding essence o f the relationship 
will be one of familiarity between the official representatives of the two governments. 
This leads on to the third and perhaps the most fundamental and unique characteristic of a 
special relationship that of ‘access,’ where the official representatives of each country 
enjoy unprecedented privileged access to the highest echelons of the other. Through 
official governmental ties, personal associations between government members and
8 See The Economist. September 29th 2001, p. 6, for a discussion of the contemporary special relationship 
between Britain and the US.
9 Quoted in Danchev, op.cit. p. 7.
10 Ibid.. p. 7.
11 In On Specialness Danchev presents a list o f ten criteria he believes a special relationship would adhere 
to. 1. Transparency, 2. Informality, 3. Generality, 4. Reciprocity, 5. Exclusivity, 6. Clandestinity, 7. 
Reliability, 8. Durability, 9. Potentiality, 10. Mythicizabiity. He does not elaborate or define these terms 
and the definitions are my own.
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transnational associations, each secures direct access to the leaders and chief decision­
makers of the other, bypassing the official bureaucratic process. The fourth attribute is 
that of ‘generality,’ in the sense that the relationship encompasses more than one area. 
For example, the US may have accorded China special status as a trading nation but this 
attribute of ‘specialness’ is strictly limited to the economic sphere. In contrast, Britain 
receives ‘special’ treatment in economic, diplomatic and military terms. The fifth 
criterion is that of ‘reciprocity’ whereby both states derive mutual benefits, either 
perceived or tangible, from the relationship. The sixth is ‘exclusivity,’ with the exact 
terms o f the relationship confined to the interaction between the two states and not 
broadened to include third parties. ‘Reliability’ is the seventh attribute, with both states 
able to depend on the support of the other in times of need or crisis. Britain was able to 
rely on US support during the Falklands War o f 1982 and Taiwan has relied on American 
support in its quest for independence from China. ‘Durability’ is the eighth attribute. For 
a relationship to be truly special it must endure across generations and cannot be a 
product o f a certain historical period, as this would make it purely a relationship of
1 "7convenience. The final attribute is ‘mythicisability.’ By this is meant the ability to 
create a legend concerning the origins and history of the relationship in order to justify 
the relationship and explain why it is special. This ‘myth’ must be unique to the two 
states in question and cannot be replicated in relations with another state.
As in any kind of relationship, whether or not those in the international sphere are to be 
regarded as more or less special, is a matter of subjective judgement. Evaluation 
explicitly or implicitly invites comparisons and in so doing makes reference to others. In 
1993 the American government inadvertently released a paper ranking states by 
‘importance to US interests’, according to a State Department study completed the 
previous year. The top ten states in order o f importance were Germany, France, Britain,
i ^
China, Japan, Russia, Mexico, Israel, Canada and Iraq. From this, it is evident that a 
country can be considered important, without being considered special. As Danchev 
notes, there are a bewildering variety o f cases. In relation to the US some claim
12 Ibid.. p. 7.
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specialness, Japan, as a result of Washington’s involvement in its post-war 
reconstruction. Others are bom in some sense special, for example, Israel, given 
Washington’s role in its legitimisation as a sovereign state. Some have specialness thrust 
upon them, as occurred with Germany following German reunification and its status as 
the most powerful member of the European Union. Some are special, it might be said, in 
spite of themselves, as in the case of Russia as the direct descendent of the Soviet Union 
and owner o f the world’s second largest nuclear arsenal. With Russia, the US has 
acquired what Coral Bell refers to as an ‘adversary partnership.’14
If all the competing claimants to special status had their claims validated, then having a 
special relationship cannot be culturally specific. The special relationship is an exclusive 
Anglo-American ‘game’ no longer. It may be a game of governance, to coin Richard 
Neustadt’s term, but it is a game that anyone can play, as long as they have the right cards 
or attributes.15 Through diplomatic manoeuvring and balance o f power machinations, 
many lesser powers have sought to establish special relationships with the Great Powers 
by attempting to make their services indispensable, in a particular historical epoch. The 
Soviet relationship with Vietnam and the US relationship with Pakistan during the Cold 
War provide two such examples. But as in the case of many Cold War relationships they 
were for the most part the product of a particular historical imperative and have not 
survived the rationale for their creation. They were relationships o f mutual convenience 
or benefit and were not founded on a particular cultural or emotional affinity.
So far the analysis has examined the notion of the ‘special relationship’ in general terms. 
But what o f the relationship specifically between Israel and the United States? The 
Israeli analyst Abraham Ben-Zvi has attempted to explore this relationship be juxtaposing 
what he terms a ‘special relationship paradigm’ with a ‘national interest paradigm’, to try
13 Ibid.. p. 7.
14 Coral Bell, A Study in Diplomatic Management (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971) p. 21.
15 Richard Neustadt, Alliance Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970) p. 79.
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to isolate the elusive element of ‘specialness’.16 He claims that the key criteria for 
defining a special relationship are durability, pervasiveness and legitimacy. This means 
that the relationship must be able to withstand conflicts of interest and disagreements, 
encapsulate all aspects of interaction, be it diplomatic, economic or military and be 
widely accepted as justified and valid. The peculiar character of the US-Israeli 
relationship cannot in this view be understood solely in terms of instrumentality or 
realpolitik. As this thesis will show, neither balance of power considerations nor the 
power of the pro-Israel lobby in the US, will suffice to explain the nature and reciprocal 
interplay of US-Israeli relations. On the other hand, since Ben-Zvi implies that the 
parameters of the relationship are determined unilaterally and arbitrarily by the United 
States, thereby suggesting a hegemonic rather than a ‘special’ relationship, his analysis 
fails to explore fully the nature of the perceived advantages to both parties.
Nevertheless, much of his argument is extremely valuable because it demonstrates that 
international relationships can be both special and unequal. Parity is not a pre-requisite 
for specialness, especially if one believes in a place for sentiment or cultural influence in 
international affairs. Even an ardent realist like Henry Kissinger acknowledged that the 
special relationship between Britain and the US involved “a pattern o f consultation so 
matter-of-factly intimate that it became psychologically impossible to ignore British 
views.”17 Under these circumstances, power and influence can be wielded in different 
forms and to different ends. As long as the United States is included in any equation of a 
‘special relationship,’ parity, in terms of pure economic and military power, will be non-
I ftexistent. The closest approximation o f parity the United States has experienced in its 
more recent history was that which it shared with Britain between 1941-42. In March 
1941, although war was nine months away, the Lend-Lease Act was a public 
announcement of the creation of the most productive and co-operative coalition of
16 Abraham Ben-Zvi, The United States and Israel (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) pp. 12- 
27.
17 Henry A. Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979) p. 90 cited in Dumbrell, 0 £. 
cit. p. 9.
1!i While the gap between American economic power and that of Germany and Japan has narrowed and 
economic interdependence has increased reducing states autonomy, American remains the worlds pre­
eminent economic power.
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modem times -  the Anglo-American alliance against Nazi Germany.19 America’s 
potential was much greater than that of Britain, but even US decision-makers 
acknowledged that this potential would take time to realise. America, as a great power, 
had gone to war in a state of comprehensive unreadiness, in contrast to the well organised 
and experienced but under resourced British. The British and Americans needed each
9 0other to ease their respective burdens. Their respective contributions, if not equal, were
complementary and necessary. It was a symbiotic relationship not so much that of patron
and client. London and Washington were interdependent and both parties knew it. Here
was reciprocity in action. “The perfect alliance would show equality of interest and
21commitment between the two parties, with a reciprocity of advantage” which the 
Anglo-American relationship did.
If we turn our attention to the case of the US and Israel, the relationship does not appear 
to embody the same reciprocity o f advantage. For all Jerusalem’s much advertised 
intransigence, it is a highly dependent relationship and one in which elements of a patron- 
client relationship exist. America has endowed Israel with many things, including the 
diplomatic support and international legitimacy that bestowed life itself. However, Israel 
is in the envious position of being considered both special and important by leading 
Washington officials and this has proved sufficient to prevent the relationship being 
determined unilaterally by the United States. That said, Israel is aware of the asymmetry 
in the relationship, and as a consequence, one constant theme has proliferated: the 
importance Jerusalem assigns to equating whenever possible what it sees as the best 
interests of Israel with those of the US. For example, following the terrorist attack on the 
World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in September 2001, Ariel Sharon, Israel’s prime 
minister tried to generate a feeling of shared threat with the US by referring to Arafat as
19 Warren F. Kimball, The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease. 1939-1941 (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 
1969) p. 241.
20 This statement is based on the assumption that without Lend-Lease the British would have been too 
under-resourced to finance the war effort, while the Americans were too inexperienced and ill-prepared to 
lead the Allied forces single handedly. Lend-Lease provided a solution to Britain’s dollar crisis by, in 
Roosevelt’s words, “leaving out the dollar mark in the form of a dollar debt and substituting for a 
gentlemen’s obligation to repay in kind.” Ibid.. p. 121.
21 Danchev op. cit. p. 11.
13
Israel’s Osama bin Laden22 and highlighting Islamic terrorism as their mutual enemy. 
Despite great disparities in states power, the character of a special relationship cannot be 
imposed or determined unilaterally. Since it is not a divine gift bestowed by one party or 
a sacred right that a state can acquire. “It is a process -  a process of interaction, laced 
with expectation.”
Within international relations expectations are crucial. “There are great possibilities for 
strain and disappointment in a special relationship,” but as John Sloan Dickey writes in 
his work on US-Canadian relations, “nothing is resented quite so much as the unfulfilled 
expectations of being consulted.”24 Successive Israeli governments have stirred such 
resentment amongst many American presidents. As will be shown, President Reagan’s 
anger at the Israeli bombing of Osiraq, the Iraqi nuclear reactor, the annexation of the 
Golan Heights and the siege of West Beirut, stemmed in part from resentment that
yc
Israel’s Prime Minister Menachem Begin had not consulted him before acting. A 
willingness to accept criticism and ultimately to be open to influence, a situation that 
implies a form of transparency, is the exacting requirement o f any special relationship. It 
is a requirement Israel is reluctant to yield. Yet despite the opportunities for tension in 
the relationship, there are limits beyond which neither side will push the other, 
particularly when the vital interests of one o f the parties are at stake. For example, during 
the last weeks of September 2001, when the vital interests of the United States were 
understood to be challenged by Islamic terrorism, Israel under immense pressure from 
Washington, agreed to a cease-fire with the Palestinians.26 This occurred not because 
Israel had reached a new understanding with the Palestinian Authority (PA), but because 
Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Prime Minister, acknowledged that Israel could not “afford to 
cross the United States in its hour of need and peril.27 Yet despite concessions of this
22 The Economist 22 September 2001, p. 61.
23 Danchev op. cit. p. 12.
24 John Sloan Dickey, Canada and the American Presence (New York: New York University Press, 1975) 
p. 189. North America’s first encounter with Jews occurred in early September 1654, when twenty-three of 
them arrived at the settlement of the New Netherlands on Manhattan Island. Peter Grose, Israel in the 
Mind of America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983) p. 3.
25 See chapter six for a full account of these events.
26 The Economist 22 September 2001, p. 61.
27 Ibid.. p. 61.
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nature, the US-Israeli relationship is not one of “unremitting and absolute American
28domination,” as was demonstrated by Israel’s subsequent incursions into PA territory in 
and after November 2001.29
The apparent disparity of power between the two states leads to the question o f influence 
in the relationship, its nature and its exercise. Professor Alvin Rubinstein has suggested 
the following definition of influence: “Influence is manifested when country A affects, 
through non-military means, directly or indirectly, the behaviour o f country B so that it 
rebounds to the advantage o f A.”30 States engage in multifaceted efforts to affect the 
policies of others, both friends and adversaries, with varying degrees o f success at 
different times. Influence is rarely forceful and open in nature but more often is 
exercised through subtle means. It is not proportionate to power, in terms of the ability to 
use military force, but is an element in the relations between two states. It can be argued 
that a relationship, though profoundly asymmetrical, can embody mutuality.31
It is the contention of this thesis that the term a ‘special relationship’ does indeed 
characterise and describe the nature of the relationship as developed between the US and 
Israel since the establishment of Israel in 1948. This is reflected in the disproportionate 
and positive attention American candidates for public office give Israel in their campaign 
rhetoric and the platforms adopted by the leading US parties acknowledging a special 
status for the Jewish state. For example, the Republican Party platform o f 1992 referred 
to “Israel’s demonstrated strategic importance to the United States, as our most reliable 
and capable ally in” the Middle East. The Democratic Party manifesto of the same year, 
acknowledged that: “The end of the Cold War does not alter America’s deep interest in 
our longstanding special relationship with Israel, based on shared values, a mutual
2X Dumbrell, op. cit. p. 13.
29 The Economist 8 December 2001, p. 57.
30 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Policy Toward Turkey. Iran and Afghanistan: The Dynamics of Influence 
(New York: Praeger, 1982), p. viii. If a military threat, tacit or otherwise, was required for country A to 
force country B to comply, this would be referred to as force not influence.
31 Dumbrell, op. cit. p. 8.
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commitment to democracy, and a strategic alliance that benefits both nations.”32 Vice- 
President Walter Mondale went so far as to claim, in 1978 that:
So long as America believes in its own professed ideals, there will always be a special 
relationship... There is no country anywhere in the world which more accurately reflects our basic 
values. [It is] the values that we hold in common which accounts for the special relationship.33 
In turn, Israeli prime ministers have also been quick to acknowledge their country’s 
special relationship with the US. In his 1992 inauguration speech, Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin commented that:
Sharing with us in the making of peace will also be the United States, whose friendship and special 
closeness we prize. We shall spare no effort to strengthen and improve the special relationship we 
have with the one power in the world.34 
Similarly, when Ehud Barak became Israel’s prime minister in 1998, he also spoke of his 
commitment to strengthening “[t]he special relationship between Israel and the United
35States.” In contrast to the rhetoric of many American statesmen, it is significant that the 
dominant Israeli view of the relationship is the ‘functionalist’ one, based on the need to 
justify Israel’s value to the US in concrete not sentimental terms. However, an 
interesting argument exists to the effect that very powerful nations share one luxury with 
very weak ones: they are able to indulge cultural preferences beyond immediate 
interests.36
If we lay aside the rhetoric of eminent statesmen and analyse the reality of US-Israeli 
relations, we can examine whether they embody the attributes of a special relationship as 
previously discussed. The first attribute that of ‘transparency’ is apparent in 
Washington’s dealings with Jerusalem, although this level of openness has on occasions 
not been reciprocated. Washington consulted closely with Jerusalem about its strategy 
for confronting the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and during its operations in Afghanistan.
32 Quoted in Reich Securing the Covenant p. 5.
33 Vice President Walter Mondale at the American Jewish Committee, New York, 18 May 1978. Emphasis 
in the original.
34 Embassy of Israel, Washington, D.C., For Your Information. “Presentation of the New Government: 
Address before Knesset by Prime Minister Designate Yitzhak Rabin, 13 July 1992.”
35 BBC Monitoring Middle East. 27 July 1999.
36 Dumbrell, op. cit. p. 12.
37 Bush stated that he was “in close touch with the key players there [in Israel] in terms of our objectives.” 
Public Papers of the Presidents: George Bush. 1990 (Washington, 1992) 8 November 1990, p. 1584.
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This element of transparency is most notable in the covert operations the two 
governments have engaged in, both in Central America and the Middle East, of which the 
Iran Contra affair is the most highly publicised. This involved the covert transfer of 
American military equipment to Iran, a country against which Washington had imposed
1 o
sanctions, in exchange for the release o f US hostages held in Iran. Israel acted as the 
intermediary in dealings between Washington and Tehran.
‘Informality’ is apparent at all levels of interaction between US and Israeli officials. 
Many American presidents have formed close personal relationships with Israeli prime 
ministers including Lyndon Johnson and Levi Eshkol and Bill Clinton and Yitzhak 
Rabin. Israel also enjoys unprecedented privileged ‘access’ to the highest echelons of the 
American decision-making elite, bypassing the official bureaucratic process. In 1971 
President Nixon established a special channel of communication between his National 
Security Council Advisor Henry Kissinger and Yitzhak Rabin, at that time Israeli 
ambassador to Washington, that bypassed state department officials.39 In 1991, during 
the Gulf War, President George Bush established a direct channel of communication 
between himself and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir that bypassed the bureaucracy.40
‘Generality’ is another attribute of the US-Israeli relationship. Aid to Israel is not limited 
to the military sphere and Jerusalem has been the recipient o f unprecedented amounts of 
financial assistance, including $10 billion in loan guarantees to settle Soviet Jews in 
1992. Israel also receives considerable economic benefit through its status as a favoured 
trading nation. The two governments have also collaborated in the area of research and 
development and on 15 March 1993, President Clinton and Prime Minister Rabin
38 For a detailed discussion of the Iran-Contra affair see Jonathan Marshall, Peter Dale Scott & Jane Hunter, 
The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in the Reagan Era (Montreal & New 
York: Black Rose Books, 1987) and Lawrence E. Walsh, Iran-Contra: The Final Report (New York: Times 
Books, 1994).
39 Author’s interview with Peter W. Rodman: Member of the National Security Council staff and a special 
assistant to Henry Kissinger 1969-1977.
40 A hot line was established between the Pentagon Crisis Situation Room and the Israeli Defence Ministry 
in Tel Aviv. Avi Shlaim, a professor at Oxford University, claimed that the hot line provided a significant 
inducement for Israel to maintain a low profile and to closely co-operate with the United States throughout 
the crisis. Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York & London: W.W. Norton & 
Co., 2000) p. 477.
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announced the establishment of a US-Israeli Science and Technology Commission, 
designed to increase cooperation in science, technology and conversion programmes.41
The fifth criterion, that of ‘reciprocity’, is perhaps the hardest to discern. The US 
government clearly believes that it receives benefits from its relationship with Israel, but 
these are intangible, as a monetary price tag cannot be assigned, for example, to having a 
democratic ally in the region, in contrast to the tangible economic and military rewards 
Israel derives from its association with America. ‘Exclusivity’ is an unquestionable facet 
of the relationship, with no other state enjoying the same level o f commitment or 
intimacy as Washington and Jerusalem receive from each other. ‘Reliability’ is the 
seventh attribute of the relationship and has been demonstrated by both US and Israeli 
governments in their dealings with each other. Washington has assisted Israel in military, 
economic and diplomatic terms both during and after each of its wars with the Arab 
states. In return, Washington was able to call on Jerusalem not to retaliate against Iraqi 
‘Scud’ missile attacks on its territory in 1991 and to withdraw from Palestinian land, 
albeit temporarily, in 2001. In the diplomatic sphere, each government can rely on the 
other to vote with them in international institutions like the United Nations. ‘Durability’ 
is another element o f the relationship, with government and transnational ties 
transcending the generations and different political alignments. The final attribute, that 
o f ‘mythicisability’ includes the creation of a shared religious and moral history, to be 
detailed below, and the belief in a common destiny.
It is evident from this analysis that US-Israeli relations are in many respects special. But 
such relationships do not materialise in a vacuum and come about because of a 
confluence of circumstances. In the case of the roles between the two countries under 
discussion, there are significant religious, historical, political and sociological factors that 
account for such a relationship, that this chapter will now explore.
The Religious Foundations of the American-Jewish Relationship
41 Reich Securing the Covenant p. 101.
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In the eighteenth century a number of notable American figures began to speculate on the 
possibility and desirability of the re-establishment of a Jewish state in former Palestine. 
Such posturing stemmed not so much from political considerations as from the religious 
beliefs of the Pilgrim Fathers. American support of Jewish aspirations constitutes a well- 
defined national policy the roots of which are discernible in the early history o f the 
settlements in the New World. Jewish influence expressed itself predominantly through 
the Hebrew scriptures because the “Englishmen who established themselves in the New 
World were the most Orthodox Puritans, whose intellectual language consisted of a 
system ardently Hebraic.”42 When Harvard was founded in 1639, Hebrew was a 
compulsory subject, with a scholar’s ability to translate the Hebrew original of the Bible 
into Latin a pre-requisite for admission.
This intense respect for the Old Testament led to a high regard for the Holy Land itself. 
The United States was founded as “New Canaan”43 and many towns given Hebrew 
names or named after Biblical places. The early pilgrims thought o f America as the 
“Biblical prophecy come to life.”44 As a determining factor in present day US-Israeli 
relations the American/Hebrew/Old Testament/modem Israel connection should not be 
pushed too far, but neither should it be dismissed. It would be foolish to argue that the 
United States supported the restoration o f Jewish sovereignty merely because many of its 
more educated Christian citizens studied Hebrew several centuries ago. However it 
would be equally misguided not to recognise that the Hebrew/Old Testament element in 
America’s intellectual history provided the foundations in which US support for the 
modem Jewish state originated, particularly among American Christians45 Many 
American clergymen today continue to include references to Old Testament images and 
metaphors in their sermons. The same was true of their ancestors during the founding
42 Vernon Lewis Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought: An interpretation of American literature 
from the beginnings to 1920 (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1930)
43 Author’s interview with David Bar-Ilan: Israeli Director of Communications.
44 Ibid.
45 Edward Glick, The Triangular Confrontation: America. Israel and American Jews (London, Boston & 
Sydney: George, Allen & Unwin, 1982) p. 22.
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and consolidation of the state.46 The colonial connection vis-a-vis Great Britain was 
compared with that of the slaves in ancient Egypt and the struggle against the King 
George III was likened with that of Moses against the Pharaoh.47 When the Founding 
Fathers were discussing the seal of the United States, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin 
Franklin and John Adams went so far as to submit a design depicting the Israelites 
crossing the Red Sea.48 Preaching on 4 July 1777, William Gordon argued that as the 
Hebrew tribes were driven to rebellion by the tyranny of Solomon’s son King Rehoboam, 
so the thirteen colonies were driven to the same action by the tyranny of the British 
sovereign King George III.49
In a Sermon of 1779 entitled Traits o f  Resemblance in the People o f  the United States o f  
America to Ancient Israel, Reverend Abiel Abbot argued that no country in the late 
eighteenth century was so much like ancient Israel as was the US. According to Abbot, 
the two resembled each other in their happiness, in their distinctiveness from other 
nations, and in their having been favoured with divine presence, divine providence and 
divine protection from their enemies. Abbot counselled his countrymen to think o f the 
new American nation as a New Zion and to conduct their lives in accordance with the 
principles of the Gospels.50 The theory that the American Indians represented the Lost 
Tribes of Israel stirred up the imagination of the early settlers.51 The last verse of Isaiah 
18 reads:
At that time tribute shall be brought to the Lord of Hosts from a people tall and smooth-skinned, 
dreaded near and far, a nation strong and proud, whose land is scoured by rivers. They shall bring it 
to Mount Zion, the place where men invoke the name o f the Lord of Hosts.
46 Ellis Sendoz, (ed.), Political Sermons of the American Founding Era. 1730-1805 (Indianapolis: Liberty 
Press, 1991) provides accounts o f sermons during the independence period that highlight the perceived 
similarities between the United States and Israel.
47 Samuel Langdon, The Republic of the Israelites: An Example to the American States sermon reprinted in 
Ibid.. pp. 941-68 and Grose, op. cit. p. 5.
48 Glick, op. cit. pp. 22-23.
49 Ibid.. p. 23.
50 Ibid.. p. 23.
51 Grose, op. cit. p. 3 claims that the Lost Tribes had been an obsession with medieval Christendom since 
their abandonment by history in 722 B.C.. It was believed that with their rediscovery would come 
redemption for all mankind; Reuben Fink, America and Palestine (New York: Herald Square Press, Inc., 
1945) p. 14.
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Ethan Smith, a minister of the time, believed that America was the land to which Isaiah 
was referring and that the people were the American Indians. Smith spun a web that 
enmeshed the Lost Tribes, American Indians, the US, the dispersion of the Jews and their 
predestined return to Zion and the Prophet Isaiah. These works related the Judeo- 
Christian history and theology to the American condition. The equation of America with 
Israel and the idea of the ‘American Israel’ was not uncommon. Smith’s work differed 
from other Ministers of the time in that he added a political dimension by advocating the 
bodily return of the Jewish people, presumably in full sovereignty, to the actual 
geographical area of the Middle East.
America is not unique in having members o f its Protestant clergy that make references to 
the Old Testament and draw parallels between biblical prophecy and contemporary life. 
The distinctive aspect of the American experience is that the US was portrayed as biblical 
prophecy come to life in a way that implied that Israel and America were one and the 
same and uniquely blessed by God. The core metaphor o f its exceptionalism as the 
Chosen People o f the New World knowingly imitated the Biblical saga.53 These Jewish 
Biblical teachings shaped the development o f self-governing institutions introducing 
religious freedom, and the evolution o f the legal codes of the thirteen colonies. As 
Woodrow Wilson acknowledged:
Not a little o f the history of liberty lies in the circumstances that the moving sentences of this Book 
[the Bible] were made familiar to the ears and the understanding of those people who had led 
mankind in exhibiting the forms of government and impulses of reforms which have made freedom 
and self-government among mankind.54
It is a matter of historic record that in the struggle for ratification of the constitution by 
the legislatures of the various states, the Bible again played a decisive role, with the 
proponents of the constitution repeatedly invoking the scriptures when pleading their 
cause.
52 Robert Bellah, “Civil Religion in America” in David McLellan (ed.), Political Christianity: A Reader 
(Wiltshire: Redwood Books, 1997) p. 98.
53 WP 15 May 1994, p. X6.
54 Quoted in Fink, op. cit. p. 14.
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presidential interest in the cause of Jewish National Restoration dates back to John 
Adams, the second president of the United States. Although not in office at the time, in 
1819 John Adams responded to a letter from a Jewish citizen thus:
If I could let my imagination loose ... I could find it my heart to wish that you had been at the head 
of a hundred thousand Israelites ... marching with them into Judea and making a conquest o f that 
country and restoring your nation to the dominion of it. For I really wish the Jews again in Judea an 
independent nation.”55
It was the idealised Jew of Scripture, not the contemporary reality that inspired the early 
Americans.56 Gentiles like Adams were grinding a Christological axe on a Judaic stone. 
The Jews’ return to Palestine was seen as a theological precondition for the latter’s 
conversion to Christianity and the Second Coming of Christ.57 From this arose the 
enduring theme of American social history, concerning the redemption of all mankind. A 
vision of the special role of America in Jewish destiny emerged with constant 
connections between modem Palestine and modem Jewry consolidating the 
psychological foundations for the later Christian acceptance of the modem state of 
Israel.58 To this day, American Evangelists perceive their own salvation as inextricably 
interwoven with Jewish claims to the promised land because the creation of Israel is a 
pre-requisite for the salvation of God’s Chosen People.
The Historical Foundations of the American-Jewish Relationship
The United States’ entrance into the First World War was accompanied in political 
circles by a debate about the fate and future of the oppressed nationalities. To a certain 
extent the problem of Palestine, that of creating an independent state from the territory of
55 Quoted in Moshe Davis (ed.), With Eves Towards Zion (New York: Amo Press, 1977) p. 9.
56 Grose, op. cit. p. 6.
57 Jewish nationalists often omit the remainder of Adams text: “Once restored to an independent 
government and no longer persecuted they would soon wear away some of the asperities and peculiarities 
of their character, possibly in time become liberal Unitarian Christians.” Quoted in Ibid.. p. 6.
58 Glick, op. cit. p. 27.
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the defeated Ottoman empire, was classified along with that of Poland, Czechoslovakia 
and other newly formed nations. However the British Government, aware of the 
favourable view Washington took of the establishment of a Jewish National home in 
Palestine, sought President Wilson’s advice in finalising the terminology of the Balfour 
Declaration that set out Britain’s position on this question. The Balfour Declaration 
stated that
His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for 
the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it 
being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious 
rights o f existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by 
Jews in any other country.59
The Balfour Declaration was not in fact or in intent a unilateral statement o f policy. 
Balfour himself saw it as a declaration of sympathy for Jewish Zionist aspirations but not 
as a British commitment to the establishment of a Jewish state. Washington participated 
in the preparation of the declaration and every American president since Woodrow 
Wilson has endorsed it. The Declaration received the approval o f all the Allied 
Governments at the Versailles Peace Conference and Wilson registered his formal 
endorsement in a letter addressed to the American Zionist leader Rabbi Stephen S. Wise 
on 29 October 1918.60
The US was prevented from participating in the Allied Conference at San Remo in April 
1920 that was convened to deal with the disposition of territory conquered from Turkey. 
This was because Congress refused Wilson’s petition to join the League o f Nations and 
because the US had not declared war on Turkey but had only severed diplomatic 
relations. In April 1920, Great Britain was awarded the Mandate over Palestine, based on 
the terms of the Balfour Declaration. However, the US claimed that her participation in 
the war entitled her to some privileges in the disposition of enemy territory including that 
for Palestine, even though opposition from Congress prevented the US from joining the
59 Quoted in Fink, op. cit. p. 432.
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League. Britain accepted American claims in a 1924 treaty and effectively gave 
Washington the formal right to intervene in matters relating to the territory.61 
Washington’s attitude towards Palestine and Zionist and Arab objectives was indicated in 
the section on Palestine in a Report and Recommendations62 officially submitted to 
President Wilson and to the American Delegation at the Versailles Peace Conference in 
1919. The report recommended that,
There be established a separate State of Palestine. The separation of the Palestinian area from Syria 
finds justification in the religious experience of mankind, the Jewish and Christian churches were 
bom in Palestine and Jerusalem was for long years at different periods the capital of each. ... It is 
recommended that the Jews be invited to return to Palestine and to settle there. It [Palestine] was 
the cradle and home of their vital race, which has made large spiritual contributions to mankind, and 
is the only land in which they can hope to find a home of their own; they being in this respect 
unique among significant people.63
Taking advantage of the growing interest in Zionism, the Zionist Organisation of 
America, on 11 June 1918, addressed a letter to all Members and Representatives of the 
United States Senate and the House of Representatives requesting their opinion on the 
Zionist question. Most Senators and Representatives indicated that their support of the 
Balfour declaration was based on the belief that the Jews were entitled to the same 
national rights enjoyed by other peoples, including the Arabs. The statement of 
Representative William E. Cox of Indiana is characteristic:
For more than thirty centuries unique and alone Judea has stood among the countries o f the globe.
A nation’s greatness is not measured by its gold, its numbers, ... but it is determined by its ideals, 
by which it has stood, and the benefits it has conferred on mankind such as Judea has stood for. 
Rome taught mankind a government of law, ... but it remained for Judea and her people to give 
mankind the true Christian religion. These ideals and teachings given to searching mankind makes 
Judea and her people the greatest on earth. ... But just as Moses has led the Israelites out of 
bondage, so the Allies are now redeeming Judea.64
60 Ibid.. p. 32.
61 Ibid.. p. 57.
62 The report was prepared by the research group appointed by President Wilson to prepare material and 
recommendations for the American Delegation at the Versailles Peace Conference.
63 Ibid.. p. 34.
64 Fink, op. cit. p. 38.
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In early 1922 the House of Lords rejected claims that Jewish rights to Palestine should be 
recognised according to the terms of the Balfour Declaration and in so doing challenged 
Zionist perceptions of the British commitment to a Jewish homeland. Having lost 
politically in London, by failing to secure the Lords ratification of the Mandate over 
Palestine, and therefore Jewish rights to the land of Palestine, the Zionists turned their 
attention towards Washington. They reasoned that the official recognition of the 
Palestine Mandate by the American Congress would stabilise the situation and began to 
refocus their campaign on the US Congress and Senate. This change of strategy was 
rewarded on 12 April 1922, when Senator Henry Cabot Lodge o f Massachusetts, as 
Chairman of the Committee for Foreign Relations of the Senate, introduced a Joint 
Resolution that was reported back to the Committee on 3 May 1922 stating that it is:
Resolved by the Senate and House of representatives o f the United States of America in Congress 
assembled, that the United States of America favours the establishment in Palestine of a national 
home for Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice 
the civil and religious rights of Christians and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and 
that the holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine shall; be adequately protected.65
This ‘enhanced Balfour Declaration’ was more favourable to Israel than the original 
document66 and was adopted unanimously by the Senate. Simultaneously with this, 
Representative Hamilton Fish, a Member o f the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives, introduced a Joint Resolution in the House of Representatives 
on 18 April and another on 19 April, both o f which were referred to the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the House. The Committee held public hearings on 19, 20 and 21 
April 192267 and on 30 June 1922, the House unanimously adopted the Resolution. The 
Senate unanimously adopted a similar Resolution on 3 June 1922. Known as the Lodge- 
Fish Resolution, it was passed unanimously by both Houses of Congress. On 14 
September it was signed by the Speaker of the House and on 21 September by President
65 Cited in Ibid.. p. 41.
66 Author’s interview with David Bar-Ilan.
67 Fink, op. cit. P. 41.
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Harding. Thus as early as 1922 the United States formally endorsed the principle of the
creation o f a Jewish state in Palestine and in that sense United States support of Israel had
68begun. Yet as former Ambassador Richard Murphy points out, this was a passing event 
in American constitutional history and it would have been too far seeing for Congress to 
have considered its establishment in practice.69 Soon after the event, the State 
Department issued a statement that the resolution “did not constitute a commitment to
70any foreign obligation or entanglement.”
In June 1924, Harding’s successor, Calvin Coolidge, added his name to the list of 
American Presidents supportive of Zionist aspirations for a Jewish state and was followed 
by Herbert Hoover in 1929.71 After completing his term in office, Hoover put forward 
the most radical proposal of any American president for the future o f Palestine, publicly 
stating that he was in favour of resettling Palestine’s Arabs in Iraq to make way for a
77Jewish homeland. This plan was significant for two reasons. Firstly, because it reveals 
the true depth of feeling this issue provoked and secondly because it was proposed by a 
non-Jewish former American president who was no longer subject to the imperatives of 
electioneering and had never been personally involved in the Zionist movement.
The Holocaust and the Transformation of American Jewry
With the adoption of the Congressional Resolution advancing the Jewish cause in 
Palestine, American prestige and national interest became interwoven with British 
decisions as the Mandated power. The issuance of the last British White Paper on 17
68 See Paul. J. Hare, “Diplomatic Chronicles of the Middle East: A Biography of Raymond Hare,” 
(Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1993), p. 10 in Michael C. Hudson, “To Play the Hegemon: Fifty 
Years of US Policy Toward the Middle East,” Middle East Journal vol. 50, no. 3, Summer 1996, pp. 329- 
343.
69 Author’s interview with Richard Murphy: U.S. Ambassador to Syria 1974-78, to Saudi Arabia 1981-83 
and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 1983-89.
70 Hare, op. cit. p. 10
71 Hoover put forwarded this unique scheme, first published in an article on 19 November 1945 by the New 
York World-Telegram.
72 Glick, op. cit. p. 58.
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March 1939, limiting Jewish immigration to Palestine to 100,000, created tensions 
between the two governments. British and American Jews and members of Congress, 
thought that the Paper posed an immediate threat to the development of a Jewish National 
Home by withdrawing basic pledges and altering the conditions on which Jews had 
proceeded to rebuild the land and recreate their lives in Palestine. Congress protested the 
White Paper claiming that, “the contemplated action, if  carried out, will be regarded as a 
violation of the British-American convention and will be viewed with disfavour by the 
American people.”73
The White Paper, the Honourable Lyle H. Boren, Representative for Oklahoma claimed, 
was “an appeasement to the pro-Axis Moslems”74 and at the time it appeared that the 
imperatives of fighting a world war took priority over previous sentimental and 
humanitarian commitments to a Jewish homeland. A senior British official explained the 
situation to a Zionist leader in March 1941, “[t]hey [the Arabs] are not reliable but they 
are a power. It is true this is appeasement. Terrible as it is for you, you must take it in 
good part.”75 Ironically, when America entered the war in December 1941, political 
questions were subordinated to military considerations. The War Department adopted the 
cardinal tenet of the British government that the goodwill o f the Arabs was vital to the 
war effort.
The response of the Roosevelt administration to the Jews’ desperate need for sanctuary 
outside Europe was one of virtual inaction. Despite the emergence of concrete evidence 
and eyewitness accounts of the Nazi wholesale murder of European Jewry, US officials 
either refused to believe what they were told or to act upon these accounts. Roosevelt did 
nothing to assist the passage o f persecuted Jews out of Europe by either pressurising 
Britain to rescind the White Paper limiting Jewish immigration to Palestine or by pushing 
Congress to liberalise, if only temporarily, America’s then racist and anti-Semitic
73 Congressional Record. 25 May 1939. p. 6167.
74 Fink, op. cit. p. 181.
75 Quoted in Zvi Ganin, Truman. American Jewry and Israel. 1945-1948 (London & New York: Holmes & 
Meier Publishers Inc., 1979) p.7.
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immigration laws. In the 1930s, emigration quotas were determined according to ethnic
and religious origin and only a certain number of people of each nationality and religion
were permitted to enter the country. In April 1943, British and American representatives
met in Bermuda to discuss the refugee question, but as one British participant noted, the
talks were “ a conflict of self-justification [and] a facade for inaction.”76 Rarely did the
issue intrude on the correspondence between Churchill and Roosevelt and although it was
occasionally discussed, no decision was ever reached.77 The American president did not
do everything he could have done (at least before 1944) to release funds and transport to
save those Jewish lives that still could be saved.78 In his defence it should be noted that
even organised Zionism did not seriously contemplate the rescue of European Jewry79 as
a viable strategy. This lack o f concrete action was not matched by a lack of internal
debate about the Jewish question and by 1945 the Roosevelt administration had come up
with 666 possible sites around the globe for the resettlement of displaced Jews after the 
80war.
Like presidents from John Adams onwards, Roosevelt considered the fate o f the Holy 
Land out of all proportion to its geographic significance or its objective relation to the
O |
American national interest. He also suffered from the chronic propensity of politicians 
to say things that would be well received and in so doing courted the favour o f both 
Arabs and Jews in the debate over Palestine. During the early 1940s Roosevelt assured 
King ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia that he would “take no action, in my capacity as Chief 
Executive of the Executive Branch o f this government, which might prove hostile to the 
Arab people”82 and “do nothing to assist the Jews against the Arabs.”83 Yet in March
76 Warren F. Kimball, ed., Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence Vol. Ill (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984) p. 206. For a detailed discussion of the Jewish refugee question 
see Henry L. Feingold, Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt administration and the Holocaust. 1938-1945 
(New Brunswick, New Jersey.: Rutgers U.P., 1970).
77 FRUS. 1943. Washington, D.C. 1965, pp. 336-46.
78 Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1999) pp. 48-49 
and Glick, op. cit. pp. 59-60.
79 Novick, op. cit. p. 40.
80 Grose, op. cit. p. 130
81 Ibid.. p. 156.
82 Jim Bishop, FDR’s Last Year (New York: William Morrow Co. Inc., 1974) p. 545.
83 Ganin, op. cit. p. 17.
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1944, he stood on the White House steps with his personal friend Rabbi Stephen Wise 
together with Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, leader of the American Emergency Zionist 
Committee, and authorised them to issue a statement that “[T]he American government 
has never given its approval to the White Paper of 1939 ... When future decisions are
OA
reached, full justice will be done to those who seek a Jewish national home.” Perhaps 
Roosevelt accepted the Zionist position that the creation of a Jewish national home was 
not a ‘hostile move’ against the Arabs, but ibn Saud interpreted Roosevelt’s assurances 
differently. For the Saudi king, the immigration of one single Jew and the purchase of 
one dunam of Arab land by a Jew was a hostile act. Rabbi Wise was dismayed that 
Roosevelt could act in such a way, while simultaneously claiming that his position on 
Zionism had not changed. Only after Roosevelt’s death was the full extent of the duality 
of his Palestine policy revealed.
By macabre default, Hitler’s holocaust resulted in American Jewry becoming the largest 
Jewish community in the world, with its subsequent transformation into a political force 
occurring as a product of political necessity. While Zionist leaders across Europe were 
being slaughtered and those in Palestine were both co-operating with the British because 
of Hitler and in conflict with them because o f the White Paper, the locus of Zionist public 
relations and diplomatic activity shifted to the US. This shift was symbolised by the 
convening of an Extraordinary Zionist conference at New York’s Biltmore Hotel in May
Of
1942, organised by America’s four largest Zionist groups. The convention was the 
result of the efforts of Rabbi Wise and David Ben Gurion, then Chairman of the Jewish 
Agency, leader of the ruling Mapai party and dominant Jewish personality
Of
internationally, who later became the first prime minister of Israel. They had made 
numerous trips to the US in the early war years to begin the process of transforming the 
American Jewish community into a pro-Zionist pressure group.87
84 FRUS. 1944 Vol. V, Washington, D.C. 1965, p. 588.
85 These groups were the Zionist Organisation of America, Hadassah (the Women’s Zionist Organisation of 
America), the Mizrachi (the religious Zionists), and the Labour Zionists, who were closely tied to the 
socialist and kibbutz-oriented party that dominated the Jewish community of Palestine.
86 Joseph Heller, The Birth of Israel. 1945-49 (Florida: Florida University Press, 2000) p. 21.
87 Ganin op. cit. pp. 2-3.
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Despite their best efforts, it was not the minimalist tradition of pushing for relief 
measures for oppressed Jewry, whilst avoiding the awkward political question of 
statehood that proved successful. In establishing the American-Jewish Conference, Wise 
and Ben-Gurion paved the way for the ascendancy of Rabbi Hillel Silver to the leadership 
o f the American Zionist Emergency Council in the summer of 1943. It was Silver, a
oo
Lithuanian bom, fifth generation rabbi, raised in Cleveland, with the toughness o f a 
man who did not care whether or not he was liked, that brought the Jews of America to a 
position o f power. It was Silver who galvanised the deeply divided Zionist movement,89 
founded the lobby and made it work. He based his actions of on his belief that instead of 
relying on the good will o f American leaders, a mass power base of public opinion 
pressure should be created to persuade Roosevelt to respond favourably to Zionist 
demands.” On 1 September 1943, at the Biltmore conference, a declaration was 
unanimously adopted demanding that Palestine be established as a Jewish 
Commonwealth and integrated into the framework of what was envisaged as the new 
postwar democratic world.''0
In mobilising American Jewry, Silver had tapped into a very important political asset. 
His goal became the conversion of “a club of well intentioned but politically passive 
Zionist personalities into the nerve centre of a revolutionary programme with a mass 
following.”91 As Bernard Baruch, a leading American Jewish businessman, 
acknowledged:
The only thing which will matter in Washington ... is if the people in the Bronx and Brownsville 
and Borough Park begin to mutter in their beards, they’ll be damned if they continue to cast their 
votes to a party that breaks its pledges to them ... You let me have the Jewish vote o f New York and 
I will bring you the head of ibn Saud on a platter! The Administration will sell all seven Arab states
88 See Marc Lee Raphael, Abba Hillel Silver: A Profile in American Judaism (New York: Holmer & Meier, 
1989) Introduction for a detailed account of Silver’s early life and political beliefs.
89 Bruce Eversen, Truman. Palestine and the Press: Shaping Conventional Wisdom at the Beginning of the 
Cold War (New York, Connecticut & London: Greenwood Press, 1992) p. 50.
90 Heller, op. cit. pp. 21 -22, Eversen, op. cit. p. 51, Grose, op. cit. p. 169,
91 Grose, op. cit. p. 172.
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if  it is a question of retaining the support ... o f the Jews of New York alone; never mind the rest of 
the country.92
The efforts of American Zionists bore fruit in 1944, when they succeeded in forcing the 
issue of a Jewish state on to the agenda o f both political parties.93 In June and July, of 
that year, Silver and Neumann used the parties’ national conventions as a forum to test 
their strategy of encouraging Republican and Democratic competition for the Jewish 
vote. If the two national parties could be induced to vie for the Jewish vote through their 
stand on the Palestine question, then another force, Zionist political power -  a new form 
of bargaining power -  could be created. Their strategy was successful. The Republicans 
called for a “free and democratic Commonwealth” in Palestine, while the Democrats 
went even further by specifying that they favoured a “free and democratic Jewish 
Commonwealth.”94 As will be shown, from this moment on the political parties position 
on Israel became a key electoral issue, with the Democrats coming to be seen as the party 
of the American Jewish people. It was to be the Democratic President, Harry S. Truman, 
who pledged full recognition of the State o f Israel in July 1948.95
Truman and the Recognition of Israel
When on 12 April 1945, Roosevelt died in office, he left a question mark about his true 
feelings, intentions and actions towards the Jews, the Arabs and Palestine. It was left to 
Harry S. Truman his successor, to determine how far the US should go in helping to 
transform the Jewish national home into the Jewish commonwealth or the Jewish state.
92 Quoted in Grose, op. cit. p. 175.
93 Eversen, op. cit. P. 52.
94 Ganin. op. cit. p. 14.
95 FRUS, 1948,Vol. V, Washington, D.C. 1972, p. 26. Statement made by the Platform o f the Democratic 
Party, Approved by the Democratic Convention, Philadelphia, 14 July, 1948. “We pledge full recognition 
of the State of Israel. We affirm our pride that the United States, under the leadership o f President Truman, 
played a leading role in the adoption of the resolution of November 29, 1947, by the United Nations 
General Assembly for the creation of the Jewish state.”
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Truman’s first social and business associations with American Jews occurred in his 
hometown of Kansas City, where his business partner Eddie Jacobson was Jewish. His 
earliest political action involving the Palestine question dates back to 1939 when, as a 
Senator, Truman spoke briefly on the floor of the Senate against the White Paper. Later 
at the Potsdam conference, even though the question of Palestine was not on the official 
agenda, Truman took the opportunity to urge Churchill to lift the White Paper restrictions 
on Jewish immigration. In the summer o f 1945, Truman announced his support of the 
immigration of 100,000 displaced persons (DP) from Europe to Palestine.96
What moved Truman to take this position in contradiction to that of the State Department 
and press Britain on the issue of immigration is unclear. His stance is generally attributed 
to a combination of factors: the Holocaust, congressional pressure and the influence of 
his advisor Sam Rosenman pressing him in the same direction. Truman’s position, like 
that of so many presidents, was one of attempting to reconcile incompatible objectives 
and conflicting views. On the one hand, he was in favour of letting “as many of the Jews 
into Palestine as it is possible to let into that country” 97 but on the other, he was not 
prepared to use military force to back up his diplomatic position. As president, he had
Q O
“no desire to send 500,000 American soldiers ... to make peace in Palestine.”
In the spring of 1947 the British terminated their responsibility for Palestine and the 
matter was referred to the UN, where the partition plan was proposed.99 Two states, one 
Arab and one Jewish, were to be established and linked in economic union.100 Truman 
instructed the State Department to support the partition plan and the US played an active
96 Heller, op. cit. p. 22.
97 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs Vol. II, (Signet Books: New York, 1965) p. 136.
9“ Ibid.. p. 136.
99 The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was created as a discussion forum for 
matters relating to Palestine.
100 On 29 November 1947, this proposal was adopted by the UN General Assembly by a vote of 33 to 13 
with 10 abstentions.
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role in seeking the support of other governments.101 In his memoirs, Truman described 
American policy in the following terms:
My purpose was then and later to help bring about the redemption of the pledge of the Balfour 
Declaration and the rescue of at least some of the victims of Nazism. I was not committed to any 
particular formula of statehood in Palestine or to any particular time schedule for its 
accomplishment. The American policy was designed to bring about, by peaceful means, the 
establishment of the promised Jewish homeland and easy access to it for the displaced Jews of 
Europe.102
This raised the usual problem of interpretation. Many Jews believed that Washington’s 
Palestine policy was the same as the Zionist policy and when it failed to conform, leading 
British and American Jews claimed that the US had turned pro-Arab.
Partition was met with such violent confrontations on the ground that many governments 
reevaluated their position on the issue and sought alternative solutions. The American 
retreat from partition occurred in response to the findings of the National Security 
Council (NSC) on the question of “the implication of current UN discussion of the 
problem of Palestine on the security interests o f the US.”103 The review concluded that 
“partition ... cannot be carried out at this time by peaceful means. We could not 
undertake to impose this solution on the people of Palestine by the use o f American 
troops.”104 The thought of sending American troops to the Middle East to fight the 
Arabs, a move that would have legitimised the deployment of Soviet troops to the region 
as part o f an international contingent, was anathema to the State Department and 
Pentagon. Kermit Roosevelt, the brother of FDR, went so far as to claim that “the 
creation of a Jewish state in the Middle East [was] not compatible with America’s 
national interest.”105
101 Truman, op. cit. pp. 183-84.
102 Ibid.. p. 157.
103 FRUS. 1947 Vol. V. Washington, D.C. 1972, p. 1283.
104 FRUS. 1948 Vol. V. p. 666.
,os Quoted in Ganin, op. cit. pp. 150-154. In response to the failure of partition, on 19 March 1948,
Ambassador Austin, US representative to the UN Security Council proposed a temporary trusteeship for
Palestine to restore public order. It is unclear whether Truman had prior knowledge of Austin’s 
announcement and evidence suggests he was not as surprised as he later made out. According to Clark 
Clifford, the White House Special Counsel, Truman had agreed to the trusteeship proposal under three
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Such a statement raised the question of who determines the national interest in the United 
States. Was it legitimate for ethnic or religious groups whose perception of the national 
interest differed from that o f the Executive to attempt to influence foreign policy 
decision-making? American Zionists believed the establishment o f a Jewish state was 
compatible with the US national interest and viewed domestic politics as moving hand in 
hand with foreign policy. Pressure exerted on the White House and the United Nations 
by the Zionist lobby was a source o f annoyance to Truman, and he eventually refused to 
meet with Zionist leaders. It was the influence exercised by his old business partner 
Eddie Jacobson that convinced Truman to receive Dr. Chaim Weizmann, head of the 
World Zionist Commission, and to hear his petition for a Jewish homeland. It is likely 
that Weizmann’s worth in the eyes o f Truman was enhanced by the fact that his trusted 
friend Jacobson had arranged the meeting.
With the failure of partition, the initiative moved out of the hands o f the Great Powers 
and to the local parties themselves. It was in the context of reported violence and chaos 
on the ground in Palestine that on 14 May 1948, Ben Gurion declared the existence of the 
State o f Israel. Twelve minutes later at 6:12 P.M., Truman, in his capacity as President 
o f the United States became the first foreign leader to accord the state recognition. The 
extending of de facto  (though not de jure)106 recognition to the State o f Israel was taken 
against the advice of his advisers and the Departments o f State and War, including that of 
General Marshall, the American war hero who Truman greatly respected.107 Clark 
Clifford, the White House Special Counsel was reportedly the only cabinet minister in 
favour of recognition.108 Professional bureaucrats considered that overt support for a 
Jewish state would be detrimental to America’s strategic and political interests in the oil
qualifications: firstly that the conciliatory machinery o f the Security Council had been completely 
exhausted, secondly that the Council itself must then vote to propose an alternative to partition and thirdly 
that the Council must vote to reject partition altogether. The president’s qualifications did not appear in 
Austin’s statement.
106 See FRUS. 1948 Vol V, pp. 82-83. The Soviet Union extended de jure recognition to Israel on 18 May 
1948. The US refused to grant de jure  recognition until Israel held its first democratic elections.
107 Eversen, op. cit. p. 164.
108 Author’s interview with David Bar-Ilam
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rich Arab world and that Washington could be called upon to back up its support o f Israel 
with force.
Uncertainty surrounds the reasons for Truman’s decision to recognise Israel. David Bar-
Ilan, the Israeli Minister of Communications for the Netanyahu government, argues that
the decision was “not done just as a matter of course but as an expression of
friendship.”109 Clark Clifford, and Dean Acheson both claimed that Truman’s long-held
humanitarian concern for Jewish refugees in Europe110 and horror at the scale of the
Holocaust played a role.111 He was genuinely distressed by the plight of the millions the
war had left homeless and particularly the Jews who had no homeland to which they
could return. Truman believed that the Balfour Declaration committed Britain, and by
implication America, to the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. He was also a
112“student and believer in the Bible,” and religion undoubtedly played a role in his 
decision. From his reading of the Old Testament he believed the Je ws derived a
I I
legitimate historical right to Palestine.
Emotional considerations aside, evidence suggests that Truman’s political concern had to 
be aroused before he would take decisive action.114 The catalyst for Truman’s decision 
appears to have been the views of David K. Niles, adviser on national minorities. Niles 
appreciated the domestic political dimension of the Jewish question and sought to exploit 
Truman’s position as President to the advantage of the Democrat party. As party leader, 
the President was expected to help congressmen, senators and governors of his party 
secure re-election. Niles informed Truman that his opponent Governor Dewey intended 
to issue “a strong statement in favour of Jewish immigration” 115 and urged him to “beat 
Dewey to the punch because the Jewish vote in New York was going to be crucial.”116
109 Ibid..
110 Truman, op. cit. p. 154.
1.1 Truman, op. cit. p. 132.
1.2 Clark Clifford with Richard Holbrooke, Counsel to the President: A Memoir (New York: Random 
House, 1991) pp. 7-8.
113 Ibid.. pp. 7-8.
114 Truman had refused to issue a statement pledging recognition of a Jewish state on the Eve of Yom 
Kippur, the timing o f which may have boosted his domestic popularity.
115 Ganin, op. cit. p. 105
116 Ibid.. p. 105.
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Clifford later claimed that public opinion in support of the Jewish state was decisive 
because it “permitted Truman, who emotionally supported the Jewish cause in 
Palestine” 117 to recognise Israel. Forces of public opinion allowed him little choice and 
he was “happy it had not.”118 Domestic necessity, a genuine humanitarian concern for 
the plight of Europe’s Jewish refugees, a commitment to upholding the Balfour 
Declarations and Truman’s own Christian upbringing were of a high order of magnitude 
in influencing his decision.
The special relationship between the United States and Israel, that Truman was 
instrumental in establishing, provides the backdrop against which US foreign policy 
toward Israel is made. It is not in itself, however, an explanation o f foreign policy 
decision-making which is a product of the interaction of a multiplicity of factors. It is to 
an analysis of the factors that influence this process that we now turn.
117 Ibid.. p. 71.
118 Clark Clifford, “Annals of Government: Serving the President in the Truman Years” New Yorker 25 
March, 1991, p. 71.
Chapter 2
Framing American Foreign Policy 
The Components of Policy
It is a truism to say that both international and domestic events affect American policy, 
while individuals and groups with partisan views, both inside and outside the 
government, compete to influence decisions.1 But the degree to which such factors 
mould or reshape government policy, if  at all, has to be a product of timing and 
circumstance. Sometimes they may be largely irrelevant because the President’s central 
political position can enable him to set the parameters of his administration’s approach to
•y
international affairs. However, within any administration post-1945, Washington’s self 
image as a global superpower has tended to be paramount in the White House and policy 
toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli dispute will not knowingly compromise what the 
administration sees as its global interests. As such, perceptions o f the national interest 
and of how to protect or enhance the country’s strategic and economic objectives are 
crucial in determining the direction of foreign policy decision-making. Perceptions of 
what such interests require and what takes precedence in the event of conflicting 
priorities may change over time and are, to a certain extent, a product of domestic 
pressure and bureaucratic rivalry. As such, the direction of US policy toward Israel may 
vary over time, in accordance with changing circumstances. This chapter will analyse 
such factors and the extent to which they may be germane in any framework for 
explaining US foreign policy decision-making.
The National Interest Perspective
To attempt to explain US policy toward Israel solely by reference to a special relationship 
is to oversimplify the dynamics of interaction between the two states. For consideration 
of national security and the need to respond to domestic circumstance are also of great,
1 Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from Truman 
to Reagan (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1985) p. 10.
2 Ibid.. p. 10.
and on occasions, greater significance because they have an immediate impact on 
decision-makers’ perceptions of their nations’ vital interests. “National interest”, Joseph 
Frankel writes, “is the most comprehensive description of the whole value complex of 
foreign policy,”4 but it is a very loosely defined concept. As a term it derives from the 
belief that states are the highest political authority and that lacking any political superior 
they must determine national policy for themselves. The question then arises o f what it 
means to say that something is in the national interest. Does ‘national’ refer to the people 
or the state and what are ‘interests’ and who defines them -  the head of government, the 
cabinet, politicians, leading interest groups, the army, the media or the people? In reality 
they all can, but what counts at any given moment is what those who speak in the name 
o f the state claim as constituting the national interest and, as a consequence, it is possible 
for interpretations to change as one government succeeds another. That said, the term 
does provide a kind of ‘intellectual core’ around which policy is framed and suggests the 
existence of certain aims and objectives that can be identified by both decision-makers 
and rational observers.5
The ‘national interest’ constitutes an aspect of foreign policy to which statesmen profess 
to attach great importance. The advancement o f what is defined as the national interest 
forms the basic objective of foreign policy and is “the general and continuing ends for 
which a nation acts.”6 On the other hand, while the term the ‘national interest’ is clouded 
by definitional ambiguity, for the purposes of this thesis, the national interest approach 
will take as its starting point the assumption that a state will use the resources at its 
disposal to try to guarantee what it regards as its security and well being. This draws on 
the classical realist assumption of scholars such as Kautilya, Machiavelli and Hobbes, 
that states seek to avoid being overpowered in economic and military terms, and that 
power in the sense of “the capacity to produce intended effects” provides the common
3 Ibid.. p. 10.
4 Joseph Frankel, National Interest (London: Pall Mall Press Ltd., 1970) p. 26.
5 Geoffrey Stem, The Structure of International Sociev (London & New York: Pinter, 2000) p. 128.
6 The Brookings Institution, Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy 1953-1954 (Washington 
D.C.:The Brookings Institute, 1955), pp. 373-5 cited in Frankel. National Interest p. 18.
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denominator in any assessment of the international system.7 For other writers, such as 
Waltz and Bull, power cannot serve as a sufficient basis for the definition of the national
o
interest partly because the term itself is o f such conceptual fluidity and partly because 
the objectives decision-makers pursue are mixed, diverse and sometimes contradictory.9 
Considerations of economic gain, prestige and domestic advantage are often perceived to 
be fundamental aspects of the national interest, but then in practice they may produce 
policies that are inconsistent. In this sense, it is more appropriate to speak o f interests 
rather than a single national interest based on a number of often conflicting objectives, in 
contrast to a single and predominant overriding operational goal.10
For any Power, great or small, foreign policy is formulated in a context that provides 
constraints as well as opportunities. The interplay between the enduring features of the 
international system, which includes balance of power calculations, international trade 
relations and the geopolitical circumstance o f a country, give foreign policy an element of 
continuity and imposes limitations on what even the most radical and ambitious leaders 
are able to achieve. For example, the people of a particular country with relatively 
unchanging neighbours, will often inherit a framework of perceptions, aspirations and 
expectations, that give the process o f defining the national interest a historical 
dimension.11 In Britain, recent disagreements over interpretations of the national interest 
have to be seen against the background o f centuries o f conflict with the European powers 
as well as the colonial experience. In attempting to find an equilibrium between the 
country’s relations with the US, the Commonwealth and with Europe, successive British 
governments since the Second World War have often seemed less wholehearted about 
their commitment to the latter than their European partners would have wished, thereby
19earning Britain the reputation of the “reluctant European.”
7 Richard Little & Steve Smith, Belief Systems and International Relations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988) 
p. 5.
8 See J. W. Burton, International Relations: A General Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1965).
9 Stem, op. cit. pp. 130-31, 143-44.
10 William Wallace, Foreign Policy and the Political Process (London & Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1971) p. 
13.
11 Stem, op. cit. p. 130.
12 David Sanders, Losing an Empire Finding a Role (Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1990) p. 135.
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The interests of a state which comprise the overarching national interest can be 
subdivided between ‘vital’ interests which governments consider worthy of sacrifice and 
are prepared to back up with the use of force and ‘secondary’ interests from which they 
can retreat. One of the most fundamental policy objectives of any government is the 
preservation of the state’s territorial integrity and political independence, which includes 
the perpetuation of a particular social, political and economic order.13 Since territory is 
the essence of statehood, decision-makers will generally defend it at any cost, either 
human or material.14 There are of course, certain exceptions to this rule as when a state 
that comprises separate ethnic entities is tom apart by internal tension and the preference 
of the component nations is to separate into sovereign states. This was the fate o f both 
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Other exceptions in extreme 
circumstances have also occurred. By signing the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Livtosk, Lenin 
surrendered large amounts of Russian territory to the Germans in exchange for peace, 
describing this as a policy of “sacrificing space in order to buy time,”15 while 
Czechoslovakian President Emil Hacha allowed the Sudetenland, the German speaking 
part o f his state, to be annexed to Germany in an attempt to save Czechoslovakia as a 
country.16 As Hitler’s stated objective was to re-unite all German speaking peoples, 
Hacha incorrectly believed that in relinquishing the Sudetenland, the Nazis would respect 
the territorial integrity of the Czech speaking part of the state. Extreme circumstances 
aside, the preservation of the state as a unified entity is generally regarded as the most 
fundamental foreign policy objective.
In recent times, the interpretation of ‘security’ has been broadened. It is no longer 
confined to that of military strength because there is increasing acknowledgement that 
security can be jeopardised both from within and without the states’ national boundaries.
13 Wallace, op. cit. p. 9.
14 Karen Dawisha, The Foundations. Structure and Dynamics of Soviet Policy Toward the Arab Radical 
Regimes (Ph.D. thesis: LSE, 1978) p. 131.
15 Helene Carrere D ’Encausee, Lenin: Revolution and Power (London & New York: Longman, 1982) p. 
78. Lenin argued that Russia had to choose between the liquidation of the internal bourgeois enemy and 
the external war with Germany.
16 Dawisha. op. cit. p. 133.
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For example, the awesome military strength of the Soviet Union could not prevent the 
country’s disintegration, while countries with little military defensive capabilities such as 
Switzerland and Luxembourg flourish, partly because of the diplomatic and economic 
policies of their governments.17 We only need to look at the great lengths to which the 
US and the Western European states went to oust Iraq from Kuwait to understand that 
resources, in this case oil, are as much a security as an economic priority.
Prestige and national esteem have always been important in international relations. 
Historically prestige was equated with military power and governments have gone to 
great lengths to preserve and enhance their military reputations. President Kennedy’s 
willingness to go to the brink of nuclear war with the Soviet Union during the 1962 
Cuban missile crisis is said to have been largely attributable to his mishandling of the 
abortive landing in Cuba’s Bay of Pigs in 1961.18 Kennedy sought to restore both his 
own personal prestige and that of the US by taking a tough stance in his subsequent 
dealings with Moscow. Today, in an era of mass communication, international esteem 
has evolved from emphasis on purely military reputation to one in which credibility is of 
increasing significance. For example, many developing countries derive considerable 
esteem from participation in the UN General Assembly, where their vote technically 
carries as much weight as that of the Great Powers, even though Great Powers can often 
exert influence, in economic and political terms, to affect voting patterns.
Paradoxically, the broader a state’s foreign commitments and the higher its standing in 
the international arena, the more limited tends to be its freedom o f action in foreign 
affairs.19 This is a product of its alliances and treaty obligations, foreign investments and 
trading interests and commitment to the well being of its citizens resident abroad. For 
global powers the credibility o f commitments is crucial to their continued international 
standing. If they make threats that they do not follow up or commitments on which they 
renege, their integrity is thrown into disrepute and their credibility suffers accordingly.
17 Stem, op. cit. p. 131.
18 ibid., p. 132.
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In 1939, after reneging on its treaty commitment to Czechoslovakia, Britain’s 
international reputation would have been completely undermined had it also abrogated its 
obligations to Warsaw by not declaring war on Germany, on 1 September 1939, when 
Nazi troops entered Poland. The US decision to bomb Afghanistan despite uncertainty 
that the raids would achieve the stated objectives of destroying Osama bin Laden’s power 
base and reducing the threat of Islamic terror, was in part a product of the need to be seen 
by the international community to be taking decisive action in response to the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks on its citizens.
A clear definition of the national interest requires agreement on the nature and priority of 
values and objectives foreign policy should promote and has to assume that decision­
makers behave rationally.20 This raises the whole question of rationality in foreign 
policy. Decision-makers are often under pressure of time, inadequate information and 
simultaneity of issues that limit their policy alternatives and necessitate decisions in 
situations of uncertainty.21 Even if the institutional process has attained a high degree of 
instrumental rationality in its collection and assimilation of information and in its 
capacity to handle a number o f problems simultaneously, areas o f uncertainty still 
confront decision-makers. Foreign policy issues must be set within a context of other 
issues and against a framework of the government’s prime concerns. Ideally, decisions 
are a product of a cost-benefit analysis accruing from alternative courses of action22 
based on considerations o f the ‘value’ or ‘utility’ of alternative sets o f consequences23 
and are not capricious or unconsidered.24 However, there is generally sufficient 
ambiguity inherent in any international situation, to make more than one interpretation of 
events plausible. The difficulty lies in determining whether a particular movement of 
troops, tariff or threat o f deprivation constitutes a serious danger to security and if so to
19 Wallace, op.cit. p. 21.
20 Ibid.. p. 32.
21 IbkUp. 32.
22 William Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976 
(University of California Press: Berkeley, Los Angeles & London, 1977) p. 4.
23 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown & 
Co., 1971) p. 29.
24 F. S. Northedge, The International Political System (London & Boston: Faber & Faber, 1981), p. 24.
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decide what level of threat it presents. Decision-makers must then determine which of 
the state’s interests are most affected and which goals are most crucial in determining
* 25their response. This criterion of rationality does not mean that governments never act 
from passion or prejudice. On occasions of course they do, and such emotional forces are 
themselves often attributable to the perceptions of the state’s past experience of 
international affairs.26
The assumption of rationality is even more problematic in assessing the probable motives 
and behaviour of other states. Increasing cultural diversity means that value systems 
differ greatly between, and sometimes within, countries. Different governments assign 
different values or weight to the defence o f particular objectives such as the preservation 
o f life, democracy, the institution of private property and the importance o f prestige. The 
weight assigned to each value will affect the direction of foreign policy. As a 
consequence, one government may have a different conception of rationality from 
another, with the cultural relativity o f values matched by “the cultural relativity of the
• 27 •processes of mind.” What is rational for one government in a given situation may not 
seem rational to another, and what a Western administration reports as rational a non- 
Westem state may not, and vice versa.
The ‘national interest’, ambiguous though the concept is, is the term given to what those 
representing states seek to defend. However, despite the great importance assigned to it, 
an objective national interest common to all cannot be discerned. It is in any case, 
subject to reinterpretation in the light o f changes in inter-state or transnational power 
relations28 or the changing values and beliefs o f decision-makers. Since the concept of 
the national interest is composed of different elements, it is to these constituent elements 
including strategic, economic and domestic interests that we now turn.
25 Wallace, op.cit. p. 33.
26 Northedge, op. cit. p. 25.
27 Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963) p. 168.
28 Frankel National Interest p. 19.
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The Strategic Interest Perspective
The strategic interest approach to foreign policy decision-making offers a state-centric 
perspective of foreign policy and looks at the way states mobilise their military and other 
such capabilities, in support of their political goals. It draws on the Clausewitzian 
tradition that understands military power as an ultimate resource that must be converted 
into a usable instrument to both advance and defend the strategic interest where 
necessary. As such states will form alliances or alignments with other states whose 
perception of the strategic interest happen to coincide.
Perhaps no region o f the world has figured as prominently in the strategic calculations of 
the Great Powers in recent years as the Middle East. The United States is no exception 
and since the Second World War American decision-makers have come to regard the 
Middle East as vital to their common perception o f the strategic interest, for three main 
reasons. The first is the role of oil as it pertains to international stability and the 
prosperity o f the Western world. The second is the geopolitical importance of the region 
as it relates to Great Power rivalry and thirdly is the US commitment to the security and 
survival of Israel, the only parliamentary democracy in the region. In attempting to 
advance its interests in these three areas, Washington considered resolution of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict as essential to the American strategic interest. This is because the conflict 
is viewed as encroaching upon and threatening all other concerns and in the absence of 
peace, the US has constantly to juggle its competing interests with Israel and the Arab 
world.
Since its creation in 1948 until 1990-91, US-Israeli relations were conditioned by an 
overarching US strategic interest, namely Washington’s desire to circumvent Soviet 
advances in the Middle East. Internal debates within the Truman administration 
concerning the recognition of Israel focused on the anticipated Soviet response to such a
29 John H. McFadden, “The Strategic Arena” in Harry S. Allen & Ivan Volgyes, (ed.), Israel, the Middle 
East and U.S. Interests (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983) p. 3.
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move. In the mid-1940s, Moscow had been eager to recognise the creation of Israel, 
believing that it would force the British out of the Middle East, thus ending British 
control over many Arab states and particularly the Arab League. Moscow anticipated 
that Israel would be a great liberating force,30 undermining Arab feudalism with the kind 
of socialist economics advocated by many refugees from Poland and Russia. In the 
event, the capitalist nature of the Jewish state proved to be a disappointment and Moscow 
became further estranged from Israel by the latter’s gradual alignment with the United 
States.31
However, a close strategic connection did not immediately follow Truman’s recognition 
of Israel and the US provided virtually no aid during Israel’s War of Independence or in 
the following years. Washington was primarily concerned with preventing Moscow from 
establishing a position of influence in the Middle East which it viewed as a threat to US 
access to the region’s oil resources and strategic lines o f communication, including the 
Suez Canal. US policy relied on the Arabs to confront the Soviet Union, arid Israel was 
generally not included.32 It was not until 1962 that the Kennedy administration 
inaugurated the first significant weapons sale of HAWK anti-aircraft missiles,33 as a 
means of demonstrating support for Israel and maintaining the military balance. In return 
for US support, Israel was expected to practice self-restraint towards its Arab neighbours 
and US policy elsewhere in the region.34 The Six Day War of 1967 was an important 
landmark in the relationship because though there were problems in its relations with Tel 
Aviv, Washington directly aligned with Israel against its Arab enemies and the Soviet 
Union. Conflict between the Arabs and Israel was seen as part of the broader 
confrontation between the two superpowers and the US supported Israel as a means of 
safeguarding its position in the region. Although the US did not play a direct role in the
30 Author’s interview with Richard Murphy.
31 Ibid..
32 Bernard Reich, Securing the Covenant: United States-Israel Relations After the Cold War (Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1995) p. 37.
33 Ibid.. p. 37.
34 David Schoenbaum, The United States and the State of Israel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) p. 
137 and George Lenczowkis, American Presidents and the Middle East (Durham & London: Duke 
University Press, 1990) p. 71.
35 The Israeli attack on the USS Liberty on 8 June 1967, presented a potential challenge to the relationship.
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conflict, it did provide tangential support and moved the Sixth Fleet to counter potential 
Soviet intervention. Washington also played a crucial role in supporting Israel’s position 
in the diplomatic battle that followed the military conflict.
Strategic ties were not enhanced until 1970, when the US was confronted with a new 
strategic reality: a deteriorating regional position linked to the presence of large numbers 
of Soviet advisors in Egypt, including pilots and other military personnel who were 
operating Egypt’s missile defence system. It was Washington’s preoccupation with 
Soviet involvement in the region that created a confluence of strategic interests between 
America and Israel. Nixon pledged US support for the maintenance of the regional 
balance of power and enhanced Israel’s deterrent capability to discourage the Arabs from 
launching another war that could provoke superpower confrontation.36
Though the global power balance conditioned US policy toward Israel, it was also 
influenced by the administration’s strategic analysis o f conditions in the region. Thus in 
1970, Nixon and Kissinger authorised Israel to act as a proxy to protect US interests in 
Jordan when King Hussein’s throne was challenged by fedayeen forces in what was 
termed Black September. In 1973 the same administration supplied Israel with arms 
during the Yom Kippur War but did not permit a decisive military victory, because they 
believed stalemate on the ground between Israeli and Egyptian forces would facilitate 
peace negotiations. Overt strategic cooperation between the US and Israel developed 
during the Reagan administration, in response to increased instability across the Middle 
East, with the overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the establishment of an Islamic 
Republic, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war. In an article in the 
Washington Post o f 15 August 1979, Reagan criticised the Democrats approach to 
relations with Israel and highlighted his perception o f Israel’s strategic importance: 
American policy-makers downgrade Israel’s geopolitical importance as a stabilising force, as a 
deterrent to radical hegemony and as a military offset to the Soviet Union. The fall of Iran has
36 See chapter five for a more detailed discussion of the arms policy the Nixon administration adopted 
toward the Middle East.
37 Black September refers to the period during September 1970, when the PLO, operating as a state-within- 
a-state, hijacked three western airliners and held the passenger hostage in Amman. The actions of the PLO 
threatened to overthrow the Jordanian monarchy. See chapter five for a more detailed account.
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increased Israel’s value as perhaps the only remaining strategic asset in the region on which the 
United States can truly rely; other pro-Westem states in the region, especially Saudi Arabia and the 
smaller Gulf kingdoms, are weak and vulnerable.38
The Reagan administration was the first to formalise and institutionalise the military, 
economic and political aspects of the US-Israeli strategic relationship.39 On 30 
November 1981, Washington and Jerusalem signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) on strategic cooperation “designed against the Soviet-controlled forces from 
outside the region introduced into the region.”40 These ties were consolidated in 1984 
when Israel was granted permission to compete directly for contracts in the US military 
market and again in April 1985 when Israel accepted America’s invitation to participate 
in the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). The objective of the SDI was to research, 
develop and test a new generation o f high-technology weapons to be deployed in space 
and on earth, that would create a ‘shield’ over the US to defend it from Soviet nuclear 
missiles. The strategic relationship reached its zenith on 14 December 1987, when Israel 
achieved the coveted status of a ‘major non-NATO ally’, a position enjoyed by only two 
other countries, Sweden and Australia.
By the end o f Reagan’s second term in office, numerous areas of military cooperation 
had come to fruition that exceeded the bounds of the memorandums of understanding. 
The US Navy and Airforce were using Israel’s live-fire ranges for training exercises, US 
and Israeli forces were engaging in joint air and sea exercises and the US Navy was 
making extensive use of Israel’s ports.41 Cooperation was also occurring in a variety of 
weapons development and production projects including aircraft, electronics, naval 
vessels, tank guns and terminal guidance bombs 42
38 Reagan’s speech was quoted in WP 15 August 1979.
39 Author’s interview with Norman Podhoretz, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute and former editor-in-chief 
of Commentary 1960-95.
40 DSB “U.S., Israel Agree on Strategic Cooperation,” January 1982, p. 45. For Israel, the significance of 
the MOU stemmed from the US identification o f Israel as a strategic partner rather than as a client state.
41 Reich op. cit. p. 45.
42 Ibid.. p. 45.
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From the US perspective, strategic cooperation had always been about more than the 
purely military dimension and included the development of an overall security 
framework designed to create the conditions for peace.43 Part of the strategic rationale 
for supplying Israel with arms was the belief that a strong and confident Israel might be 
willing to take risks for peace. In reality the reverse often proved to be the case, as when 
the military balance of power favoured Israel, its leaders were generally reluctant to 
embark on peace negotiations. It is this linkage between strategic cooperation and peace 
that constituted one of the most important differences between the respective conceptions 
o f strategic cooperation held by Washington and Jerusalem.44
As the majority of the world’s known oil reserves are found in the Persian Gulf, 
petrodollars have made the oil producing states a valuable economic prize and of 
immense importance to the Western economies. Historically concerns have been raised 
that support for Israel antagonises the oil producing states, thereby jeopardising Western 
access to Middle East oil. However, with the exception of the oil crisis of 1973, there is 
little evidence to support this contention and Washington concluded successful working 
relationships with the monarchies o f the Gulf. While some attempts to create overt and 
formal alliances, such as the Baghdad Pact of 1955 failed, because the Middle Eastern 
states refused to join,45 informal networks based on shared interests but not underwritten 
by public treaty obligations, like that with Saudi Arabia have been more successful. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s decision to support Saudi Arabia and Richard Nixon’s decision 
to support Iran, were based on a pragmatic assessment o f America’s security 
requirements. Roosevelt was the first president to publicly acknowledge that “the 
defence of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defence of the United States” because it is
43 Author’s interview with Marshall Breger, special assistant to President Reagan and his liaison to the 
Jewish Community, 1982-84.
44 Author’s interview with Norman Podhoretz.
45 In principle any number o f states could join the Baghdad Pact, but in practice the criteria for selection 
was rigorous. Anglo-American planners expected potential members to share their real sense of danger 
posed by Soviet Union and world Communism and that all member states should see eye to eye with one 
another. As a consequence, a very short list o f candidates was compiled which yielded only three 
signatories: Britain, Iraq and Turkey. Even the United States was unwilling to join. Schoenbaum, op. cit. 
p.84.
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“probably the richest economic prize in the world in the field of foreign investment.”46 
Successive administrations acknowledged that if  support for Israel was critical for honour 
and votes, then support for Saudi Arabia was critical for oil.47 Nixon acknowledged 
Israel’s inability to protect US interests single-handedly and made Iran an important
48American ally, supplying the Shah with arms accordingly.
In the atmosphere of the Cold War, the protection of the Middle East oil fields were, in 
their own way, as important to the strategic interest of the United States as the 
independence of Western Europe.49 Early in the Second World War, in his 
correspondence with Roosevelt, Churchill had acknowledged the importance o f US 
interests in Saudi Arabia.50 The State Department reconciled support for Israel with 
American oil interests by seeking where possible to delegate to the oil companies 
themselves Washington’s relations with the Arab governments o f the Middle East.51 
Confronted with Communist, Islamic and Hashemite threats to his throne, King ibn Saud
S'}depended on Washington to guarantee the security of his kingdom and accepted 
Washington’s compromise position o f separating economic considerations from the 
political question of US support for Israel. With oil as the sole source o f the monarchy’s 
rapidly expanding wealth and basis for economic development, it was in the monarchy’s 
interest to draw a clear distinction between the operations of Aramco, a purely 
commercial enterprise owned by four private companies, and the policies of the US 
government elsewhere in the region. Washington’s dual policy with the richest oil state 
was very successful until the oil crisis o f 1973, when under pressure from President 
Anwar-al Sadat of Egypt, King Faisal imposed an oil embargo on the United States in a 
show of Arab solidarity. The embargo was a protest against Washington’s support for
46 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil. Money and Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1991) p. 115.
47 Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Made (Sevenoaks: 
Coronet Books, 1976) p. 115.
48 Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979) pp. 1262-64.
49 Yergin. op. cit. p. 115.
50 Warren F. Kimball, (ed.), Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence Vol. Ill (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984) p. 17.
51 Yergin. op. cit. p. 115.
52 Murphy, op. cit.
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Israel in its war against the Arab states.53 Yet because the alignment between the House 
o f Saud and the White House was seen as mutually beneficial, the disruption to oil 
supplies was short lived. Oil derives its value from its sales potential and if stockpiling 
oil for political ends may damage the Western economies, the financial impact on the oil 
producing states can be even greater. By 1975, US-Saudi relations had returned to their 
former equilibrium. Saudi Arabia acted as a bulwark of stability in the Gulf, while the 
stationing of US troops on Saudi soil during the Gulf War of 1991, was understood by 
both sides to have defended the regime against internal subversion and attack from 
external forces.
Historically, the American rationale for describing Israel as a strategic asset derived from 
the latter’s perceived ability to deter radical Arab aggression and with it the prospects for 
Soviet regional expansion. It was also thought that Israel’s existence and military 
strength buttressed the security of friendly Arab states, thus ensuring Western access to 
Mideast oil. However, while in theory this may have been the case, the strategic asset 
explanation suffers from a number o f deficiencies. Despite Israel’s undoubted military 
strength and the US perception o f Israel as a friend that could be relied upon in an 
extremity, there are few occasions when actual military cooperation was put to the test. 
Although US-Israeli cooperation during the September 1970 Jordan crisis provides the 
most obvious example of direct military collaboration, generally Washington has been 
reluctant to be seen as openly working with Israel in the region,54 in case this undermined 
its relations with friendly Arab regimes. In contrast, examples o f technological 
collaboration or joint research and development projects, such as Reagan’s SDI abound, 
as do examples of covert cooperation as with the Iran-Contra affair.55 Strategic 
cooperation with Israel did little to enhance America’s ability to project its power in the 
Middle East. In most circumstances, America was reluctant to use Israeli troops in a 
conflict with an Arab state, as was the case during the 1990-91 Gulf War. Therefore,
53 See chapter five for a more detailed account of the 1973 oil embargo.
54 Karen L. Puschel, US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post 
Press, 1992) p. 157.
55 This involved the covert transfer o f American military equipment to Iran, a country against which 
Washington had imposed sanctions, in exchange for the release of US hostages held in Iran. Israel acted as 
the intermediary in dealings between Washington and Tehran.
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while the notion of Israel as a strategic asset contributes to an explanation of US policy 
toward Israel, the underlying rationale for the policy must be found elsewhere.
The Economic Interest Approach
The viability of a given course of foreign policy action is as much a product of economic 
factors as of strategic calculations. Economic strength is a pre-requisite for any 
government wishing to pursue an effective foreign policy. The prevalence and quality of 
natural resources, the sophistication and diversification of industry, the standard of living 
of the population and the level of economic self-sufficiency, contribute to any calculation 
of the economic capabilities o f the state. In the formulation of foreign policy, economic 
interests play a key role in decision-making calculations. In terms of US foreign policy, 
the costs and benefits of global confrontation are analysed not only in terms of the ability 
of the industrial complex to sustain the military infrastructure necessary for its defence, 
but also in relation to the impact a particular foreign policy course will exert on 
international trade relations. The unwillingness o f the population to tolerate the sacrifice 
of domestic economic growth when priority is given to defence spending has also acted 
as a foreign policy constraint. By an accident of geography and nature, America has been 
blessed with a vast landmass and an abundance o f natural resources that have enabled her 
leaders to invest sizeable economic resources in advancing their perception o f the 
national interest. Foreign aid and trade relations are used to protect American interests 
overseas by supporting friendly governments against internal and external challenges.
The Marshall Plan56 of 1947 was the greatest foreign aid package in history57 and 
provided for the transfer of $13bn. from the US to Europe between 1948 and 1952.58 It 
was intended to revive the European economies and stimulate international trade, lest the 
deprivation and shortages engendered by the Second World War fuel the expansion of
56 For the text of Marshall’s speech announcing the Marshall Plan see George C. Marshall, “European 
Initiative Essential to Economic Recovery,” DSB XVI, no. 415 (15 June, 1947) pp. 1159-60.
57 Although wealthy states shared their resources with allies long before the Second World War, “the use of 
public funds on subsidised terms to assist in the development and growth of sovereign nations” had no 
significant precedent before the Marshall Plan. Charles Frank & Mary Baird, “Foreign Aid: Its Speckled 
Past and Future Prospects.” International Organisation 29, Winter 1975, p. 135.
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Communism across Europe.59 Since then the Pax Americana has been firmly grounded 
in the belief that trade produces economic and social change. In this it is not dissimilar 
from the Pax Britannica which was largely based on the belief that free trade brought 
enlightenment and with enlightenment liberty.60 Foreign aid and trade relations continue 
to be used as a device for promoting stability and creating a world hospitable to 
American society and its ideals.
Since the mid-1970s, Israel has become the leading beneficiary of America’s policy of 
foreign aid. US-Israeli economic relations did not originate as a product o f economic 
imperatives but as a by-product o f the special political and cultural ties between the two 
countries. The record o f US financial and military support for Israel has been unique and 
historically dependent on a continuous dialogue between the two governments, reinforced 
by congressional and public support.61 Over time however, economic relations have 
expanded in both depth and breadth and they sometimes function virtually autonomously 
o f the political environment.
Initially, US government aid to Israel was low, but increased dramatically as a 
consequence of the 1973 war and the level o f official assistance as o f 1990 stood at $3 
billion per year - $1.8 billion in military assistance and $1.2 billion in economic
67assistance. In 1981 grants replaced loans for economic assistance and in 1984, when
Israel faced the prospect of repaying past military loans, the US also restructured its
6*^military assistance to Israel from loans to grants. This effectively absolved Israel of the 
obligation to repay the debt. In 1991, following the Gulf War, Israel received an 
additional $5 billion in aid and in 1992 Washington granted Israel $10 billion over five 
years in commercial loans to assist with the financial cost of absorbing one million Soviet
58 Hook, op. cit. p. 24.
59 David Baldwin, Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy: A Documentary Analysis (New York, 
Washington & London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966) p. 25.
60 Christopher Coker, Reflections on American Foreign Policy Since 1945 (London: Pinter Publishers, 
1989) p. 106.
61 Leopold Yehuda Laufer, “U.S. Aid to Israel: Problems and Perceptions,” in Gabriel Sheffer (ed.), 
Dynamics of Dependence: U.S. Israeli Relations (Boulder & London: Westview Press, 1987) p. 134.
62 Reich, op. cit. p. 93.
63 Ibid.. p. 93.
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Jews.64 Moreover, in contrast to every other US aid recipient, Israel’s grants are handed 
over in full by the Treasury at the beginning of the fiscal year for the Israeli government 
to invest and use as it sees fit.65
Foreign aid, a relatively new political strategy for Washington, was largely a product of 
the Cold War. It stemmed from the perception that US investment in capitalist countries 
would be an effective device to thwart the spread of Communism.66 That Israel has been 
the recipient o f the largest share of US annual assistance of any state in the world since 
1976 is directly attributable to its democratic and capitalist status,67 but has occurred for a 
number o f other reasons - the first being American foreign policy priorities and until 
recently the exigencies o f superpower competition in particular. As the Soviet Union 
increased arms deliveries to Israel’s Arab enemies Washington reciprocated to maintain 
the military balance in the region. The American initiation of aid to the Middle East 
generally followed that o f Moscow68 and escalated in accordance with Soviet arms 
deliveries to Egypt and Syria.
The second reason for increases in aid stemmed from the need to counterbalance 
American arms sales to the Arab states. Arms sales were one of the most powerful forms 
of leverage the superpowers could apply to influence regional states. In response to 
Israeli objections following the supply of arms to friendly Arab leaders, the US claimed 
that the weapons did not really constitute a change in the balance of power but merely 
facilitated the recycling of petrodollars. To reinforce this claim, the US supplied 
additional arms to Israel to maintain its position vis-a-vis its adversaries.69 Thirdly, the 
US escalated its economic assistance as the quid pro quo for persuading the Israeli 
government to adhere to American strategic priorities, including ‘land for peace’ deals
64 Ibid.. p. 91.
65 WP 15 May 1994, p. X6.
66 Author’s interview with Lewis Roth, Representative, Americans for Peace Now, Washington, D. C.
67 There is a tendency of donors to direct aid flows to recipient countries with economic systems similar to 
their own. Steven W. Hook, National Interest and Foreign Aid (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1995) p. 145.
68 A. F. K. Organski, The $36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1990) p. 159.
69 Ibid.. p. 160.
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with the Arabs that it found difficult to countenance.70 Aid to Israel tended to increase 
with the signing of each peace agreement and territorial withdrawal, beginning with the 
Camp David Accords of 197971 and most recently with the Wye River Memorandum of 
1999.
That US-Israeli economic relations were originally a product of political expediency is 
evident by the way they have tended to track political relations between the two 
governments. Economic factors appeared to have little bearing on aid patterns. 
Initially, US economic and military assistance was part of a maximalist strategy designed 
to repulse any expansion by proxy o f Soviet influence in the Middle East and to thwart 
the expansion of radical Arab states that threatened the security of Israel and the Arab
7 Tregimes friendly to Washington. In the 1980s, the perception within the Reagan 
administration of Israel as a strategic asset was translated into economic advantage for 
the Jewish state with the conversion of loans into grants and the signing o f a bilateral free 
trade agreement.74 Israel was the first country to enjoy a free-trade agreement with the 
US and it provided a means for Israel to receive preferential access to the US market and 
for the US to ensure its own access to the Israeli market. By 1990, US products
7Scomprised one-fifth of Israeli imports valued at $4 billion annually. Gradually 
economic relations became somewhat more balanced and included greater emphasis on 
trade relations and policies to promote and sustain Israeli economic growth. For 
example, by the mid-1990s, the United States was purchasing 40 percent of Israel’s 
machinery and mechanical appliances and over one third of Israel’s optical, photographic 
and medical exports.76
Though economically, Israel would appear to be the main beneficiary o f the relationship, 
there are those like Geoffrey Aronson who argue that support for Israel gives “value for
70 Ibid.. p. 161.
71 In 1979 US aid to Israel reached an all-time high of $4.81 billion. See Laufer. op. cit. p. 131.
72 Hook, op. cit. p.
73 Organski, op. cit. p. 202.
74 WP 15 May 1994, p. X6.
75 Reich, op. cit. p. 96.
76 Ibid-, P- 96.
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money” according to a non-economic calculus that has been established over time.77 The 
author A. F. K. Organski, elaborates on this and provides three main reasons for his 
argument. Firstly, he claims that in the absence of an Arab ally with the political and 
military power to defend its regional interests, America was left with little alternative but 
to fund Israel. Secondly, aid to Israel had been ‘cost-effective’ because Tel Aviv was 
victorious in every war against the Soviet backed Arab states, which humiliated Moscow. 
Israel had effectively blocked Soviet expansion through proxies, while its military 
strength and potential had defended the moderate Arab regimes.78 Thirdly the Arabs 
successive defeats at the hands of Israel proved the futility of alignment with Moscow. 
As a consequence, the Arab leaders, beginning with Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat, 
concluded that an alignment with Washington was necessary to secure the return of Arab 
lands conquered by Israel.79
But can the ‘return’ America received on its investment in Israel be so readily quantified? 
After all, even if Israel success fully contained the radical Arab states, would Arab leaders 
have been so receptive to Soviet involvement in their domestic politics were it not for 
their hatred of Israel? Although the brokering o f a peace agreement between Egypt and 
Israel was to America’s advantage, to perceive it as a direct benefit deriving from 
previous military and economic assistance to Israel is somewhat misleading. While the 
Camp David negotiations had their origins in the 1973 war, the accords were 
painstakingly and personally brokered by American President Jimmy Carter, and 
underwritten by $5 billion in annual aid ($3 billion to Israel and $2 billion to Egypt). It 
was this additional financial commitment to Israel that secured Israeli withdrawal from 
Sinai, and subsequent Arab-Israeli peace treaties have been underwritten by further 
economic guarantees. In view of this ongoing financial obligation, it is hard to portray 
economic support for Israel as a ‘bargain’ after all. The United States pays a high 
financial price to its ally for every peace agreement it secures to enhance its perception of 
its own and Israel’s strategic interest.
77 Author’s interview with Geoffrey Aronson, Director for Research and Publications, Foundation for 
Middle East Peace.
7S Organski, op. cit. p. 204.
79 Ibid-, P- 206.
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In terms of the original rationale behind the foreign aid programme that was designed to
promote parliamentary democracy and capitalism, Israel is one of America’s success
stories, even if many Arabs would question the degree to which the democratic rights of
Israeli Arabs were respected. However, from a purely economic perspective, America
does not receive a tangible financial return on its capital investment in Israel. The first
report by the US General Accounting office (GAO), which followed the Lebanon war,
analysed the economic aspects of the relationship. Even though it was intended for
Congress, the branch of government traditionally most sensitive to Israeli concerns, it
emphasised the high financial cost and financial liabilities the US incurred in supporting
Israel.80 This highlighted both complications associated with politically motivated
lending and the crucial role domestic politics play in American political decision-making
and the importance of popular support for foreign aid to Israel. Foreign policy is often
the product of domestic political necessity, with one of its basic objectives to reduce
domestic political disequilibria. It is to the realm o f domestic policy-making that we now 
81turn.
The Domestic Politics Perspective
In any democratic country, domestic considerations play a key role in shaping 
perceptions o f the nation’s values and national interest. Michael Donelan argues that 
“US foreign policy [is] an emanation of domestic politics” because America is not
01
monolithic and the course of foreign policy is deeply rooted in the nature of the political 
system and the imperatives o f electioneering. That is not to say that domestic politics 
determine foreign policy, but it does provide the immediate context in which decisions 
are made, defines the rules of the game and determines who is responsible for decision-
80 For both the censored and uncensored versions see “US Assistance to the State of Israel”; Report of the 
Comptroller General of the United States “US Assistance to Israel,” General Accounting Office, United 
States, 24 June 1983, Washington 1983.
81 Frankel National Interest p. 24.
82 Michael Donelan, “The Elements of United States Foreign Policy” in F.S. Northedge (ed.), Foreign 
Policies o f the Powers (London: Faber & Faber, 1972) p 45.
83 Author’s interview with George R. Salem, member o f the Palestinian negotiating team at Madrid talks 
1991-93.
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making. That said, as James Rosenau explains, the influence of domestic factors on 
decision-making is notoriously difficult to define:
The premise is that domestic sources of foreign policy are no less crucial to its content than are the 
international situations toward which it is directed. The dilemma is that links between the domestic 
sources and the resulting behaviour - foreign policy - are not easily observed and are thus especially 
resistant to coherent analysis.85
The US has a very distinctive political system based on the separation of powers and is 
home to arguably the most powerful and autonomous legislature in the world. The highly 
competitive nature of the political system makes it susceptible to pressure from organised 
lobbyists and voting majorities, where office holders can become a function of their 
constituents. The separation of powers was designed to prevent the abuse o f authority 
through the concentration of power in one body. In reality the Constitution of 1787 did 
not create a government of ‘separated powers’ but a government o f ‘separated 
institutions’ sharing power. As a consequence, while the American president is often 
considered to be the most powerful man in the world, in reality his power is severely 
circumscribed by the other governing organs o f the state. O f these governing bodies, 
Congress has become the institution through which pressure groups attempt to achieve 
their objectives and have their preferences translated into public policy. Samuel 
Huntington claims that “the most prominent congressional role is that o f prodder or goad 
of the Administration on behalf of specific programmes or activities. With the executive
on
the decision-maker, Congress becomes the lobbyist.” Congress as a whole does not 
lobby the executive but particular groups within Congress do: committees, blocs, or even 
an entire house. As lobbyists, congressional groups are in a peripheral bargaining 
position with the administration. Although Congress is unable to impose its preferences
84 Quandt, op. cit. p. 15.
85 James N. Rosenau, “Introduction,” in James N. Rosenau, (ed.), Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy 
(New York: Free Press, 1967) p. 2.
86 Richard E. Neustadt, presidential Power and the Modem Presidents: The Politics o f Leadership from 
Roosevelt to Reagan (New York: The Free Press, MacMillan Publishing Co., 1990) p. 29.
87 Samuel Huntington. The Common Defence: Strategic Programmes in National Politics (New York & 
London: Columbia University Press, 1961) p. 135 cited in Robert J. Art, “Bureaucratic Politics & American 
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on the executive, through public criticism, it can force the executive to pay a substantial 
price for policies with which it disagrees.88
As a result, lobbying, electoral battles and competition between the executive and 
legislative branches of the government have become an integral part of the foreign-policy 
process. Robert Art claims that “it is presidential anticipation of Congress and public 
response that causes him to heed those bureaucratic demands he chooses to accede to.”89 
It is Congress that “sets the tone o f many policies and limits on many others .... It seems 
obvious that Executive proposals are shaped by estimates of how Congress and individual 
Congressmen will react.”90 The preferences of Congress are only one of a number of 
different opinions to which the president is exposed. Richard Neustadt describes the 
president as having five sets o f constituents. Executive officialdom, Congress, his 
partisans, public opinion and the international arena,91 each of which vie for his attention 
and policy decisions favourable to their interests.
American Jews and the pro-Israel Lobby
The American Jewish community together with the pro-Israel lobby (the two are by no 
means synonymous) exerts one o f the most powerful domestic influences on American 
foreign policy. This is partly attributable to the nature of the American political system 
that is both integrative and susceptible to religious and ethnic pressure and partly to the 
highly organised and well funded activities of the pro-Israel lobby. As was discussed in 
chapter one, as a result of the Jews’ history and early integration into American society, 
the political system facilitated their socio-economic mobility and operates in a way that
M
enhances their values and interests. Washington has never been a place in which 
foreign and domestic influences have been separated, a fact that the highly organised and
88 Ibid.. p. 135.
89 Art, op. cit. p. 470.
90 Roger Hillsman, “The Foreign-Policy Consensus: An Interim Report” Journal of Conflict Resolution 3: 
(December 1959) p. 369 cited in Robert J. Art, op. cit. p. 470.
91 Neustadt, op. cit. p. 7.
92 Camille Mansour, Beyond Alliance: Israel in US ForeiRn Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1994) p. 265.
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nationally coordinated pro-Israel lobby has not been reluctant to exploit. The social 
political openness and coalitional political system, which responds to, and absorbs 
diversity, has enabled American Jews to secure an advantage in politics and public office, 
based on their achievement orientation and their extraordinary level of participation.93
Although impossible to quantify it is often claimed that the pro-Israel lobby in 
conjunction with the perceived power of the American Jewish vote, have played a major 
role in shaping US policy toward Israel. Wayne Owens, a former Senator and now 
President of the Centre for Middle East Peace, claimed that in Washington “politics is the 
name of the game and no one plays the game better than the American Jews.”94 Within 
the US, some hold that a candidate cannot run for office without the backing o f the 
Jewish community.95 Though this is partly mythical, myths can achieve a kind of reality 
if they are believed in strongly enough. It is broadly true, for example, that Congressmen 
“always feel safe voting for Israel.”96
Since the 1950s, lobbying in support of Israel has been the preserve o f two primary 
institutions, the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organisations and the 
American Israel Public Affairs Committee (Aipac). The primary objective o f the 
Conference of Presidents is to define by consensus any grievances the Jewish community 
harbours towards America’s Middle East policy and to present these views to the White 
House or Department of State. The Conference seeks only to reach a consensus amongst 
its members on questions concerning Israel and is not involved in direct political action. 
In effect, the conference is the diplomatic wing of the lobby and is responsible for 
managing relations between the American Jewish community and the governments o f the 
US and Israel.
93 Seymour Lipset & Earl Raab, Jews and the New American Scene (Cambridge, MA. & London: Harvard 
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Aipac is the official lobbying body of Israeli interests on Capitol Hill. It has over 55,000 
members and an annual budget exceeding $15 million.97 By the mid-1990s it was 
considered to be the second most powerful lobby in the United States.98 It is a highly 
centralised organisation, dedicated to securing the unconditional support o f both the 
executive and legislature for what the Israeli government conceives o f as the country’s 
interests. In this endeavour, the lobby maintains daily contact with members of the 
administration, Senators and representatives. These contacts serve a dual purpose. 
Firstly, they act as a valuable source o f information about policies affecting Israel prior to 
an official announcement by the American government.99 This provides the opportunity 
for early intervention to harmonise American and Israeli positions or to counsel Israel on 
what it can realistically expect to gain from Washington.100 David Bar-Ilan, the Israeli 
director of communications under the Netanyahu government, asserted that a crucial 
reason for the lobby’s success is its timing. It is not enough to be pro-Israeli, you have to 
know when and where and how101 to make your power truly felt.
Secondly, regular contact with decision-making personnel provides Israel’s supporters 
with the access necessary to apply pressure to steer policy to what the Israeli government
i n?asserts to be Israel’s advantage and to secure favours from Congress. For example, in 
1985, when the Reagan administration considered selling arms to Jordan and Saudi 
Arabia, Aipac began the attack long before the administration even announced its 
intention to sell the arms. It used a time-tested formula: “get insider information on the 
proposals, give them to the press of friendly Congressmen and use the resulting publicity 
to generate opposition.”103 The power o f the lobby was such that the arms sale was 
vetoed before the administration even submitted it as a bill to be debated by Congress.
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This phenomenon is partly attributable to the “law of anticipated reaction”104 whereby the 
mere existence of the lobby is enough to encourage Congress to adopt a pro-Israeli line 
based on the untested assumption that the proposed action would ignite major protests.
The perceived power of the pro-Israel lobby is reinforced by the perceived importance of 
the American Jewish vote. Walter Etyan wrote that Israel’s security rests on two pillars, 
the army and the American Jewish community. He quotes an Israeli spokesman who 
explained to a state department official that “[t]he Almighty placed massive oil deposits 
under Arab soil. It is our good fortune that God placed five million Jews in America.”105 
The emphasis assigned to the American Jewish vote is perhaps surprising when one 
considers how relatively few Jews there are in America. On the other hand, in terms of 
pure numbers, the fact that America is home to 5.5 million Jews constituting only 3 
percent of the population106 conceals the actual weight o f the American Jewish vote. The 
intense concern and political activity of this relatively small sector of the population 
compensates for lack of numbers and is a major source of strength for several reasons.
Firstly, the American Jewish population is not equally distributed throughout the country 
but is highly concentrated in key electoral states. Jewish influence is strongest in states
107where Jews provide the critical mass of voters. In New York 12 percent o f eligible 
voters are Jewish, in New Jersey 6 percent and in California 3 percent.108 Even more 
crucially, the Jewish population is concentrated in the politically most important zones of 
those states. More than 90 percent o f New York’s Jewish population reside in New York 
City, 70 percent of Pennsylvanian Jews live in Philadelphia and in Massachusetts, 68 
percent of Jews reside in Boston.109 As the number of representatives a state is allocated
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is determined by the size of its population, in electoral terms these states have greater 
weight than many others because of their large number of state representatives. The state 
of California can nominate 45 representatives. These factors have a multiplier effect on 
the potency of the Jewish vote both locally and nationally.110 For example, California 
hosts some 970,000 Jews, who represent 2.9 percent of the state’s population but a full 6 
percent of the electorate, according to a 2000 Los Angeles Times exit poll.111 Secondly, 
American Jews are highly politicised. In the 1960s and 1970s, the time period o f two of 
the forthcoming case studies, more than 90 percent went to the polls in contrast to the rest 
o f the American population where almost half the eligible voters fail to cast their vote.112 
This had the effect of increasing the general weight of the Jewish vote by at least one 
percentage point and by a higher percentage in those states in which Jews are highly 
concentrated, rising to between 2 and 6 percent in New York City.113 Since political 
campaigning is a long-term endeavour where candidates seek to ingratiate themselves 
with politically organised groups, politicians have found it expedient to sensitise 
themselves to Jewish community feelings.114
Thirdly, the significance of the Jewish vote is further increased because it tends to be 
located at the centre of the electoral configuration. For while generally voting for the 
Democratic Party, in a close run race the Jewish vote can be the margin of victory or 
defeat, encouraging politicians to be responsive to the concerns of the Jewish 
community.115 In the 2000 presidential election, Florida was one of several "swing 
states" where Republicans and Democrats expended most of their energies, on the theory 
that these electorates could be swayed to either party. Joseph Lieberman’s potential to 
draw Florida Jews was cited as one of the reasons for his nomination.116 In any case, 
support for Israel is a strong motivational force for American Jews and increases their
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disposition to vote as a bloc for candidates considered to be pro-Israeli. During the 
Reagan presidency, opinion polls indicated that more than 70 percent of all Jews believed 
that “Jews should not vote for candidates who have a hostile attitude towards Israel.”117 
Jimmy Carter, who in 1976 captured 70 percent of the Jewish vote, secured less than 50 
percent in his re-election bid of 1980 because he was perceived by a portion of the Jewish 
electorate to be unsympathetic to Israel.118 However, irrespective of the factors outlined 
above, many Jews tend to vote in accordance with their other concerns, such as the 
education and standard o f living of themselves and their family.119
Israel has presented a radical test to the capacity of American exceptionalism to tolerate
ethnic activism in support o f a foreign state -  something it has been more unwilling to do
120for other ethnic groups such as the Irish and the Greeks. However, it is not only 
American Jews for whom Israel is an emotional issue, for Protestant Christians have also 
become increasingly vocal in their defence of the Jewish state.
Christian Evangelicals and the State o f  Israel
Given the numerically small Jewish population in the US, Israel has never relied solely 
on this community to maintain political and public support. This is because many non- 
Jewish citizens are also committed to the Israeli cause. While perceptions of Israel 
amongst the religious community are by no means uniform, a powerful tendency exists 
within many Protestant sects to see the Jews as ‘God’s chosen people’.121 The alliance of 
Israeli lobbyists and Christian Zionist fundamentalists, began in 1978 with the 
publication of a Likud plan to encourage fundamentalist churches to give their support to 
Israel. By 1980, there was an "International Christian Embassy" in Jerusalem; and in 
1985, a Christian Zionist lobby emerged at a "National Prayer Breakfast for Israel" whose 
principal speaker, Benjamin Netanyahu, later became Prime Minister o f Israel.122
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One of the most notable and numerically powerful organisations is the Christian 
Evangelicals, a movement with more than 40 million members. The majority of 
American Christians that align with Israel are members of the National Council of 
Churches (NCC) of Evangelical Fundamentalists, who adhere to a literal interpretation of 
the Bible and fervently believe that God himself wants Israel to take possession of all the 
Arab lands it can capture. For these Christians, support for Israel has little to do with the 
endorsement o f the government’s political strategies or the maintenance of the state as a 
safe haven for world Jewry. The relationship appears to be one of mutual convenience 
and is not founded on a confluence o f theological doctrine or spiritual belief. It is a 
working partnership based on circumstances o f a political and military nature, in which 
both parties are nationalistic, militaristic and advance a dogma centred on Israel and a 
cult o f land. By this I mean that the value and importance assigned to the biblical 
lands of Judea and Samaria, in the modem day Gaza Strip, was attributable to their 
religious significance.124 This confluence of interests is necessary purely because in 
religious terms the two movements are, from a theological perspective, worlds apart.125 
The religious characteristics of the Jewish state are based on strains of Judaism that 
regard Christian proselytising - a basic premise of fundamentalism -  as a profound threat 
to the existence o f the Jews as a community.126 Nevertheless, many people in Israel and 
amongst the American Jewish community believe that the Evangelicals offer an 
important source of political and economic support even if they take exception to the 
latter’s underlying motivations.
In the 1980s, during Reagan’s time in office, Irving Kristol, a Professor of Social 
Thought at the New York University Graduate School, urged American Jews to generate
additional support for Israel by forming an alliance with Jerry Falwell, the leading
1 ")1American Evangelical Fundamentalist. The Reverend Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority,
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one of the major political organisations of the New Christian Right,128 and other 
fundamentalist/evangelical political groups campaigned hard for Reagan in the run-up to 
both the 1980 and 1984 presidential elections. They portrayed Reagan as a defender of 
traditional Judeo-Christian values, in contrast to the Democrats who were depicted as 
agents of ‘secular humanism’129 - the sinister cabal supposedly ruining America.130 The 
power of the Religious Right reached its zenith under the Reagan administration when 
the President directly linked himself to the NCC and proclaimed 1983 “The Year of the 
Bible”.131 His appeal to the fundamentalists appeared to have translated into votes with 
22 million Christian fundamentalist and evangelicals shifting from a pro-Democratic 56- 
43% margin in 1976 to an 81-19% Republican sweep in 1984.132 The correlation 
between Reagan’s Christian evangelical beliefs and his support for Israel is unclear, but 
he is commonly portrayed as one o f the most staunchly pro-Israel presidents to occupy 
the White House.
Arab Americans and the pro-Arab Lobby
There is a danger in the above analysis in that the reader may draw the conclusion that 
the support of American society for Israel is beyond doubt. However, not all Americans 
share these feelings of empathy for the Jewish state, and the Arab Americans are one 
such group. The Arab American community had not traditionally been involved in 
political activity partly because of the more recent emigration of many o f its million and 
a half members and partly because o f their disparate origins.133 Intensified feelings of 
ethnic awareness amongst the Arab American community emerged in response to the 
1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars and the subsequent oil crisis this provoked.134 By the 
early 1980s, The Action Committee on American Arab Relations (ACAAR) and the 
Washington based National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA), the two main Arab
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lobbying bodies, were firmly established. The impact of these associations was limited 
because the Arab community is highly fragmented and lacks the unity and consensus of 
their Jewish counterparts on basic political and tactical issues.135 Internal problems 
hamper the Arab lobby’s efforts136 and their potential power is curtailed by their failure to
1 37agree amongst themselves. A former president of the NAAA, James Baroody 
concluded that:
We can’t represent the Arabs the way the Jewish lobby can represent Israel. The Israeli government 
has one policy to state, whereas we couldn’t represent the “Arabs” if we wanted to. They’re as 
different as the Libyans and Saudis are different or as divided as the Christian and Moslem 
Lebanese.”138
The acknowledged weakness within the political community of the Arab lobby vis-a-vis 
the pro-Israel lobby is demonstrated by the following example. In 1988 John Sununu, an 
American o f Arab origin, had to declare that he did not harbour anti-Jewish sentiment 
when he was chosen as a candidate for the position of White House Chief of Staff under 
president-elect George Bush.139 It is inconceivable that an American Jew, in the same 
position, would be called upon to make a similar pledge in relation to the Arabs. 
However, this gap began to close and in the mid-1990s, for the first time in history, a US 
President, Bill Clinton addressed the NAAA.140
In economic terms, the Arab contribution to the US economy is far more important than 
that of Israel, but the Arabs have failed to appreciate how to exercise their annual 
contribution o f $27 billion as economic leverage to achieve their political objectives.141 
In contrast, American businessmen have long since realised that being pro-Arab is not a
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precondition for making money in the Arab world and therefore have no particular 
economic interest in lobbying Congress to adopt a more favourable policy toward the 
Palestinians and the Arab states.142 The minimal involvement o f many Arab Americans 
in domestic politics is partly attributable to the perceptibly undemocratic nature of the 
Arab states as well as their inadequate understanding o f how to manipulate the American 
democratic process to their advantage. Many Arabs do not appreciate, because o f their 
limited experience of democratic politics, that even a superpower is amenable to outside 
intervention and domestic pressure.143 The Arabs are also hindered by the cultural divide 
between themselves and many Americans, by internal disputes and the tendency o f Arab 
governments and the State Department to bypass Congress and conduct business through 
American embassies in Arab capitals.144
Limitations o f  Domestic Political Influences on Foreign Policy Decision Making 
Domestic politics have the potential to influence policy toward Israel in a myriad of 
ways, but in reality this potential is limited to constraining the policy alternatives open to 
the Executive, not determining his course of action. As a result o f domestic and 
congressional pressure, a president will generally not be overtly anti-Israeli, will ensure 
the regional balance of power continues to favour Israel and will not force its government 
to make concessions in the Arab-Israeli peace process that cannot be justified to the 
population at large. It should not however be construed that Israel has free rein to 
demand anything it wants from Washington and that it is immune from any kind of 
pressure. As Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco pointed out in 1970, the American 
“national interest goes beyond any one state in the area”145 and successive 
administrations have exerted pressure on Israel to advance Washington’s perception of 
the national interest. In 1956 Eisenhower forced an Israeli withdrawal from the Suez 
Canal, in 1973 Nixon insisted that Israel allow supplies to reach the encircled Egyptian 
army and in 1981 Reagan proceeded with the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia despite 
virulent pressure to the contrary. Similarly, in 1991 Bush Sr. pressured Israel to adopt a
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policy o f non-retaliation during the Gulf War and in 2002 Bush Jr. set out his “road map” 
to peace which the Likud government strongly objected to. However, Israel can be 
assured that a US president will never knowingly take action that will threaten Israel’s 
fundamental security interests.
Public opinion, as reflected in opinion polls, does influence American foreign policy but 
often in very indirect ways. Politicians are more likely to be responsive to their 
perceptions o f the overall public mood as opposed to reacting to preferences on specific 
issues. In the sphere of foreign affairs the public mood is often very volatile and can 
vacillate between interventionism and isolationism.146 Yet with regard to the Arab-Israeli 
dispute, public opinion has remained relatively constant, favouring the Israeli cause 
above the several causes of the Arabs.147 It is this generally high level o f public support 
for Israel and popular distrust of the Arab states that has set the tone for America’s 
Middle East policy and influenced the government’s approach to the region.148 But what 
is the origin o f this positive perception of Israel and negative image of the Arab world, 
and how does it relate to America’s perceptions of its broader values and interests in the 
world?
Defining Political Culture
Since political culture is but one dimension o f culture, it seems appropriate first to 
elucidate the latter concept. The term culture generally encompasses the customs and 
civilisation of a particular time or people and embraces widely shared ideas o f what is 
and is not regarded as socially acceptable, as expressed through social, religious and 
educational institutions and other forms o f social interaction. A society’s culture is also
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expressed through literature and the graphic arts, music, the press and other forms of 
media. While cultural expression is often to be found in a common understanding of the 
meanings of terms, these may be altered under pressure of experience, contact with other 
societies and scientific and geographical discovery. In sum, culture may be defined as 
“systems of meaning, ... including not only the beliefs and values of social groups, but 
also their language, forms of knowledge and common sense, as well as the material 
products, interactional practices, rituals, and ways of life established by these.” 149 In this 
sense, to quote Raymond Williams, culture is expressed in the “whole way of life” 150 of a 
society. It is precisely because culture permeates virtually all aspects of life, that it is 
through an understanding of the culture o f a society that we can understand decision­
makers’ responses to both national and international events. As Clifford Geertz explains: 
“culture is not a power, something to which social events, behaviours, institutions, or 
processes can be casually attributed; it is a context, something in which they can be 
intelligibly described.”151 For the purposes o f this thesis, which explores the influence of 
beliefs and perceptions on foreign policy decision-making, culture will be defined as the 
ideas, values and images which are transmitted from one generation to another and serve 
to shape the way of life of the society.
It follows therefore, that political culture is that aspect of social experience that focuses 
on the political dimension of a society, shaping the political system and framework of 
political ideas. To understand political culture therefore, it is necessary first to define 
politics. The word ‘politics’ is derived from the Greek word for government of the city 
state and is concerned with government, rule, regulation or authority. A political arena is 
a social framework in which the structure of authority, and the purposes, procedures or 
priorities of government of the society are debated and contested. In its narrowest 
interpretation, politics is the science and art o f government. It is an activity or process 
under formal government as in a cabinet meeting, a parliament or a local council. In its 
broader connotations politics is non-violent contention within an ordered framework and
149 Sharon Hays, “Structure and Agency and the sticky problem of culture”, Sociological Theory 12(1), 
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can occur in any social situation, so that one can speak of the politics of the classroom or 
office politics.152
Political culture refers to the ideologies, beliefs, values, attitudes, opinions, institutions, 
operational norms and methodologies governing political behaviour and which give 
structure and coherence to a political system. As such it may serve either to sustain and 
promote an existing political framework or to undermine one. The concept of political 
culture is not a new phenomenon in political discourse. It has a long history and was 
alluded to in differing forms by the prophets in their oracles and the historians and poets 
o f ancient Greece and Rome. Classical theorists including Plato, Aristotle, Montesquieu, 
Rousseau and de Tocqueville viewed custom, tradition, mores and religious practice as 
significant factors in the explanation o f political action. In Republic, Plato describes the 
political structure and characteristics o f the state as deriving from the values and 
experiences of the citizens. He writes that:
governments vary as the dispositions of men vary, and that there must be as many of one as there 
are o f the other. For we cannot suppose that States are made o f ‘oak and rock’ and not out of the 
human natures which are in them.153 
Classical theorists, therefore, tended to regard political culture as a given, something 
inherited and acquired from a historical or traditional approach to the ‘good society’ and 
its attainment. In The Social Contract, Rousseau highlighted the importance o f political 
culture by claiming it has independent authority because it is akin to a law that is 
“engraved on the hearts of the citizens. This forms the real constitution of the state ... 
and insensibly replaces authority by force of habit.”154
In contrast, modem sociologists influenced by the Marxist tradition have tended to see 
political culture as part of the ‘superstructure’, largely constmcted, manufactured and
151 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973) p. 15.
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manipulated by what C. Wright Mills called ‘The Power Elite’155 to produce a compliant 
mass population which accepts its subordination to the power holders as ‘natural’, part of 
the eternal social order and unchallengeable. To Gramsci, bourgeois rule was at its most 
successful (as in the US) when the majority of the people internalised philosophies, 
sciences, legal and sociological theories propagated by the hegemon, that is the dominant 
forces in society, and came to see them as common sense.156 “The bourgeois class poses 
itself as an organism in continuous movement, capable of absorbing the entire society, 
assimilating it to its own cultural and economic level. The entire function o f the state has 
been transformed: the state has become an ‘educator.’157 Barrington Moore puts the 
position more starkly.
Culture or tradition is not something that exists outside of or independently of individual human 
beings living in society. Cultural values do not descend from heaven to influence the course of  
history. ... To maintain and transmit a value system, human beings are punched, bullied, sent to 
jail, thrown into concentration camps, cajoled, bribed, made into heroes, encouraged to read 
newspapers, stood up against a wall and shot, and sometimes even taught sociology. To speak 
of cultural inertia is to overlook the concrete interests and privileges that are served by 
indoctrination, education, and the entire complicated process of transmitting culture from one 
generation to the next.158
For him, the ‘continuity’ o f identity, affinity and animosity depends on the mechanisms 
of selection, amnesia, reformulation and invention manipulated by the powerful.
Yet the notion that a political culture can be entirely manufactured from above and 
imposed on an unwitting population has been discredited by the fall of the Soviet Union 
and the collapse of Communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe. Religious values, 
patriotism, habit and tradition play such a significant role in determining political 
structure and legitimacy that not even the most persistent propaganda machines o f the
155 In American society, C. Wright Mills describes the power elite as the leading men in the high military, 
the corporate executives and the political directorate. For an in-depth discussion see C. Wright Mills, 
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Soviet Union could completely overcome. This is because education or even re­
education is not an antidote to culture159 and “[i]f the law cannot change culture then 
culture operates as the defining limit of government power.”160
In the 1960s and 1970s, theorists such as Almond, Verba and MacIntyre began to rethink 
the concept of political culture161 arguing that traditions of beliefs and practices are what 
bind a society together within a framework of a common language, rules o f life and 
techniques of discourse. Though this might appear to be a reversion to the ideas of the 
classical theorists referred to above it was not, for these theorists saw political culture as 
the product of reciprocal interaction between history and current politics and between the 
elites and the masses. For them what was significant in a democracy, was the diverse and 
complex origins of opinion formation on policy issues and the often competing agenda of 
governments, political parties, businesses, interest groups, lobbies, churches and the 
media in manipulating minds.
As against such approaches there are rational choice theorists who would deny altogether 
the importance of cultural predispositions. For them calculations o f interest take 
precedence. Richard Rogowski claims that there are clearly defined and, more 
importantly, rational relationships between socio-economic, ethnic and religious interests 
and political structure, which the political culture literature fails to identify.163 While this 
may be true, perceptions of what constitutes a rational act are based on pre-existing ideas 
and beliefs and as not all societies share the same beliefs, rationality is not always defined 
in the same way. For example, in October 1973, Sadat launched a war against Israel 
which the US had not anticipated since in its calculations of military strength, Egypt
158 Barrington Moore, The Social Origins of Democracy & Dictatorship: Lord and Peasant in the Making o f  
the Modem World (London: Allen Lane, 1967) p. 486.
159 Loren Baritz, Backfire: A History of How American Culture Led us into Vietnam and Made us Fieht the 
Wav We Did (Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press, 1998) p. 331.
160 Barbara Cruikshank, “Cultural Politics: Political Theory and the Foundations of Democratic Order” in 
Jodi Dean (ed.), Cultural Studies and Political Theory (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 2000) p. 
67.
161 See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A study in moral theory (London: Duckworth, 1985).
162 John Gibbens, “Contemporary Political Culture: an Introduction” in Gibbens, J. (ed.), Contemporary 
Political Culture: politics in a post-modem age (London: Sage, 1989) pp. 3-6.
163 Ronald Rogowski, A Rational Theory of Legitimacy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976)
72
could not win, and therefore such an act was considered irrational. However, Sadat’s 
interpretation of rationality differed from that of the Nixon administration and as 
Kissinger later noted in his memoirs, “[Ojur definition of rationality did not take 
seriously the notion of starting an unwinnable war to restore self-respect.”164 Here, of 
course, Kissinger was thinking entirely in terms of military ratios and dispositions. 
Others, however, might claim that since the war produced a stalemate and US 
intervention to broker a cease-fire between the parties, Egypt had not lost the war because 
it had won US patronage -  a not inconsiderable achievement.
As has been shown, political culture is an amorphous concept beset with definitional 
ambiguities that does not provide the researcher with a systematic theory o f political 
action that can be subjected to the scrutiny o f scientific rigour. Nonetheless, political 
culture does offer a set of variables that may be used in the construction of theory.
The Construction and Development of Political Culture
As defined here, political culture evolves over time and “is the product o f both the 
collective history of a political system and the life histories of the individuals who 
currently make up the system.”165 It is therefore, as rooted as much in private 
experiences as in public events and it is what people collectively make of their history 
that gives each society a distinct political culture, giving meaning, predictability and form 
to the political process. But of course, the shaping of political culture is complex. For 
popular political attitudes and sentiments are variegated, some too ephemeral to play a 
significant role in the socialisation process. By contrast, some apparently non-political 
beliefs such as orientations towards time, human trust and camaraderie and a belief in 
future progress may be critical in shaping political culture, because they exert an 
influence on the nature of society.
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But political culture is shaped not merely by domestic factors but also by interaction in a 
world society that is increasingly inter-dependent despite the diverse cultural heritage of 
its constituent members. In an era of global communications and media, it is no longer 
possible for a society to remain entirely isolated from the outside world, as the opening 
up of twentieth century China and Albania demonstrate. As cultural dialogue between 
societies expands, preconceptions and understandings of the world and interpretations of 
reality cannot remain unaffected. For example, when an Islamic culture is challenged on 
the issue of human rights, it has to try to locate the concept of human rights within its 
own structure of meaning. While many Islamists may reject the concept as alien, at the 
very least, the cross-cultural dialogue obliges it to define itself against this alien concept.
The notion that a political culture can be reshaped by its exposure to the vicissitudes of 
global politics is thrown into especially sharp relief as countries face threats o f secession 
from aggrieved minorities. It was in 1941 that Winston Churchill told parliament that he 
had not become prime minister to “preside over the liquidation o f the British Empire” -  a 
theme taken up by L. S. Amery, when introduced to thunderous applause to the 
Conservative party conference o f 1947, as the “greatest imperialist in our midst.” Yet 
despite the evident popularity of imperialism, in the same year, 1947, the jewel in the 
crown o f the British Empire was partitioned into India and Pakistan, Burma was to gain 
independence the following year and the liquidation of the Empire that had seemed 
unthinkable only a generation before was being welcomed in Britain. What had begun 
with different interpretations of British political culture - the Conservatives wanting to 
retain an Empire they conceived of as providing stability, education and enlightenment to 
backward peoples, Labour interpreting democracy in terms o f granting independence to 
indigenous populations, was ultimately to end in a grudging consensus .
Adaptation and Change at Different Levels of Political Culture
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As has been exemplified, political culture is in part derived from the way in which a 
shared experience is interpreted. Such interpretations constitute an ‘irreducible core’ of 
fundamental beliefs that form the intersubjective meanings which constitute a society’s 
identity. They make the social life of a society distinctive by expressing the kinds of 
common values associated with a sense of national identity which large numbers of 
citizens share. Such values concern the nature of society, the obligation of the individual 
to that society and the relationship o f a society to other societies. The beliefs they 
encompass include culturally defined concepts of historical progress and perceptions of 
the way in which the world works. It is through these beliefs that a society comes to 
understand itself and the world of which it is a part.
This sense o f belonging is the crucial element in an overarching framework Brian Girvin 
has termed a macro-political culture. The macro-level ‘establishes the rules o f the game’ 
that the majority of participants consider acceptable. In Girvin’s view, macro-level 
political culture is the least susceptible to change or adaptation particularly in the short to 
medium-term. For him, the presence o f an overarching political culture enables social 
conflict to be mediated without the disintegration of either the political culture or the 
shared sense o f identity. Thus, serious political upheaval as experienced in the United 
States during the 1960s did not culminate in the disintegration of the system, in contrast 
to the former Soviet Union where the absence of a shared identity led to the collapse of 
the polity.
In contrast, Girvin explains that at the micro-level of the political culture, numerous sub­
cultures are evident. A sub-culture is a significant regional, class, ethnic, religious, 
occupational, gender-based or other cultural variant subsumed within an overarching 
framework. Such sub-cultures are often shaped and defined by macro-political cultural 
beliefs and orientations and are held together by a common source of values that inform 
those beliefs. The existence of sub-cultures does not invalidate the notion o f an 
overarching political culture. It does mean however, that an apparently homogeneous 
political culture includes diverse sub-cultures not incompatible with the wider cultural
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framework. Changes at the micro-level can create a climate in which fresh ideas o f what 
is possible, desirable and necessary can emerge.
The macro-political culture and micro-culture begin to interact and interconnect at what 
Girvin called the meso-level.166 While the macro-level is relatively stable, the meso-level 
is susceptible to influence from political developments and social evolution that occur at 
the micro-level. These changes are gradually incorporated into the meso-level or even 
the macro-level of the political culture. To apply Clifford Geertz’s analogy, “culture 
moves rather like an octopus ... not all at once in a smoothly coordinated synergy o f parts 
... but by disjointed movements of this part, then that, and now the other which somehow 
cumulate to directional change.”167 Often the process of the rise and fall o f various 
elements within a political culture can be equated with the rise and fall of the use of 
common myths and symbols which express and elucidate core beliefs and values.
Myths & Symbols
Cultural representation, that is the visible representation of a culture, is one of the most 
pervasive ways in which the government o f a society can reinforce the nation’s political 
culture in the minds of its citizens. Symbols and myths are among the most common
1 fillforms of cultural representation. Symbols, such as flags, anthems, historical 
monuments and ceremonies, provide a form of political cultural expression on which 
ideas of ‘national identity’ are constructed. Their importance resides in the fact that they 
embody meaning and are the “material vehicles of thought”.169 Symbols provide a 
reference point170 and play a role in the perception, understanding, judgement and 
manipulation of the world. In many new nations or authoritarian regimes a charismatic
166 See B. Girvin, “Change and Continuity in Liberal Political Culture” in J. Gibbens, ed., Contemporary 
Political Culture: Politics in a Post-Modern Age (London: Sage, 1989).
167 Geertz, op. cit. p. 408.
168 Chris Jenks, Culture (London & New York: Routledge, 1993) p. 53.
169 Geertz, op. cit. p. 362.
170 David E. Apter, “Ideology and Discontent” in David E. Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent (London & 
New York: The Free Press, 1964) p. 62.
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leader may survive politically as much by being regarded as a symbol of collective 
national identity as by achieving concrete goals. For example, Yassir Arafat symbolises 
for many the embodiment of Palestine, while Nelson Mandela symbolised the anti­
apartheid movement in South Africa. Both leaders have been widely represented as the 
personification of nations in the process of coming into being. Mythicised figures can 
also personify the nation - for example, Marianne of France and Germania as well as 
cartoon stereotypes such as Uncle Sam and John Bull.171 Symbols are of great 
significance to any culture, since as Clifford Geertz explains, they “are felt to sum up, for 
those for whom they are resonant, what is known about the way the world is, the quality 
o f the emotional life it supports, and the way one ought to behave while in it.”172
However, symbols only have meaning if they have resonance for a population. In this 
sense it is necessary to contextualise symbolic references in order to locate meaning. For 
example, a red card shown by a referee on a football pitch has a very definite meaning 
within the context of the sport. The red card itself does not have intrinsic meaning, but 
has been assigned a particular meaning within a given context. Symbols and traditions 
are an important part of nation building because they assert common heritage and cultural
11'Kkinship. As such they are incorporated into everyday life and are a representation of a 
community’s mental construction of its place in the world.174 The Statue of Liberty 
represents America as the land of freedom and liberty, but in so doing, is seen by some to 
represent the US in opposition to the rest of the world, which is by implication less free. 
Many symbols are culturally specific, be they religious, philosophical, aesthetic, 
scientific or ideological. For example, the cross or crucifix is of symbolic importance to 
Christians while the crescent is of symbolic importance to Muslims. At the same time, 
symbols are a visual representation of a belief system that provides a template or
171 Eric Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions,” in Hobsbawm, E. & Ranger, T. (eds), The 
Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 7.
172 Geertz. op. cit. p. 126.
173 Anthony Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin Books, 1991) p. 16-17.
174 Apter (ed.), op. cit. p. 62.
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blueprint for organising social and psychological processes175 that transform individuals 
into members of a community.
In The Invention o f  Tradition, the historian Eric Hobsbawm claims that the nation is an 
artificial creation in so far as it “can be sited, planted and tended to a conscious
i n z
design.” The creation o f a nation’s apparently seamless history, a mix of fabrication 
and reality, is designed to create a type o f nationalist sentiment and unity. He writes that:
The history which [becomes] part of a fund of knowledge or the ideology o f nation, state or 
movement is not what has actually been preserved in popular memory, but what has been selected, 
written, pictured, popularised and institutionalised by those whose function it is to do so.177
This is true with regard to the American experience, where the dominant culture is based 
upon the positive values of liberty, freedom and democracy as symbolised by the 
American flag and not the past institution o f African-American slavery. Such symbols 
and myths can be created and manipulated by those with access to political power to 
provide a sense o f unity and shared identity within a society to maintain political
178integration and stability. In the process, elites may fabricate traditions, ceremonials, 
institutions and structures that are in effect quite novel but which appear to be or are of 
ancient lineage.179 For example, the origins of the traditional British Christmas 
celebrations with Christmas trees and Santa Claus are a product o f the nineteenth century 
and are not steeped in centuries of British history as is often assumed. Prince Albert, who 
fondly remembered earlier Christmases in Germany, imported into Victorian England 
this ‘British tradition,’180 while Charles Dickens in A Christmas Carol provided a further 
sentimental overlay. Similarly, the world renowned Scottish kilt was invented in the 
1730s by an English cloth merchant, while the tartan colour that is supposed to indicate 
allegiance to a particular clan was designed for an early nineteenth century pageant.181 
One of the most recent ‘invented British traditions’ is the reconstruction of a
175 Ibid.. p. 62.
176 Hobsbawm, op. cit. p. 107.
177 Ibid-, PP- 1-14.
178 William Bloom. Personal Identity. National Identity and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990) p. 81.
179 Hobsbawm, op. cit. p. 1.
180 Stem, op. cit. p. 106.
181 Ibid.. p. 106.
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Shakespearean theatre in Southwark, by the River Thames. The theatre, while marketed 
as ‘Shakespeare’s Globe’ is yards from the original site, is built with modem materials 
and includes safety features never dreamed of in Elizabethan England.182 Nevertheless, 
such ‘invented traditions’ in Hobsbawm’s words, play a role in shaping collective
1 Jttidentity and culture, their significance lying “precisely in their undefined 
universality.” 184
Elite and Mass
This thesis adopts the view that there is a mutually reinforcing role between individuals 
and the collective in the formation both o f political culture and foreign policy, although it 
does accept the prevalent conclusion o f the literature on political culture or belief systems
1 BSthat elites play a particularly central role in the creative synthesis of political culture.
As Philip Converse asserts: “The shaping of belief systems o f any range into apparently
logical wholes that are credible to large numbers of people is an act o f creative synthesis
186characteristic of only a minuscule proportion of any population. In this vein Gellner 
argued that meaningful national identity emerged out of an elite high culture o f which the
1 87masses were passive recipients. This elite group is both highly educated and politically
active. Ideas, as Max Weber insisted, must be carried by powerful social groups to have
1 88powerful social effects. In the United States, the elite refers to the policy-making elite, 
those actively engaged in political lobbying and those journalists, business executives, 
intellectuals or religious leaders that contribute to the cultural dialogue out of which 
relevant values and attitudes are developed. It is this elite that attempts to resolve the 
dissonant elements within the political culture which are continually arising as a result of
182 Ibid.. p. 106.
183 Anthony Smith, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Polity Press,
1995) pp. 179-80.
184 Hobsbawm, op. cit. p. 11.
185 Habermas, J. Legitimating Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975) p. 105.
186 Philip Converse, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mas Publics” in Apter, D. (ed.) Ideology and 
Discontent. (New York: Free Press, 1964) p. 211.
187 See E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).
188 Asher Arian, Ilan Talmud & Tamar Hermann National Security and Public Opinion in Israel (Boulder: 
Westview, 1988) p. 16.
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new realities. It is they that lead the process of reinterpreting symbols and myths. It is 
therefore to their discourse that we must turn in order to gain an awareness of this 
process.
Nevertheless, one cannot wholly detach the elite political culture from the larger cultural 
environment, as described in the previous section. According to Asher Arian, politicians 
and citizens tend to emerge from the same political culture. At least at the level of 
general orientation, national traumas and collective memories are widely shared. 
Therefore, when viewing international problems both elites and masses will be 
conditioned by similar dispositions.189 Thus, no elite can simply manipulate the mass and 
impose its values; rather its values must, in some sense, resonate with the broader public 
mood. In a democracy like the US, the elites may attempt to shape minds, but at the 
same time they have to act within a framework of generally accepted ideas. If the ideas 
o f the elites fail to resonate with the mood of the country, as occurred when Woodrow 
Wilson tried to take America into the League of Nations, they risk losing their power. As 
Aldous Huxley notes, “Propaganda ... may give force and direction to successive 
movements of popular feeling and desire; but it does not do much to create these 
movements. The propagandist is a man who canalises an already existing stream. In the 
land where there is no water, he digs in vain.”190
While the elites cannot impose an alien value system on a population, one of the most 
important ways in which political culture will filter into policy is through the 
consciousness of the decision-making elite. Leaders such as Napoleon, Churchill and 
Hitler and statesmen like Kissinger played crucial roles in the conduct of their state’s 
foreign policies. The conglomeration of their existential and instrumental values 
informed a policy strategy that was used to define objectives and provide a framework for 
implementation. This strategy may have been constrained by outside factors and 
eventually abandoned, but it nevertheless provided a workable, if temporary, framework 
for action. Within any elite, different strategies will exist representing different emphases
189 Ibid.. p. 16.
190 Quoted in S. Welch The Concept of Political Culture (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993) p. 7.
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and different values within a political culture. The predominance of one strategy over 
another will depend not only on the official power wielded by the various members of the 
elite within the policy-making structure, but also on their ability to make their strategy 
appear successful in achieving common overarching goals and values.
Political culture will also impact on foreign policy through its role in legitimating the 
decision-making elite and their policies. Francis Fukuyama explained that in order to act 
effectively, even an authoritarian ruler needs genuine support from at least some elements 
of the population.191 Subordinates that enact the will o f the dictator are necessary to 
enable a regime to implement its policies. In the realm of foreign affairs, political culture 
enables the elite to legitimise its foreign policy to its citizens or at the very least to its 
active political supporters and domestic political allies.
Although the elite may be viewed as the most important element in the generation and 
construction o f political culture, their innovations will only be successful in legitimising 
policy to the public if they resonate with the mass by tapping into pre-existing themes. 
As Henry Kissinger acknowledged: “No foreign policy -  no matter how ingenious -  has 
any chance of success if it is bom in the minds of a few and carried out in the hearts of 
none.”192 Eric Hobsbawm asserted that the most successful leaders exploit traditions that 
meet a genuinely felt, though not necessarily clearly articulated or understood need.193 
The masses are therefore attracted by what the elite appears to stand for, even if this does 
not always represent the true motivation behind its policies. Public opinion has been 
shown to be susceptible to manipulation by the elite, yet conversely, public opinion can 
also act as a constraint on policy either of itself or because decision-makers perceive it as 
such. While public opinion does not determine policy it delineates the option parameters 
of decision-makers.194 For example, the decision-making elite’s perception o f the British 
public as highly pacifist and generally opposed to a military conflict with Germany in the 
early 1930s, was a significant inducement for the government to follow a policy of
191 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992) p. 15.
192 DSB 16 September 1974, p. 377.
193 Hobsbawm. op. cit. p. 123.
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appeasement with Hitler until 1938. It took a number of years, combined with the 
demonstration of the futility of its diplomacy, to psychologically prepare the British 
people for war.195
To validate the claim that political culture plays a role in influencing decision-making, it 
has to be demonstrated that a coherent set of ideas about politics and the political system 
are passed from generation to generation. As Talcott Parsons explained, the influence of 
political culture resides in the fact that it is transmitted, learned and shared.196 Firstly, the 
transmission of political culture means that it constitutes a heritage or a social tradition; 
secondly, it is learned and is not a genetic inheritance; and thirdly, that it is shared and is 
broadly speaking, common to the whole society.197 It is to an analysis of the process of 
political socialisation i.e. o f the way political attitudes are transmitted from one 
generation to another, that we now turn.
Political Socialisation
The process through which a community transmits, from one generation to another, its 
social and intellectual character,198 that is the particular knowledge, attitudes and 
judgements that affect politics, is referred to as political socialisation.199 In its broadest 
sense, socialisation is, as defined by Irvin Child, a
whole process by which an individual, bom with behavioural potentialities o f enormously wide 
range, is led to develop actual behaviour which is confined within a more narrow range — the range 
of what is customary and acceptable for him according to the standards of his group.200
194 A. Arain, M. Shamir & R. Ventura, “Public Opinion and Political Change” Comparative Politics vol. 24, 
no. 3 p. 317.
195 Wilson & Pronay eds., The Political Re-Education of Germany and Her Allies After World War II 
(London: Croom Helm, 1985).
196 Talcott Parsons, The Social System (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951) p. 15.
197 Ibid.. p. 15.
198 Apter, op. cit. p. 43.
199 James F. Barnes, Marshall Carter & Max J. Skidmore, The World o f Politics: A Concise Introduction 
2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984) p. 33.
200 Irvin Child, “Socialisation” in Lindzey Gardner (ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology Vol. II, (Boston: 
McGraw-Hill, New York: Oxford University Press, 1954) p. 655.
82
Behavioural patterns are infinitely variable, but regularities can be imposed through the 
learning process and the induction, or some would say indoctrination, of new members 
into a society’s preferred way of behaviour. Political socialisation is crucial to the 
longevity of a nation because, as Emile Durkheim explains:
The stability of any social system and authority of its government is not purely based in 
structural constraints and balance, but on social norms which were taken into the character of 
societies members and created a ‘collective conscience.201
Political socialisation occurs through both manifest and latent processes. Manifest 
socialisation is the formal and overt learning of political culture and tends to occur first 
through the family, formal education and the mass media. Here basic political attitudes 
tend to be acquired, such as loyalty toward society and nation and recognition of 
authority. This is generally followed by the acquisition of more specific attitudes 
towards politics, such as identification with a party and attitudes towards a specific 
policy. Today this includes observations o f the behaviour and conduct of political 
figures, party political broadcasts and the impact of the image politicians convey via the 
mass media. One common feature o f this method of socialisation is the repetition of 
simple ideas -  American ‘freedom’ and British ‘fair play’. The second process is that of 
latent socialisation. This involves the more subtle acquisition of values and attitudes that 
are politically significant through experience in non-political situations. For example, 
individuals may acquire an attitude towards forms of authority from interaction with 
parents or teachers, or from the hierarchical structure of a business corporation or firm.
Classical scholars emphasised the role of parents, teachers, priests and other authority 
figures in the socialisation process. Traditionally the family played the principle role in 
the socialisation process and the transmission of values and beliefs across the 
generations, although this could conceivably change with the disintegration of the nuclear
201 Emile Durkheim, cited in William Bloom, Personal Identity and International Relations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990) p. 14
202 William Lyons, John M. Scheb II & Lilliard E. Richardson, Jr., American Government: Politics & 
Political Culture (Minneapolis/St. Paul, New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco: West Publishing Co.,
1995) p. 175.
203 Lyons, Scheb II & Richardson, Jr., op. cit. p. 175.
83
family. Children tended to leam through their parent’s identification with specific 
groups. This has been particularly true in terms of religious education where children 
soon leam that ‘we are’ people of Catholic, Muslim, Jewish or some other faith.204 These 
messages were often instrumental in encouraging children to form a religious orientation 
that was supposed to last a lifetime. Parents’ views have also been influential in the 
political context, shaping their children’s identification and perceptions of the political 
parties. In the US, a parent’s expression of the view that ‘Democrats are good in the field 
of foreign affairs’ or that ‘Republicans are the party of low taxation’ can provide the 
cognitive basis on which their children receive and process information. Similarly, if the 
child heard statements such as ‘They don’t care about people like us,’ with reference to a 
political party, this could form the basis of their subsequent affective reactions to 
politics.205
But while children have tended to acquire political identification and attitudes towards 
authority from their parents, it was generally from the formal education system that they 
learned the rules and rituals o f the political system. Schools would transmit the values 
and attitudes of society and shape attitudes about unwritten rules of the political game. In 
Britain, traditional public schools have tried to instil values of public duty, informal 
political relations and the importance of hierarchical deference, as well as political 
integrity. The public education system has tended to reinforce affection for the political 
system and promote symbols o f national identity. In the United States, children begin 
by learning the prevalent interpretations o f the American Revolution and Civil War and 
to accept the symbols o f the state through the pledge o f allegiance to the American 
flag.207 By extension, political socialisation through the education system has been 
extended to all those who wish to become American citizens. New immigrants to the 
United States must attend citizenship classes and pass an examination about the history 
and government of the country before citizenship is granted.
204 Barnes, Carter & Skidmore, op. cit. p. 174.
205 Ibid.. p. 174.
206 Almond & Powell, op. cit. p. 43.
207 Barnes, Carter & Skidmore, op. cit. p. 175.
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Since the education system has been an important source of political socialisation, during 
times of regime change, it serves as the focal point of a new leader’s efforts to alter the 
public’s belief system. This adheres to the views of Marxist-inspired sociologists who 
argued that the present cannot be deduced from the past and that popular perceptions of 
the past have to be ‘constructed’, through the manipulation of symbols by the power elite 
and the shaping of mass opinion through history text books. For example, when the 
Nazis took power in Germany, school history textbooks were rewritten and mention of 
the Treaty of Versailles removed. Similarly, in the Soviet Union, the ‘cult of Stalin’ was 
propagated in the schools. Stalin’s work the Problems o f Leninism was required reading 
in schools and universities, while a volume on Stalin, the Liberator o f  Eastern & South- 
Eastern European People was translated into the relevant languages and distributed 
free.208
Through the process of political socialisation, decision-makers, like all citizens, are 
inducted into their society’s preferred way o f viewing the world and their beliefs are 
shaped by the cultural environment o f which they are a product. Political culture feeds 
into the foreign policy decision-making process because it provides the political and 
psychological environment through which decision-makers view the world. The 
psychological dimension of human behaviour, including the ideas, meanings and beliefs 
people hold o f the world, play a crucial role in determining action because they shape 
decision-makers’ perceptions of the external environment. Harold and Margaret Sprout 
analysed the way in which human behaviour depends upon perception. They pointed out 
that while the consequences of state behaviour can be understood predominantly in terms 
of the decision-makers’ operational environment, i.e. the world ‘out there’ the capabilities 
and intentions o f the relevant actors, must be understood in terms o f their psychological 
environment -  their beliefs about the world and other actors.209 “What matters in the 
process of policy-making is not conditions and events as they actually are (operational 
environment) but what the policy-maker imagine them to be (psychological
208 Geoffrey Stem, The Rise and Decline of International Communism (Aldershot: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Ltd., 1990) p. 139.
209 Harold and Margaret Sprout, Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International 
Politics (Princeton: Centre for International Studies, 1956) Introduction.
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environment.)” Decision-making may have unintended consequences when the
2||
operational and psychological environments diverge. Yet, merely by being bom into a 
society and cultural milieu we are conditioned to hold certain images of the world. The 
purpose o f an image is to provide a simplification and ordering of the external 
environment that makes it comprehensible to the individual. Such images are not static 
constructs but are adapted and refined when an individual brings opinions, interpretations 
and experience to bear.
In the United States, as in many societies, this process o f socialisation has perpetuated a 
predominant view of the world and of America’s place within it. Within American 
society a set of prevalent views or a communal way o f looking at the world may be said 
to exist and because certain notions have persisted through time we can talk of them in 
terms of a political culture. To fully appreciate American policy makers’ approach to 
foreign policy, their perception of their role in the world, coupled with the values and 
beliefs that underpin their actions, it is necessary to have a greater understanding o f both 
the American decision-making process and the basic elements of American political 
culture. It is to an analysis of the operation of the American political system and the 
content of American political culture that we now turn.
210 Ibid.. Introduction.
211 For a detailed discussion of perception and misperception in decision-making see Robert Jervis, 
Perception and Misperception in World politics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976) 
and Robert Axelrod Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1976).
212 John Volger, “Perspectives on the Foreign Policy System: Psychological Approaches”, in Michael 
Clarke & Brian White (eds.), Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach 
(Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1989), p. 136.
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Chapter 3
American Political Culture
The Evolution of American Political Culture
Whereas the first settlers were predominantly from the British isles, subsequent 
immigrants came from Continental Europe, Africa and Asia. Some settlers originated as 
slaves, while others came to escape war, poverty and religious persecution. Nonetheless, 
despite the considerable diversity of the peoples comprising it, the United States was able 
to develop an overarching political culture that has survived the centuries. One 
contributory factor was the desire o f virtually all the immigrants who remained in the 
colonies of their own volition to become Americans and to embrace what they 
understood to be the American way of life,1 apparently transcending the country’s vast 
size and geographical diversity. Yet even as an ‘American identity’ was under 
construction, the achievement of which is described below, the immigrants were never 
obliged to forego all traces of their original heritage. To be regarded as an American 
citizen may have required considerable conformity in overt behaviour; yet people were 
permitted within limits to preserve the religious beliefs and sense of national 
identification of their countries of origin,2 not least because the notion of being an 
‘American’ has always existed on the basis o f consent and was not intended to replace all 
other forms of identification.3 This is, o f course, how the notion of the ‘hyphenated 
American’ originated. At the same time, if  American society did not rest upon ethnic 
homogeneity, it did presume acceptance o f ‘a set of principles and ideas’4 about 
America’s place in the world. In effect the US was to become if not a ‘melting pot’ then 
a kind of ‘salad bowl’ of peoples.
1 Daniel J. Elazar, The American Mosaic: The Impact o f Space. Time. & Culture on American Politics 
(Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1994) p. 201.
2 Ibid.. p. 201.
3 Ibid.. p. 201.
4 P. M. Kattenburg, The Vietnam Trauma in American Foreign Policy. 1945-75 (New Brunswick: 
Transaction books, 1980) p. 69 ff. This is not to suggest that America is the only society that is defined by 
principles and ideas. It is the degree to which this has been the case in America when combined with its 
vast size and population diversity that makes the US somewhat exceptional in this regard.
As a consequence of the pattern of colonisation, in which immigrants tended to 
congregate in adjacent settlements, ghettos or shelters and continued to settle together 
when they or their descendants moved westward, regionalism and sectionalism have 
always been important forces in American politics, acting as a constraint on the actions of 
federal government, including its foreign policy. Over time, as one religious or ethnic 
group succeeded another in establishing their settlements in the same location, some 
regional cultural patterns were eroded or modified, while others were intensified. There 
was also some diminution in regional cultural difference because of geographical 
mobility between the states and changes in interests and attitudes.5 The tangible factors 
such as wealth and social status that contributed to the social and geographic separation 
of ethnic groups tended to diminish during the twentieth century. As third and fourth 
generation immigrants were assimilated into American society, their wealth and status 
often far exceeding those of their parents and grandparents, they tended to identify with 
people o f similar economic and social circumstance, rather than those of the same 
religious or ethnic origins. Such tendencies to homogenisation were also engendered by 
the increasing demand for national policy to tackle such global issues as the environment, 
international trade, terrorism and illegal immigration, affecting the nation as a whole and 
not just individual states.
Meanwhile, the transition from an individual-based to a more group orientated, but 
distinctively ‘American’ political culture was assisted by four factors. Firstly, the gradual 
development in American business of a corporate culture in which the idea o f a 
‘rationalised conformity’ in behavioural and spending patterns was prized, and loyalty to 
the firm was considered a prime virtue.6 Secondly, the growth in scope and influence of 
the mass media, national as well as regional, which had the effect o f both moulding and 
reflecting public opinion and shaping the flow o f information between the government 
and the people.7 The media contributed to the diminishing of significant regional and 
sectional differences and disparities o f view, as people in locations as diverse as Miami, 
Alabama, Seattle and Boston were able to watch the same programmes and read the same
5 Elazar American Federalism p. 106.
6 Vance Packard, The Hidden Persuaders (London: Longmans, 1962) p. 201.
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journals. Thirdly, the increasing use by commercial concerns, lobbyists and party 
politicians of psychoanalytic techniques designed to influence mass opinion, affect 
consumption patterns and shape or reshape domestic and foreign policy agendas. In 
drawing on the insights of Pavlov and conditioned reflexes, Freud and his father images 
and David Riesman and his conception of the modem American voter as a spectator- 
consumer of politics,9 Vance Packard spoke of ‘the hidden persuaders’, who sought to 
tap into ‘the fabric of men’s minds’, to condition the hidden emotions that motivate 
behaviour and to create a group consciousness which would make people “easier to 
guide, control, cope with and herd.”10 Motivation research, the field of study from which 
such techniques were derived, was originally used by advertisers to encourage the mass 
consumption o f their products. When subsequently employed by those with political 
agendas, it fed into the popular political culture and helped to mould a more collective 
concept of what it meant to be an American.11 Fourthly, the gradual increase in the 
power of the federal agencies to determine policy, often at the expense o f the state 
governments, contributed to a more uniform political culture. As the civil rights 
legislation o f the 1960s and beyond took effect and the federal courts prohibited the 
vestiges o f segregation and other violations o f minority rights hitherto in common
1 9practice in many of the southern states, the process of cultural homogenisation 
proceeded apace, and with it the refashioning of the American national identity to 
become much more collectively and nationally self aware. But while the above 
discussion reveals how American political culture came to permeate society it tells us 
little about the essence of that culture and it is to an analysis of its content that we now 
turn.
7 Peter Woll & Stephen J. Rockwell, American Politics and Realities (New York: Longman, 2000) p. 31.
8 Lyons, Scheb II & Richardson, Jr.. op. cit. p. 25.
9 Packard, op. cit. p. 201.
10 Ibid.. pp. 181-2.
11 The head of a Chicago research firm that conducted psychoanalytically orientated studies for 
merchandisers, Louis Cheskin, summed up motivation research as “the type of research that seeks to leam 
what motivates people in making choices. It employs techniques designed to reach the unconscious or 
subconscious mind because preferences generally are determined by factors of which the individual is not 
conscious ... Actually in the buying situation the consumer generally acts emotionally and compulsively, 
unconsciously reacting to the images and designs which in the subconscious are associated with the 
product.” Quoted in Ibid.. p. 8.
12 Lyons, Scheb II & Richardson Jr., op. cit. p. 25.
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Defining American Political C ulture
Culture plays a very significant part in US foreign policy, more so than in countries with
a longer and more complex political heritage. The establishment of an ‘American
political culture’ and the concept o f what it means to be an ‘American’ provided the
means through which a rootless society o f immigrants consolidated and retained its sense 
11
of identity. In America more than any other country, political speeches resonate with 
allusions to history and to God. The leaders of today exercise power, by making repeated 
references to the ideals of the Founding Fathers from which they seek to derive 
legitimacy. This reveals how great a role historical myth, images and metaphors play in 
American political life, both consciously and unconsciously. The interpretation o f this 
history acts as what Christopher Coker describs as a “strait-jacket, o f a political culture 
which is unyielding in its forcefulness and all-embracing in its scope”.14
The past continues to inform the present. Yet the past to which successive American 
politicians make appeal to win public support for their actions are not necessarily an 
accurate reflection of history. Often it is a past which Americans have not lived but 
which to an extent has been manufactured. For the United States, as Coker explained, 
can be attributed with not one past but three. The first depicts America as a unique 
country that is set apart and therefore has little to offer the world and no obligation 
towards it. The second portrays America as a country founded by Protestant 
fundamentalism from which it inherited a historical mission to redeem mankind from 
tyranny whether imposed by eighteenth century monarchs or twenty-first century 
commissars. The third views America as a country blessed with an abundance of natural 
resources and political liberty which has bestowed on it a duty to show the world that 
freedom can produce an efficient government and economic growth.15
Exceptionalism
13 Christopher Coker, Reflections on American Foreign Policy Since 1945 (London: Pinter, 1989) p. 1.
14 Ibid.. p. 2.
15 Ibid.. p. 4.
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The legacy of the Pilgrim Fathers and the unique development of the American nation 
created the image of America as a country apart, a model to be emulated, but destined to 
stand alone. This sense of exceptionalism was the product of the secularising of 
Calvinism and the belief in a divine dispensation in a land where nature had bred a purer 
more sterling individual -  the archetypal American.
The process of creating an ‘American’ identity began with the landing of the Pilgrim 
Fathers at Massachusetts Bay. The Pilgrims were highly religious, having fled to the 
colonies to escape religious persecution in England, and the laws and values o f the 
colonies they helped to shape were based on Biblical teachings and the literal 
interpretation of the Bible. As was discussed in Chapter One, the Puritans believed 
themselves to be creating a ‘New World’ in accordance with Biblical prophecy and 
tended to polarise the world into the ‘good’ and the ‘evil’. Such religiosity permeated 
many aspects o f life in the colonies and continues to resonate to this day, giving rise to 
claims such as that by Samuel Huntington that “Americans gave to their nation and its 
creed many of the functions and attributes o f a church.” 16 Robert Bellah compares the 
power o f Puritan moralism to permeate society to that o f a ‘civic religion’ that provided a 
“religious dimension for the whole fabric of American life, including the political 
sphere.” 17 In creating a sense of cohesion to unite an otherwise diverse population 
together as Americans, the ‘civil religion’ bestowed a sacred character to national 
ceremonies and civic obligations. The ‘civil religion’ can be described as the “lowest 
common denominator,”18 providing a set o f transcendent beliefs that have tended to bind 
together what might otherwise have been an excessively individualistic and diverse group 
o f peoples. As Michael Novak explained:
The Trinity becomes a vision of the importance o f individualism over and against the constraints of 
community; the Incarnation becomes a reality principle that warns us against the utopian hopes of 
socialism; the value of many biblical narratives is that they ‘envisage human life as a contest’; the 
doctrine of Original Sin serves mainly to convince us that no economic system can ever be free of
16 Samuel Huntington, American Politics in the United States (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987) p. 6.
17 Robert Bellah, Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World (New York: 1970) pp. 
182-3.
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some evil; the doctrine of the Two Kingdoms becomes an argument for laissez-faire; and the 
principle o f love in the Judeo-Christian tradition mainly suggests that we should respect the freedom 
of the individual.19
Applied in this way, a religious aura embraced establishment values, endorsing attempts 
to integrate diverse beliefs under the rubric of the ‘religion o f democracy.’ As such it 
contributed to the formation of an American national identity that took hold and was 
politicised by the revolution and independence from Britain in 1776.
Although the thirteen states that unanimously declared independence from Britain were 
vast and disparate, they constructed a sense of identity from the relatively unique 
experience o f the process of colonisation and settlement of the United States and o f being
90situated in the New World. The Declaration of Independence played a crucial role in 
the construction of an American collective memory, and its preamble set the tone for the 
legitimacy o f the government and the existence of the United States. When Jefferson 
wrote the words: “We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal, 
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these 
are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness”, he was heavily influenced by the recent 
injection of ideas of political as well as commercial freedom, that followed independence 
from Britain. The political element provided the crucial distinction between the two 
worlds, Old and New, despite the fact that much of the reason for revolution had centred 
on ‘taxation without representation’ that had restricted commercial opportunities.21 
Jefferson enshrined the ‘exceptionalism’ of the American people by making the thirteen 
colonies the first country to find God’s truths ‘self-evident’.
This is why the Founding Fathers did not refer to their actions as ‘revolutionary’. The 
American Revolution was never conceived of being for export and throughout the 
eighteenth century the term ‘revolution’ referred to a change o f power within a state, not
18 David McLellan “Introduction” in David McLellan (ed.), Political Christianity: A Reader (Wiltshire: 
Redwood Books, 1997) p. 97.
19 Michael Novak, The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism (London, IEA Health and Welfare Unit, 1991) 
quoted in David McLellan “Introduction” in Ibid.. pp. 97-8.
20 David Ryan, US Foreign Policy in World History (London & New York: Routledge, 2000) p. 23.
21 Ibid.. d p . 24-5.
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the creation of a new one. They believed themselves to be charting a new course through 
history and did not think it was one that other nations could replicate. As the American 
ambassador to France stated at the close of the eighteenth century: the French “want an
99American constitution, without realising they have no Americans to uphold it.”
This conception of American exceptionalism is derived from the notion that America was 
created differently, developed differently and thus has to be understood differently from 
other states -  essentially on its own terms and within its own context.23 American 
exceptionalism assumes that not only is America set apart and different from other 
nations, a “shining city on a hill,”24 but also that it is exceptional in the sense o f being
9 <exemplary and “a beacon among nations.” Within the domestic context, Americans 
have deemed their identity exceptional, and their tendency to polarise political issues into 
an overly simple dichotomy between good and evil led them to believe they had created 
something new and set apart from the Qld World. Such a mindset was to have deep 
implications for the future o f US foreign policy. The ‘exceptionalist syndrome’ assumed 
that the New World was created by divine providence which bestowed on America a 
‘providential destiny’ and a ‘universal mission’ to ‘civilise’ the world.
But how far has this belief in exceptionalism translated into American foreign policy? 
Isolationism in the inter-war years derived much of its legitimacy in the public eye from 
the need to keep the country’s virtue intact. The frontier had been reached and the 
majority of Americans were content to protect their exceptional standing by retreating 
inside the shield created by their great nation that defended them from the evils o f the 
outside world.
But the recourse to isolationism provided only an illusion of security. In 1941 the outside 
world sucked the US inexorably into the Second World War in a conflict that was sold to
22 Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since 
the Revolution (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1955) p. 38.
23 Byron Shafer Introduction p. v in Byron Shafer (ed.), Is America Different? (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991).
24 DBS 6 December 1976 p. 677.
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the American people in terms with which they could easily identify: a contest between 
good and evil. By 1945, Americans had been convinced that a second retreat into 
isolationism would not be a legitimate response to the demands of the modem world. 
America was now depicted as a member of the international community with a moral 
responsibility to help its allies, a responsibility that the inter-war interpretation of 
exceptionalism had obscured. Roosevelt and Truman, in respect to very different 
enemies, appealed to both the sense of exceptionalism and redemptionism, to rally the 
people to their respective causes.
The assumption of leadership of the ‘free world’ was not synonymous with American 
integration into the international system and institutions. Its statesmen still maintained 
that its unique characteristics made it morally superior to organisations like the United 
Nations, whose laws were drawn up by other states. Protracted debates surrounded the 
decision to join the International Court of Justice and the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee in 1948. More recently, the Washington’s procrastination in signing the UN 
resolution on the Genocide Convention in 1981 and the Kyoto protocol was attributable 
to its belief in its own exceptionalism and its unwillingness to submit to the will of other 
nations. Americans believe that they are only subject to their own national laws and 
often resist close integration with the UN, for example, because it is perceived to be an 
undemocratic institution that lacks a mechanism for democratic input into its 
deliberations. As Senator Jesses Helms explained: “we have a unique development of 
legal history, the result o f our traditions, our religions, our moral and ethical values and 
our experience. [Therefore there was] no justification for submitting this tradition to the 
judgement of the world.”26 The decision of the administration of George W. Bush to 
launch an attack on Iraq on 20 March 2003 in the absence of a second UN resolution is 
the most recent demonstration of this.
Redemptionism
25 Daniel Bell, “The Hegelian Secret: Civil Society and American Exceptionalism” in Byron Shafer (ed.), Is 
America Different? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) pp. 50-51.
26 Vernon van Dyke, Human Rights, the United States and the World Community (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1970) quoted in Coker op. cit. p. 10.
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Redemptionism is the second historical cannon of the US and is by far the oldest. It 
promotes the belief that America should encourage positive change. The image of the 
US as a “redeemer nation,”27 that “right will prevail over might”28 and the Manichian 
perception of a world divided into the ‘children of Light and the children of Darkness,’ 
are intrinsic to the deeply religious sensibilities that permeate the nation. The preaching 
of John Winthrop and Cotton Mather may have been replaced by Billy Graham and 
successive tele-evangelists, but the message remains unchanged -  Americans, according 
to Graham “were created for a spiritual mission among the nations”.29 The depiction of 
America as a ‘city upon a hill’ reinforced the belief that a unique American destiny 
serves as a kind of vanguard of a universal destiny for the world.30 The United States 
presents itself as a nation convinced of its own ability to treat all other nations justly, 
objectively and equally and of its capacity to handle problems alone.
The extent to which, in its more subtle manifestations, redemptionism has influenced 
American foreign policy should not be under estimated. In 1952, as the Cold War 
intensified, Truman announced to the American people that they had stepped “into the
<> i
leadership which Almighty God intended us to assume a generation ago.” President 
Eisenhower was similarly preoccupied with America’s mission. As he told the American 
Legion in 1955, the most basic expression of Americanism was recognition o f God. 
Without God there could be no American form of government, or an American way of 
life.32 His Secretary of State John Foster Dulles held fundamentalist beliefs. He believed 
that the US had been founded as an experiment in human liberty and that its survival was 
dependent on it showing men the way to a better life.33 Zbigniew Brzezinski commented
27 Daniel Boorstin, The Image, or What Happened to the American Dream (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson 1961) p. 244.
28 David L. Larson, The Puritan Ethic in United States Foreign Policy. (New York: D. van Nostrand Co. 
Ltd., 1966) p. 12.
29 See Christopher Thome, “American Political Culture and the End of the Cold War” Journal of American 
Studies 26, 1992, p. 316.
30 DSB. 6 December 1976, pp. 677-78.
31 James Bums, The American Idea of Mission (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1957) p. 14.
32 Cited in William Herberg, Protestant-Catholic-Jew (New York: Doubleday, 1960) p. 258n.
33 John Foster Dulles, War. Peace or Change (New York: Harper & Row, 1939).
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in his last year at the National Security Council that the US “can help history along by 
positive deeds.”34
The belief that America has a mission amongst the nations has its origins in the Puritan 
tradition. Puritanism was Americanised by the challenge the untamed wilderness 
presented to the first settlers. The terrain of New England was so harsh and unwelcoming 
that to prosper there the settlers had to be graced by God and in that sense, the taming of 
the frontier took on a religious manifestation. Christopher Coker notes that their very 
survival created a vision amongst the American people of themselves as a “providential 
people destined to expand, to redeem the land to the west, the frontier.”35 Such beliefs 
gave rise to the religious concept of manifest destiny which did not come to an end when 
the frontier was reached in 1890. In his work, The Significance o f  the Frontier in 
American History, presented to the American Historical Association in 1893, Fredrick 
Jackson Turner argued that the frontier was the defining feature of American political 
culture. In pushing across the American continent, Turner claimed, the balance between 
civilisation and savagery, wilderness and garden, lawlessness and law formed the 
crucible o f the frontier and contributed to the formation of American political culture.36 
While the validity o f this argument is a subject of debate, the rhetoric o f the frontier is 
evident in modem day American discourse, the frontier experience having made America 
fundamentally different from Europe. Creating a new society from nothing, including the 
establishment of new social, political and economic institutions, made demands on the 
political system quite unlike those experienced by the European states that had evolved 
over the course o f many centuries.
The concept o f ‘manifest destiny’ has continued to inform American political life, with 
successive generations reinterpreting its aw n in g  and applicability to themselves. The 
corollary o f this is the assumption that the assertion \m erican power and rights were 
natural, with the often br.cal treatment of other peoples, the /  merican Indians included,
34 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Remarks before the Women’s National Democratic Club, Washington DC, 21 
February 1980”, Whit' House Press Release (21 February 1980).
35 Coker, op.cit. p. 1r .
36 Fredrick Turner The Frontier in American History (1920) pp. 1-3.
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justified by references to ‘destiny’, ‘progress’, ‘civilisation’ and ‘modernisation’. Its 
continued influence is evident in the wars the nation has chosen to fight. It has 
compelled Americans, on occasion, to embark upon an interventionist foreign policy 
seemingly based on the tenets of the Protestant faith - a tendency Lipset describes as 
‘utopian moralism’ i.e. viewing foreign affairs essentially as morality plays, with the 
need for goodness and greatness inextricably linked. President Johnson was influenced 
by the redemptionist past and a strong biblical compulsion that America had the 
opportunity to extend its frontier to southeast Asia and to rescue the Vietnamese people 
from Communist tyranny. Manifest destiny instilled in the American people the belief 
that they had the right to intervene in the internal affairs of other nations, o f which 
George W. Bush’s preference, in 2003, for regime change in Iraq is the most recent 
example.
The redemptionist approach to foreign policy and its attendant moralistic connotations 
underpins the standards to which America must adhere (at least rhetorically) and the 
image it must project in its external relations. As Scott Lucas noted, “however calculated 
the geopolitical strategy, however base the pursuit of profit and economic control, US 
foreign policy has to be perceived as ‘right’ at home and abroad.”38 But although much 
in the official (and sometimes unofficial) rhetoric is derived from Christianity, its basis is
" lOnot itself Christianity While successive presidents never fail to mention God in their 
inaugural address or in rousing speeches to the nation, Christ is rarely spoken of.40 The 
God of what can be described as America’s ‘civic religion’ is much more related to law 
and order than to salvation and love.41 Robert Bellah described this God as unitariag. and
37 Crabb, op. cit. p. 32.
38 Scott Lucas, Freedom’s War: The US Crusade Against the Soviet Union. 1945-56 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1999) p. 2.
39 There has generally been an implicit but clear division of function between the civil religion and 
Christianity. Bellah Beyond Belief p. 176.
40 Robert Bellah, “Civil Religion in America” in David McLellan (ed.), Political Christianity: A Reader 
(Wiltshire: Redwood Books, 1997) p. 98.
41 Lipset argued that American religion, at least since the early nineteenth century has been predominately 
activist, moralistic and social rather than contemplative, theological, or innerly spiritual. Seymour Martin 
Lipset, “Religion and American Values” in The First New Nation (New York: Basic Books, 1964) chapter 
4.
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one that “is actively interested and involved in history, with a special concern for 
America.”42
The belief of American decision-makers that God had carved out a special role for the US 
has led to their frequent claim to know without doubt what is good and evil in relations 
between states.43 In this respect, moralism and moralistic terminology becomes an 
expedient, if subconscious, way to cloak political activity based on power politics in the 
garb o f universal principle. On the other hand, the tendency to moralise must be 
distinguished from respect for moral principle, which also has deep cultural roots in the 
US and embodies popular values and beliefs. Cecil Crabb offers a revealing definition of 
the differences between moralism and morality:
Moralism is not the same as morality ... Morality has to do with the substance of behaviour. It is 
conduct in accordance with a predetermined code o f behaviour, and throughout Christendom this 
refers to behaviour sanctioned by the Christian faith. Moralism [in the political sense] is concerned 
with [the] appearances, with the concepts and language employed in foreign relations, with the 
symbols used, and with the way ends and means are visualised and expressed publicly.44
Moralism, as distinct from morality, tends to have a political base, and in consequence 
Washington’s censures have tended to be somewhat selective. Towards its allies or in 
respect o f countries perceived to be offering important political or commercial 
opportunities, Washington’s official rhetoric has tended to be far less censorious, even if 
their regimes endorsed practices anathema to American values. In the past half century 
for example, whilst maintaining the rhetoric against the ‘evils’ of the Castro regime in 
Cuba, US administrations chose largely to disregard the political misdemeanours of the 
authoritarian regimes in Guatemala, El Salvador and Chile that they courted. Similarly, 
whilst Washington was constantly pointing to what it perceived as the political misdeeds 
of the Soviet Union, there was comparatively little criticism of Communist China when 
the State Department sought to curry favour with the administration o f Deng Xiaoping.
42 Bellah Civil Religion p. 98.
43 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. (New York: McGraw- 
Hill, Inc., 1993) p. 13.
44 Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age (New York: Harper & Row, 1960) p. 32.
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Scarce wonder, then, that Washington has often stood accused of applying double 
standards -  and not least in its dealings with Israel.
Such interpretations of American redemptionism have provoked condemnation from the 
Left who criticise what they see as the distortion of the past and the manipulation of 
moral purpose as a shroud for an aggressive foreign policy, the demonisation of 
America’s foreign enemies, and the tendency to view conflicts as stemming from matters 
o f principle rather than of interest. After all, official rhetoric would often dwell on the 
‘evils’ of America’s opponents -  on their ‘tyranny’, ‘despotism’, ‘abuse of power’ and 
the like. Historically, the US had portrayed itself as a nation set apart and ‘fighting the 
good fight’: in the revolutionary period against the monarchy and British imperialism, in 
President Monroe’s diplomacy against the machinations o f the Old World, in the late 
nineteenth century against Spanish colonialism, during the Second World War against the 
‘Godless’ Nazis and Fascists and afterwards, against the ‘Godless’ Communists and their 
‘dupes’ at home and abroad.
Yet such was the rhetorical force o f America’s professed principles that even when 
aligned with regimes opposed to the very values for which the US was supposed to stand, 
Washington would tend to invoke the notion of ‘freedom’ in support o f its policy. As 
Bellah explained, those nations that at any moment are “on our side become ‘the free 
world’”45 -  an expedient which allowed Portugal under the authoritarian government of 
Salazar to be admitted to NATO, a repressive military regime in South Vietnam to be 
defended against Communist opponents and unelected administrations in the Middle East 
to be given financial and military assistance against militant Islamic groups.
Despite the rhetoric of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’, in practice the fundamental concern 
o f US foreign policy at least since the First World War appears to have been world 
order,46 defined in terms of an international system conducive to the enhancement of the
45 Bellah, Civil Religion p. 102.
46 Michael Donelan, “The Elements of United States Policy” in F. S. Northedge, Foreign Policies of the 
Powers (London: Faber & Faber, 1974) p. 62.
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American way of life and the establishment of foreign governments favourable to that 
process.47 Washington tended to limit its support for ‘democratic movements’ to areas 
where it was assured that what the electorate sought would be congenial to the American 
model and that the governments that resulted would be friendly to the US.48 As a 
consequence, the application of the notion of ‘freedom’ has been “highly elastic.”49 
Washington had grave doubts about the ‘democratic process’ when the electorate chose 
left-leaning regimes as in Guatemala in 1954 or Chile in 1970. At the same time, 
Washington’s interest in buttressing friendly dictatorships50 such as those in Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE, stemmed from the perception that their demise could result in their 
replacement by governments hostile to US and Western interests and in this sense could 
be understood as serving the cause of ‘freedom’.51 To its critics however, the US was no 
more principled than any other state and its rhetoric could not disguise the degree o f self- 
interest and ambition underlying its foreign policy.
The redemptionist approach to foreign affairs has also been combined with ‘legalistic’ 
rhetoric, thus giving rise to what George F. Kennan described as the “legalistic- 
moralistic” approach to international problems. This can be defined as the belief that 
through the acceptance of a system of legal rules and restraints, as practised in the US, it 
should be possible to suppress the self-interested aspirations of governments in the 
international arena. In this Washington was attempting to impose on an international 
scale the Anglo-Saxon concept of domestic law that is said to govern and constrain the
47 George F. Kennan, Realities of American Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1954) p. 13. 
R. A. Packenham writes that “Nowhere in the world has the United States knowingly supported, directly or 
indirectly, actively or by cool responses to those in power, genuinely radical movements, groups or 
individuals. This seems to be strong evidence that under no circumstances are radicalism and revolution 
appropriate for economic and political development.” R. A. Packenham, Liberal America and the Third 
World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1973) p. 144.
48 Japan and the Philippines are two such examples.
49 Lucas, op. cit. p. 279.
50 Michael Donelan, “The Ideas of American Foreign Policy” in F. S. Northedge, Foreign Policies o f the 
Powers (London: Chapman & Hall Ltd., 1968) p. 62.
51 During the Eisenhower administration, George Humphrey, the Secretary of the Treasury, argued that 
“We should ... stop talking so much about democracy, and make it clear that we are quite willing to 
support dictatorships of the right if their polices are pro-American.” See Lucas, op. cit. p. 279.
52 George Kennan, American Diplomacy. 1900-1950 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1953) p. 94.
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behaviour of individuals.53 This tendency found expression in attempts to outlaw war by 
international legislation, as in the case o f the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, and if this 
failed to determine principles upon which wars were fought. ‘Democratic’ international 
institutions such as the League of Nations and the United Nations were seen by the 
proponents of this approach as forums in which debating and voting procedures would be 
used to settle international disputes in much the same way as they were believed to 
resolve disputes within American society.54
Though Washington would bend or even break international law when it was regarded as 
expedient to do so, American decision-makers nonetheless considered themselves to be 
very law abiding in their approach to international affairs. John Foster Dulles, Secretary 
of State from 1953 to 1959, was the personification of the ‘legalistic-moralistic’ approach 
to international affairs. He applied legalistic rhetoric to justify the non-recognition of 
China and the construction of a system of alliances to isolate the Communist states and 
moralistic rhetoric to condemn neutral states (those not aligned with either East or West) 
as ‘immoral’.55 More recently, in the 1990s, President Clinton argued that there existed 
both a legal and moral basis for the continued imposition of sanctions against Iraq, while 
President George W. Bush tended to shroud the US bombing of Afghanistan in 2001-02 
and Iraq in 2003 in, the legalistic-moralistic rhetoric of a “just cause”.56
Exemplarism
The third version of the American past -  perhaps of lesser moment in recent years - is of 
a secular nature and is based on the belief that by setting an example and providing a 
model worthy of emulation, the US can redeem mankind without recourse to direct 
intervention. Such a conception rested on the need to preserve American ‘purity’ which 
would be jeopardised were it to exercise its power to assist other nations, however moral
53 Ibid.. p. 94.
54 Banks Foreign Policy p. 47.
55 Ibid.. p. 48.
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the cause. Those associated with the exemplarist tradition feared that association with 
non-democratic regimes would compromise the democratic experiment that is America. 
They were also apprehensive of the potential repercussions were the US to attempt to 
democratise a nation and to fail in its endeavour. As Kissinger explained: “There are 
certain experiments that cannot be tried, not because the goals are undesirable but 
because the consequences of failure would be so server.”57
Yet the hopes of those like William Fulbright58 that nations across the globe who lived 
under tyranny and repression would adopt moral principles derived from the American 
constitution have proved a disappointment. In the case of the fall of Communism in the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, it was as much the American example of 
capitalism and consumerism that provided the impetus for political reform and upheaval 
as the desire of the people to live under a democratic form of government. And when the 
initial euphoria of the election of government leaders and the writing of constitutions 
failed to generate a great increase in economic growth, many o f these countries opted for 
a reversion to the security of the socialist state and elected former Communist party 
members.
In the modem age, non-intervention or isolationism, has ceased to be considered a viable 
policy. Washington has often found itself in a position where it needs to act even against 
its better judgement, as occurred in Somalia and Kosovo in the 1990s. As the only 
remaining superpower, America is actively engaged in defending its interests overseas 
and its former distaste for intervention has been largely cast aside.
‘Americanism’
The national images that pervade American life are drawn from three very different 
conceptions of the past. Perhaps this should not be considered surprising because nations
56 See transcript of President George W. Bush’s first State of the Union address, delivered to Congress on 
29 January 2002. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-l 1 .html
57 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979) p. 911.
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constantly, albeit subtly, rewrite themselves. This is because a country is not just one 
personality but a multitude of personalities which are in constant movement.59 The shifts 
in which aspects of America’s role have been dominant since it became a nation are a 
good illustration of Sorokin’s principle of ‘permanent change’. Change is inherent in any 
dynamic society and society itself produces it. Change is endogenous not exogenous and 
can be a response to an internal as well as an external challenge.60 No conception of 
America’s past comprises the whole truth and neither is it entirely false. But the 
American past, in its various interpretations, continues to inform the present, its foreign 
policy and its relations with other states. This heritage has given rise to another culturally 
derived concept, that o f ‘Americanism’.
‘Americanism’ is a belief in doing what is necessary to preserve and promote what is 
defined as the ‘American way of life.’ As Leon Samson explained:
When we examine the meaning of Americanism, we discover that Americanism is to the American 
not a tradition or a territory, not what France is a Frenchman or England to an Englishman, out a 
doctrine -  what socialism is to a socialist.61
For Gramsci, ‘Americanism’ was the product o f the bourgeoisie’s most successful 
attempt to establish ideological hegemony. An ideology is a theory or belief system 
regarding existing society, the desirability or otherwise o f its replacement and 
methodologies for change. According to David Apter, the mythical elements o f an 
ideology cement the solidarity of society and buttress the moral authority o f the rulers. 
An ideology also creates a world image that contributes to the individuals sense of 
identity. These functions interact to legitimise the authority o f political elites. 
Hegemony is the use of seductive, non-coercive inducements and co-optation to secure 
the masses compliance to a political and social system. In analysing American culture
58 William Fulbright wrote that “inevitably our major impact on the world is not what we do but what we 
are: the way we govern ourselves.” William Fulbright The Arrogance of Power ( London: Cape, 1967).
59 Fernand Braudel, The Identity of France. Vol. 1: History & Environment (London: Collins, 1988) p. 18.
60 Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Crisis of Our Age (London & Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1942) p. 104.
61 Leon Samson, Toward a United Front: a philosophy for American Workers (New York: Faber & 
Rinehart, 1933) pp. 16-17.
62 David Apter, “Introduction: Ideology and Discontent” in David E. Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent 
(London & New York: The Free Press, 1964) pp. 18-21.
103
Gramsci contrasted the US experience to that of nineteenth century Germany or Italy, and 
saw the country as a dynamic material culture based on corporative, bureaucratic and 
technologically innovative forms of rationality, with no feudal remnants (monarchy, 
nobility or peasantry) and a form of religion which, unlike Catholic conservatism, was 
conducive to the notions of the dignity of labour, efficiency, profit and property which 
sustained capitalist endeavour. It had produced a worker who was effectively a ‘trained 
gorilla’ -  the product of social conditioning not only through the state and its 
bureaucracies but through the legal system, the schools, churches, boardrooms, 
workplaces, cultural and leisure activities and the mass media. Together, the 
conditioning legitimated the competitive individualism of liberalism, the social atomism 
and depoliticisation of bureaucracy, the fatalism of religion, the states worship of 
nationalism and the patriarchy of the traditional family. Gramsci believed that in the US, 
the masses had been lulled into complete acceptance of the bourgeois system through the 
‘manipulation of consent’ by means o f an adroit use o f ideology. In this sense 
‘Americanism’ is akin to an ideology, a belief system that encompasses America’s self- 
styled values o f democracy, freedom, anti-colonialism, self-determination and so forth.
One does not have to be a Marxist like Gramsci to believe that there is a kind of 
‘Americanist’ ideology, not as rigidly presented, or as systematically developed perhaps 
as Marxism-Leninism or Maoism, but to some extent providing the parameters for 
political, economic, military and cultural activity in the US.64 Furthermore, that it has 
persuasive power not merely because of its innate appeal throughout a country struggling 
to find an identity, but because it is buttressed by a state which has grown geographically, 
industrially, commercially and militarily for over two hundred years,65 to become the 
world’s only superpower.
63 Carl Boggs, The Two Revolutions: Gramsci and the Dilemmas of Western Marxism (Boston, 
Massachusetts: South End Press, 1984) p. 179.
64 Lucas, op. cit. pp. 1 & 7.
65 Ryan, op. cit. p. 1.
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If there is a theoretical component to American ‘ideology’ it is derived from Lockean 
liberalism. Traditionally Locke held a particular attraction for Americans and in his 
Second Treatise on Civil Government he wrote “In the beginning all the world was 
America”. The affinity of American society for Locke’s writings stemmed from two 
principles: the first is the morality of proprietary accumulation and the second is the 
collective right to self-defence.66 The tie between morality and self-defence culminated 
in Locke developing a doctrine of just war and protective reaction. These concepts have 
been turned into ideological precepts by Americans as a result of Locke’s philosophical 
tendency to integrate moral, social, economic and political realities. Louis Hartz argued 
that Lockean liberalism had become so embedded in American life that it has become a 
political ideology.67 This ideology fed into the nation’s foreign policy which has been 
criticised alternately for being too economically driven and imperialist, too moralistic and 
interventionist, too utilitarian and isolationist. All paradoxically are true, “for the 
concern with wealth, power, status, moral virtue and the freedom of mankind were 
successfully transformed in to a single set of mutually reinforcing values by the paradigm 
of Lockean liberalism.”68
Ironically the commitment to both ‘Americanism’ and ‘Lockean principles’ has often led 
to the apparent neglect in practice of the country’s professed ideals and its policies o f 
protective reaction have often culminated in an interventionist foreign policy grounded in 
more conventional notions of ‘national interest’. Yet even here, the tendency has been to 
use the language of moral rectitude by way of justification,69 though whether this is also a 
‘screen’ for geopolitical and economic objectives is a matter of contention.70 The
66 Edward Weisband, The Ideology of American Foreign Policy: a paradigm of Lockean liberalism 
(London & Beverly Hills: Sage Publications) p. 62.
67 Cited in Donald Devine, The Political Culture of the United States (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972).
68 Weisband, op. cit. p. 62.
69 Naom Chomsky, “The Old and the New Cold War” in James Peck (ed.), The Chomsky Reader (New  
York: Pantheon Books, 1987) p. 218.
70 Two foreign policy analysts observed in the lead article in a 1993 edition of Foreign Policy that 
“Underpinning U.S. world order strategy is the belief that America must maintain what is in essence a 
military protectorate in economically critical regions to ensure that America’s vital trade and financial 
relations will not be disrupted by political upheaval. Christopher Layne, senior fellow of the Cato Institute, 
and Benjamin Schwarz, international policy analyst at RAND, Foreign Policy. Fall 1993, cited in Noam 
Chomsky, World Orders Old and New (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) pp. 31-32. See 
Lucas, op. cit. p.2 for a contrary discussion of this issue
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overthrow of the democratically elected President Arbenz of Guatemala in 1954, like the 
blockade of Cuba in 1962, the intervention of US Marines in the Dominican Republic in 
1965, the support of the Pinochet coup in Chile against an elected Left wing government, 
its assistance to the Contras in Nicaragua and the despatch of US troops to Grenada in 
1983 were all justified in terms of fighting Communism, as if the US were combating 
some kind of contagious disease on behalf of the American people and the whole of 
humankind. But in this kind of rationale lies a peculiarity of the American system. For 
in contrast to the European powers, the US has tended to view not a country, its 
government and its citizens as a threat, but a particular ideology. Washington was never 
at war with Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union or China, but with German Nazism, 
Japanese militarism and Russian and Chinese Communism. This may explain the 
propensity o f the US to bomb countries including Panama, Grenada, Afghanistan and 
Iraq, without first declaring war on the state. In certain respects, the great foreign policy 
battles the US has fought have involved its own ideology o f capitalism and ‘freedom’ 
against an external ideology. Communism was perceived as a source of evil because 
America rhetorically deplored the way in which a state could subjugate its own people 
and tended to conceive of what it saw as the forces of ‘international Communism’ as a 
single regime.
To Washington, the Soviet Union had forced the countries and peoples of Eastern Europe
against their will into a ‘Communist Empire’, in the process putting in jeopardy the kinds
of institutions and regimes for collective action and for constraining force on which it
believed international order should be based. In addition, ‘Communism’ represented an
affront to America’s prestige and sense o f honour since it actively opposed the very
principles underlying the American way of life. Indeed, the spectacle of what it
perceived, often against the evidence, as a monolithic Communist bloc, controlled by
Moscow, continually expanding and taking over one country after another by ‘indirect
71aggression’ was to remain of fundamental concern to Washington until the mid-1980s 
when Mikhail Gorbachev took over the reins of Soviet power and showed earnest in
71 Donelan, 1974 op. cit. p. 67.
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dismantling the political and institutional edifice of the Cold War. Ironically, though 
Gorbachev was to become a partner in building the UN based ‘New World Order’ that 
President Bush Sr. had called into being, his own political security was in jeopardy as 
was that of his state, and their political demise was to usher in the complete collapse of
79what remained of the Soviet bloc. On the other hand, that Cuba and North Korea 
remained in the US political vocabulary as ‘focuses’ or ‘axes’ of evil’ indicates how 
difficult Washington was to find it to jettison the mindset of nearly a century.
But Communism has not been Washington’s only recent demon. Indeed, with the 
disappearance of so many Communist-ruled governments since the late 1980s, it is no 
longer regarded as the primary threat. From Washington’s perspective it is the ideology 
of what it calls ‘Islamic Fundamentalism’, which it associates with terrorism and threats 
to civilised life, that constitutes the main danger. Once again, the US uses high sounding 
phraseology to conceal its use o f the time-honoured balance of power principal of ‘my 
enemy’s enemy is my friend’, in the process moulding a tenuous coalition from among a 
motley collection of states, by no means all champions of ‘democracy* and ‘free 
institutions.’ As in the case of its opposition to Communism, Washington has tended to 
define ‘Islamic Fundamentalism’ with great imprecision, ascribing the term to such 
broadly secular governments as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and Colonel Qadafi’s Libya, of 
both of which it strongly disapproved. It is in the context of the struggle against this 
ideology, however, that Israel has gained an especial resonance in American eyes. After 
all, since the 2001 terrorist assaults on America’s World Trade Centre and Pentagon 
coincided with the suicide attacks on civilians in connection with the second Intifada, 
Israel can be portrayed as a fellow victim and this has given Washington further cause to
73regard the Jewish state as a ‘special relation.’
72 See Geoffrey Stem, The Rise and Decline of International Communism (Aldershot: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Ltd., 1990) pp. 253-4 for a discussion of the changes Gorbachev made to the Soviet bureaucracy 
that contributed to the demise o f the Soviet Union.
73 In a 2002 survey, 77% of Americans said they viewed Palestinian suicide bombings as terrorism in the 
sense of the war on terror. Professor Makiya, Brandeis University, speaking on Newsnight BBC 1, 4 April 
2002 .
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The Influence of Culture & History in American Foreign Policy tow ard Israel
Through a process of political socialisation, decision-makers are inducted, as are all 
citizens, into their society’s preferred way of viewing the world and their beliefs are 
shaped by the cultural environment o f which they are a product. Political culture feeds 
into the foreign policy decision-making process because it provides the political, social 
and psychological environment through which decision-makers view the world. The 
psycho-social dimension of human behaviour, including the ideas, meanings and beliefs 
people hold of the world, play a crucial role in determining action because they shape 
decision-maker’s perceptions of the external environment. Merely by being bom into a 
society and cultural milieu we are conditioned to hold certain images o f the world. Such 
images are not static constructs but are adapted and refined in changing circumstances 
and when individual opinions, interpretations and experiences are brought to bear on a 
problem.
Political culture influences foreign policy making as well as domestic affairs through the 
nature of the relationship a state has with other states. In international relations, the 
ability o f a state to secure allies on the basis of shared values and beliefs and not purely 
on calculations o f realpolitik can be very significant. This is particularly true in the case 
of the US where the polity defines itself in terms of values and ideals and looks to other 
states to promote the values it holds dear. If a state can make itself resonate with another 
state in terms of values, and link that identification with powerful political forces, it will 
create a lever through which to pursue its objectives. This is the strategy Israel adopted 
in its relationship with the western world and has proved particularly effective in the case 
of the US, where, as the case studies which follow will discuss, it has formed enduring 
alliances with different elements within the political culture.
This thesis does not claim that political culture is the only factor in accounting for US 
policy toward Israel, but it does argue that the underlying values o f American society
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play a crucial role in shaping policy makers’ perceptions of the world.74 The preceding 
discussion explored the way in which the values and beliefs on which the United States is 
founded can influence the approach to foreign policy and perception of America’s place 
in the world. Within a democracy, with the government dependent on popular support, 
foreign policy must resonate with popular aspirations. Nowhere is it easier for American 
decision-makers to demonstrate a direct correlation between the country’s political 
cultural values and its foreign policy than in its support for Israel, where there tends to be 
a convergence of views between the foreign-policy making elites and public opinion. As 
Abraham Ben-Zvi acknowledged, there is:
a widespread fund of goodwill toward Israel that is not restricted to the Jewish community, and an 
equally strong and persistent commitment to Israel’s continued national existence, integrity, and 
security. Comprising a cluster of broadly based attitudes that underscore the affinity and similarity 
between the two states in terms of their pioneering nature and commitment to democracy, this 
paradigm emerged as a legitimate and pervasive precept.75
For many Americans, the history and culture of the United States is perceived to resonate 
with that of the Jewish state, which reinforces the feeling o f moral responsibility for the 
preservation of Israel because of the role Washington had played in its creation. This 
sense o f moral obligation is underlined by the media which tends to encourage the 
discourse of revulsion and horror at the Holocaust and American complicity through 
disbelief and inaction in its perpetration. After all, in 1943, a Gallup poll revealed that 
thirty percent of respondents dismissed news of the death o f two million Jews in Europe 
as a rumour, while an informal poll conducted by the New York Post in the same year 
found that a broad range of Americans did not believe the atrocity reports.76 In more 
recent times, however, with the plight of the Jews under constant review, it is hardly 
surprising that the belief is widespread that the Jewish people have a ‘right’ to their own 
state as a consequence of Nazi atrocities. At the same time, the constant reminder of the
74 Fawas A. Gerges, America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999) p. 6.
75 Abraham Ben-Zvi, The United States and Israel (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) pp. 15- 
16.
76 New York Post, 2 April 1943, p. 29 and January 1943 Gallup poll cited in Deborah Lipstadt, Beyond 
Belief: The American Press and the Coming of the Holocaust. 1933-45 (New York: The Free Press, 1986) 
pp. 240, 241.
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Holocaust is indicative of the power o f Jewish and Israeli images to permeate American 
society. But what is the origin of this connection with an atrocity that was marginalised 
in the decades following its perpetration and what is the process by which Israel and 
memories of the Holocaust have come to be such an integral and powerful part of 
American political culture?
The M arginalisation of the Holocaust
The speed with which the Holocaust was marginalised and concealed in the late 1940s 
may astound us today, but when considered against the political realities of the time, it is 
comprehensible. For it was not feelings of shame and guilt that prompted its relegation, 
but a revolutionary change in the configuration of world alignments. In the aftermath of 
the Second World War new rivalries emerged and the international battle lines were re­
drawn. The conflict was no longer between Nazi Germany and the Allied forces, but 
Soviet Communism and the capitalist West, and given its geographical proximity to 
Moscow, West Germany was on the front line. To secure public support for the rapid 
rehabilitation o f West Germany into the Western family of nations, a fundamental 
ideological retooling of the minds of the American public mind was required. The 
apotheosis of evil was reassigned from Berlin to Moscow and public opinion had to be 
mobilised to accept this new reality. Symbols like the Holocaust that reinforced the old 
view -  that of the Germans as the epitome of limitless depravity -  were now 
dysfunctional because they reminded Americans how recently their new allies had been 
their enemies and their new enemies their friends. Norman Finkelstein argued that 
reference to the Holocaust was marginalised because it was actively obstructive to this 
‘re-education’ process.77
The theory of totalitarianism was invoked to explain the apparent change in US policy.78 
The Truman administration argued that from the perspective of western ideological
77 Norman G. Finkelstein, The Holocaust Industry: Reflections of the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering 
(London & New York: 2000) p. 14.
78 Within a short period of time following the end of the Second World War the American conception of 
the Soviet Union changed from that of an ally to the image of a totalitarian state bent on unlimited
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beliefs the Cold War was actually a continuation o f the Second World War in the form of 
a struggle against the transcendent enemy of totalitarianism first in Nazism and then in 
Soviet Communism. The concentration camps of the Holocaust were not depicted as an 
atrocity against the Jews as an ethnic group, but as a symbol o f the persecution of 
political opponents, thus creating a connection between the ‘totalitarianism’ o f Nazi
70
Germany and the ‘totalitarianism’ of Communist Russia.
Washington’s demonisation of the Soviet Union was potentially threatening to the 
survival of the fledgling Jewish state, which in its early years assumed many o f the 
trappings of a socialist society. American Jewish organisations were confronted with the 
unwanted dilemma of how to limit the association between Jews and Communists in the 
public mind, particularly when many of Israel’s Jewish inhabitants were left wing 
refugees from Eastern Europe. The identification of Jews with Communists dates back to 
the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 when most of the ‘alien agitators’ deported from
OA
America during the Red Scare after the First World War had been Jews. In the inter­
war years the Communist Jew was a staple of anti-Semitic propaganda in both Europe 
and the US. The association was muted during the Second World War when the Soviet 
Union was part of the Allied forces, but the respite was short lived.
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, American Jewish organisations worked to counteract 
the popular Jewish/Communist equation that was being reinforced by the relatively high 
number of Jews appearing in espionage prosecutions. The ultimate public relations 
disasters for Jewish organisations in the 1950s were the trials of Julius and Ethel 
Rosenberg, Morton Sobell, Harry Gold and David Greenglass,81 all o f whom invoked the 
Holocaust as justification for their association with the Soviet Union. Holocaust rhetoric 
was a staple of Communist Party policy and American Jewish organisations were 
determined to distance themselves from it.
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Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Jewish organisations worked on a variety of fronts to 
alter the American frame of cultural reference by limiting the association between Jews 
and Communists in the public mind. Their principle co-operative venture was the 
‘Hollywood Project’, in which they jointly employed a West Coast representative to 
lobby film producers to portray sympathetic images of Jews. For example, the producer 
of I  Married a Communist agreed that no Communist character would be given a “name 
that can even remotely be construed as Jewish,”82 while in The Red Menace, the only 
sympathetic character m the film was a Jew.
Simultaneously with this, Jewish organisations conducted a purge of their members, 
expelling their leftist chapters and anyone who could remotely be considered to have 
Communist sympathies.84 During this period it was the American Jewish Committee that 
was the most active and its monthly magazine Commentary published hard-line anti- 
Soviet articles that were, according to its editor Norman Podhoretz, “part o f a secret
o r
programme to demonstrate that not all Jews were Communists.” The Committee also 
secured agreements from Time and Life magazine and a number of New York 
newspapers not to publish letters from readers commenting on the Jewishness of accused 
Communists. The American Jewish Committee also participated in and financially 
supported the McCarthyite All-American Conference to Combat Communism and, like
many other mainstream Jewish organisations, remained aloof from the campaign for
86clemency for the Rosenbergs.
While the disassociation o f Jews and Communists in the public mind was a powerful 
imperative it was only one of a number o f factors that explain the reticence of American 
Jews to draw attention to the Holocaust during this time. Involvement in the Second 
World War had united Americans and the post-war years were a time of upbeat
81 Ibjd., p. 92.
82 Report No. 2 from Hollywood representative, 15 October 1948, NCR AC Papers, Box 51, cited in Ibid.. 
p. 95.
83 Report No. 10, 23 May 1949, NCR AC Papers, Box 51, cited in Ibid.. p. 95.
84 Finkelstein, op. cit. p. 16.
85 Norman Podhoretz, Making It (New York, 1967) p. 101.
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optimism. American Jews shared wholeheartedly in this ebullient mood. “An 
integrationist rather than a particularist consciousness was the norm in the postwar
87decades” and the ‘victory’ over Nazism drew many Americans, particularly the sons 
and daughters of recent immigrants, into a shared experience o f the mystique of the 
American nation.88 The 1950s and 1960s saw a precipitous decline in anti-semitism in 
the United States, in part because Jews were increasingly seen as far less ‘foreign’ than in 
the past. Generally they were no longer the new immigrants, but third generation
on
Americans and by the 1950s three quarters of American Jews were native bom. 
American Jews were energetically engaged in becoming integrated into American society 
and seizing the opportunities available to them. It was not until this process was 
complete, Alan Mintz argues, and Jews felt comfortable in America as Americans, and 
the lustre of America itself had dimmed, that American Jews were ready to acknowledge 
the full extent o f the Holocaust.90
In their earlier marginalisation of the Holocaust, Jews were also repudiating their status 
as victims. While identification with the struggle and pioneering spirit o f the new state of 
Israel was positive and had parallels in the American society o f which they were a part, 
the victim status of Holocaust Jews was shameful and dispiriting. How and when this 
avoidance of confronting the Holocaust, shared across many sectors of society, was 
overcome, was a tmly fundamental shift and one for which the reasons are many.
The Integration of Israel into American Culture
A crucial factor in this change was a shift in the very conception of America as a paragon 
society. In the post-war years America was viewed as the richest, freest, most powerful 
and most just nation on earth and it is obvious why Jews would wish to be fully 
integrated into such a society. Yet with the advent of the civil rights movement and the
86 Novick. op. cit. pp. 95-96.
87 Ibid.. p. 114.
88 Alan Mintz, Popular Culture and the Shaping of Holocaust Memory in America (Seattle & London: 
University of Washington Press, 2001) p. 5.
89 Novick. op.cit. p. 113.
90 Mintz, op.cit. p. 7.
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embroilment in Vietnam, the idealist image of America was brought into disrepute. The 
critique of the justness o f American society and its controversial use of power opened up 
the vista of America, not as a shining example to the world, but as a country that had 
inflicted suffering both at home and abroad. A growing awareness of the consequences 
of ‘man’s inhumanity to man’ was epitomised by the apparent hopelessness of the plight 
of the American black underclass and televised images of the burned limbs of the 
Vietnamese peasants. The vocabulary used to describe the more unpalatable aspects of 
American life replicated that more commonly associated with contemporary images of 
the Holocaust. The urban slums in which the poor existed were called ghettos, the 
attempt o f a strong nation to destroy another peoples was called genocide and the 
potential for a conflict using atomic weapons was called a nuclear Holocaust. As 
American culture began to absorb this new reality and the survivor figure emerged as the 
hero of culture, Jews were conferred with the moral prestige of being the ultimate victims 
of mans evil.91
The 1960s was the decade in which the concept of American society as a single nation 
comprising citizens from different backgrounds was severely challenged.92 Difference 
was being articulated and prized more highly than conformity. As African-Americans 
articulated their unique status, constraints on the public expression of Jewishness and the 
Jewish historical experience were lifted. American culture was profoundly, if  belatedly, 
influenced by the Second World War and the Holocaust. One explanation for this, was 
enumerated by Morris Dickstein in an article on black humour novels of the early 1960s: 
“... it’s because the unsolved moral enigma of that period and that experience most 
closely expresses the conundrum of contemporary life fifteen years later.”93 Parallels 
were drawn between the Jewish underclass of Nazi Germany and the black underclass of 
1960s America.
91 Ibid., p. 10.
92 See Nathan Glazer, Ethnic Dilemmas. 1964-82 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).
93 Morris Dickstein, “Black Humor and History,” in Gerald Howard, (ed.), The Sixties (New York: 
Washington Square Press publication of Pocket Books, 1982) pp. 272-92, cited in Judith Doneson, The 
Holocaust in American Film (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2002) p. 107.
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Yet, the real catalyst for increased discourse about the Holocaust came with Israeli Prime 
Minister David Ben-Gurion’s announcement on 23 May 1960 that Israeli agents had 
captured Adolf Eichmann in Argentina and secretly transported him to Israel where he 
would stand trial.94 For many Americans, Jews and non-Jews alike, Eichmann’s trial, 
which was broadcast around the world, was the first time the reality of the attempted 
annihilation of European Jewry was revealed. As the full horrors of the Holocaust were 
recounted, the image of Israeli Jews as activists took precedence over the image o f Jews 
as victims. The public and unrelenting nature of the trial which lasted for over a year, 
conveyed a plethora of information and heralded the entry of the Holocaust as a distinct 
entity, perpetrated against a specific ethnic group, into American consciousness.95 The 
recognition o f the Holocaust by the gentile world had an important impact on American 
Jews, giving them licence to analyse this aspect of their past.
Yet Israel’s actions, including the breach of Argentinean sovereignty in the capture of 
Eichmann, provoked censure in the Western world. It was noteworthy too that the liberal 
press in Britain and America that had lauded the Nuremberg trials, expressed reservations 
about Israel’s behaviour.96 To be sure, in the 1960s criticism of Israel did not take the 
form o f anti-Semitic hatred. On the contrary, it was based on friendship and philo- 
Semitism and the fact that the world had expected something better of the Jews. Yet 
whatever the course of the intellectual debate, Argentina was the only country to demand 
Eichmann’s extradition and European countries and the US expressed in their various 
ways their conviction that the trial would be pursued fairly and justly. In the event, the 
prisoner was allowed to select this own counsel from any nation he chose, the Israeli 
government paid all the bills and expenses97 and when the defendant appealed against the 
verdict his appeal was heard in the Supreme Court. In their adherence to jurisprudence 
the Israelis firmly positioned themselves as a part of the Western family of nations.
94 Novick. op. cit. p. 128.
95 Author’s interview with Marshall Breger, special assistant to President Reagan and his liaison to the 
Jewish Community, 1982-84.
96 Howard Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1996) p. 555.
97 Ibid., p. 556.
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The trial also placed the Holocaust on the moral radar of the Christian community in 
America and prompted renewed scrutiny over Christian collaboration and responsibility. 
The silence of the Vatican and the failure of Pope Pius XII to publicly denounce the 
Holocaust during its perpetration were re-established in the public mind. Yet while 
raising questions of gentile culpability, the trial itself created the opportunity for a 
positive theological connection to the Jews as victims of affliction and torment that 
resonated with the Christian imagination, making the Jews once again an active and
QQ
relevant presence in the Christian mind of America.
Cultural change in American society coincided with new political realities that gradually 
led to a diminution of the constraints in publicising the Holocaust. By the 1960s, the 
Cold War mentality that had previously limited public discussion of the Nazi genocide 
had become so institutionalised that it could no longer be jeopardised by reminders of 
Second World War alliances. An environment was emerging where Americans were 
increasingly receptive to the rehabilitation o f memories o f the Holocaust that were 
reinforced in the early 1960s when the East German government revealed the Nazi 
connections of prominent West German officials. Yet the process through which the 
Holocaust succeeded in penetrating the layers of American isolationism is complex," and 
its infiltration into the cultural discourse of society through books, films and television 
played a crucial role.
Israel and American Popular Culture
Perhaps the first major cultural event that impacted on public perceptions of the 
Holocaust was the publication of the English translation of Anne Frank’s The Diary o f  a 
Young Girl in 1952 and its subsequent translation to stage and screen. The importance of 
the diary lay in its ability to do what political events had proved incapable of: creating an 
empathetic connection between the fate of European Jewry and the average American 
reader who had little knowledge of the event itself. Yet, the Holocaust does not form the
98 Mintz, op. cit. pp. 12-3.
99 Ibid., p. 16.
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central consciousness of either the book or its various dramatisations and Anne’s Jewish 
identity is depicted in such a way that it seems inessential to her character. The film was 
also compromised by Hollywood conventions of scoring and casting,100 with Anne 
bearing a striking resemblance to the popular 1950s actress Audrey Hepburn.101 The 
audience was more likely to associate with Anne’s courageous struggle in a time of 
adversity than to confront the horrors o f the Holocaust itself. Americans might empathise 
with the young girl’s plight and blame the Nazis -  though none appeared in the play -  but 
they were not asked to implicate their government or themselves for any role in a tragic 
drama overseas.102 In the mid-1950s, American audiences were not ready to make that 
connection.
In early American cinematic responses to the Holocaust, both the Nazi genocide and the
Jewish homeland were absent. For example, the 1947 film Gentleman’s Agreement
explored the bloodless anti-Semitic practices o f New York and Connecticut, which by
implication cast the Jewish experience o f the US in a much more favourable light than
their experience of Central and Eastern Europe. In the film, gentile journalist Skylar
Philip Green posed as a Jew to research an article on anti-Semitism, as it were, ‘from the
inside’. While posing as a Jew, Green experiences various kinds o f hostility including
anti-Semite remarks and exclusion from exclusive clubs. Although these might appear to
be relatively harmless forms of discrimination, the unspoken backdrop o f the Holocaust
makes clear that these actions fall along a continuum, the ultimate conclusion of which is 
103
genocide. Gentleman’s Agreement universalised the meaning of the Holocaust to 
encompass all forms of bigotry, prejudice, hatred and social injustice. By extending its 
concern with anti-Semitism to prejudice more generally, the film repudiates its 
perpetration not only because it is morally objectionable but because it is the antithesis of 
American values.
100 Annette Insdorf, Indelible Shadows: Film and the Holocaust (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 
2003) p. 7.
101 Ibid.. p.7.
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Theater”, in Hilene Flanzbaum, The Americanization of the Holocaust (Maryland: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1999) p. 125.
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A central objective of the film was to minimise the difference between Jews and others 
through an exploration of American Jewish identity. When Green’s young son asks him 
“What is an American Jew?” Green adopts the Enlightenment response to the centuries 
old European Jewry question: religion as distinct from nationality. He describes Jews by 
their religious label,104 as members of one of the many religions that have a place on the 
American urban landscape and explains that anti-Semitism is just one of a variety of 
hatreds targeted at members of a particular religion. Jews are described as being as 
American as anyone else: “You can be an American and a Protestant, or an American and 
a Catholic, or an American and a Jew.” 105 By implication, Nazi Germany’s repudiation 
o f its Jewish citizens is also a repudiation of its democratic values, and therefore, an 
example to be rejected. Green explains that: “One thing is your country ... but the other 
thing is religion. ... That doesn’t have anything to do with the flag or the uniform or the 
airplanes.” In defining the Jews nationality through the national symbols of flag, uniform 
and airplanes, Green also marginalises suspicions of dual loyalties for the American 
Jew.106
The absence of any reference to Israel in Gentleman’s Agreement is representative of a 
time when Jews were encouraged to embrace an American identity through the adoption 
o f an American universalist vision. The contrast between this 1947 film and Otto 
Preminger’s 1960 film Exodus exemplifies the difference in approach and the evolution 
o f American cultural attitudes.
Leon Uris’s 1960 book and film Exodus treats the Holocaust as a distinctly Jewish event 
and pairs the quintessential Jewish tragedy with the Jewish triumph o f a homeland in 
Palestine. Crucially for the development of American Jewish identity, the Holocaust and 
the creation of the state o f Israel are shown in the film as the two pillars by which Jews 
can define themselves. An unarticulated but important triangulation exists between the 
traditional Jew as remembered, the new Israeli Jew represented on screen and the
103 Ibid., p. 149.
104 Doneson, op. cit. p. 53.
105 Antler, op. cit. p. 150.
106 Ibid., pp. 150-51.
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American Jew off-screen, external to the films plot. The identification of the American 
Jew with the new Israeli Jew is encouraged by the American English dialogue and the 
casting of Paul Newman in the lead role as Ari Ben Canaan. While Ari personifies the 
powerful, virile and handsome Israeli man he also represents the American Jew, thus 
enabling a positive connection to be made between them.
The film endeavours to make clear that although the Jews have a distinctive religion and 
history they are no different from anyone else. This ‘anyone else’ is shown to be the 
gentile world. While Ari enters into a relationship with an American Christian nurse, that 
is designed to erase differences between Americans and Jews, more ominously for a 
Jewish state situated in an Arab world, Exodus presents Jewish-Arab difference as 
unbreachable -  Ari will not permit his sister to marry his Arab friend.107 Simultaneously 
with this, the connection between the Arab enemies of the Jewish homeland and the Nazi 
murders of European Jewry justifies this difference. Palestinian terrorism is 
masterminded with an escaped Nazi in the background.
Exodus is representative of popular American characterisations of Jewish history that, in 
depicting the state o f Israel as the culmination and redemption of the Shoah, conflate the 
American and the Israeli Jew. For American Jews internalising this discourse, the 
imagined Israel is not the actual Israel but an Israel of the mind. The virile representation 
of the Israeli Jew is someone with whom American Jews can identify in contrast to the 
vision of Jewish impotence of the Shoah that they wish to cast off.108 It is this idealised 
image of Israel that American Jews mobilised to defend.
The Entry of the Holocaust into American Life
The most effective means of securing public engagement with the Holocaust was through 
the depiction of it in terms that had a resonance with the contemporary concerns of the
107 Sara R. Horowitz, “The Cinematic Triangulation of Jewish American Identity: Israel, America, and the 
Holocaust” in Hilene Flanzbaum, The Americanization of the Holocaust (Maryland: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1999) pp. 155-6.
108 Ibid., p. 156.
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audience. Two of the first films that attempted this were the 1961 film Judgement at 
Nuremberg and the 1965 film The Pawnbroker. Both relied on parallels between Nazi 
Germany and 1960s America for their popular appeal and both enlisted all star casts to 
ensure that audiences were drawn to the box office.
When Judgement at Nuremberg premiered on 14 December 1961 it was a major cultural 
event. United Artists staged the screening in Kongresshalle in the shadow of the Berlin 
Wall. The invited audience were Allied commanders, members of the West German 
government and American journalists who had been flown in to report on the event. The 
film had already been brought to the attention of the American people by a feature in Life 
magazine109 and a profile in the New York Times of the film’s director Stanley Kramer.110 
The premier was also guaranteed an audience because its opening coincided with the 
verdict in the Eichmann trial and parallels between the courtroom in Nuremberg and the 
courtroom in Beit Haam, Jerusalem, could be drawn in the public mind.
The film dealt with principles not individuals and its “metaphorical content on the 
discourse of justice, so relevant to Americans, created an atmosphere of what Pierre 
Sorlin call[ed] readiness.”111 Nazi symbols and images avail the credits and the audience 
read the words Nuremberg, Germany 1948, which introduces them to a courtroom scene. 
We then meet the American judge Dan Haywood (Spencer Tracy) who has come out of 
retirement to judge four Nazi war criminals. Most of the film is devoted to the trials 
which are orchestrated by the raging American prosecutor Colonel Tad Rolfe (Richard 
Widmark) and the charismatic German defence lawyer Hans Clift (Maximilian Schell). 
The key witnesses are Rudolf Petersen who was sterilised by the Nazi’s for political 
reasons, Irene Hoffman (Judy Garland) who recounts an incident o f racial pollution and 
the most important defendant, the German scholar and jurist Ernst Janning (Burt 
Lancaster). Judge Dan Haywood respected Janning for his earlier writings on
109 “Man’s Long, Rough Pursuit o f Justice.” Life. 15 December 1965, pp. 121-3, cited in Mintz, op. cit. p. 
92.
110 Bosley Crowther, “Hollywood’s Producer of Controversy,” NYT Magazine. 10 December 1961, pp. 76- 
77.
111 Pierre Sorlin, The Film in History: Restaging the Past (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes & Nobel Books, 1980) p. 
44, cited in Doneson, op. cit. p. 97.
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jurisprudence and he now explains that in a period of indignity and fear, Hitler had 
restored pride to the German people. “I am aware!” he yells. “Were we deaf? Blind? If 
we didn’t know, it’s because we didn’t want to know.” 112
Rolfe’s comeback is that if  Janning is guilty then everyone is guilty: the Vatican, 
Churchill who indirectly praised Hitler in 1938, American industrialists who assisted 
Hitler in rebuilding German armaments and the list goes on. The judge finally indicts the 
men in the dock because these men were directly responsible for their actions, 
irrespective o f whether many more people were guilty. He then warns the court that “If 
these murders were monsters, this event would have no more moral significance than an
1 I T
earthquake ... how easily this can happen!”
In essence, Judgement at Nuremberg is a film in which four stories are told. The first is 
the manifest submission of the German people, particularly the educated classes to 
Nazism and the denial of complicity for their willing compliance. The second is the 
implicit splendour of American justice which provides the moral yardstick for the 
determination of right and wrong.114 The third story addresses the issue of responsibility, 
both individual and national.115 The fourth is the subtly concealed narrative o f the 
Holocaust and the public interest in its perpetrators.
The Pawnbroker tried to achieve a connection between Nazi Germany o f the 1930s and 
the US in the 1960s by creating an analogy between street violence in Harlem and the 
murder of European Jewry. The film tells the story of Holocaust survivor Sol Nazerman 
(Rod Steiger), who lost his wife and children in the camps and now runs a pawnshop in 
Harlem. It depicts American society as being responsible for the suffering o f the blacks 
and the Jews, and Nazerman, himself so recently a victim, is guilty of complicity, not 
unlike the Germans responsible for his own suffering and the death of his family.116 The 
film focuses on the psychological damage inflicted on the pawnbroker by his wartime
112 Insdorf, op. cit. p. 8.
113 Ibid.. p. 8.
114 Mintz, op. cit. p. 91.
115 Insdorf, op. cit. p. 8.
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experiences that have made him choose a life bereft of human compassion and 
detachment. At the time of the film’s release, New York Times writer Bosley Crowther 
dscribed it as a “drama of discovery o f the need of man to try to do something for his 
fellow human sufferers in the troubled world o f today.” 117 The story tells o f how the 
shooting of Nazerman’s Puerto Rican assistant finally strips off his defences and brings 
him back to the living world of suffering. This ‘regeneration’ does not culminate with 
the alleviation of pain but with a renewed capacity to feel it and the ability to rejoin the 
world of “fellow suffers.”118 In so doing, the pawnbroker regains his ‘social conscience’, 
a newly developing concept in American society.
The film is one of the first in which the ‘survivor’ is the central consciousness and it 
played a role in shaping the image of the survivor in American culture.119 It heralded the 
emergence of the survivor as a representative type and the onset o f the process by which 
the survivor became the hero of society and popular culture.
The transition from a general consciousness of the Holocaust to its memorialisation was 
to a certain extent, driven by the pervasive influence of another cultural artefact: the 
television. Peter Novick, a professor o f history at the University of Chicago contends 
that the defining moment in the entry of the Holocaust into general American 
consciousness was NBC’s presentation in 1978 of the television mini-series Holocaust. 
The programme reflected the resurgence of ethnic consciousness in America and the 
strengthening of ethnic identification that had occurred as a product of the black struggle 
for civil rights in the 1960s.120 Close to 100 million Americans tuned into the four part 
nine and a half-hour programme121 that featured household names including Meryl Streep 
and James Wood. The series was designed to maximise identification between the 
American audience and the victims, an educated German Jewish family. The television
116 Doneson. op. cit. p. 112.
1,7 Bosley Crowther, “Screen: The Pawnbroker Opens at Three Theatres,” NYT 14 April 1965.
118 Mintz. op. cit. p. 113.
"9 Ibid-, P- 115,
120 See Glazer, op. cit.
121 Novick, op. cit. p. 209.
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images showed the ‘evil’ of societies based on other ideologies and the righteous 
morality of the United States and its obligation to prevent a repeat of this genocide.
The success of Holocaust represented the intersection of a medium that was very 
American with a virulent mode of Jewish persecution that was seen as exclusively 
European. A human cataclysm had taken place in the Old World and had gained 
admittance to American consciousness through the medium of “entertainment that 
Americans had devised to protect their historical innocence.”122 The incredible power of 
television universalised the Holocaust in two senses. Firstly, it became the referent for 
collective suffering and the ultimate standard o f describing victimisation. Secondly, in 
the political sphere, it dramatically became a point of moral consensus. A politician 
could maximise his political capital by advocating the memorialisation of the Holocaust 
and rest assured that his actions would generate public support. It was in this vein that on 
1 May 1978, two weeks after Holocaust had been aired on national television, President 
Jimmy Carter announced the establishment o f a presidential commission to recommend a 
national Holocaust memorial. Carter responded to the developing consensus within 
American society that the Holocaust should be memorialised in America. He claimed his 
decision was a product o f changes in American cultural consciousness, brought about by 
his reading of Arthur Morse’s book While Six Million Died and his growing awareness 
that Israel had been bom “out of the ashes” of the Holocaust.
Fifteen years later, Steven Spielberg’s blockbuster film Schindler's List represented 
“Israel as the historical culmination of Jewish destiny.”123 The film is a work of popular 
culture that led to an intensification of engagement with the Holocaust in public cultural 
discourse in the US. Not unlike the mini-series Holocaust, the genre was crafted in a way 
that enabled the public to admit the film into their consciousness in very American terms. 
Firstly individualism is an integral aspect of American political culture and the portrayal 
of the individualism of Schindler enabled him to assume the traditional Hollywood role
122 Mintz, op. cit. p. 26.
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of the strong leading man. Through an oversimplification of history, Schindler becomes 
the saviour of the Jewish people and with it the personification of goodness against the 
evil o f Nazism. Schindler’s perceived success in saving countless Jews from the gas 
chamber plays to the American conviction that individuals can move history.
Secondly the concept of rescue that is manifest in the films Hollywood style ‘happy 
ending’ appealed to an American audience. Alan Mintz argued that the issue was more 
profound than a standard plot device and was essential to the success of the film because 
an American audience would not accept the true story of the fate of the majority of 
European Jews.124 By choosing Schindler as the focal point of a film depicting the 
Holocaust, Spielberg was able to focus on the atypical rescue of a group o f European 
Jews, within the overarching framework of Nazi genocide. The concept o f survivor- 
rescuer, facilitated by the rehabilitation of the survivor in the American mind, has led to a 
new interest in those gentiles who helped make that survival possible. As Lawrence 
Langer acknowledged, “it is the nature o f the American mind, and perhaps human nature 
in general, to avoid abiding the unremittingly tragic.”125
In the American mind, the idea of rescue is interwoven with the concept of redemption, a 
concept that has deep roots in American culture and is commensurate with the theological 
dimension of some of the country’s leading religious groups. Spielberg’s film is a story 
about a rescuer and a fallen Christian at that, who returns to his faith and saves himself by 
saving Jews. In seeking to appeal to a modem American audience, the focus on survivor- 
rescuer and the overarching theme of redemption, was a key device through which the 
film was accepted into mainstream popular culture.
The power o f images of the Holocaust to move the American public was convincingly 
demonstrated in 1992 when fund-raisers asked for donations from individuals for the 
construction of the national Holocaust museum. An astonishing $168 million was raised, 
demonstrating the power and commitment of a sector of American society to support a
124 Mintz, op. cit. p. 151.
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cause in which they came to deeply believe.126 Situated in the heart of the nation’s 
capital, next to the National Museum of American History, the museum enshrines, by 
virtue of its placement, not just the history o f the Holocaust but what are seen as 
American democratic and egalitarian ideals as a counterpoint to the Holocaust. James 
Young, a professor of English and Judaic studies at the University of Massachusetts 
explained that “remembering the crimes of another people in another land ... encourages 
Americans to recall their nation’s own idealised reason for being.”127 It is also a means 
by which the symbolic importance o f Israel is reinforced in the minds of America.
The “Americanisation of the Holocaust”, the title o f a number of works on this subject, 
implies that this event has been refracted through means of representation that resonate 
with American culture. Events are only comprehensible to cultures, like people, from 
within the confines of their own experiences, interests and values and the willingness to 
engage in an external event is generally motivated by an internal exigency.128 The 
Holocaust was admitted into American life in American terms and has gradually been 
assimilated into public discourse and political culture.
Shared Values and Practices
Americans have come to feel a strong empathy for Israel as a society imbued with the 
liberal values and humanistic culture of the West. Viewed as a democratic and open 
society, the Jewish state is perceived as sharing the concepts of individual freedom, and 
in this regard is identified as a ‘Western’ state. In some respects, Israel is seen as a 
reflection o f the American self not just because many of Israel’s more vociferous citizens 
were radicals raised in the US, but because shared values, cultural affinity, a common
125 Lawrence Langer, Versions of Survival (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982) pp. 1-65 
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ethical and religious heritage, the Judaic tradition and the Judeo-Christian heritage bind 
the United States and Israel together.129
Israel has a parliament elected by free and secret ballot and a government that is 
perceived as changing in accordance with the will of the governed. Debates between the 
different political and ideological persuasions o f the political parties characterise Israeli 
political life and these ideas are also central to western political systems. The United 
States has an interest in the survival of the relatively few democratic states outside of 
Europe and believes it has a moral obligation to protect such an exposed democracy in a 
sea of Arab feudalism. Characteristically, in the 1992 presidential election, Clinton drew 
on Israel as an example of a ‘democratic ally’ and claimed that “Democracy has always 
been our nation’s perfecting impulse ... democracy abroad also protects our own concrete 
economic and security interests here at home.” 130
Washington’s professed concern with Isniel’s fundamental values includes support for 
what are seen as human rights, minority rights, (there are Arab members of the Knesset) 
pluralism, popular participation in government, and the rejection of extremism, 
oppression and terrorism, and whatever misgivings some Americans may feel regarding 
Israel’s ability to deliver on these values, the country is generally believed to honour 
them where possible. Successive US administrations have believed that Washington can 
have close and enduring relations with countries such as Israel that are believed to share 
America’s fundamental values.131
Like America, Israel is a nation of immigrants who left inhospitable lands for a new one 
where they endeavoured to build a just and free society. The American experience in 
striving to escape persecution and establish an independent national homeland had a
129 Bernard Reich, Securing the Covenant: United States-Israel relations after the Cold War (Westport, 
Connecticut & London: Praeger Publishers, 1995) p. 11.
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parallel in a Jewish state that appeared to reaffirm those ideals through absorption and 
immigration. A parallel is also seen between the struggle of the Israelis against the Arabs
132 • *and the struggle of the Pilgrim Fathers against the American Indians. There is, in
addition, a corresponding dedication to the values of pioneering peoples -  the United
States placed great importance on those who heeded the call to ‘go west’ and Israel
1attributed equal salience to the settlers who moved to and developed the frontier lands.
The importance of political culture in influencing foreign policy is evident in the 
pronouncements of senior American decision-makers such as former Assistant Secretary 
of State Edward Djerejian: “The U.S.-Israeli relationship [is based on] shared democratic 
ideals and values ... and we remain unshakeably committed to Israel’s security and to 
preserving Israel’s qualitative edge.” The perception of such cultural similarities and 
shared values clearly contribute to the strength and endurance of the US-Israeli 
relationship. As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger explained:
For Americans, co-operation among the free nations is a moral and not merely a practical necessity.
... America, to be itself, needs a sense of identity and collaboration with other nations who share its 
values. ... The solidarity of the democratic nations in the world is essential both as material support 
and as a moral symbol.134
This is very revealing of decision-makers’ attitudes towards international affairs in 
general and, in the context o f this thesis, o f their understanding of relations with the Arab 
states in general and Israel in particular.
The Selection of the Case Studies
131 Author’s interview with William Quandt, National Security Council aide, Nixon and Carter 
administrations.
132 The theme of the American Israel was used, almost from the beginning, as a justification for the 
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This thesis focuses on United States policy toward Israel during times o f hostilities 
between Israel and her Arab neighbours, which tended to create tensions in relations 
between Washington and Jerusalem and also between Washington and Moscow. As 
most o f the events under consideration occurred during the Cold War, tensions in the 
Middle East both reflected and impacted on the relationship between the superpowers, 
when their leaders perceived the national interest of their respective states to be 
threatened to a far greater extent than under normal circumstances. It is particularly 
revealing to analyse inter-state relations during periods of intense strain between Israel 
and the United States, when their respective national interests often appeared to demand 
different courses of action. Under such conditions, the real flow of influence, willingness 
to compromise and commitment of both parties to the security and interest o f the other is 
most apparent. As Quandt acknowledges:
By definition, crisis involves surprise, threat, and enhanced uncertainty. Previous policies may well 
be exposed as flawed or bankrupt. Reality no longer accords with previous expectations. In such a 
situation, a new structure o f perceptions is likely to emerge, one that will reflect presidential 
perspectives to the degree that the president becomes involved in handling the crisis.135
It is because of the crucial role that US presidents and their key decision-makers tended 
to play in crisis situations that their perceptions and actions form the main focus of this 
thesis. As was discussed in Chapter One, it is apparent from an assessment o f the 
available evidence of the foreign policy-making elite’s pronouncements on Israel that the
136relationship is perceived to rest on a “moral basis”. The United States’ commitment to 
Israel is seen as transcending the bounds of realpolitik, and an emotional affinity and 
spiritual connection is perceived to exist between the two nations. The rhetoric of 
successive American leaders indicates that Israel is considered to be one of the United 
States’ greatest allies and that a “commitment to the security and survival o f Israel is an
137essential element o f ... global policy.”
135 William Quandt, Decade of Decision: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 1967-1976 
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An analysis of the public rhetoric and private sentiments of the United States foreign- 
policy elite reveals recurrent themes, values and resonant notions that are indicative of 
the cultural premises on which elite perceptions of Israel are based.138 The analytical 
challenge is to assess the complex relationship between ideas and action, by comparing 
public pronouncements with private statements to determine whether the rhetoric of 
successive administrations acts as a reliable guide to policy or if serious contradictions 
exist between words and deeds. Comparisons will also be made between the statements 
and actions of successive presidents to illuminate the priorities of different 
administrations’ and to reveal both continuities and changes in policy.
The selected case studies focus on the Johnson, Nixon, Reagan and Bush Sr. 
administrations, and therefore analyse the policies of both Democratic and Republican 
governments. Particular emphasis is placed on crisis situations and their impact in 
shaping issues for Presidents and their advisers, particularly the Secretary of State, 
National Security Adviser and Secretary o f Defence. Consideration will be given to the 
extent to which their actions have been a rational response to the defence of the perceived 
national interest, the product o f domestic pressure or the outcome of a cultural frame of 
reference and o f Washington’s special relationship with Israel.
During the Suez crisis of 1956, Eisenhower forced Israel to withdraw from Egyptian land 
it had captured as part of a joint Anglo-French operation to control the Canal zone. By 
opposing what Washington viewed as the ‘imperialist’ actions o f other Western states in 
Afro-Asia, Eisenhower hoped to win the support of the regions newly independent states
11Qand to discredit the Soviet Union’s ‘colonialism’ in Eastern Europe. Yet by the time 
Kennedy assumed the presidency in 1960, Eisenhower’s decision had been discredited. 
The Soviet Union was increasing its influence in the region, most notably with the 
assistance of President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt, who had benefited from American
138 Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987) pp. 
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actions a decade earlier. While continuing to court the Egyptian leader, Kennedy began 
the process of re-establishing friendly relations with Israel and supplied Israel with small 
quantities of arms.
The failure of both Eisenhower and Kennedy to lure Nasser into the Western camp and 
Kennedy’s agreement to the sale of US arms to Israel, provides the context for the first 
case study that begins with President Johnson and the response o f his administration to 
the June War of 1967. This has been taken as the starting point because the conditions of 
more recent ties between the United States and Israel largely stemmed from this event. 
The 1967 war culminated in the Johnson administration mounting the first American 
military resupply operation to Israel following the cease-fire, providing Israel with 
diplomatic support in the United Nations against the Soviet Union and the radical Arab 
states and tacitly endorsing Israeli occupation of captured Arab territory until the 
conclusion of peace negotiations.
The second case study explores the policy of the Republican administration of Richard 
Nixon toward Israel during the Yom Kippur war o f October 1973. This period is of 
particular interest because the Arab-Israeli conflict culminated in the US armed forces 
being put on nuclear alert, the launch of America’s first resupply operation to Israel 
during a war and the establishment of the financial component of the more recent special 
relationship, when Congress authorised Nixon and Kissinger’s request for $2.2 billion in 
financial aid to Israel.
The third case study analyses the Reagan administration’s approach to the Israeli invasion 
of Lebanon in 1982. This was Israel’s first ‘war of choice’ and has parallels with Suez 
because Israel was widely perceived as the aggressor state. Despite this, Reagan 
continued to support Israel and even deployed US Marines to keep the peace between the 
warring Lebanese factions, many hundreds of whom were killed in a terrorist attack in 
Beirut -  more than the number of US servicemen killed in the Gulf War of 1991.
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The final case study provides an overview of the administration of George Bush Sr. and 
its attempts to balance American, Israeli and Arab interests during the kaleidoscopic 
changes in the international landscape that characterised the post-Cold War world. The 
objective o f this and the other case studies is to explore the dynamics o f US policy 
toward Israel in terms of the politics, sociology, economics and strategy of commitment.
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Chapter 4
The Johnson Administration and US Policy Toward Israel
The policy Lyndon Johnson’s administration pursued toward Israel reflected a 
combination o f the shifts that occurred in American political culture during the 1960s 
and the trauma of Vietnam. Johnson assumed office as leader o f a troubled nation 
whose President had just been assassinated and which was beginning to question the 
conception of itself as a paragon society. The violence associated with the reaction to 
the civil rights movement and the move to end racial segregation in the Southern 
states challenged the unity o f the nation at a time when the Vietnam war undermined 
the belief in American military superiority and the righteousness o f its foreign policy. 
The questioning at home and abroad o f the exemplary nature o f American society and 
its controversial use o f power undermined the perception of America as an ‘ideal’ 
nation.
Johnson’s mastery o f domestic politics was surpassed by few and he was well placed 
to confront the domestic challenges assailing his country. As majority leader in the 
Senate he had built consensus through ingeniously constructed compromises,1 using 
his power to further his objectives for social reform. But the confidence he exuded in 
domestic politics contrasted sharply with his inexperience in foreign affairs, an area 
that required his increasing attention with the escalation o f the US commitment in 
Vietnam during 1964-65 and the Middle East crisis o f 1967. Perhaps as an 
acknowledgement o f this, Johnson continued the foreign policy strategy o f his 
predecessor, President John F. Kennedy and in the Middle East, sought to balance 
American interests with those o f Israel and fhose o f the Arab states. It is perhaps 
because he pursued Kennedy’s approach and did not formulate his own strategy at the 
outset, that the contrast between his reluctance to act decisively to avert war in May
'i
1967 and his decisive support and alignment with Israel as the war intensified, was 
so great. The extent o f his personal belief that the Jews had the right to a homeland
1 William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 
(Washington D.C. & Berkeley, Los Angeles: The Brookings Institute, & University o f California Press, 
1993) p. 25.
2 Barbara Kellerman & Ryan J. Barilleaux, The President as World Leader (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1991) p. 74.
132
and his commitment to the preservation of Israel was apparent in his rhetoric but was 
not truly revealed in practice until the war commenced. By the end of his presidency, 
the Middle Eastern map had been redrawn, the United States had become Israel’s 
major arms supplier and had tacitly accepted Israel’s occupation of Arab land.
From his early days in office, Johnson’s outspoken defence of Jewish causes 
distinguished him as a strong proponent o f Israel and, despite the circumstances, his 
assumption o f the presidency was greeted warmly in Tel Aviv. In 1938, prior to the 
outbreak o f the Second World War, he had used his position as a congressman to 
press immigration officials to lift restrictions on Jewish refugees seeking asylum in 
the United States.4 A decade later, when Israel was literally fighting for its survival, 
he worked behind the scenes to facilitate the clandestine flow o f American arms to 
Israel’s fledgling army, the Haganah.5 Following the Suez crisis o f 1956, Johnson 
opposed the Eisenhower administration’s insistence on Israeli withdrawal from Sinai 
and spoke out in opposition to United Nations sanctions against Israel. He came to 
Tel Aviv’s assistance again in 1958, supporting its attempts to secure American 
military aid. Johnson’s efforts did not go unnoticed by leading Jewish figures6 and as 
early as the mid-1950s, Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban claimed that “there was 
something about Israel that stirred [Johnson’s] pious McPherson, a White House aide, 
went so far as to suggest that “some place in Lyndon Johnson’s blood [there were] a 
great many Jewish corpuscles.”7
Johnson’s early life shaped the basic premises on which he operated as President. 
Bom of a Christian family that had ties to the small Texas Jewish community in his 
hometown, he was raised on Biblical teachings that taught him to believe that the 
Jews had the right to a homeland in Palestine. As a politician, the influence o f his
3 Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from 
Truman to Reagan (Chicago & London: The University o f Chicago Press, 1985) p. 118.
4 Louis Gomolak, Prologue: LBJ’s Foreign Affairs Background. 1908-48. Ph.D. diss., University of 
Texas, Austin, 1981) pp. 30-35, 44-51, 94-96. cited in Douglas Little, “Choosing Sides: Lyndon 
Johnson and the Middle East”, in Robert A. Divine ed., The Johnson Years vol. Ill, (Lawrence, Kansas: 
University Press o f Kansas, 1994) p. 152.
5 Ibid.. p. 152.
6 Ibid.. p. 152.
7 H. W. Brands, The Wages o f Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American Power (New 
York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) p. 187.
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religious upbringing was evident as revealed in a speech he delivered to a B ’nai B’rith 
meeting in Washington in 1968:
Most, if not all o f you, have very deep ties with the land and with the people o f  Israel, as I do, 
for my Christian faith sprang from yours. The Bible stories are woven into my childhood 
memories as the gallant struggle of modem Jews to be free of persecution is also woven into our 
souls.8
These positive images of Israel were reinforced by the close contacts he had enjoyed 
with the American Jewish community when, in fighting for domestic liberal and 
social reforms in the Senate, he had discovered in them a kindred spirit and shared 
values. Israeli leaders capitalised on this to advance the US-Israeli relationship. It 
was possible to translate this empathy into foreign affairs because in the mid-1960s, 
Tel Aviv was experiencing problems o f economic development and challenges from 
external forces, with which a domestically orientated President, believing his own 
country to be threatened by Communism, could identify.9 In his memoirs Johnson 
acknowledged that he had “always had a deep feeling o f sympathy for Israel and its 
people, gallantly building and defending a modem nation against great odds and 
against the tragic background of Jewish experience.” 10
The emotional affinity and sense o f common heritage Johnson felt for Israel, was 
explicit in his public pronouncements. In a toast he made to President Zalam Shazar 
o f Israel in August 1966, he asserted:
[0]ur Republic like yours, was nurtured by the philosophy o f the ancient Hebrew teachers who 
taught mankind the principles o f morality, o f  social justice and of universal peace. This is our 
heritage and it is yours."
This did not mean that he was hostile to the Arabs, but the warm sentiments he 
expressed for the Jewish state contrasted with his emphasis on the differences 
between the American and Arab peoples. In toasting King Hussein o f Jordan in 1964, 
he claimed that, “in Jordan, he [King Hussein] and his people have brought that 
ancient land o f the camel, the date and the palm to the threshold o f a bright and a
8 Public Papers o f  the Presidents: Lyndon Johnson. 1968 (Washington, 1969): 10 September 1968. 
Johnson delivered this speech at the 125th Anniversary Meeting of B ’nai B ’rith.
9 Spiegel, op. cit. p. 124.
10 Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the presidency. 1963-1969 (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971) p. 297.
" Public Papers o f the Presidents: Lyndon Johnson. 1966 (Washington, 1967) 2 August 1966, p. 573.
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hopeful and a modem future.” 12 He believed many aspects of Arab culture, such as 
Islam and the lack o f democracy, to be incommensurate with American political 
culture, and a sense o f shared history or common identity was lacking in Johnson’s 
image (and the majority of Americans) o f the Arab world. He was unsympathetic 
toward the radical brand o f Arab nationalism promoted by Egypt’s President Gamal 
Abdel Nasser and was conscious that the Soviet Union was exploiting Arab
I
nationalism to weaken US interests in the Middle East. He fluctuated between 
trying to come to terms with Nasser and the belief that the ambitions o f Egypt’s 
President had to be curtailed. In general, however, he perceived Nasser’s brand o f 
Arab nationalism to be very different from the Zionist nationalism of the state o f 
Israel, and often applied the analogy o f the Texans fighting the Mexicans to depict 
Israel’s struggle against the Arabs. Given the President’s mindset, in the event o f an 
Arab-Israeli war, it was already evident where the support of the White House would 
lie.
Johnson’s commitment to Israel was as personal as it was political for he valued the 
friendship o f many American Jews for whom Israel was a personal issue14 and as 
President he cultivated the close personal relations he had developed with leading 
Israeli politicians. In 1954, when Johnson emerged as the Senate majority leader, he 
befriended Abba Eban, the Israeli Ambassador to Washington -  a friendship that was 
to continue throughout his presidency, Eban being the last Israeli official to meet with 
Johnson prior to the June 1967 war. It was Eban who pressed for US support in the 
event o f hostilities and then reported to the Knesset that Johnson had indeed given 
Israel the green light to proceed with a pre-emptive strike against Egypt. Likewise, 
one o f Johnson’s first foreign policy acts as President was to receive Levi Eshkol, the 
Israeli premier to Washington in June 1964. The visit was marked by a considerable 
cordiality, and over time he and Eshkol established a degree o f intimacy Eban 
described as “unprecedented in previous relations between Israeli premiers and
12 Public Papers o f the Presidents: Lyndon Johnson. 1963-64 (Washington, 1965)14 April 1964, p. 462.
13 Quandt, Peace Process p. 25.
14 Brands, op. cit. p. 187.
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American presidents.” 15 It was Eshkol who requested of his friend, and received for 
Israel, the most advanced fighter planes US inventories could supply.
Perhaps the most controversial question o f Jewish ‘access’ and its potential to 
influence policy concerned the close friendship between Johnson and the Israeli 
Minister Ephraim (“Epi”) Evron, second-in-command at the Israeli embassy in 
Washington. Harry McPherson, a Texas Democrat and impeccably Anglo-Saxon, 
held the Jewish portfolio from 1966 and was responsible for managing White House 
relations with the American Jewish community and presenting their concerns to the 
President. He was the only non-Jew ever to hold this position and found it hard to 
account for the appointment, save that he had worked on civil rights, worked with 
Jewish liberals and administered several foreign programmes. There also appeared to 
be no suitable Jewish candidate on the White house staff who was either interested or 
available.16 McPherson was close to both Johnson and leading Jewish figures and 
commented that Evron “developed one o f the most unusual friendships with an 
American President, I suspect, that any Minister has ever developed.” 17 The hitherto 
unprecedented associations between the Executive and the Israeli government laid the 
administration open to the charge that the national interest was being subordinated to 
personal affinity in determining matters o f state.
Johnson’s close association with Israel was replicated by many o f his advisers who 
for a mixture of cultural, political, ideological or religious reasons shared his
1 Q
sympathy. Former members o f the “old Left” Democratic liberal-labour alliance 
identified with Israel as a state founded on the same humanitarian ideals that had 
given rise to Democratic party programmes such as the New Deal and the Great 
Society. Included in this group were Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, White House 
speechwriters John Roche and Ben Wattenberg, and Sheldon Cohen the Chief o f the
15 Eban, An Autobiography p. 355.
16 David Schoenbaum, The United States and the State o f Israel (New York & Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993) p. 154. In his personal correspondence McPherson recalled that “The 
impression 1 have is that I simply reached up one day and found the ‘Jewish affairs’ hat on my head."
17 Harry McPherson, JOHI, 16 January 1969, tape 4, p. 22.
18 See Donald Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days That Changed the Middle East (Simon and 
Schuster, 1984) pp. 80-85, 156-58 and Abba Eban An Autobiography (New York: Random House, 
1977).
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Internal Revenue Service. Even in the more impartial national security apparatus, 
Arthur J. Goldberg, US Ambassador to the UN and Eugene Rostow, Under Secretary 
o f  State for Political Affairs, fitted into this pro-Israeli framework.19
The question o f Jewish access to and influence upon the decision-making process 
extended beyond members o f the administration to the many non-governmental 
American Jews with a vested interest in Israel’s future. Amongst the most influential 
were Ed Weisl, a leading New York lawyer, Abe Feinberg a Democratic party 
member, Arthur Krim of Paramount Pictures (whose Israeli wife purchased a ranch 
near Johnson’s in Texas), and David Ginsberg, a Washington lawyer who listed the 
Israeli embassy amongst his clients. It was these people with whom Johnson spent 
the final days prior to the Arab-Israeli war and their views he heard before he returned 
to Washington to direct US policy during the crisis.20
Irrespective o f personal preferences, as President, Johnson was not an independent 
figure. He held office as leader o f his party, for many o f whose members the future o f 
Israel was a prime concern, and was therefore under a certain obligation to back Tel 
Aviv. Party pressure was tempered by the fact that as President o f the United States 
he had sworn an oath to place the American national interest above all else. In this 
endeavour Johnson tried to strike a balance between the pro-Israeli sentiments o f 
much o f the Democrat party and the oil interests prominent in Texas politics. Even 
anti-Israeli pressures from companies with Middle East interests were restricted in 
this period because o f the threat Nasser posed to Saudi Arabia, the largest Gulf oil
y iproducing state. Thus if  the issue o f petroleum exerted an influence, it moved
Johnson against Nasser. However, he did not carry co-operation with American oil
22interests to the point o f pro-Arabism, and until the June 1967 war, tried to moderate 
support for Israel to avoid antagonising the Arab oil producing states. Thus it cannot 
be construed that Johnson’s support for Israel blinded him to America’s broader 
interests in the Middle East. As a Senator, he had played a pivotal role in securing the
19 Spiegel, op. cit. p. 128.
20 Ibid-, P- 129.
21 Harry McPherson, claimed that Johnson was “never a friend of the Oil and Gas Industry. Harry 
McPherson, 5 December 1968, tape 1, pp. 21-22, JOHI Interview.
22 Brands, op. cit.. p. 188.
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passage o f the Eisenhower Doctrine that committed the US to the defence o f both the 
Arab states and Israel.23 As befitted his office, Johnson looked critically at what 
Israel’s welfare required24 and, without diluting his devotion to the Jewish state, 
sought to balance it against America’s other regional interests.
It is unclear how much factual knowledge Johnson had of the Middle East, its history 
and its politics. As a politician he was aware of the power o f the pro-Israel lobby, 
comprised o f Israelis, right-wing Jews and increasingly Christian fundamentalists, to 
shape the political process and was not averse to linking domestic politics to foreign 
policy decision-making. Likewise, in making personal appointments to high office 
including the White House staff or the United Nations, he was aware o f the effect his
25choices could exert on the attitudes o f ethnic, religious and social constituencies.
Johnson was very territorial towards policymaking that affected Israel. He monitored 
it closely and kept the personnel involved in its formation to a minimum. Gradually 
he drew all matters concerning Israel that were previously handled in the Middle East 
regional bureau of the State Department and the International Securities Affairs 
division o f the Pentagon, under close White House supervision, for reasons that will 
be explained below.
Global & Regional Perspectives
The foreign policy o f the Johnson administration was to a considerable extent a 
product o f the redemptionist interpretation of the American past and a 
continuation o f the sentiment that had imbued the rhetoric o f the Kennedy years.
That the US was fighting a war in Vietnam was largely due to Kennedy’s almost
23 Divine, op. cit. p. 152.
24 Brands, op. cit. p. 188.
25 Ibid.. p. 91.
26 See Paul Y. Hammond, LBJ and the presidential Management o f Foreign Relations (Austin: 
University o f Texas Press, 1992) pp. 12-20 for a more detailed account of Johnson’s management of  
the foreign policy process. When war broke out in June 1967, the role o f the State Department was 
further undermined as McGeorge Bundy was recalled to the White House as a part-time advisor to 
head a committee charged with devising a strategy for a long-term Middle East peace settlement. This 
personnel change displaced Walt Rostow as Johnson’s White House Middle Eastern advisor. The 
President believed Rostow was partisan on matters relating to Israel and felt Bundy would provide a 
more independent viewpoint. This reorganisation was to affect the way both the International Securities 
Affairs office in Defence and the regional desk in State operated during the Middle East crisis.
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messianic redemptionism and his conception o f the frontier. He took his country 
into Vietnam arguing that the US had no other motive than the defence o f 
“freedom” and that a nation raised in “freedom” could not be oblivious to the 
“freedom” of others. Redemptionism bestowed on America the God given 
mission to redeem a sinful world and gave it the moral authority to lead. This 
belief manifested itself in a foreign policy designed to shape an American world 
order and to prevent the spread of Communism, yet the belief in its righteousness 
distorted America’s perception o f the world. The war in Southeast Asia may 
have been fought to save South Vietnam from Communism but South Vietnam 
was itself an American invention, conceived o f by Eisenhower but delivered by
9 0Kennedy. What this construct symbolised was the idea that the people o f South 
Vietnam were eagerly awaiting the coming o f the Americans to save them from 
Communist tyranny.
Johnson inherited the idea o f South Vietnam as a nation that required American 
protection and under his leadership the ideological tradition of Lockean 
liberalism reached its fruition. The verbal strategy o f the President and his 
advisors invoked the ideological norms o f liberalism to justify a succession o f 
escalated commitments in Southeast Asia. The administration could legitimise its 
military activities that inflicted vast material damage and human suffering on the 
Vietnamese people because it was less concerned with the welfare o f those it was 
trying to help than with the abstractions -  ‘freedom’, liberation from
■7A
Communism and stability -  that it believed justified the war. Johnson believed
that the failure o f the US in the 1930s was a failure o f the spirit not the sword and
11
was determined not to permit a repeat o f this. Instead, efforts to fulfil the
27 Christopher Coker, Reflections on American Foreign Policy Since 1945 (London: Pinter Publishers, 
1989) p. 87.
28 Kellerman & Ryan J. Barrilleaux, op. cit. p. 74. For more detailed accounts o f the origins and 
evolution o f the American commitment to the security o f Southeast Asia see Robert Divine, “The 
Johnson Revival: A Bibliographical Appraisal” in Robert Divine (ed.), The Johnson Years (Lawrence: 
University o f Kansas Press, 1977) vol. II, pp. 16-17 and Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1990) pp. 430, 442.
29 Loren Baritz, Backfire: a history o f how American culture led us into Vietnam and made us fight the 
wav we did (Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press, 1998) p. 128.
30 Ibid.. p. 38.
31 Cited in Stephen D. Young, “Ethnicity and the Indo-China war: reasons for conflict” in Winston van 
Home & Thomas V. Tonnesen (eds.), Ethnicity and War (Madison: University o f Wisconsin, 1984).
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redemptionist past inflicted a far greater sense of failure on the American nation 
that was to overshadow his presidency, and the lives o f a generation.
Despite the protracted conflict in Vietnam, Johnson nurtured the vision that he 
stood at the head of a great nation with a responsibility for guaranteeing peace 
and stability across the globe. His belief in the indivisibility o f peace resonated 
throughout his foreign policy. In a speech in May 1966 he explained that: 
“Surely it is not a paranoid vision o f  America’s place in the world to recognise 
that freedom is still indivisible -  still has adversaries whose challenge must be
-l'l
answered.” While Johnson could readily accept America’s world involvement, 
what was difficult to accept was “the comparative impotency o f the world’s 
greatest power in the face o f the tiniest pinpricks from the puniest o f nations.”34 
Superpower status as Johnson became painfully aware did not enable his 
administration to control the actions o f  other international actors to the extent he 
may have wished.35
In the heady days of perceived US strength following Khrushchev’s climb down 
over the Cuban missile crisis, some officials felt they had the requisite power to 
stop all Communist threats and that this power should be used to the hilt.36 It was 
against this backdrop o f American gains, that in 1965, Johnson abandoned 
Kennedy’s overtures towards the Arab nationalists. He came to equate, as did 
Thomas Mann, his Assistant Secretary o f  State for Latin American Affairs, even 
a left-wing government, as threatening to American interests irrespective o f
37whether Communists were involved. Johnson’s sense o f optimism combined
32 Just days after Kennedy’s death Secretary o f  State Dean Rusk, summed up the new President’s view  
of America’s world role thus: “We [America] made a national decision to involve ourselves in the fate 
of the world [after WWII] because, among other things, our own fate was deeply involved in what 
happens elsewhere.” Philip Geyelin, Lyndon B. Johnson and the World (New York, Washington & 
London: Praeger 1966) p. 70.
33 PPP 11 May 1966, p. 497.
34 Ibid.. pp. 71-2.
35 This was a reality President Kennedy had acknowledged prior to his death: “We can’t expect these 
countries to do everything the way we want them to do it. They have their own interests, their own personality, 
their own tradition. We can’t make everyone in our image, and there are a good many people who don’t want to 
go in our image.” See Ibid.. p. 70.
36 See for example, Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon Johnson. 1965 (Washington, 1966) 28 
May 1965, p. 593.
37 See for example, DSB 8 November 1965, pp. 736-37.
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with virulent anti-Communism was reinforced by several o f his key advisers
o
including Walt Rostow and Dean Rusk and became a key influence on 
American foreign policy.
These global perspectives were crucial to the unfolding o f the administration’s policy 
towards the Middle East and the penchant for addressing regional situations through 
the prism of superpower confrontation. When President Nasser o f Egypt declared, 
after a brief flirtation with the Vietcong, that “[WJhoever does not like our conduct 
can go drink up the sea. If the Mediterranean is not sufficient, there is the Red Sea, 
too,” Johnson responded by attempting to isolate Egypt and court those he saw as 
more moderate Arab leaders. Since the level o f antagonism in American-Egyptian 
relations was not replicated in the administration’s dealings with Israel, Tel Aviv was 
to show an understanding o f the American cause in Vietnam, voting with Washington 
in international institutions and in turn making the President even more predisposed to 
support the Jewish state in any conflict with Egypt.40
The Evolution of US-Israeli Relations
While Johnson is often credited with, or condemned for, enhancing and consolidating 
the special relationship between the US and Israel, it was his predecessor President 
Kennedy, who had reversed Eisenhower’s policy toward Israel and initiated the chain 
o f events that culminated in America’s alignment with Tel Aviv in June 1967.
That the American perception o f Israel and the importance assigned to American Jews 
changed between the Suez crisis and the presidential election o f 1960 was 
demonstrated by Kennedy’s willingness to use the issue of Israel for electoral 
purposes and his need to secure the support o f this sector o f the electorate. He was 
the first President to publicly discount charges o f ‘dual loyalty’ that Jews feared made
38 Spiegel, op. cit. p. 122.
39 Nasser’s speech at Port Said, broadcast on Radio Cairo, 23 December 1964, quoted in William B. 
Quandt, U.S. Policy in the Middle East: Constraints and Choices (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 
1970) p. 38.
40 Geyelin, op. cit. p. 261. It is interesting to note that while in Congress, Johnson had voted to halt aid 
to Nasser unless Israeli shipping was permitted to pass through the Suez Canal.
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support for Israel incompatible with their integration into American society, when he 
acknowledged that as he had an emotional attachment to Ireland, why shouldn’t the 
Jews identify with Israel?41 As President, he initiated a major breakthrough in 
Middle East policy by simultaneously improving relations with Israel while enhancing 
ties with Nasser, which led him to announce that “the United States ... has a special 
relationship with Israel in the Middle East really comparable only to that which it has 
with Britain over a wide range of world affairs.”42 High praise indeed for a state that 
had incurred Washington’s wrath less than five years before. But what explains this 
shift in US policy and the increasing assertiveness of the American Jewish 
community? Strategic calculations were undoubtedly of paramount importance but 
Kennedy may also have been influenced at a more fundamental level by subtle 
changes in perceptions o f American culture, fuelled by an increasing discourse about 
Israel and the Holocaust.
Kennedy’s courting o f the American Jewish vote and Israel coincided with the 
worldwide attention given to the trial o f  Adolf Eichmann, whose capture had been 
announced by the Israelis on 24 May 1960. Eichmann was the SS officer who had 
directed the Jewish Section o f Nazi Germany’s Reich Main Security Office and who 
in that capacity had presided over a major phase of the Final Solution.43 The 
Eichmann trial filled the news and public discourse during and after the presidential 
election and entered the homes of millions o f Americans through the relatively new 
cultural medium of the television. Media coverage o f the Eichmann trial revealed, for 
the first time to an American audience, the full-scale atrocities o f  the attempted 
annihilation o f six million Jews and in so doing, served to reinforce in the public mind 
the legitimacy o f Israel as a homeland for the Jewish people.
The new level o f interest that news coverage o f the trial, and by association the 
Holocaust, generated amongst mainstream American viewers did not go unnoticed by 
the television networks. During the early 1960s, episodic series that were the
41 Interview with Myer Feldman quoted in Spiegel, op. cit. p. 95.
42 Public Papers o f the Presidents: John Kennedy. 1962 (Washington, 1963); Memorandum of  
presidential Conversation with Israeli Foreign Minister Meir, 27 December 1962, p.5.
43 Howard Sachar, A History o f Israel from the Rise o f Zionism to Our Time (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1996) p. 552.
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mainstay of prime-time television entertainment began to feature the Holocaust as a 
‘guest topic’ in popular dramas like The Defenders and Dragnet, The FBI. These 
programmes depicted individual cases involving Holocaust survivors, former Nazis, 
or neo-Nazis and explored the larger challenge of coming to terms with the injustices 
o f the Holocaust in the postwar era. The symbols of the Nazi swastika and jackboots 
and the numbered tattoo on the forearms of concentration camp survivors 
consolidated the Holocaust as a recognisable concept in American public culture in 
the 1960s. The larger issues addressed in these ‘guest’ appearances by the Holocaust 
were indicative o f its “emergence as a moral paradigm in American discourse”44 and 
one that could act as a test case in the limits o f social justice or the “study o f the 
nature o f evil” in society.45
The Holocaust also made ‘guest’ appearances in science fiction, which, considering 
the genre’s conventions o f travelling through time and defying the laws o f nature, 
provided an unparalleled opportunity to address the subject. The Twilight Zone, one 
o f America’s most popular science fiction series, first dealt with the subject o f the 
Holocaust in November 1961 in an episode entitled “Death’s Head Revisited.” Like 
most episodes o f The Twilight Zone, it used supernatural situations and events to 
explore social and ethical issues o f relevance to American audiences, in this case 
issues raised by the Eichmann trial, in otherworldly “morality plays.”46 The drama 
tells the story o f fictional SS Captain Lutze who takes a nostalgic visit to Dachau. As 
he walks round the camp he recalls his past, embodied in an apparition o f himself 
wearing his SS uniform. Suddenly a former prisoner in a striped uniform appears and, 
addressing Lutze as Captain, announces that he and the other inmates have “been 
waiting for [him].” The prisoner leads Lutze round the camp, describing the suffering 
o f the Nazi victims at each site and then announces that the inmates o f Dachau will try 
him for “crimes against humanity.” The sentence passed down on Lutze is that he
44 Jeffrey Shandler, “Aliens in the Wasteland: American Encounters with the Holocaust on 1960s 
Science Fiction Television” in Hilene Flanzbaum (ed.), The Americanisation o f the Holocaust 
(Baltimore & London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999) p. 35.
45 Ibid-, P- 35.
46 ibid., p. 36.
143
will be rendered insane, but he is told that this is not revenge but justice and that his 
“final judgement will come from God.”47
“Death’s Head Revisited” implicitly retried Eichmann in the otherworldly court o f the 
Twilight Zone. In so doing, it offered viewers a less complex but more satisfying 
account o f the Holocaust and the bringing to justice of those responsible for its 
perpetration, than the four months o f televised proceedings from Jerusalem. The 
technical capabilities o f television’s special effects and the endless possibilities o f the 
science fiction genre provided viewers with the rewarding spectacle o f witnessing the 
victims o f Nazism rising up and bringing their persecutor to justice. This appealed to 
the American sense o f ‘justice’ and the triumph of ‘good’ over ‘evil’ and contrasted 
with the protracted debate in the international press of how the Israeli court might 
appropriately punish Eichmann. In simplifying the symbols and meaning o f the 
Holocaust, mainstream television encouraged Americans to identify with the Jews and 
Israel in a way that news coverage and political statements never could.
The gradual entry o f Israel into American culture and the sense o f empathy that was 
beginning to develop in the minds o f many Americans, increased the confidence of 
American Jews to more actively campaign for the interests of the Jewish state, and 
created a domestic environment conducive to the enhancement o f US-Israeli ties. 
These developments contributed to the combination of forces operating on Kennedy, 
when he created the precedent, albeit modest, o f arms sales to Israel. When Johnson 
succeeded Kennedy, a president with closer links to Jewish figures nationally than his 
predecessor, Tel Aviv endeavoured to exploit the relationship to secure an increase in 
arms transfers to offset Soviet weapons supplies to the Arab states.
Arms for Israel: The Special Relationship Begins
From the Israeli perspective, the only way it could compete in the new regional 
balance o f power Moscow was creating in the early 1960s, was by accessing the US 
arms market as a permanent source o f supply. Planes could be bought in France, but
47 Ibid., p. 37.
144
French tanks could not match the Soviet T-54s and T-55s being supplied to Syria and 
Egypt and the only comparable alternative, British Centurion tanks, were only 
available in very limited quantities. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and Shimon Peres, 
a Labour member o f the Knesset, visited Washington in 1964, to request a major 
change in America’s arms shipment policy and to discuss for the first time the 
purchase o f an offensive weapon -  the tank.
The administration was divided over the appropriate response to Israel’s request. 
Defence experts confirmed that Soviet arms transfers to the United Arab Republic 
(UAR)49 had weakened Israel’s defensive capability, but were reluctant for 
Washington to become its major arms supplier.50 The Pentagon’s preference was for 
Israel to obtain tanks from Europe, while the CIA was concerned that accommodation 
with Israel in an election year would be detrimental to American interests. Members 
o f the bureaucracy feared that the Arabs would demand greater oil revenues from US 
companies and cease co-operation on the isolation o f mainland China if  American 
policy was seen to favour Israel.51 The State Department was opposed to the sale on 
the grounds that the regional balance o f power still favoured Israel and that increased
c*y
arms transfers would only serve to intensify the military build up.
It is interesting to note that it was the career bureaucrats and unelected officials who 
opposed the sale. Support for Israel’s request came from those quarters with a direct 
personal or constituency interest. At the White House, Myer Feldman, the new holder 
o f the Jewish portfolio, was in favour o f shipping tanks to Israel. McGeorge Bundy, 
the NSC advisor, was also in agreement but wanted to secure a quid pro quo for the 
US in return. The final decision on reconciling Eshkol’s request with Washington’s 
broader regional interests rested with Johnson. After days o f deliberation he settled 
on a compromise position and agreed to assist Israel in securing tanks from Europe,
48 Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1979) p. 49.
49 The United Arab Republic (UAR) was formed in 1958 when the Syrian army convinced Egypt to 
unify with Syria to prevent the growth o f communism in the country.
50 Spiegel, op. cit. p. 131.
51 From the time the Communists came to power in China in 1948, until Nixon’s overtures of 
friendship in the early 1970s, the United States pursued a policy o f isolating China from the rest of the 
world and tried to deter other states from forming diplomatic or trade relations with the Communist 
regime.
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with the proviso that if  this failed, the United States would supply them directly.53 In 
exchange, the administration secured Israel’s grudging permission for a US inspection 
o f its nuclear research and development facilities.54 The transfer scheme operated on 
the basis that Washington would send new tanks to West Germany to modernise its 
defence forces while used German tanks would be forwarded to Israel. The deal was 
to remain secret to alleviate Bonn’s fears that the Arab states would retaliate against a 
blatantly pro-Israeli policy by recognising East Germany.
The debate surrounding the weapons transfer scheme was indicative o f the conflict o f 
interests in a relationship between a small state and a superpower. Eshkol and Peres 
objected to the exact terms o f the deal because the American tanks would be supplied 
indirectly to Israel via Germany. They were interested not only in American tanks as 
a weapon, but in receiving them from an American source with all its political 
implications. Peres believed that the direct supply o f tanks would demonstrate 
Washington’s support for Israel, thus enhancing its deterrent power and reducing the 
prospect o f an Arab attack.55 However, Johnson gave Peres no alternative but to 
accept the deal on his terms.
By January 1965, after the delivery o f about forty US tanks from West German 
inventories, word leaked out.56 Embarrassed in the Arab world, Bonn offered Egypt 
financial compensation - a strategy that proved ineffective and resulted in the
57strengthening o f ties between Cairo and Moscow. In February, the West Germans 
terminated tank shipments to Israel, and Washington pledged to fulfil the agreement 
itself. The failure o f the transfer scheme placed the Johnson administration in the 
very situation it had sought to avoid. The blatant supply o f offensive weapons to 
Israel undermined its regional arms embargo and set Washington on course to become
52 Spiegel, op. cit. p. 131.
53 Shimon Peres, David’s Sling (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970) p. 106.
54 Ibid., PP- 105-6.
55 Peres, op. cit. p. 104.
56 Schoenbaum, op. cit. p. 143. Word of the transfer agreement leaked out because the tanks were 
moved overland from Germany into Italy. During transportation, one of the tanks got caught on a low 
bridge, held up traffic and attracted public attention. As a result, the incident was reported in the press.
57 Schoenbaum, op. cit. p. 143. Revelations o f the tank shipments had the effect Bonn had sought to 
avoid and pushed Nasser closer to the Soviets and East Germany. Nasser received increased aid from
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a major Middle East arms supplier, as the administration appeared to fall captive to 
events.
Simultaneously with the Israeli-German tank controversy, the United States undertook 
another initiative that appeared to undermine its commitment to Israel’s security. It 
agreed to supply arms to Jordan. In late 1964, King Hussein o f Jordan had also 
requested weapons supplies from the United States the cost o f which was met by 
Kuwait as a show of solidarity with the Palestinian cause in the ‘war’ against Israel. 
The White House believed that it had no choice but to adhere to Amman’s request 
because a refusal from Washington would have forced Hussein to look to Moscow for 
assistance, the corollary o f which would have been increased Soviet influence in 
Jordan. Opening a supply line to Jordan reinforced Washington’s objective o f  
standing firm against Moscow’s attempts to increase its influence in the region at 
American expense. Yet this policy raised another dilemma: if  the United States 
armed Jordan, a hostile Arab state situated on Israel’s borders, while the Soviets were 
pouring weapons into the UAE, the military balance in the Middle East could be 
destabilised and relations with Israel undermined.
The Johnson administration was the first to be confronted with the dilemma of selling 
arms to the Arab states and the controversy this engendered on both a domestic and 
international scale. The sale was necessary to prevent Jordan from accepting Soviet 
supplies and to ease King Hussein’s increasing fears that neighbouring radical Arab 
states could challenge his monarchy. Yet by agreeing to the King’s request, 
Washington faced the problem o f having to convince the Israelis o f the merits o f the 
sale, while minimising the domestic political backlash that was certain to ensue. In 
early 1965, Averell Harriman the Under Secretary o f State for Political Affairs and 
Robert Komer of the NSC, met with Prime Minister Eshkol and Foreign Minister 
Golda Meir in Tel Aviv and informed them of Washington’s decisions. Predictably, 
Eshkol and Meir were incensed by the suggestion and could not reconcile themselves 
to the idea o f American arms deliveries to a country that might turn against them in
the Soviet Union and, in January 1965, the East German leader Walter Ulbricht travelled to Cairo to 
sign a $78 million credit package with him.
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58the event o f war. Israeli acquiescence was eventually secured, not so much as a 
result o f Washington’s bargaining power, but because Eshkol and Meir realised that 
they had little choice but to accept it. The real issue at stake was not whether Jordan 
was to receive the arms, but from whom it would obtain them - Washington or 
Moscow, with all the implications that stemmed from either choice.59
The paradoxical elements of US-Israeli relations were revealed by Israel’s demand for 
increased aid in exchange for ratifying a decision it had no alternative but to accept. 
The administration was not yet as tolerant o f Israeli demands as future governments 
were to become and expected Tel Aviv’s acquiescence in a matter directly related to 
the American national interest. However, the influence o f Israel and the pro-Israel 
lobby was steadily increasing, and as early as February 1966, Komer told Bundy that 
“[Capitol] Hill and Zionist pressure [will] sooner or later force us to sell planes to 
Israel.”60
The level o f tension the negotiations evoked in a supposedly close inter-state 
relationship is evident from the acrimonious debate that dragged on for many months 
and was indicative o f the difficulties that arise when American and Israeli perceptions 
o f the national interest diverge and operate in apparent contradiction to each other. It 
was also a symptom o f the different parameters within which a superpower and a 
small regional state respectively have to operate. Nonetheless the fundamentals o f the 
US-Israeli relationship, in this case the mutual interest in countering Soviet influence 
and guaranteeing Israel’s security in conjunction with an acknowledgement that each 
state needed the other, allowed a compromise position to be reached. Negotiations 
ended with Johnson’s agreement to supply Israel and Jordan with Patton tanks, Israel 
with Skyhawk planes and Jordan with F-104’s.61
58 Israeli fears were legitimate as this is exactly what happened in the Six-Day War, when Jordan used 
American supplied weapons to attack Israel.
59 Peres, op. cit. p. 108.
60 Komer to Bundy, 8 February 1966, NSF, Name File, Box 6, “Komer Memos, vol. 2” LBJ Library.
61 Peres, op. cit. p. 108. Jordan apparently preferred the design o f the F-104s over the Skyhawks.
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The irony o f the US-Israeli relationship and the strength o f Israel’s negotiating
position was attributable to the highly penetrated nature o f the American political
system and its susceptibility to influence from transnational actors. It was Tel Aviv
not the administration that convinced the pro-Israel lobby and Congress not to oppose
the sale. By communicating informally with their contacts in Washington, Tel Aviv
prevented the mobilisation of Israel’s congressional friends against the Jordanian arms 
62deal. Israeli access and ability to influence government officials paradoxically gave 
Israel almost equal weight with the White House in the negotiations. In an all-out 
confrontation with Israel, Johnson was not guaranteed o f success and may have 
expended considerable political capital and his personal currency as President in 
securing the support o f the Senate in ratifying the sale. As will be shown, President 
Reagan’s 1981 battle with Congress and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin over 
the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia, vindicates Johnson’s determination to secure Israeli 
compliance in the deal.
The Jordanian arms deal undermined the distinction between defensive and offensive 
arms sales and signalled a fundamental reconfiguration o f  America’s role in the 
Middle East. A spiral o f superpower confrontation by proxy was unleashed, whereby 
arms supplies to the region escalated as the regional states exploited their new found 
power over their patrons to secure an abundance of increasingly sophisticated 
weapons systems.64 Washington’s official policy o f curbing arms supplies was 
further undermined by the revelation that Jordan was not an exception to the rule and 
that a number o f friendly Arab states, including Lebanon, Libya and Saudi Arabia, 
had also received weapons from the US.65 Members o f the State Department were 
also concerned that “if  Israel [were] unable to obtain its valid conventional arms 
requirements, those in Israel who advocate[d] the acquisition o f nuclear weapons 
[would] find a much more fertile environment for their views.”66 The extent to which
67this fear was replicated in the White House is unclear, but both Kennedy and
62 Spiegel, op. cit. p. 134 and Rabin, op. cit. p. 50.
63 For a fuller account o f the controversy surrounding the AWACS sale see pp. 211-16.
64 By late 1966, Soviet arms sales to the Middle East had totalled $2.3 billion.
65 Spiegel, op. cit. p. 135.
66 Benjamin Read to Walt Rostow, 30 April 1966, NSF, Country File, box 139, “Israel, vol. 5” LBJ 
Library.
67 See Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) Chapter 9.
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68Johnson made US inspections o f Israeli nuclear facilities to ascertain the extent o f 
Israel’s nuclear capability, a prerequisite for agreement on conventional arms 
transfers.
Through accident as much as by design, three broad contours o f Johnson’s Middle 
East policy were firmly established by the eve o f the 1967 war. The first objective 
was to create stability in the Gulf region. This was to be achieved through the sale o f 
nearly half a billion dollars worth o f military equipment to Iran and Saudi Arabia to 
enable them to strengthen their monarchies against internal subversion and to defend 
the region against Soviet encroachment. The second objective was to promote 
Israel’s security and deter it from seeking a nuclear capability. The third objective 
was to control the Arab radicalism that threatened to erode Western influence in the 
Middle East by decreasing aid to Egypt and isolating Syria’s pro-Soviet regime.69 
This policy was designed to strengthen pro-American regimes while avoiding official 
commitments and diplomatic entanglement.
Prelude to Crisis
Despite Washington’s effort to buttress what it saw as the forces o f moderation, 
Middle Eastern tensions were heightened in February 1966, when a new radical 
government, drawn from the minority Alawi sect, seized power in Syria. In seeking 
to consolidate its hold on power, the regime fell foul o f Soviet blandishments and the
70temptation to substitute foreign adventures for domestic popularity. In so doing, 
Damascus was instrumental in accelerating the outbreak o f the third Arab-Israeli
71war.
68 Seymour Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New  
York: Random House, 1991) pp. 124-26.
69 Divine, op. cit. pp. 170-71.
70 Theodore Draper, Israel and World Politics: Roots o f the Third Arab-lsraeli War (New York: Viking 
Press, 1968) p. 58.
71 Richard B. Parker, “The June War: Whose Conspiracy?” Journal o f Palestine Studies vol. XXI, no. 4 
(Summer 1992) p. 21. In a statement to the Knesset on 22 May 1967, Prime Minister Eshkol described 
the closure o f the Straits as “the latest development is a link in a chain o f tension, the source o f which 
lies in Damascus.” Israel. Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, vols. 1-2: 1947-1974, XI. The Six-Day War,
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In an endeavour to establish popular legitimacy and support amongst the Syrian 
people, the government used Ahmad Shuqairi’s fledgling Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) in a “war of national liberation” that took the form of guerrilla 
raids into Israel across the Syrian, Jordanian and Lebanese borders. For the Syrian 
leaders, the raids and the predictable Israeli reaction had the double virtue o f putting 
both ‘reactionary’ Jordan and ‘progressive’ Egypt on the spot and forced Cairo’s hand
72in concluding a mutual defence treaty with Damascus in November 1966. The 
treaty blatantly aligned the region’s two most radical states with Moscow, and by 
implication, against Israel and the United States.
The explosive nature of the situation was heightened in November 1966 when Israel 
retaliated against the raids by attacking the Palestinian West Bank village o f Es-Samu 
and killing 30 civilians. Johnson rebuked Eshkol for the severity o f the attack and 
reassured King Hussein o f his government’s commitment to the territorial integrity o f 
his Kingdom. The administration was so incensed that another democracy could 
behave in such a way that in the United Nations, the US ambassador Arthur Goldberg 
condemned both sides for the use o f force and on 25 November refused to veto the 
UN Security Council resolution censuring Tel Aviv. American strategy appeared to 
have the desired effect when in January 1967 Eshkol reacted with marked restraint to 
a Fatah74 raid on Israeli territory.75 The effect was short lived, however, and the scale 
o f Arab terrorist attacks and Israeli retaliation reached new heights on 7 April 1967 
when the Israelis shot down six Syrian Mig-21s over Jordanian and Syrian territory 
without sustaining any losses themselves.76
“Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Eshkol,” 22 May 1967. Available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp7MFAH0dya0
72 Schoenbaum, op. cit. p. 150.
73 DSB 16 November 1966, pp. 974-78.
74 Fatah were the radical wing of the PLO led by Yassir Arafat.
75 Divine, op. cit. p. 172.
76 In such a tense atmosphere, even the calculated display o f restraint at Israel’s Independence Day 
parade of 1967 was interpreted as a sign of belligerency. Eban claims that the Israeli government did 
not to display its full military hardware and fighter planes in case the Arabs interpreted this as a sign of  
military aggression. However, the Arabs drew the opposite conclusion; the sophisticated weaponry 
was not paraded because it had been deployed at the northern border. See Randolph S. Churchill & 
Winston S. Churchill, The Six Day War (London: Heinemann, 1967) p. 30 and Eban, An 
Autobiography p. 320.
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Despite the obvious and abundant warning signs, a President beleaguered and 
increasingly despised by his people for the escalation o f American involvement in 
Vietnam, failed to appreciate the significance o f the explosive situation brewing in the 
Middle East. By May 1967, when it became apparent that war was imminent, 
Johnson’s credibility with Congress and the American people had diminished to such 
an extent that he was powerless to commit his country to decisive intervention to 
defuse the crisis.
The Crisis of May 1967
As if  to demonstrate their legitimacy and leadership credentials to their Arab peers, 
Arab rulers tended to outbid one another in rhetorical outbursts o f hatred against 
Israel. Yet throughout early 1967 the customary posturing began to spiral out of 
control, ultimately setting the scene for renewed Arab-Israeli war.
By spring 1967, Nasser was growing increasingly aware that his anti-Israel rhetoric 
lacked credibility while the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) that had 
patrolled the Egyptian-Israeli border since the Suez crisis of 195777 prevented an 
Egyptian attack on Israel. To enhance his status in the Arab world, in a letter o f 16 
May to Major-General Indar Jit Rikhye, Nasser ordered General Fawzy o f the 
Egyptian army to request the removal o f UN posts from the Sinai.78 Israel’s 1957 
withdrawal from the Sinai, Gaza and the entry to the Straits o f Tiran, had been 
secured on the condition that the UNEF be deployed to safeguard the border and that 
it would remain in place until its task had been completed. Since, however, this was
77 Maj.-Gen. Indar Jit Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal o f United Nations Emergency Force 
Leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967 (London: Frank Cass, 1980) p. 158. On 15 April 1967, a US 
newspaper, the Mideast Mirror carried the following report about the situation: “The whole question of 
UNEF has been brought up by Jordan in Arab defence councils, where Jordan has been under heavy pressure to 
admit foreign troops to defend the country against Israeli attacks. Jordan responded by insisting that other Arab 
states also go on a war footing for the battle with Israel, and specifically asked Egypt to get rid of UNEF so that 
the Egyptian army -  the biggest in the Arab world -  can take part in the battle. The Egyptian response has been 
that the UN force was symbolic (it numbers about 3,000 men) and would have no effect whatsoever if it tried to 
stop Egypt’s army movements.”
Draper, op. cit. p. 44.
78 Rikhye, op. cit. p. 160.
The letter read: “The Government of the United Arab Republic has the honour to inform your Excellency that it 
has decided to terminate the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force from the territory of the United 
Arab Republic and Gaza Strip. I request that the necessary steps be taken for the withdrawal of the forces as soon 
as possible.”
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to be jettisoned following Nasser’s letter,79 the Israelis believed that what was in
OA
prospect was the “precise situation” that had justified Israel’s exercise o f its 
“inherent right of self-defence”81 ten years before.
Secretary General U Thant o f the United Nations compounded the situation by not 
responding to the exact terms o f the Egyptian request and limiting the UNEF 
withdrawal to the Sinai, but ordering its complete removal from Egypt. U Thant 
argued that he had no alternative but to accede to a request rooted in Egypt’s
O A  Q A
sovereign rights, a decision that took Johnson by surprise. In so doing, he 
prevented Nasser from exploiting the diplomatic victory o f securing a partial 
withdrawal o f troops as a face saving device, while retaining UNEF troops in Sharm-
84el-Sheikh as a buffer between Egypt and Israel. Meanwhile, in response to N asser’s 
moves, the Israelis began to mobilise.
The US administration’s reaction to the impending crisis was reminiscent o f 
Truman’s approach to partition in 1947 and 1948. Johnson recalled in his memoirs 
that “[a]s far as possible, I wanted the main thrust of our diplomacy to be through the 
United Nations. At the same time I was prepared to use American influence in any
Of
way that might be effective and helpful.” During this period the President sent 
letters to Nasser, Eshkol and Kosygin urging a diplomatic solution and supported the
79 Terence Prittie, Eshkol o f Israel: The Man and the Nation (London: Museum Press, 1969) p. 252.
80 Abba Eban, Personal Witness: Israel Through My Eves (London: Jonathan Cape, 1993) p. 355.
81 Ibid.. p. 355. Eban described the 16 & 17 May as “the most astonishing days in the history o f  
international institutions.” p. 357
82 In early July 1967 the UN published a report on the withdrawal of the UNEF in the UN Monthly 
Chronicle, vol. IV, no. 7, July 1967. “The withdrawal o f United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF).” 
Report by the Secretary-General published by the United Nations office of Public Information 
(OP1/275-17584). The report exacerbated criticism o f U Thant’s role.
83 Johnson, Vantage Point p. 290.
84 The UNEF had provided a buffer between Israel and Egypt for more than a decade and had made an 
important contribution to keeping the peace during that time. U Thant’s actions were subject to 
criticism for a number o f reasons. Firstly, the decision was unparalleled in its speed. U Thant’s 
response was delivered within 75 minutes o f  receipt of the letter to which it made reply. Secondly, the 
decision was taken before consultation with Israel or the governments that contributed troops to the 
force. Thirdly, no appeal was made to Nasser to reconsider. Finally and perhaps most crucially, U 
Thant’s determination that a request for partial withdrawal was “tantamount to a request for complete 
withdrawal” had never been endorsed by any international institution.
85 Johnson, Vantage Point p. 290
153
o / r
UN's recommendation o f discussions in Cairo. The Israelis, however, were 
impatient with the low-key American response to Nasser’s moves; the administration 
had rejected their request for public support and even suggested that the UNEF troops
8 7be stationed on the Israeli side o f the armistice lines.
On 22 May Nasser announced a blockade o f all Israeli shipping and strategic goods
oo
bound for Israel through the Straits o f Tiran. The declaration was technically an act 
o f war since freedom of shipping in the Gulf o f Aqaba had been a key objective o f the
Q Q
Sinai Campaign, Israel having maintained since 1957 that it would take military 
action to maintain free access to the port o f Eilat.
Washington responded by seeking an Israeli delay and consultation preceding any use 
o f force. In contrast, General Yitzhak Rabin and General Moshe Dayan, Minister o f 
Defence, demanded an early attack against Egypt because Israel lacked the strategic 
depth to fight the war on her own territory.90 The military urged a pre-emptive strike 
which offered military gains that could not be made up later91 and argued that 
stalemate worked to the Egyptian’s advantage.92 However, in an effort to avoid a 
repeat o f the tensions with Washington in the wake o f the Suez crisis, Tel Aviv 
decided on 23 May to acquiesce in the President’s appeal.
As the international crisis grew, Johnson reaffirmed America’s long-held position that 
the Gulf o f Aqaba was an international waterway and that the blockade o f Israeli 
shipping was therefore illegal. Surprisingly, however, the President still did not 
declare overt support for Israel or offer a solution to the crisis.93
86 Michael Bar-Zohar, Embassies in Crisis: Diplomats and Demagogues behind the Six-Day War 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970) pp. 40-41.
87 Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1974) 
p. 375.
88 Gamel Nasser’s speech was published in Al-Ahram (Cairo), 23 May 1967, reprinted in Draper, og  ^
cit pp. 9, p. 214.
89 Moshe Dayan, Dairy o f the Sinai Campaign (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966) p. 203.
90 Rabin, op. cit. p. 79.
91 Moshe Davan. Story o f My Life (London: Sphere Books Ltd., 1977) pp. 339, 345.
92 The Pentagon adopted the contrary perspective and claimed that delays in an Israeli or international 
response actually weakened the Egyptians.
93 Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon Johnson. 1967 (Washington, 1968); 23 May 1967, pp. 561 - 
63.
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Descent into W ar
Although the military facts spoke for themselves, US support would be crucial if 
Israel were to win the diplomatic battle that was sure to follow a military 
confrontation. A pre-emptive strike risked isolating Israel diplomatically and the tacit 
support of the western powers94 would be necessary to create the international 
environment in which Israel could “safely and profitably” launch an attack.95 Eshkol 
reasoned that as long as the international community was convinced that Israel had 
been provoked into fighting for its survival and that every alternative political avenue 
had been exhausted, American political and economic assistance was assured.96 The 
importance placed on US support was evident in EshkoTs explanation to the 
Ministerial Committee o f Defence, convened on 2 June:
We will still need Johnson’s help and support. I hope we won’t need it during the fighting, but 
we shall certainly need it if we are to be victorious, in order to protect our gains. I want to make 
it clear to the President, beyond a shadow o f a doubt, that we have not mislead him; that w e’ve 
given the necessary time for any political action designed to prevent the war.”97
Israel’s request for international support received a cool response from French Prime 
Minister General Charles De Gaulle, who rejected the notion that Nasser had initiated 
hostilities. De Gaulle took the view that opening hostilities meant firing the first 
shot.98 He told Harold Wilson, the British Prime Minister, that he saw no justifiable 
reason for France or Great Britain to jeopardise its relations with the Arabs because 
they felt some “superficial sympathy”99 with Israel because “she was a small state 
with an unhappy history.” 100 This was in sharp contrast to Johnson’s use o f the 
analogy o f the Texans fighting the Mexicans to depict Israel’s struggle against the 
Arabs. However, Wilson was more supportive of the Israeli position and reassured
94 Dayan, op.cit. p. 345.
95 Lenczowski, op.cit. p. 107.
96 Gideon Rafael, Destination Peace: Three Decades o f Israeli Foreign Policy (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicholson, 1981) p. 153.
97 Rabin, op. cit. p. 76.
98 Eban Personal Witness p. 374, In a statement to the Council o f Ministers o f France on the Middle 
East De Gaulle stated that “the state that would be the first -  wherever it might be -  to take up arms 
will not have either her approval and even less her support.” Israel. Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, 
available at www.mfa.gov.il/mfa
99 Harold Wilson, The Chariot of Israel. (London: Weidenfeld & Michael Joseph, 1981) p. 358.
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the Israeli Foreign Minister that London would co-operate with Washington.101 Thus 
it fell to the White House to determine and co-ordinate the international response to 
Nasser’s actions. Johnson was gravely concerned that the conflict would escalate into 
a superpower confrontation, but his power to effectively determine the outcome was 
significantly weakened by the public and congressional opposition to the growing 
commitment in Vietnam. The scale o f US casualties and public opposition to the war 
was soon to cause Congress not merely to regret its decision to allow the escalation o f 
American involvement but to make it reluctant to sanction American military
1 09operations elsewhere. As a consequence, McNamara claimed, the President 
believed that the question o f who fired the first shot would be o f vital significance in 
mobilising Congress and the people if  America were called upon to assist Israel in a 
war.103
In Congress, sentiment strongly favoured Israel, but there was much opposition to 
intervention. Key senators on the Foreign Relations Committee such as Fulbright, 
Mansfield and Stennis opposed unilateral American action, but others, including three 
Vietnam ‘doves’, Edward and Robert Kennedy and Wayne Morse, urged the use o f 
force. Senator Stuart Symington suggested that a choice had to be made between the 
Middle East and the Far East and he favoured the Middle East as meaning more to the 
US and its allies, “politically, economically and mutually.” 104 In this complex 
international atmosphere, Congress was too divided to take action, although this was 
the last occasion that the legislature was not fully mobilised in defence o f Israel. For 
already, through a process o f popular cultural representations in novels, plays, films 
and television productions, by 1967 Israel was gradually assuming a special place in 
American consciousness, particularly amongst Congressmen who were beginning to 
acknowledge the concerns o f their American Jewish constituents. On the other hand, 
with 500,000 troops committed to Vietnam, the legislature was not prepared to 
countenance a second war to protect a vulnerable state. The perception o f US 
interests were not yet fully aligned with those of Israel, and American Jewish
100 Ibid.., p. 358
101 Schoenbaum. op. cit. p. 150.
102 Ibid., p. 72.
103 Robert McNamara, US Secretary o f Defense, 1961-68, speaking on Dead in the Water: The USS 
Liberty Source Films for the BBC, 4 June 2003.
104 Congressional Record. Senate, vol. 113, pt. 10, 23 May 1967, pp. 13481, 7222.
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organisations lacked both the strength and confidence to go against the tide o f public 
opinion and demand US intervention on Israel’s behalf
Washington’s hesitant actions and cautious statements conveyed to Tel Aviv a sense 
of an administration divided, while its inability to assemble an international maritime 
force to open the Straits sent signals o f weakness to both the Arabs and Israel.105 On 
the eve of the war, only the Australians, British and Dutch had agreed to participate, 
and the numbers fell short o f the forty to fifty ships Israel had been promised.106 In 
his memoirs Johnson recalled that American action would have been taken if  
necessary, but that the administration had not had time to prepare the public for such 
an event. It was one thing to think o f principles, commitments and rights, but it was 
quite another to think o f arms and a second-front war.107 While the Knesset had 
confidence in Johnson’s personal credentials as a champion o f the Israeli cause, the 
President no longer commanded sufficient respect nor Israel sufficient esteem, for him 
to be able to mobilise Congress and the people in its defence. America was not ready 
to embark on another interventionist crusade. In military terms, Johnson saw Vietnam 
and Israel as similar issues and, mistrusting the conversion o f “Congressional 
Vietnam doves” into “Israeli hawks”, he discounted many statements backing Israel
1 ORas merely “political”. Rhetoric cost nothing, while committing troops cost money, 
lives and potentially elections. As he explained to Eban, while he was “aware o f what 
three Presidents have said [that] will not be worth five cents i f  the people and the 
Congress do not support their President now.” 109
Johnson believed that the re-opening o f the Straits served the American national 
interest because hostilities were certain to erupt if  the blockade remained. He also felt 
obligated to honour Eisenhower’s promise to Israel to keep the Straits open,110 but felt 
powerless to act decisively and was assailed from both within his administration and 
without. Meanwhile, Moscow was exacerbating regional tensions by informing both 
the White House and the Kremlin’s Arab clients that it had evidence that an Israeli
105 Spiegel, op.cit., pp. 144-5.
106 Johnson, op. cit. pp. 295-96.
107 Ibid.. p. 295.
108 Ibid.. p. 295.
109 Ibid.. p. 293 and Eban Personal Witness p. 358.
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attack was imminent.111 This provoked Hussein to sign a defence pact with Nasser on 
11230 May, in effect confirming in Israeli minds that in the event of war, Tel Aviv 
would be forced to fight the enemy on three borders.113
As tensions escalated, Washington continued its diplomatic efforts. The US had been 
without an ambassador in Cairo for three months prior to the June crisis114 and in a 
belated effort to avert war an envoy was dispatched to Nasser and a visit to 
Washington o f the Egyptian Vice-President, Zakariyya Muhieddin scheduled.115 The 
proposed visit greatly alarmed the Israelis who feared that any improvement in US- 
Egyptian relations would occur at their expense and that Washington might defuse the 
crisis by capitulating to Nasser’s demands.116
It was against this backdrop that Meir Amit, the head o f Mossad, reported to the 
Israeli cabinet the findings o f his 31 May visit to Washington. Based on his meetings 
with Robert McNamara at the Pentagon and Richard Helms and James Angleton at 
the CIA, Amit advised the Israeli cabinet that if  they launched a pre-emptive strike 
Washington would accept it as having been their only viable alternative. This 
appeared to be confirmed by a journalist’s report that when asked if the US was 
seeking to restrain Israel, Rusk had replied, “I don’t think it is our business to restrain
 ___ **117anyone.
On 1 June Eban received an account o f a meeting between Evron and Justice Abe 
Fortas, a close personal friend o f both Avraham Harman (the Israeli ambassador) and
110 Johnson, op. cit. p. 295.
111 Churchill & Churchill, op. cit. p. 33.
112 Spiegel, op. cit. p. 148.
1,3 In a broadcast to the nation on the 5 June 1967, Eshkol described the objective of the pact as to 
“encircle us with an ever-tightening noose.” http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp7MFAH0dyr0
114 Lucius Battle and David Nes, then deputy Chair o f the US mission in Cairo, were convinced as early 
as January 1967 that Nasser was planning a showdown with Israel and the West. See Draper, op. cit. p. 
105 and Churchill & Churchill, op. cit. p. 33.
115 Spiegel, op. cit. pp. 143-4.
116 Mohamed Heikal, Nasser: The Cairo Documents (London: New English Library, 1972) p. 221.
117 Michael Bar-Zohar, Embassies in Crisis: Diplomats and Demagogues behind the Six-Day War 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970) p. 157, states that on 30 May, after Jordan threw 
in its lot with Egypt, Walt Rostow expressed the opinion that he no longer saw a political solution. 
Quoted in Quandt Peace Process p. 45.
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Johnson, that altered his position in favour o f an Israeli attack. William Quandt, a 
former NSC adviser claimed that the Israelis had every reason to believe that in
110
Harman they were dealing with one of Johnson’s true confidants and that his views 
deserved careful attention. According to the report, Fortas claimed that: “Eshkol and 
Eban did great service to Israel by giving the United States a chance to explore
options other than Israeli force.119 If they had not done so, it would have been
11(\difficult to secure the President’s sympathy.” Eban interpreted this as the closest 
thing to a green light Johnson was going to give and informed General Rabin and
12 1
General Yariv that the diplomatic reason for military restraint had been removed.
On 2 June Eshkol reluctantly acknowledged that decisive American action would not 
be forthcoming but that in acting alone, Israel need not fear diplomatic isolation. He 
realised that American public perceptions and popular representations o f Israel had 
shifted so markedly since 1957 that if  Israel were successful in its attack, Congress 
would not easily allow Johnson to punish it for its actions, in the unlikely event o f the 
President seeking to do so. After all, Israel was taking protective action and 
exercising the state’s collective right o f self-defence, 122a right deeply enshrined in the 
American belief system. He was also aware that it would be even more difficult for a 
Democratic President to take a hard line with Israel than it had been for Eisenhower in
1
1957, since unlike the Republicans, the Democrats had a sizeable pro-Zionist 
component for whom Israel’s security was a prime concern.
When a President becomes involved in a crisis the role o f outside groups is 
diminished as he takes centre stage and in this crisis Israel’s supporters were relegated 
to the sidelines. The pro-Israel lobby wanted to see Israeli security preserved but 
given the atmosphere of the times, they could not call for unilateral American action 
or Israeli pre-emption. In this respect, some o f the problems that inhibited Johnson
118 William Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy Towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict: 1967- 
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also inhibited them. Vietnam had created an atmosphere in which any military action 
elsewhere, especially if  not related to the conflict between East and West, could not 
easily be contemplated.124
As war broke out, a sense of sympathy tinged with regret prevailed in the White 
House, which would explain the President’s handling of the crisis both during the war 
and in the efforts for peace that followed. Johnson recalled in his memoirs that:
I have always had a deep feeling of sympathy for Israel and its people, gallantly building and 
defending a modem nation against great odds and against the tragic background o f Jewish 
experience. ... I have never concealed my regret that Israel decided to move when it did. I 
always made it equally clear, however, to the Russians and to every other nation, that I did not 
accept the oversimplified charge o f Israeli aggression. Arab actions in the weeks before the war 
started -  forcing UN troops out, closing the Port o f Aqaba, and assembling forces on the Israeli 
border -  made that charge ridiculous.125
Washington had been unable to act decisively to prevent the slide into war and would 
be forced to deal with the long-term consequences o f its client’s actions and territorial 
conquests.
The Six Day War
On 5 June 1967, Israeli forces launched a surprise attack on Egypt and destroyed the 
Egyptian air force in its bases on the ground. The Israelis quickly moved on to 
capture the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula and a cabinet message was sent to King 
Hussein requesting that Jordan remain out o f the war.126 Hussein considered his 
position to be too vulnerable to heed the warning, a decision that cost Jordan East 
Jerusalem and the West Bank but, ironically, may have saved his kingdom. With over 
half his population o f Palestinian descent, had Hussein not participated in a w ar to 
liberate the lands o f Palestine, he risked being deposed by his own people. On 9 June, 
in contravention o f the UN brokered cease-fire, Israeli troops advanced across the
124 Spiegel, op. cit. p. 149.
125 Johnson, op. cit. p. 297.
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Golan Heights, forcing out terrorist militia and capturing the Syrian town o f Quneitra. 
So impressive were the Israeli advances, that by 9 June Damascus itself was only
127thirty miles beyond the reach of its troops and an estimated thirty-six hours away.
A serious challenge to Israel’s existence threatened to put the US administration in an 
untenable position. The nature o f superpower confrontation was such that American
1 9 Racquiescence in Israel’s destruction at the hands of Soviet proxies was unthinkable 
and Washington would have been forced to militarily intervene on Israel’s behalf to 
prevent this. Congress feared that they would be asked to sign another blank cheque 
for American intervention at a time when public opinion opposed the further 
deployment o f US troops in regional conflicts. Under these circumstances, the 
administration was more than willing to extend diplomatic rather than military 
support to reinforce Israel’s accomplishments on the ground, by pressing for a cease­
fire in place.129
Confronted with the prospect o f having a large number o f their own advisers and 
equipment captured in Syria and given the apparent threat to Damascus, the Soviets 
threatened to raise the level o f superpower confrontation if Washington did not rein in 
its client. In a hotline message on 10 June,130 Premier Alexsei Kosygin demanded 
that Israeli operations cease immediately or the Kremlin would take “necessary
1 *2 l
actions including military.” Conscious o f the overtones of the message, Johnson 
responded to the threat by ordering the re-deployment o f the Sixth Fleet from its 
position three hundred miles off the Syrian coast to a distance o f fifty miles. The 
implications o f such a manoeuvre were obvious. The US was positioning its warships 
to attack the Soviets and defend the Middle East against Soviet advances should 
Moscow take aggressive action. Simultaneously with this, the administration moved
127 This was the estimate Israel’s Major General David Elazar gave of the time it would take the Israeli 
army to reach Damascus. Schoenbaum, op. cit. p. 159.
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1 77to deescalate the crisis. Rusk ordered the Israelis to halt their advance and Johnson
133reassured the Kremlin that his government supported a Syrian-Israeli cease-fire.
At 06:00 on Saturday 10 June the shooting officially stopped, signalling the end o f the 
first round of hostilities in a war that transformed the geographical and diplomatic 
contours of the Middle East. Israel’s vulnerability to Arab attack had been 
dramatically reduced. Cairo was now within range o f Israeli tanks and Damascus in 
range o f Israeli artillery. All o f Mandated Palestine and East Jerusalem now fell 
under Israeli control. On the diplomatic front, the Soviets severed relations with 
Israel and when Nasser falsely charged on the second day o f the war, that British and 
American carrier-based planes had aided Israel in attacks against Egypt, they as well 
as Algeria, Syria, Iraq, the Sudan and Yemen, severed diplomatic relations with 
Washington.134
Although Nasser’s claims were false, the severing o f diplomatic relations reflected the 
Arab’s belief that Washington was not neutral in the conflict and had sided with 
Israel.135 It also demonstrated that Johnson’s efforts to convince the Arabs that his 
policy was not so much pro-Israeli as anti-Nasser had failed. The position o f the 
US as an impartial bystander in the conflict had been called into question early in the 
war, when a State Department announcement that “Our [America’s] position is
1 77neutral in thought, word and deed” provoked controversy within the administration.
Congress was outraged by the announcement and passed a resolution that stated: “The
people of this country are not neutral in thought and word. Every expression o f
1 ^ 8opinion ... shows a deep concern for the preservation o f Israel.” The President had 
also politically committed his country to Israel’s position on opening the Straits and 
did not propose to be neutral if  diplomacy failed to sway Egypt. Johnson recalled in 
his memoirs that: “We are certainly not belligerents, but our successive guarantees
132 Bailey, op. cit. p. 89.
133 Schoenbaum. op. cit. p. 159.
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since 1950 to the independence and territorial integrity of all the states in the area 
made “neutral” the wrong word.”139
Iraq and Kuwait responded to Nasser’s accusation with the imposition o f an ill- 
prepared and ineffective oil embargo against Britain and America. In 1967, the US 
was not sufficiently dependent on Middle Eastern oil and the producers not 
sufficiently well organised for the embargo to produce a significant impact on the 
Western economies.140 Yet the very fact that an embargo was actually imposed is 
significant and indicates the extent to which Johnson and Rostow had overestimated 
the pro-Western sentiments o f the Arab conservatives and underestimated the 
collective Arab hatred o f Israel. King Faisal did not allow gratitude for US support in 
Yemen141 to deter him from embargoing oil shipments as an act o f  solidarity with 
Nasser, his Arab rival. When aligned against Israel and the West, blood proved 
thicker than ideology, (perhaps the same can be said o f US relations with Israel) and 
was something Washington did not fully comprehend until the oil embargo o f  October 
1973.142
US-Israeli Relations under Pressure: The USS Liberty
During the Six-Day War, an incident occurred that under other circumstances should 
have signalled an almost irrevocable breach in US-Israeli relations. On 8 June the 
Israelis attacked the U.S.S. Liberty. The American vessel was in international waters 
in the East Mediterranean on an intelligence-gathering mission when Israeli planes 
and torpedo boats besieged it.143 As life rafts were lowered from the ship, the crew 
claimed these were also fired upon in an apparent attempt to wipe out all survivors
i 144and witnesses.
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In the light of Israel’s determination to secure US support for the war effort, it may 
seem surprising that Tel Aviv ordered such a devastating attack on a vessel o f its 
greatest supporter. Though Israel’s motive is still debated and the government 
claimed that the vessel was incorrectly identified, the nature o f the Liberty’s mission 
as an intelligence gathering ship, capable o f intercepting radio messages between the 
Israelis and the Arabs in the war zone, offers a possible explanation. For if  the attack 
was intentional, Tel Aviv’s motivation may have been in keeping outside knowledge 
o f its operations to a minimum, particularly its plans for attacking Syria after the UN 
cease-fire had gone into effect. It is possible therefore, that the Liberty was targeted 
to prevent Washington from receiving advanced warning o f General Moshe Dayan’s 
order to attack Syria at 07:00 on 9 June, four hours after Damascus had accepted the 
UN cease-fire. Had the Liberty conveyed reports to Washington that an attack was 
imminent, Israeli plans might have been thwarted.145
To this day, survivors o f the Liberty claim that the Israeli government intentionally 
ordered the attack. Their argument is based on the fact that during the morning o f the 
8 June Israeli aeroplanes had circled the ship and as visibility was perfect would have 
been able to correctly identify it as a an American vessel.146 In the afternoon, when 
the Liberty was attacked by three Delta Wing Mirage jets, the crew tried to send an 
SOS but were unable to do so apparently because their frequencies were jammed. 
John Hrankowski, a member o f the crew, claimed that the attackers needed to know 
which frequencies the ship operated on in order to jam them and therefore must have 
known that it was an American vessel as all ships in the US fleet used the same 
frequencies.147
Eventually the Sixth Fleet picked up the SOS and in retaliation for the assault on a US 
vessels, two A-4 bombers from the USS America were launched to attack Egypt, the 
presumed attackers o f the Liberty. Richard Parker, the Political Consul at the US 
embassy in Cairo was informed that a US attack on Egypt was imminent. Yet within
145 Author’s interview with James M. Ennes, Jr., crew member, USS Liberty.
146 Ibid..
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minutes of the order being given, Tony Hart, the Naval Communications Supervisor
I A O
on the America, passed on a Pentagon message recalling the aircraft. News had 
reached Washington that Nasser was not responsible for the strike.
Thirty-four crew members were killed and 171 wounded in the attack.149 A group o f 
US Navy planes from the carrier America set out to assist the crew but were ordered 
back before reaching the stricken vessel.150 Eventually the Liberty reached a US 
naval base in Malta where several wounded were transferred to a US hospital in 
Naples. Significantly, the ship’s personnel were ordered not to comment on the 
attack151 and the naval inquiry that followed was conducted in such away that many 
dubbed it “cover-up.” 152 The US Navy still refuses to comment on the incident.
Israel accepted responsibility for the attack but insisted that it had occurred in error 
because military intelligence had incorrectly identified the USS Liberty as an 
Egyptian vessel. Transcripts o f voice conversations between two Israeli helicopter 
pilots and the control tower at Hazor Airfield, collected by a US Navy EC-121 
following the attack, indicate that Israel was trying to correctly identify the ship as
1 Oeither Egyptian or American. Compensation totalling $13 million was paid to the 
families of the dead and wounded but Tel Aviv refused to meet the cost o f repairing 
the vessel because the cabinet did not consider itself responsible for the train o f events 
that culminated in the attack.154 To do so would have been to acknowledge that Israel 
had deliberately and wilfully attacked a vessel o f the US Navy. No one in Israel was 
charged or court martialled as a result o f the incident.155
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Within the executive branch of the government, interpretations o f the event were 
mixed. Secretary Rusk considered Tel Aviv’s version o f events an incredible 
distortion of reality and in a 10 June communication to Israel’s ambassador in 
Washington stated that:
At the time o f the attack, the U.S.S. Liberty was flying the American flag and its identification 
was clearly indicated in large white letters and numerals on its hull .... Experience demonstrates 
that both the flag and the identification number o f the vessel were readily visible from the air 
.... Accordingly, there is every reason to believe that the U.S.S. Liberty was identified, or at 
least her nationality determined, by Israeli aircraft approximately one hour before the attack ....
The subsequent attack by Israeli torpedo boats, substantially after the vessel was or should have 
been identified by Israeli military forces, manifests the same reckless disregard for human 
life.156
According to Joseph Califano, a, member o f Johnson’s White House staff, Clark 
Clifford, as representative o f the President’s Foreign Policy Advisory Board (PFIAB), 
also urged the President to take a tough stance and approach the attack as though the 
perpetrator were Arab or Soviet,157 although he did counsel against a permanent break 
between the two countries.158
The US response to the attack was revealing of the strength o f  the ties that bound 
Washington and Tel Aviv and the power o f presidential perception o f the national 
interest in determining government policy. In contradiction to the views of his 
Secretary o f State, Johnson, publicly at least, accepted the Israeli version o f events159 
and actually downplayed the seriousness o f the incident. In the only official 
presidential statement about the incident he went so far as to lower the number of 
dead and wounded and claimed that:
156 Quoted in Ennes, op. cit. p. 111.
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We learned that the ship had been attacked in error by Israeli gunboats and planes. Ten men of 
the Liberty crew were killed and a hundred were wounded. This heartbreaking episode grieved 
the Israelis deeply, as it did us.160
Califano writes in his memoirs that privately Johnson subscribed one hundred percent 
to Clifford’s view,161 while McNamara attributed the President’s decision not to
1 f \7pursue the event to his “reluctance to embarrass an ally”.
Lucius Battle, Director o f the Near East Bureau, later said o f the incident “we ignored 
it for all practical purposes and we shouldn’t have. The price of winning the war 
quickly was the Liberty ship.” Press Secretary George Christian expressed similar 
sentiments when he wrote that the matter of what caused the attack was not pursued 
because it was dwarfed by other events. The major concern o f the Johnson 
administration lay not in chastising Israel but in presenting a united front against the 
humiliated Soviet Union and its clients164 and stopping the war before it led to a direct 
superpower confrontation. Johnson also believed that his only hope of restraining 
Israel was to remain on friendly terms, with superpower rivalry and congressional 
pressure rendering the severing o f relations or the imposition o f sanctions politically 
inconceivable.165 The imperative o f electioneering may also have played a role in 
Johnson’s calculations, as he could not afford to antagonise pro-Israeli supporters in 
the run up to the presidential election.
In the legislature, Congress endorsed Israel’s position, with the Congressional Record 
referring to the incident as “the tragic mistake o f today -  when Israeli forces attacked 
a United States ship.” 166 The Pentagon took a stronger stance and described the attack
] 67on the ship as an “outrage”.
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The silence and lack of condemnation, irrespective of the underlying motivations, 
which followed the attack on the Liberty is unprecedented in American history. The 
death o f US servicemen is generally met with condemnation, public outrage and a 
pledge o f retaliation by the White House. This did not happen in June 1967 and 
conventional explanations o f international relations fail to adequately explain the 
apparent collusion o f the President and Congress in the ‘cover-up’ that surrounds the 
killing o f US servicemen by an American ally. The matter was officially closed 
between the two governments by an exchange o f diplomatic notes on 17 December
1987 '68
The lack o f media investigation in to the attack is perhaps even more surprising than 
the response o f the administration. The relatively small amount o f news coverage o f 
the incident was coordinated and centralised by the Pentagon and the surviving 
crewmen were not permitted to speak independently to reporters.169 In the first weeks 
after the attack the American press was often critical o f Israel and there was a great 
deal o f journalistic speculation. On 26 June 1967 US News stated that some US 
officials did not subscribe to the view that the attack was accidental and the following 
day the National Review  printed the most emphatic denouncement when it asked “Is 
the Liberty episode being erased from history?” However, neither publication 
followed up on their original reports and in 1968 the US News and the National 
Review printed only two stories about the incident, both o f which accepted the 
findings o f the Naval enquiry that the Liberty had been incorrectly identified by the 
Israelis.
In contrast, the coverage in the New York Times started from the premise on 10 June 
that the attack on the ship was accidental. On 18 June the NYT  printed contradictory 
stories of the attack, one adopting the Israeli position that the vessel was wrongly 
identified and the other taking the view o f the crew that it was intentional. However,
168 Author’s interview with David Bar-Ilan: Israeli Director of Communications and “The USS 
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the newspaper did not appear to investigate to see which story was true and the 
coverage was devoid of the customary journalistic analysis. Subsequently to this, 
since 1967, the Liberty has rarely been mentioned in either the NYT  or the mainstream 
American press.
There are several possible explanations for the relative lack o f media interest. Firstly, 
Johnson and McNamara set the parameters for coverage o f the incident and publicly 
the administration did not waver in its position that the attack was an accident. The 
official enquiry concluded that Israel had wrongly identified the vessel and the 
general reluctance o f Americans to question the integrity o f their judicial system 
appeared to prevail. Secondly, the attack on the Liberty was drowned out by other 
events. Israel’s victory filled the news and by the time the findings o f the inquiry 
were published, public attention had returned to the Vietnam war which was 
perceived to threaten the lives o f thousands o f US servicemen. Thirdly, Israel had 
been victorious in a war that had defeated Soviet proxies, and Americans preferred to 
revel in the success o f an ally than to condemn its misdemeanours. Israel may have 
benefited from a type o f moral blindness whereby the American people failed to take 
account o f the ethical shortcomings o f a country with which they perceived
17ftthemselves to share a sense o f political and cultural kinship. People, whether at the 
individual, corporate or state level are always more willing to condemn agreed upon 
perpetrators o f evil than they are to question an ally.171 In the years preceding the 
June war, Israel had become increasingly popular with both the American media and 
the general public and people were reluctant to seek evidence that challenged their 
perceptions o f Israel as a society as virtuous as the US.
Cultural Change and Israel’s Place in America
In the aftermath of the war, Johnson’s sentimental feelings for Israel were 
increasingly reflected throughout American society, as people gave voice to the 
dramatic change that had occurred to Israel’s place within American culture in the
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decade preceding Suez. The entrance of Israel and the Holocaust into public 
consciousness, as reflected in the media, altered the frame o f reference through which 
the American public perceived the Jewish state. By the mid-1960s, the reality o f the 
Holocaust was increasingly interspersed with fictitious but gratifying images o f events 
that gave Americans increasing cause to consider the actions o f their own country in 
relation to Israel. By the time of the Johnson administration, the dramatisation o f the 
anti-semitism that could lead to a Holocaust as in Bernard Malamud’s 1966 novel The 
Fixer and the theme of complicity through inaction as portrayed in Arthur M iller’s 
1964 stage plays After the Fall and Incident at Vichy, contributed to the increasing 
feeling that Israel was not a socialist state, despite the large number o f East European 
Jews who had settled there, and that Americans should be concerned with its security. 
This was facilitated by Israel’s astounding victory that enabled the US to support the 
state diplomatically, safe in the knowledge that American troops would not be called 
upon to defend it physically.
The parallel between Israel and Vietnam, that o f weak states in need o f American 
protection, that had prevented decisive action to avert a Middle Eastern war, was 
gradually replaced by the image o f Israel as a strong state that epitomised American 
values. Israel’s victory was equated with the reassertion o f the power o f American 
ideals and demonstrated that American values could triumph over the enemies of 
‘freedom’. Israel’s defeat o f the Arabs was heralded by some as a kind o f victory for 
the US that extended the American frontier into the Middle East, in a way Johnson
11'yhad failed to do in Southeast Asia. After all, it had not been Americans but Israelis 
that had been fighting and dying to protect what were regarded as American as well as 
Israeli interests, and in contrast to American GIs in Vietnam, “Israeli fighters were not 
being humiliated by Third World upstarts.” 173
This cultural evolution, which was consolidated by Israel’s dramatic victory, 
generated an increased feeling o f security amongst American Jewish organisations. 
The fear that overt support of Israel might merit the charge o f  ‘dual loyalty’ was
172 Goldman, The Tragedy o f Lyndon Johnson (New York: Knopf, 1969) p. 63.
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replaced by the image that support for Israel denoted super-loyalty.174 With the defeat 
of the Arab states, the last vestige o f Israel as a vulnerable or socialist state were cast 
off and replaced by the image o f the Jews standing on the front line, defending 
America against the proxies of the Soviet Union. From this point on, American 
Jewish organisations could devote much o f their efforts to consolidating the US- 
Israeli alliance.175 This was demonstrated in increased fund raising for Israel and 
between 27 May and 10 June 1967, American Jews had collected over $100 mn. in 
emergency funding, and a total of $317.5 mn. by the end o f the year. The year’s total 
dollar transfers placed such a burden on the balance o f payments that Johnson was 
advised to seek Eshkol’s assistance in ensuring that a large proportion o f it was 
reinvested in long-term dollar holdings.
Tel Aviv was less diplomatically isolated than it had been in 1956 and public opinion 
would not permit Johnson to force the kind o f Israeli withdrawal that Eisenhower had 
demanded in 1957. This, coupled with the President’s own beliefs, led to the 
negotiation o f UN Resolution 242.
American Diplomacy and the United Nations
Johnson exerted his greatest influence over the Arab-Israeli dispute in the months 
immediately following the war, when he determined that a genuine peace agreement 
might be reached on the basis o f a land for peace formula. He did not believe that the 
US should launch an intensive peace-making effort at a time when it was preoccupied 
with Vietnam and America’s standing in the Arab world was at an all time low.177 
Instead, he saw the establishment o f a diplomatic framework for a peace settlement 
that allowed time to pass until the Arabs were prepared to negotiate with Israel, as an 
interim solution to the crisis. One o f his prime concerns was to prevent the balance o f 
power moving against Israel, but with the armed forces o f Egypt, Syria and Jordan in
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ruins this was not an imminent possibility. However, his administration’s relief at 
Israel’s victory did not necessarily translate into unconditional support for its actions
t no
and territorial gains.
Johnson’s reasoning was a product o f the major shift that occurred in US policy in the 
days immediately following the war. There is no documentary evidence that this 
change of emphasis was accompanied by debate within the administration and it may 
have been attributable to his personal recollection of Suez. After all, he had opposed 
Eisenhower’s decision to force an Israeli withdrawal in the absence o f tangible 
Egyptian concessions and his position had been proved right by the outbreak o f the 
June war. Johnson was determined not to emulate what he saw as Eisenhower’s 
mistake, especially when Israel’s right to defend itself against Arab aggression, 
appeared much stronger than in 1957.179 He would not pressurise Israel to withdraw 
in the absence o f a peace settlement to resolve the outstanding issues dating back to 
1948.
Immediately after the war, Johnson’s formula for a land for peace agreement found 
support in the Knesset. From a military perspective, the planning and execution o f the 
Six-Day War was a testament to the ingenuity o f Israel’s generals and the skill and 
determination of the country’s defence forces. In contrast, the political planning for 
the post-war situation was negligible. Its cabinet had not anticipated the rapid 
expansion of Israel’s borders and the occupation of land inhabited by Arab peoples. 
The government was in agreement, from Begin’s Gahal on the right to Mapam and 
former Brigadier General Yigal Allon’s Achdut ha’ Avodah on the left, that territory 
should be traded for peace. The question the parties confronted was which
1 RAterritories and how peace should be defined. Israel was willing to return to the 
status quo ante with Syria and Egypt in exchange for a peace treaty and the de­
militarisation of land evacuated by Israeli forces. The most sensitive issues were that
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181of Jerusalem and the West Bank because their existential religious value “raised
i oj
problems that transcended strategic interest.”
In determining the framework for a peace agreement between the Arab states and
Israel, the President played the decisive role. On 19 June at a State Department
address that had been timed to overshadow Soviet Premier Kosygin’s opening
remarks at the UN General Assembly, Johnson placed the entire responsibility for the
1war on Egypt and deemed the closure o f the Strait o f Tiran an “act o f folly.” He 
then unveiled his own approach in which the US would not press for an Israeli 
withdrawal in the absence o f Arab diplomatic concessions. While reflecting Israel’s 
post-war popularity, the speech also presented principles that could appeal to the 
conservative Arabs. Johnson stated that the Israelis should withdraw but only in 
return for a peaceful settlement. Certainly, troops must be withdrawn; but there must 
be recognised rights o f national life, progress in solving the refugee problem, freedom 
o f innocent maritime passage, limitation o f the arms race, and respect for political 
independence and territorial integrity.” 184 This view became widely accepted in the 
American government but was subject to differing interpretations on exactly what 
Arab concessions were required in exchange for Israeli withdrawals.
Between June and November 1967, American diplomatic efforts focused on achieving 
a UN Security Council resolution based upon Johnson’s five points. The negotiations 
between the US and Israel and between the Soviets and the Arabs revealed very real 
differences in the positions o f the parties. Israel insisted on direct negotiations with 
the Arab states and a settlement in which withdrawal was one element o f a peace
1 R^agreement. In contrast, the Arabs insisted upon withdrawal as a pre-condition for 
negotiations. The Soviets backed the Arab position, whereas Washington, in 
endorsing a land for peace agreement, was less insistent on direct negotiations, but
181 Jonathan Rvnhold Israeli Political Culture in Relations with the U.S. over the Palestine Question. 
1981-96 (Ph.D. thesis, University o f London, London, 1998) p. 266.
182 Ibid.. p. 160.
183 Quandt Peace Process p. 55.
184 PPP. 19 June 1967, p. 633.
185 Israel: Ministry o f Foreign Affairs. Eshkol made a statement on 27 June 1967 in which he made 
direct negotiations a pre-requisite for a peace agreement. A copy o f the statement is available at the 
www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp7MFAH0e 150
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continued to support the Israeli position. After all, the very idea of accommodation 
with the enemy lay outside the US imagination and militated against the idea of 
winning, which it perceived as the sole rationale of waging w ar.186
Ironically, the divergent positions o f the superpowers were brought closer together by 
a conflict between the US and Israel over Jerusalem and the West Bank. Johnson was 
dismayed by the Knesset’s unilateral decision to annex East Jerusalem and 
incorporate it into the State o f Israel because it transgressed the Lockean principle of 
self-determination that both Eisenhower and Johnson had sent American soldiers to
I 0*1
war to defend. The Knesset’s unwillingness to co-ordinate its actions with 
Washington further compromised America’s relations with the Arab states. In a 
meeting between Rusk and Eban, the Israeli Foreign Minister proposed that the future 
o f the West Bank be decided through a settlement with King Hussein or an 
association between the West Bank and Israel. Rusk was outraged by the Israeli 
proposal and its blatant disregard for democratic principles and reminded Eban that 
‘‘there is a constitutional precedent for letting people themselves decide.” 188
In mid-July, in an attempt to break the deadlock, Goldberg and the Russian Foreign 
Minister Andrei Gromyko advanced a joint proposal that called for an immediate 
Israeli withdrawal in exchange for a declaration o f non-belligerency and the
1 QQinadmissibility of territory acquired through force. The Israelis were incensed that 
Washington had agreed to a major reversal in policy without prior consultation and 
that the potential for reaching an understanding with the Soviet Union took 
precedence over support for Israel’s current position.190 They were further outraged 
that the word “Israel” did not appear in the text as this would enable the Arabs to 
agree to a general statement and then declare its non-applicability to Israel at a later 
date.191 Eban claimed that his country had been confronted with a Soviet-Arab-US 
alignment and a proposal that, if  endorsed by the General Assembly, his country
186 Coker, op. cit. p. 90.
187 Eisenhower had sent American troops into South Korea in 1950 to protect the people’s right to self- 
determination against the Communist forces o f the North.
188 Rafael, op. cit. p. 177.
189 Schoenbaum. op. cit. p. 161.
190 Rafael, op. cit p. 179.
191 Eban An Autobiography p. 443.
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192would be forced to flout. However, an outright confrontation between Jerusalem
and Washington was averted by the Arab rejection o f the superpower’s proposal. For
the refusal of the governments of Algeria and Syria to compromise, insisting on a full
Israeli withdrawal without acknowledging the rights o f all states in the area, resulted
1
in the Arab rejection o f the plan as the Arab league operated on the basis o f 
unanimity.
With the failure of the initiative, the regional states entrenched their positions. On 1 
August 1967 the Knesset passed a resolution calling for the establishment o f peace 
treaties through direct negotiation.194 For the Israelis, victory presented an 
unprecedented opportunity for concluding a final, negotiated settlement with the 
Arabs and they were determined to capitalise this.195 The Arabs opposed direct 
negotiations as this implied at least the tacit recognition o f Israel and by implication, 
its right to exist. In late August, Arab intransigence intensified at the Khartoum 
conference, where in return for subsidies from the oil-producing Arab states, Nasser 
and Hussein were pressurised to accept guidelines for a political settlement based on 
“no negotiations with Israel; no peace with Israel; no recognition o f Israel and no 
bargaining over any Palestinian territory on any terms.” 196
For domestic and diplomatic reasons the Israelis made the alteration o f their position 
contingent on Arab recognition. For a different set o f domestic and diplomatic 
reasons, the Arabs made immobility their common position. The Soviets, seeking to 
regain a semblance o f credibility in the region, were forced to support their Arab 
clients, while the US could not advance a resolution that was unacceptable to 
Jerusalem. By insisting on a solution that was acceptable to both Israel and at least
192 192 When Israel occupied East Jerusalem in the June 1967 War, the Knesset and government of  
Israel re-located from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Although the United States did not formally recognised 
Jerusalem as the capital o f Israel, for the purposes o f this thesis, references after June 1967 will refer to 
Jerusalem as Israel’s capital city. This is because foreign policy decisions taken by the government of  
Israel during the period under consideration, were made in Jerusalem.
193 Bailey, op. cit. p. 126.
194 Eban An Autobiography p. 445.
195 Howard Sachar, A History o f  Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1996) p. 673.
196 David A. Korn, Stalemate: The War of Attrition and Great Power Diplomacy in the Middle East. 
1967-1970 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992) pp. 84-86.
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some of the conservative Arab states, Washington created a situation in which Israel
1 07could effectively veto its policy.
The deadlock was broken by the British, who only eleven years before had been the 
enemy o f every state in the region, but were now seen as the only impartial and 
trustworthy arbitrator. Lord Caradon, the British delegate to the UN, composed a 
resolution, the language o f which was o f such calculated ambiguity that it satisfied the
1 QRnow modest expectations o f each party. It differed from the American text in that it 
did not recommend limiting the arms race but did advise the appointment o f a special 
UN representative to act as mediator.199
The result o f Caradon’s efforts was UN Resolution 242, passed unanimously by the 
Security Council on 22 November 1967. The Resolution was in part a product of 
Goldberg’s diplomatic efforts because at his insistence the word “the” was removed 
from the terms o f Israeli withdrawal, leaving it free to withdraw from some or all of 
the territories it had occupied depending on agreements reached with its 
neighbours.200 Goldberg, himself o f Jewish origin, had manoeuvred for many months 
to “protect Israel from losing on New York’s East River what it won on the
701battlefield.” The resolution fell short o f calling for Israeli withdrawal from all Arab 
territories and on the Arabs to conclude a full peace agreement with Israel. It called 
for Israeli withdrawal:
from territories occupied in the recent conflict [and] respect for and acknowledgement o f the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence o f every State in the area and their 
right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries.202
The implementation of the resolution was to be achieved through a process of 
negotiation not forced implementation.
197 Abba Eban, “Jarring, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon and ‘242,’” in Lord Carandon et al. U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 242: A Case Study in Diplomatic Ambiguity (Washington D.C., 1981) p. 
48.
198 Schoenbaum, op. cit. p. 164.
199 Rafael, op. cit. pp. 185 & 188.
200 J. J. Goldberg, Jewish Power: Inside the American Jewish Establishment. (Reading, Massachusetts: 
Addison Wesley, 1996) pp. 230.
201 J J. Goldberg, op. cit. p. 230.
202 For a transcript o f UN Resolution 242 see Appendix I.
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Caradon’s text contained three crucial omissions. No reference was made to specific
203postwar borders, the status o f Jerusalem or the Palestinians as a separate people. 
The fact that the resolution was passed is directly attributable to these ambiguities. 
Nasser accepted the resolution but kept his armed forces in place and made any 
solution contingent upon the acceptance o f the Palestinians themselves. The 
“Palestinians” he referred to were the Popular Front for the Liberation o f Palestine 
(PLO), which rejected the resolution on 23 November 1967. Eban accepted on behalf 
o f Israel at Eshkol’s behest, but the acceptance was so indirect and discreet that 
Johnson requested its reaffirmation in April 1968.
The ambiguity o f UN Resolution 242 predictably led to stalemate and inaction 
because the demands o f each party were irreconcilable. The Israelis demanded 
negotiations as a condition o f withdrawal, while the Arabs demanded withdrawal as a 
condition for negotiation. During 1968, the UN special representative Ambassador 
Gunnar Jarring took centre stage in the peace negotiations and the administration 
itself maintained a relatively low profile. In public, American officials said nothing to 
modify the language o f Resolution 242, but in private, Washington repeatedly told the 
Israelis that a settlement would have to be based on a virtually complete 
withdrawal.204 The administration could countenance Israel depriving the inhabitants 
o f the West Bank and Gaza of their right to self-determination and democratic 
elections because the occupation was viewed as a temporary situation pending a 
negotiated settlement. Besides, Vietnam was Johnson’s foremost preoccupation and 
after the Tet offensive o f February 1968, he announced his intention not to seek re- 
election. This initiated an intense campaign for the presidency first within his party
90Sand, after Hubert Humphrey’s nomination, between the two parties. Domestic 
considerations took precedence over foreign policy initiatives and throughout his last 
months in office Johnson left negotiations to the UN.
203 Rafael claims that the sponsors o f Resolution 242 were aware of the Arab design to turn the refugee 
issue into a political weapon and therefore the word “Palestinian” was not included. Rafael, op. cit. p. 
190.
204 Rabin, op. cit. p. 114.
205 Quandt Decade o f Decisions p. 66.
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Popular Opinion and the Media
Following the tension of May and euphoria o f June 1967 American public interest in
'yOf.
Israel had dramatically increased. Opinion polls indicated that sympathy for Israel 
stood at 55 percent in the few weeks during and after the war in contrast to support for 
the Arab side which remained at 4 percent.207 Israel’s victory against the Arabs was 
quick and decisive and the television coverage o f the ‘heroic’ Jewish nation won the 
hearts and minds o f large sectors o f the American public. This stood in marked 
contrast to the situation in Vietnam where, largely to conserve American lives, the US
had dropped 90 percent of its bombs on civilian populations. This had the unintended
208consequence o f further alienating the already jaded American television viewer. 
Identification with Israel was reinforced by the ease with which Americans could 
associate with the victory of a state which they perceived to share their own values. 
Initially this new found support was largely superficial in its effects though it 
materialised in increased fund raising and attendance at commemorative events. 
However, by the end o f the 1960s it had been transformed into a powerful pro-Israel 
presence.
By supporting Johnson’s efforts to safeguard the Israeli victory through international 
diplomacy, the American people were encouraged to believe they were acting in 
defence o f a people they had virtually ignored during the 1930s. It was not simply the 
facts on the ground that was shaping the public consciousness, it was also the steady 
filtration through film that was capturing people’s minds. In 1965 beside The 
Pawnbroker which juxtaposed images o f the Holocaust with Harlem and Ship o f  
Fools, in which the ship’s passengers disregard a world on the brink o f war, The 
Sound o f  Music, a popular musical about the Trapp family singers who were forced to 
flee Nazism, was also an overwhelming success. In the same year, the Czech film 
The Shop on Main Street that told the story o f the deportation o f Jews in Slovakia in 
1942 received an Academy Award for the best foreign film. Their popular appeal was
206 Steven Spiegel, “Israel and Beyond: American Jews and US Foreign Policy” in L. Sandy Maisel 
(ed.), Jews in American Politics (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: Lanham, Boulder, New York, 
Oxford, 2001) p. 261.
207 Gallup Opinion Index. Report 25, July 1967, p. 5 cited in Spiegel, op. cit. p. 158.
208 Coker, p. 93.
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attributable to the many parallels that could be drawn between the 1930s, the setting 
o f many of these films, and the social upheaval o f the 1960s.
The extent to which the nature and subjects of films change in response to social 
developments or were themselves designed to engender change, has been a subject of 
much debate. Author and sociologist Leo Rosten, in his study o f Hollywood observed 
that:
The very success of Hollywood lies in the skill with which it reflects the assumptions, the 
fallacies, and the aspirations of an entire culture. The movie producers, the movie directors, 
the movie writers, and the movie actors work with stereotypes which are current in our 
society -  for they, too, are the children o f that society; they, too, have inherited and absorbed 
the values o f  our world. But Hollywood, through the movies, reinforces our typologies on 
an enormous scale and with overpowering repetitiveness.209
The increase in the number o f films addressing the subject o f the Holocaust, social 
inequality and persecution occurred at a time when American society was in great 
turmoil. By Americanising the Jew, films also began to Americanise Jewish history, 
with the Jews coming to symbolise more universal ideas. America appeared to be 
assimilating, and coming to terms with, the history o f Nazism through its application 
to contemporary life.210 The media, intentionally or otherwise, propagated images 
that fuelled the protests by many Americans against racial inequality and an unjust 
war in Vietnam. With the memory o f recent Jewish history in mind, the American 
black underclass intensified their struggle against racial inequality, while US 
involvement in Vietnam ignited student protests at universities against the war 
machine. Support for Israel against the Arabs was one way in which this discontent 
found expression and provided a means through which Americans could believe they 
were making recompense for both the injustices o f their society and those o f others.
Furthermore, Israel consolidated its place in American consciousness not through a 
perception o f its weakness but through a demonstration o f its strength, and its victory 
was represented symbolically in television drama. Aired on 16 February 1968, the 
cult television show Star Trek, addressed the subject o f ethnic cleansing and racial
209 Leo C. Rosten, Hollywood: The Movie Colony. The Movie Makers (New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
Co., 1941) p. 360 quoted in Doneson, op. cit. p. 15.
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persecution amidst a plethora of Nazi symbols. The programme offered an encounter 
between the inhabitants of the fictitious planet Ekos, which had been transformed into 
a replica o f Nazi Germany in the 1930s and was persecuting its minority Zeon 
citizens, and the crew of the starship Enterprise. Symbols of the Nazi era, including 
jackboots and swastikas, were used to establish in viewer’s minds the concept o f a 
totalitarian culture. The programme also included vintage black-and-white footage o f 
the Nazi era interspersed with original images, also in black and white, o f characters 
who appeared in the episode.
By the climax o f the episode the crew o f the Enterprise had helped the Zeons throw 
off their Ekos persecutors and reconciled the two peoples so they could live in 
harmony on the planet. For the programme’s viewers, the depiction o f the Zeons 
rising up to defeat their enemy may have resonated with the recent victory o f Zionism 
over the Arabs in the Six-Day War, with the heroes o f the Enterprise, who supported 
the persecuted Zeons, analogous to Johnson’s diplomatic support o f the Israelis in the 
UN.
Through media representations, Americans could share in Israel’s glorious victory 
over hostile forces. For America in the late 1960s, Israel had become the heroic, 
civilising democratic force that it had longed to be for southeast Asia. In entering into 
a war in Vietnam, the government had demanded for a second time that the American 
people support a war rather than a crusade, but once the draft was introduced the ends 
had to be unlimited and the objective, unconditional victory, underwritten by a peace
2 1 j
agreement not an armistice. A hero must have a heroic task and by 1967, the 
American people conceived o f their involvement in Vietnam as anything but heroic. 
The Six-Day War occurred at a time when America was receptive to an Israeli victory 
and an alliance with a small, but powerful, regional state. Providence can only be 
served by heroes and Israel provided those heroes.
US-Israeli Diplomatic Relations in the Aftermath of War
210 Judith Doneson, The Holocaust in American Film (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2002) p. 
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Despite Israel’s enhanced popularity, the outbreak o f hostilities had led the 
administration to embargo all arms transfers to the Middle East in the hope that 
Moscow would reciprocate. However, the Kremlin refused to deviate from its
position that, prior to a political settlement, there could be no agreement on arms
212limitations. As a consequence, in January 1968, in response to Soviet arms 
transfers to the Arabs, the US arms embargo against Israel and Jordan was
213terminated. This presented Washington with the problem of how to balance Soviet 
weapon supplies with arms transfers to Israel and the friendly Arab states. During the 
fighting an absurd situation had arisen in which “outside Old Jerusalem, American 
tanks manned by Jordanians met American tanks manned by Israelis.”214 From this 
point on, Israel’s defence requirements became a crucial aspect o f US-Israeli relations 
and formed an integral aspect o f W ashington’s diplomatic efforts to mediate the Arab- 
Israeli dispute.
In negotiating arms agreements with Washington, Israel and its supporters were in a 
stronger position to wield influence than they were in the diplomatic arena. Firstly, 
the American commitment to a regional balance o f power meant that requests for 
arms were commensurate with Washington’s objectives whereas their respective 
views on a territorial settlement differed. Secondly, although the Israeli aircraft that 
had defeated the Arabs in 1967 were o f French origin, as a consequence o f De 
Gaulle’s pro-Arab policy, France was no longer a reliable source o f supply. With the 
French supply route closed, the growing pro-Israel lobby could legitimately argue that 
US weapons were the only option. Thirdly, the Constitution grants Congress the 
responsibility for appropriating funds, which makes it easier for any such lobby to 
campaign for material assistance in contrast to diplomatic support. In addition, it is 
foreign governments that initiate the weapons procurement process by making a 
request which its supporters have time to prepare for and act upon. Fourthly, through 
unilateral action, Israel had demonstrated its propensity for transforming its own
212 By July 1968, some members o f the administration had concluded that pressuring Israel to accept a 
peace settlement would do little to undermine Soviet influence in the Middle East. This diminished the 
rationale for withholding arms supplies. “Telegram From Bromley Smith o f the National Security 
Council Staff to President Johnson,” 4 July, 1968, Johnson Library, National Security File, Country 
File, Israel, vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68.
213 Ibid., p. 66.
214 Congressional Record. 26 June 1967, vol. 113, part 13, p. 17305.
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security concerns into a potential superpower crisis, and in so doing, aligned US 
security interests with its own.
The domestic environment created by Vietnam was also conducive to providing arms 
for Israel. Conservatives and military officials had become more sympathetic toward 
Israel for displaying characteristics most Americans admired and respected: self- 
reliance, democracy, anti-communism and idealism. The Israelis were also making a 
positive contribution to US security as their capture o f Russian equipment provided 
useful information to the American military in Southeast Asia. Israel clearly opposed 
Soviet objectives in contrast to the majority o f the Arab states that were firmly 
aligned, if  not ideologically, at least militarily, with the Communist regime.
The new balance o f domestic forces was tested in 1968 by Israel’s request for the 
President’s support in purchasing F-4 Phantom jets. The stage was set for what was 
to become a familiar battle for the President’s support between the bureaucracy which 
opposed the sale and the pro-Israel lobby. Within the bureaucracy, the feeling was 
that the supply o f F-4 fighter planes should be dependent upon movement in the 
Israeli position, and two currents o f opinion emerged. Some felt that Israel should be 
asked to agree to full withdrawal in the context o f peace in exchange for US arms. 
Others, fearful o f Israel’s nuclear development argued that the signing o f the non- 
proliferation treaty (NPT) should be a precondition for delivery o f the jets. The 
NPT issue was discussed at length with Israeli representatives, but they would only 
commit themselves not to be the first to “introduce” nuclear weapons into the region. 
In trying to ascertain exactly what this meant Ambassador Rabin informed US 
officials that Israel would not be the first to “test” nuclear weapons or to publicly 
reveal their existence. In response, Assistant Secretary o f Defence, Paul Wamke, sent 
a letter to Rabin specifying that Washington’s understanding o f the non-introduction 
o f nuclear weapons meant: “no production o f a nuclear device.”217
215 Author’s interview with Norman Podhoretz, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute and former editor-in- 
chief o f Commentary 1960-95.
216 Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders o f the National Security Council Staff to the President's 
Special Assistant Rostow, 14 October 1968, Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, 
Israel, vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68.
217 Quandt Decade of Decisions p. 67.
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To counteract the pressure on Israel and the efforts of the bureaucracy to prevent the 
sale, the pro-Israeli lobby initiated a campaign of its own. Every American Jewish 
organisation and an array o f non-Jewish groups emphasised the importance o f the 
sale, and the American-Israeli Public Affairs Commission (Aipac) obtained 
statements from presidential candidates, Hubert Humphrey and Richard Nixon, in 
support of the sale. In fact, there was no concerted public opposition to the sale which 
indicated that many influential Americans and organised groups were beginning to 
identify with, and support, the Israeli cause. In July the Senate passed a resolution 
calling for the sale o f F-4s to Jerusalem. Finally, on 9 October, Johnson succumbed 
to the pressure inflicted on his beleaguered administration and publicly announced 
that Israel would be permitted to purchase fifty Phantom jets to be delivered in 1969 
and 1970.218
In a futile attempt to offset the inevitable backlash from the Arab states, Rusk 
informed the Egyptians on 2 November that Washington continued to favour full 
Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai as part o f a peace settlement. This position was 
subsequently endorsed in the Rogers Plan o f 1969, and had consistently been part o f
J 1 Q
the American official consensus on the terms o f an Israeli-Egyptian peace accord. 
The move did little to win the confidence o f the Israelis and a distinct chill between 
the two governments marked the last months o f Johnson’s term in office, at the head 
o f an administration that had firmly positioned the US as Israel’s undisputed ally and 
major arms supplier.
Assessing Johnson’s Middle East Policy
Both Vietnam and the Six-Day War exerted a profound effect on the domestic forces 
that sought to influence Johnson’s foreign policy. Vietnam acted as a constraint that 
all but destroyed his relationship with the legislature and turned the tide o f public 
opinion against him. In its lightning victory against the Arabs, Israel proved that it 
was able to achieve what the US could not in Vietnam: the defeat o f Communist 
proxies and the expansion o f the frontier of the American values o f freedom and
218 Ibid.. p. 67.
219 Ibid.. p. 67.
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democracy, and in so doing, tapped into a powerful strain in American culture. The 
Jewish community and American conservatives responded by becoming more deeply 
involved with Israel, while media coverage diffused this enthusiasm throughout the 
population. A new awareness o f the Holocaust and the symbolic importance of Israel 
as the homeland of the Jewish people was rapidly absorbed into American culture and 
support for Israel became the new political currency.
Washington was a major beneficiary o f the 1967 war, even though it had not risked 
military action and Israel’s defeat o f the Arabs had been secured with French, not 
American aircraft. A US ally had been victorious in a war that directly undermined 
Soviet interests and Johnson sought to capitalise diplomatically on Israel’s military 
prowess. In seeking to avoid what he perceived as the mistakes o f  the Eisenhower 
administration in advancing grandiose conceptions and forcing a complete Israeli 
withdrawal, Johnson made the mistake o f moving too far in the opposite direction, 
with avoidance and lack o f commitment. His administration failed to advance 
proposals for a genuine peace settlement or a strategy for normalising relations 
between the Arab states and Israel. In attempting to appease different factions, 
Johnson’s approach tried to unify two irreconcilable strategies: one favoured by the
bureaucracy and pro-Arab supporters, the other by Congress, many o f his political
220associates and increasing numbers o f the American public. In trying to reconcile 
the two strains, Johnson adopted elements o f both strategies to the confusion o f all 
involved. He eventually settled on a policy similar to that pursued by Truman of
increasing arms sales to Israel to soften the impact o f a divergent diplomatic
221strategy.
In the final analysis, “sentiment and concern” had proved no substitute for innovation 
and diplomatic skill. Time eventually ran out for the Democrats and the unfinished 
business o f the Arab-Israeli conflict passed on to the Republicans. In contrast to 
Johnson, President Richard Nixon placed a high priority on foreign policy and 
considered the conduct o f international relations to be one of his greatest strengths.
220 Spiegel, op. cit. p. 165.
221 Ibjd., p. 165.
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Yet even Nixon’s knowledge of the Middle East did not prepare him for the 
complexity and challenges o f managing Arab-Israeli affairs.
185
Chapter 5
Nixon, Kissinger and U.S. Policy toward Israel
The strategy the administration of Richard Nixon adopted in its relations with the 
Arab states and Israel was not noted for its consistency and the President’s attitude 
and policy toward Israel often mirrored the erratic and contradictory elements o f his 
own personality. The man behind the presidency was something o f an enigma. Re­
elected overwhelmingly to office in 1972, his foreign policy hailed as a resounding 
success, within two years the Watergate scandal forced him to resign in disgrace on 9 
August 1974, his domestic support in tatters. During his six years in office Nixon had 
condemned the Israeli government for its intransigence in negotiations with the Arabs 
and for a time, withheld arms supplies. Yet he had also played a key role in 
overseeing the most dramatic consolidation of US-Israeli ties o f any President. Under 
his leadership Israel was considered worthy to act as a proxy state to protect US 
interests, was elevated to the status o f a strategic asset and received, on the personal 
request o f the President, an unprecedented $2.2 billion aid appropriation during the 
1973 war.1 On occasions Nixon allowed the imperatives o f detente, superpower 
competition for influence in the Arab world and divisions within his own 
administration to force a reluctant Israel to compromise with Egypt. Yet on each 
occasion, while he maintained the power o f his presidency, Nixon always provided 
Israel with a way out o f difficult negotiations and alternative policy options that 
bypassed those in his administration who would have forced Jerusalem to make peace 
at any price.2
Israel’s leaders were adept at manipulating Nixon’s admiration for the Jewish state,
1
his distrust o f the American bureaucracy and his penchant for viewing regional 
conflicts through the prism of the Cold War, to their advantage.4 As will be shown,
1 Jonathan. J. Goldberg, Jewish Power: Inside the American Jewish Establishment. (Reading, 
Massachusetts: Addison Wesley, 1996) p. 246.
2 Author’s interview with Peter W. Rodman: Member of the National Security Council staff and a 
special assistant to Henry Kissinger 1969-1977. Nixon was to establish a special channel of  
communication between US National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger and Israeli Ambassador 
Yitzhak Rabin that circumvented Secretary o f State William Rogers and the State Department.
3 Nixon Memoirs p. 339
4 George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 1990) p. 121.
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by the time Nixon was elected to the presidency, his religious upbringing and 
perception o f international affairs had conditioned him to believe that the United 
States had an “absolute commitment”5 to prevent Israel from “being driven into the 
sea”.6 This belief, in conjunction with his view of foreign affairs, not as a distinct 
series o f events but as inter-linked developments set against the backdrop o f 
superpower rivalry,7 meant that ultimately his support o f Israel was assured.
Nixon was raised in a tight-knit Quaker community by religious parents who adhered
Q
to a literal interpretation o f the Bible. Religion played an influential role in his early 
life and was revealed in a paper he wrote while at college under the heading “What 
Can I Believe?”
Years of training in the home and church have had their effect on my thinking ... My parents, 
“fundamental Quakers,” had ground into me, with the aid o f the church, all the fundamental 
ideas in their strictest interpretation. The infallibility and literal correctness o f  the Bible, ... all 
these were accepted facts.9 
Within the Nixon household, religion and prayer were essentially personal and 
private and perhaps because o f this, Nixon avoided the common practice o f so 
many political figures o f quoting the Bible during public speaking. He recalled 
that as Vice-President, Eisenhower urged him to give greater legitimacy and power 
to his public speeches by occasionally referring to God, but that he did not feel 
comfortable in so doing.10
Once absorbed by the intricacies o f international affairs, Nixon was to be less 
influenced by his religious heritage. He came to believe, for example, that the 
pacifism espoused by Quakers was only an option in international life if one were 
confronting a civilised, compassionate enemy.11 History had proved that in the face 
o f dictators such as Hitler and Stalin, pacifism had failed to stop violence,
5 Ibid.. pp. 120-21.
6 Ibid.. pp. 120-21.
7 For a more detailed account o f “linkage” politics see Robert S. Litwak, Detente and the Nixon 
Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit o f  Stability. 1969 -  1976 (Cambridge, New York, 
New Rochelle, Melbourne & Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
8 Nixon’s mother came from a long line o f Quakers and his father converted from Methodism to 
Quakerism at the time o f his marriage.
9 Richard Nixon, RN (Touchstone: New York, 1990), p. 16
10 Ibid.. p. 14.
11 Ibid.. p. 27.
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12strengthened the enemy and weakened morale at home. In foreign affairs Nixon 
was to take a tough stance against the enemy and in Israel he found a kindred spirit.
Nixon does not appear to have perceived a connection between his view o f Israel, 
American Jews and his personal acquaintance with individual Jews, and his feelings
1 "lfor one group were not necessarily commensurate with his feelings for another. 
Henry A. Kissinger, his National Security Adviser, claimed that he embodied many o f 
the prejudices o f the uprooted, Californian lower middle class from which he came.14 
He believed that Jews formed a powerful, cohesive group in American society, that 
they were predominantly liberal; placed the interests o f Israel above all else; were 
generally more sympathetic to the Soviet Union than other sectors of American 
society and that their control of the mass media made them powerful and dangerous 
adversaries.15 In this regard, Nixon retained the post-war view o f Israel as a socialist 
state inhabited by Communist Jews from Eastern Europe, which he juxtaposed with 
the post-1967 image o f Israel as part o f the western camp with its guns firmly pointed 
at Moscow. Yet his contradictory image o f American Jews as an entity did not deter 
him from enjoying cordial personal relations with individual Jews and from elevating 
them to influential positions within his administration. Kissinger went so far as to 
claim that Nixon felt particularly at ease with representatives o f a group that shared 
his experience o f being an outsider.16
Yet this view stands in stark contrast to the image o f Nixon more recently revealed.17
On one occasion, at an Oval office meeting Nixon reportedly complained that the
“Jews are all over the government, ... generally speaking, you can’t trust the bastards.
1 8They turn on you ....” He was not averse to expressing his crude views in front o f 
Kissinger19 and Kissinger himself once said that, “You can’t believe how much anti-
12 Nixon, op. cit. p. 27.
13 Author’s interview with William Quandt, former National Security Council aide, Nixon and Carter 
administrations.
14 Henry A. Kissinger, Years o f Upheaval (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson & Michael Joseph, 1982)
p. 202.
15 Ibid.. p. 202.
16 Ibid.. p. 202.
17 For a discussion o f Nixon’s apparently negative attitude toward the American Jewish community see 
Anthony Summers, The Arrogance of Power: The Secret World o f Richard Nixon (New York: Viking, 
Penguin Group, 2000) pp. 354-55.
IH Ibid.. p. 354.
19 Author’s interview with William Quandt.
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70Semitism there is at the top of this government, and I mean at the top.” It was this 
aspect o f Nixon’s personality that caused Kissinger to remark that Israeli Prime 
Minister Golda Meir’s announcement within a year of Nixon’s election that he was 
“an old friend of the Jewish people”21 was “startling news to those o f us more familiar 
with Nixon’s ambivalences.”22
Despite these outbursts, it would be inaccurate to categorise Nixon as an anti-Semite. 
Long before he became President a leading Jewish group defended him against such 
charges and, remarkably for a Republican, once in office he filled many senior posts 
with people o f Jewish origin. For example, he appointed Kissinger, a Jewish 
immigrant and former Harvard Professor, to the second most powerful post in the 
United States, that o f National Security Adviser. Subsequently, in 1974, Kissinger 
was appointed Secretary o f State, becoming the only official to hold the two posts 
simultaneously. Kissinger was a Rockerfeller protege and his appointment was 
therefore beneficial to Nixon’s standing amongst the ‘respectable’ Republican wing of 
the Republican party, where he needed allies.24 Nixon also appointed other Jewish 
figures, including Arthur Bums as chairman o f the Federal Reserve, Herb Stein as 
head o f the Council o f Economic advisors, Leonard Garment as White House counsel
7 Sand William Safire as a White House speech writer.
Irrespective o f his general distrust o f American Jews and his ambivalence toward 
Israel as a spiritual and emotional homeland, Nixon shared the deeply ingrained belief
7/r
of his generation that Israel could not be abandoned and stood by it more firmly in 
every crisis that assailed the Jewish state than any President except Truman. He was 
vocal in his support for Israel, even though his associates later claimed that this was a 
ruse to conceal his true feelings and policies. Whatever Nixon’s real sentiments, 
Israel embodied many o f the attributes he most admired. He respected Israel’s
20 Ibid.. p. 354.
21 Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979) p. 370.
22 Ibid.. p. 370.
23 Summers, op. cit. p. 354.
24 Author’s interview with William Quandt.
25 Summers, op. cit. p. 353 and Goldberg, op. cit. p. 248.
26 Author’s interview with William Quandt
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determination and courage and its leader’s tenacious defence o f their national interest. 
He also considered its military prowess to be an asset for the Western democracies.27
His admiration for Israel’s tough stance was tempered by his conviction that Israeli
28occupation o f Arab land only strengthened anti-Western radical forces in the region. 
His prime belief was that Israel had to be forced into a peace settlement because its 
current posture jeopardised US relations with the Arab states. Yet Nixon was 
sufficiently astute to realise that pressurising Israel to relinquish territory in apparent 
response to the demands o f the radical Arab states, was more likely to promote Soviet, 
rather than US, interests. He came to share Kissinger’s view that America could not 
mediate an Israeli withdrawal until circumstances made it clear that Washington’s 
actions had not been extorted by Soviet pressure. Under his leadership, the exclusion 
o f  the Soviet Union from the Middle East was seen as a pre-requisite for a concerted 
White House initiative to secure an Arab-Israeli peace agreement.
Kissinger’s viewpoint on Middle Eastern affairs began at the opposite end o f  the 
emotional spectrum to that o f his patron. Whilst not actively practicing his Jewish 
religion, Kissinger carried with him the memory that thirteen members o f his family 
had died in Nazi concentration camps.31 His determination not to leave Israel 
strategically vulnerable and susceptible to the infliction o f  a second Holocaust was 
evident in his refusal to countenance a diplomatic strategy that might escalate the 
regional situation beyond his control. 32 Despite his personal friendship with a 
number o f Israeli leaders and his assertion that “it was not always easy [and] 
occasionally proved painful,” he subordinated his emotional preferences to his 
perception o f the strategic interest o f the country o f which he was a citizen. The 
journalist Jonathan Goldberg claimed that “[T]o many, he embodied the age-old truth 
that Jews in high places will serve their masters, not their brethren.”34 Yet as will be 
shown, there is ample evidence that simple fear as a Jew for Israel’s safety was a
27 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval p. 203
28 Ibid.. pp. 202-03.
29 Ibid.. pp. 202-03.
30 Ibid.. pp. 201-02.
31 Author’s interview with Peter Rodman.
32 Ibid...
33 Kissinger, Years o f Upheaval p. 203.
34 Goldberg, op. cit. p. 238.
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crucial factor in Kissinger’s strategy during the tense early days of the Yom Kippur 
War. Defence Secretary James Schlesinger would later say that, “[a]s Israel began to
o c
fall apart, Henry began to fall apart.” It mattered to Kissinger that Israel was the 
only Jewish state and while he was not averse to arguing with its leaders and forcing 
concessions, there was a point beyond which he would not go. By the end o f  the Ford 
administration he had reportedly stated that he would resign rather than push Israel 
still further.36
An astute political realist, Kissinger believed that in the long-term, Israel’s security 
could not be guaranteed by an appeal to the emotional sentiment o f  politicians and 
decision-makers, but only by anchoring it to the strategic interest of the United States. 
These shared conceptions o f the national interest solidified the close personal
'i'7
relationship between Nixon and Kissinger and provided the foundations on which 
the unlikely partnership between the Communist-baiter from California and a refugee 
from Nazi Germany was formed. By different routes and emotional perspectives, 
similar perceptions o f the national interest brought Nixon and Kissinger to the same 
conclusion regarding the strategy the administration should pursue in the Middle 
East. Their relationship was consolidated still further by Kissinger’s preference for 
secret negotiations that played to Nixon’s paranoia.
Israeli leaders expertly capitalised on Nixon and Kissinger’s pre-existing conception 
o f international affairs and their positive image o f Israel to consolidate their control 
over territorial gains made in the Six-Day War. The President was obsessed with the 
potential for a Soviet-American confrontation in the Middle East, believing that the 
Soviet commitment to the Arab radicals and the American commitment to Israel 
might draw both superpowers into a confrontation “even against our wills -  and 
almost certainly against our national interest.” At the same time, he tended to distort 
the true origins o f the Arab-Israeli conflict by asserting that “the Soviets are the main
35 Defence Secretary James Schlesinger quoted in Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography 
(London: Faber & Faber, 1992) p. 521.
36 Author’s interview with William Quandt.
37 Jean A. Garrison, Games Advisors Play: Foreign policy in the Nixon and Carter Administrations 
(Texas: Texas A&M University, 1999) p. 8.
38 Kissinger Years o f Upheaval p. 202.
39 Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon vol. I (New York: Warner Books, 1978) p. 591.
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cause o f Middle East tensions,”40 thereby ignoring the reality that Moscow was 
actually fuelling a pre-existing hostility for its advantage. In response, and to ensure 
the support o f a staunchly anti-Communist President, the Israeli government 
promoted the view that its conflict with its Arab neighbours was a direct result of 
Arab intrigue and Soviet machinations. By aligning their views directly with those of 
Nixon, Israeli leaders could be more certain o f American support.41
The potential for Soviet intrigue in the Middle East was a recurring theme in 
conversations between Israeli leaders and the President.42 However, it remains 
uncertain whether this commonly expressed view o f Moscow’s involvement in the 
region was an accurate reflection o f the President’s position, or a tactic to pacify and 
reassure the Israeli government. Five years after publishing his Memoirs, Nixon 
acknowledged that:
[a] 1 though the Soviet Union is the cause o f  many conflicts in the Third World and profits from 
most o f them, it is not the only cause. If the Soviet Union did not exist there would still be 
regional conflicts and civil wars. The Palestinian people would still fight for their homeland.43
Nixon justified his commitment to maintaining Israel’s military superiority on his 
cultural and strategic conviction that it was the “only state in the Mideast which [was] 
pro-freedom and an effective opponent to Soviet expansion.”44 The image o f Israel as 
a courageous state was prevalent amongst conservatives, like the President, who 
advocated a stronger stance against Communism.45 Israel was seen as a model o f how 
a state should behave and contrasted sharply with the American experience in 
Vietnam. The need to enhance US-Israeli relations to undercut Soviet advances into 
the region apparently took precedence over potential interests in the Arab world,46 as 
the administration did little to improve its relations with the governments o f either 
Egypt or Syria.
40 Lenczowski, op. cit. p. 121.
41 Ibid^p. 121.
42 Author’s interview with Norman Podhoretz, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute and former editor-in- 
chief o f Commentary 1960-95.
43 Lenczowski. op. cit. p. 121.
44 Nixon Memoirs p. 596.
45 Author’s interview with Norman Podhoretz.
46 Nixon Memoirs p. 591.
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Despite this, Nixon’s commitment to Israel was tempered by two other factors. First, 
was Israel’s attitude o f “total intransigence on negotiating any peace agreement that 
would involve the return o f any o f the occupied territories.”47 “Israel’s victory” , 
Nixon claimed “had been too great”48 because its resounding achievements in the 
1967 war had substantiated the belief that Israel’s security could most effectively be 
secured through military force and territorial control. Second was what Nixon 
described as “the unyielding and short-sighted pro-Israeli attitude prevalent in large 
and influential sectors o f the American Jewish community, Congress, the media, and 
in intellectual and cultural circles.”49 Domestic politics were a perennial concern to 
Nixon but he decried the Jewish lobby’s tendency to equate moderation in relations 
with Israel with anti-Semitism.50 Irrespective o f his declarations that he did not care 
about the Jewish vote because American Jews would never vote for him, he was 
painfully aware that the Jewish constituencies in New York, Pennsylvania and 
California had voted 95 percent against him in 1968 and he was determined to carry 
these states with him in the 1972 presidential election.51 The conclusion could be 
drawn that both the national interest and domestic political considerations played a 
role in his administration’s Middle East policy. The exact balance o f these 
considerations remains, however, a subject o f debate.
The Changing Place of Israel in the Mind of America
Nixon was the first President to be elected to office following Israel’s newly elevated 
standing in public discourse and in formulating policy toward the Middle East had to 
be cognisant o f the changing place o f Israel in the mind o f America. As a 
conservative he was proud o f America’s alliance with the heroic Jewish state, even 
though he did not share the emotional empathy for Israel that many o f  his countrymen 
had begun to demonstrate. Positive media representations o f Israel and parallels 
between the depravity that led to the Holocaust and the more unpalatable aspects o f 
American life, were fast becoming a staple of popular culture and shaping the
47 Ibid.. p. 350.
48 Ibid.. p. 350.
49 Ibid.. p. 595.
50 Author’s interview with Peter Rodmam
51 Nixon Memoirs p. 596.
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expectations, albeit subtly, o f the policy the American people expected their 
government to pursue towards the Jewish homeland.
Some o f the most popular films of the early 1970s were set against the backdrop o f 
Nazi Germany and by implication the consequential establishment of the state o f 
Israel. Amongst the most successful American films in portraying the rise o f Nazism 
was the musical Cabaret, released in 1972. Annette Insdorf describes the film as 
“entertaining, engrossing, and ultimately chilling in its stylised tableaux o f spreading 
swastikas.” It is set in the Germany o f the early 1930s and the audience observes 
Germany through the eyes o f an English university student involved in a relationship 
with an American cabaret singer. The story evolves through a juxtaposition o f scenes 
at the cabaret and daily existence in Berlin. Songs and dances provide a social 
commentary to the film which depicts the disintegration o f the Weimar Republic and 
the rise o f National Socialism. The format is reminiscent o f  the earlier film Ship o f  
Fools as life in the cabaret continues whereas life outside is on the verge o f exploding.
At both a cultural and political level, Cabaret evokes a parallel, albeit tenuous, 
between Germany in the 1930s and the chaos o f American society in the early 1970s. 
At the cultural level, German expressionism reached its zenith in the 1920s but was 
outlawed by Hitler in the 1930s. This provided a sharp contrast to contemporary 
America where the openly permissive atmosphere deprived art o f its ability to shock. 
On the political level there is a parallel between violence, murder and social and 
political chaos. In Weimar Germany protests tended to be anti-democratic in contrast 
to America where protestors advocated greater democracy with an end to racism and 
the Vietnam war.53
It was during this period o f newly developing social and political consciousness 
throughout American society that Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel became an 
important figure on the Jewish scene. WieseTs personal memoir Night, which told o f
52 Annette Insdorf, Indelible Shadows: Film and the Holocaust (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 2003) p. 47.
53 Judith Doneson, The Holocaust in American Film (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2002) pp. 
123,125.
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his experiences in a concentration camp, published in I960,54 and his 1966 testimony 
o f the harassment o f Jews in the Soviet Union in The Jews o f  Silence drew American 
Jewish youth, who were themselves searching for their own identity, towards him. 
Judith Doneson goes as far to say that by the early 1970s Wiesel and his works had 
built a “cult o f the Holocaust” around him. At a time o f “spiritual neediness” 
Wiesel’s renditions o f the Holocaust “personified a lost culture with a contemporary 
relevance that was irresistible.”55 As a consequence, Nixon was confronted with an 
electorate with a higher degree o f emotional commitment to Israel than ever before. 
A connection that was to intensify throughout his term in office.
The Nixon Team: An Administration Divided
In the first year o f Nixon’s term in office, high-ranking officials became embroiled in 
an unprecedented controversy over the Middle East. The conflict challenged the 
assumption that the United States had become Israel’s staunchest ally as a result o f the 
resupply operation in the wake of the Six-Day War and subsequent alignment with 
Israel’s position in the United Nations. It also appeared to contradict the cultural ties 
that had burgeoned at the public level and the increasing confidence o f the American 
Jewish community in using its influence in defence o f Israel.
The debate centred on the difference o f opinion between the National Security 
Adviser and the Secretary o f State William Rogers. Rogers was a lawyer by 
profession and a close personal friend o f the President. He had served in 
Eisenhower’s cabinet as Attorney General, but while an excellent negotiator, lacked 
the strong, assertive personality and foreign policy experience necessary to compete 
with Kissinger.56 Rogers was doubly disadvantaged because his cabinet post created 
a greater physical and psychological distance between himself and a President who
cn
admitted in his memoirs that he distrusted the Foreign Service, partly because he felt 
unable to control it.58
54 For a fuller account o f the film see Hilene Flanzbaum (ed.), The Americanisation of the Holocaust 
(Baltimore & London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999).
pp, 95, 199.
55 Doneson, op. cit. pp. 127-8.
56 Author’s interview with Peter Rodman.
57 Nixon, Memoirs p. 339.
58 Garrison, op. cit. p. p.
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Nixon’s personality and leadership style, combined with his suspicion o f the 
bureaucracy, which he perceived to be a bastion o f the Democrats,59 worked to 
Kissinger’s advantage.60 To increase his control over foreign policy, the President 
transferred the locus o f power, traditionally centred in the State Department, to the 
White House and the newly empowered and reinvigorated National Security Council 
(NSC).61 Nixon and Kissinger’s demand for power over all decisions eventually 
merged both policy formulation and operational functions inside the NSC. As a
£■7
result, the National Security Adviser had the means to shape foreign policy and
ultimately became the foreign policy Tsar.64 In his memoirs Kissinger described the
evolution o f the system thus:
Eventually, though not for the first one and a half years, I became the principal adviser. Until 
the end o f 1970 I was influential but not dominant. From then on, my role increased as Nixon 
sought to bypass the delays and sometimes opposition o f the departments. The fact remains that 
the NSC machinery was used more fully before my authority was confirmed, while afterward 
tactical decisions were increasingly taken outside the system in personal conversations with the 
President.65
If  relations between Kissinger and Rogers were acrimonious, then Rogers’ deputy, the 
talented and ambitious Under Secretary o f State Elliot Richardson, bridged some o f 
the rift. Richardson developed a close working relationship with Kissinger that kept 
the channels between the White House and the State Department open.66 Joseph 
Sisco, a skilled State Department bureaucratic tactician was appointed as Secretary o f 
State for Near East and South Asia affairs. In his long career at the State Department, 
Sisco had never served overseas and derived his considerable knowledge o f the 
Middle East from time spent in Washington. Working with him first as office director
59 Nixon Memoirs p. 340.
60 Garrison, op. cit. p. 7.
61 The NSC provided the President with genuine foreign policy alternatives through the constant flow 
o f memoranda and policy studies that situated foreign policy formulation in a broader context than had 
been available to previous presidents. These National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM) were 
discussed by a Senior Review Group (SRG), then referred to the NSC for decision before a National 
Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) was issued.
62 Joan Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered (New York: Basic Books, 1994) p. 157.
63 Garrison, op. cit. p. 7.
64 Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-lsraeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from 
Truman to Reagan (Chicago & London: The University o f Chicago Press, 1985) p. 174.
65 Kissinger Years o f Upheaval p. 48 cited in Spiegel, op. cit. p. 174.
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for Israel and Arab-Israeli affairs and later as Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Near 
East, was Alfred “Roy” L. Atherton, Jr. Atherton was the embodiment o f 
professionalism and experience and formed a formidable partnership with Sisco in 
Middle East policymaking.
Nixon’s other notable appointees were not directly involved with Middle Eastern 
affairs on a day-to-day basis. These included Melvin Laird, the Secretary o f Defence, 
for whom Vietnam and the defence budget were his main preoccupation and the
i'O
chairman o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff, General Earl Wheeler. Richard Helms, 
Director o f the CIA reported directly to the NSC and provided the President with an 
alternative viewpoint on international affairs to that o f the State Department. As 
Nixon’s presidency progressed, all but one o f his advisors exerted a gradually 
decreasing influence over the administration’s Middle East policy. However, these 
men continued to play a role in reinforcing the President’s ideologically imbued 
image o f the world as one divided between friends and enemies and emphasised the 
links they perceived to exist between Nixon’s domestic support and his foreign policy
69successes.
The Israeli government’s perception o f Nixon’s commitment to their state’s security 
and interests was challenged by this bureaucratic infighting. In organising the foreign 
policy apparatus in the early days o f his presidency, the Middle East was the one 
region Nixon subcontracted to the State Department. As the State Department was 
the home o f the “Arabists”, in the sense that many bureaucrats had served in the Arab 
Middle East, Israeli officials were concerned that they would encourage the 
administration to pressurise Israel to sacrifice territory to facilitate a US 
rapprochement with the Arabs. However, Israeli fears were misplaced and Nixon’s 
decision seems to have been a product o f practicality, not grand strategy. In his 
memoirs Nixon explained his decision in terms o f his concern that “Kissinger’s 
Jewish background would put him at a disadvantage during delicate negotiations for
66 William Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 
(Washington D.C. & Berkeley, Los Angeles: The Brookings Institute, & University of California Press, 
1993) p. 67.
67 Ibid., pp. 67-68.
68 William Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy Towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict: 1967- 
1976 (London, Berkeley & Los Angeles: University o f California Press, 1977) p. 75.
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the reopening o f relations with the Arab states”,70 a claim with which Kissinger 
concurred.71 Nixon’s actions were also motivated by his perception o f the Middle
79East as a “powder keg” where the stakes were elusive, the risk o f superpower 
confrontation high and the price of intervention, especially in domestic terms, even 
higher. Underlying the President’s thinking was a desire to distance the White 
House from an unsuccessful Arab-Israeli initiative and the potentially negative fall­
out such a move might entail.74
The War of Attrition
As the Four Power talks between Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United 
States to reach a settlement o f the Arab-Israeli dispute continued, the situation on the 
ground deteriorated throughout the spring o f 1969 and the war o f attrition intensified. 
Moscow attempted to dissuade Nasser from escalating the “mini-war” but its efforts 
were not backed up with the necessary threat o f force to have been taken seriously.75 
Fighting broke out along the Suez Canal, while fedaveen attacks escalated, thus 
provoking Israeli retaliatory raids. Throughout 1969, the Egyptians, armed with 
superior artillery, inflicted extensive physical and psychological casualties on Israel. 
Jerusalem’s apparent weakness in countering the Egyptian assault, appeared to reflect 
the deterioration of Washington’s position in the Middle East relative to that o f 
Moscow. On 1 September, King Idris o f Libya, one o f the most pro-Western, 
conservative Arab monarchs was overthrown in a coup d ’etat by Nasserist army 
officers led by Muammar Qaddafi. This, in conjunction with the declared state of 
emergency in Lebanon and the coup in Sudan the previous spring, convinced State 
Department officials that the trend towards extremism in the Arab world was a 
response to the lack o f progress towards a peace settlement.
69 Quandt Decade o f Decisions pp. 75-76.
70 Nixon RN p. 477.
71 Kissinger White House Years p. 348.
72 Nixon news conference on 27 January, 1969, DSB, vol. 60 (17 February, 1969), pp. 142-43.
73 Kissinger White House Years p. 348.
74 Ibid.. p. 348.
75 Alvin Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relationship Since the June 
War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977) p. 87. With the Four Powers talks in a situation o f  
stalemate and the US determined to press ahead with the SALT talks irrespective of disputes in other 
areas, Moscow had little to loose by supporting Nasser in the War of Attrition.
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The Israeli government was increasingly uncertain o f Nixon’s position on the growing 
crisis, because his public response oscillated between the view o f his National 
Security Adviser and those o f his Secretary o f State. On the one hand, at a meeting in 
mid-December 1968, he reassured Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Dayan o f his 
support76 but on the other, at his first news conference as President, he emphasised 
the danger o f US-Soviet confrontation in the Middle East and rejected Israel’s
77demand for direct negotiations. These words ignited fear in Jerusalem o f an 
imposed peace. Rabin claimed that the Israeli government “knew perfectly well that 
if  an agreement were reached between the two powers, each would be obliged to 
“induce” its “clients to accept it.””78
By mid-September, Nixon sought expert advice on the effect State Department 
negotiations were exerting on domestic opinion and became increasingly sceptical as
7QState officials moved negotiations closer to Arab demands on the 1967 borders. 
Thus he rejected both Rogers’ requests for increasing pressure on Israel and Israel’s
OA
demands for a joint American-Israeli position to force the Arabs to negotiate.
In the midst o f these internal deliberations, Golda Meir, who had become Prime 
Minister o f Israel after the death o f Levi Eshkol, arrived in Washington in September 
1969. Meir was to enjoy a good working relationship with the Nixon administration 
and some political analysts claim that she was more popular in the US than she was in
o 1
Israel. Her fear o f a diminution in US support was assuaged by her meeting with 
Nixon, as he gave his visitors the impression that he did not share Rogers’ 
commitment to the talks now in progress. He even established a special channel o f 
communication between Kissinger and Rabin that circumvented the State
o-»
Department. This was symptomatic o f Nixon’s tendency to exploit internal 
disagreements within his administration when dealing with the Arab states and Israel.
76 Moshe Dayan, Story o f Mv Life (London: Sphere Books Ltd., 1977) pp. 369-70.
77 Public Papers o f the Presidents: Richard Nixon. 1969 (Washington. 1971) 27 January 1969, p. 18.
78 Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1979) p. 115.
79 Spiegel, op. cit. p. 184.
80 Kissinger, White House Years pp. 367-69, 370-72.
81 Author’s interview with Ira Sharkansky, professor o f political science & public administration, 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Some analysts o f US-Israeli relations claim that Meir was able to 
form a good working relationship with the Nixon administration because she “spoke English better 
than she spoke Hebrew.”
82 Ibid.. p. 376.
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Once each side had its “friends,” the President sought to balance the competing 
parties while appearing sympathetic to all. Immediately after Meir’s return to Israel, 
Nixon granted Rogers permission to present Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin with 
Washington’s fallback position which “would determine a timetable and procedures 
for [the] withdrawal o f Israeli armed forces from UAR territory occupied during the 
conflict o f 1967.”85
The first public challenge to Israel’s confidence in Nixon’s support came at the end of 
the first year o f his presidency. Entrusted with the conduct o f Middle East policy, 
Rogers presented a comprehensive proposal for an Arab-Israeli peace agreement, 
known as the Rogers Plan. This was a rare but dramatic exception to presidential 
control over the bureaucracy and heralded a downturn in US-Israeli relations. The 
Rogers Plan, publicly announced on 9 December 1969, was based on UN Security 
Council Resolution 242 and upheld the principle that Israel should return the occupied 
territories in exchange for Arab commitments to end the state o f war and respect 
Israel’s territorial integrity. The objective o f US policy Rogers declared was:
to encourage the Arabs to accept a permanent peace based on a binding agreement and to urge 
the Israelis to withdraw from occupied territory when their territorial integrity is assured as 
envisaged by the Security Council resolution. ... Any changes in pre-existing lines, should not 
reflect the weight o f conquest86 and should be confined to insubstantial alterations required for 
mutual security. We do not support expansionism. We believe that troops must be withdrawn 
as the resolution provides.87
Israel’s leaders were outraged that the new administration’s interpretation of 
Resolution 242 appeared to differ so greatly from that of Johnson. From Jerusalem’s
Q O
perspective, “the Soviets were acting as dutiful lawyers for the Arabs,” while the 
American representatives were negotiating their own terms at Israel’s expense and
89informing Jerusalem only after the event. Given the psychological environment of 
fear o f invasion in which Israel existed, any agreement Washington made on 
alterations to the 1967 borders, was considered to be a concession made at their
83 Author’s interview with Peter Rodman.
84 Spiegel, op. cit. pp. 185-86.
85 Joint US-USSR Working Paper, Fundamental Principles (The Rogers Plan), October 28, 1969.
86 NYT, 28 March 1969 and p. 14: DSB, 14 April 1969, p.305
87 Full text in the NYT, 11 December 1969 and in the DSB. 5 January 1970.
88 Spiegel, op. cit. p. 183.
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expense.90 Therefore, the central provision of the Plan, that the occupied territories be 
exchanged for peace, guaranteed that it would be greeted by hostility in Israel. Rabin 
claimed that:
At no stage in the talks did the Russians adopt any position that had not previously been agreed 
upon with the Egyptians, whereas basic American positions were not co-ordinated in advance 
with [Israel]. They essentially reflected American interests and concepts that we were more or 
less expected to adopt.91
Israeli objections were as much procedural as they were substantive and the public 
way in which the proposal was presented was as much a cause o f rejection as its 
substance. Washington had transgressed a very important element o f any special 
relationship -  the right to be consulted. The following day Jerusalem rejected the 
plan and on 22 December the Israeli cabinet issued the following statement:
Israel will not be sacrificed by any power or interpower policy and will reject any attempt to 
impose a forced solution on her ... The proposal o f the U.S.A. cannot but be interpreted by the 
Arab parties as an attempt to appease them at the expense of Israel.92 
The next day, the Soviet Union also rejected the proposal.
It was at this juncture that the duality o f  Nixon’s policy toward Israel was starkly 
revealed. Had Rogers’ proposals carried the full weight o f presidential backing, 
Jerusalem may have felt an obligation to be receptive to the Plan. However, Nixon 
used the Rogers Plan as a device to show the Arab world “that the United States did 
not automatically dismiss its claims to the occupied territories or rule out a 
compromise settlement o f the conflicting claims.”94 Yet irrespective o f the fact that 
he had both appointed and trusted Rogers with the conduct o f Middle East diplomacy, 
Nixon endorsed Kissinger’s and by implication Israel’s position - that the proposal 
encouraged extremism among the Arab states and played into the hands o f the 
Soviets. To preserve his own standing with the Israelis, Nixon used Leonard 
Garment, his White House advisor on Jewish affairs, to privately inform both Prime 
Minister Meir and leaders o f the American Jewish community o f his doubts about
89 Rabin, op. cit. p. 96.
90 Abba Eban, An Autobiography (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1978) p. 463.
91 Rabin, op. cit. p. 115.
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State Department policy. In so doing he demonstrated the increasingly perceived 
importance o f the pro-Israel lobby and public support o f Israel in the United States. 
He also explained that without the willing acceptance of the parties, the proposals 
would not be enforced.95 In so doing, Nixon effectively gave the Israeli government 
the latitude to veto the plan.
Kissinger remained aloof from Mideast affairs during the early phases o f this inter­
administration dispute. While he was critical of any State Department initiative that 
placed the onus on Washington to deliver Israeli concessions, he did not align himself 
with the delegation opposing Rogers. Kissinger’s objective was to deny gains to 
countries aligned with Moscow and to ensure that the Kremlin did not receive credit 
for any progress made in negotiations.96 He was not averse to pressuring Israel for 
concessions but only after the Arab states had been shown the futility o f alignment 
with Moscow and looked towards Washington for progress. Kissinger was
n*7
“attem pting] to create a foreign policy based on permanent values and interests,” 
and in his memoirs explained that he “wanted to frustrate the radicals -  who were in 
any event hostile to us -  by demonstrating that in the Middle East friendship with the
no
United States was the precondition to diplomatic progress.” He was only prepared 
to pressure Israel if  “the Arabs showed their willingness to reciprocate.”99
Reflection and Reassessment
The failure o f the US initiative exerted a profound impact on Israeli perceptions of 
their relationship with the administration and gave rise to a period o f reflection within 
both governments. The White House concluded that it had been foolhardy to believe 
that the Soviet Union could be separated from Egypt during settlement negotiations 
and that a confluence o f interests between the superpowers could form the basis o f an 
agreement. Even when common ground was found, Washington and Moscow were 
unable to deliver their clients to the negotiating table or impose a settlement. In
94 Nixon RN p. 478.
95 Kissinger White House Years pp. 372 & 376.
96 Ibid.. pp. 351-52.
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submitting the Rogers Plan, Washington had blatantly placed superpower detente 
above the interests o f Israel, and had shown its willingness to distance itself from 
some Israeli demands. This degree o f flexibility had not been reciprocated in 
Moscow’s dealings with Egypt. Events had demonstrated that America’s best 
interests were served by the realignment o f its negotiating position with that o f Israel, 
because the administration concluded that every American initiative that failed played 
into the hands o f the Soviets and strengthened the radicals.100
The perceived balance o f power between Washington and Jerusalem was also a factor 
in this decision. Kissinger believed that Rogers had doomed himself to failure by 
underestimating the will and ability o f  Israel to resist American pressure. In the 
domestic sphere, both he and Nixon recognised the strength o f congressional and 
public support for Israel, engendered by popular cultural representations o f Israel and 
its perceived military prowess. While issues pertaining to Israel and the Holocaust 
were making ‘guest’ appearances on every popular television programme from Star 
Trek and The Twilight Zone to the latest crime drama and were becoming a staple o f 
articles in the mainstream press, a domestic backlash against policy decisions viewed 
as antagonistic toward Israel was a very real possibility. Israel was now perceived not 
as a distant, unknown state, but in terms o f real people, from Ben Gurion to Elie 
Wiesel, who had come to symbolise the Jewish homeland. It was harder to ask the 
American public to adopt a policy o f indifference towards people that entertained 
their living rooms, and were portrayed in such warm terms, on the evening news. On 
a strategic level, the White House also considered it misguided to try to exert pressure 
on a friend as a means for improving relations with an adversary and it is the notion of 
Israel as a friend, a state which for ideological and cultural reasons America could 
identify, that is crucial to understanding the nuances of US policy.101
The administration drew several conclusions from the diplomatic failures o f 1969. 
Firstly, Kissinger’s belief that pressure should only be exerted on Israel if  the Soviet 
and Egyptian position were moderated to such an extent that a permanent settlement 
could be secured, gradually became the dominant tenet o f US policy. Secondly,
100 Author’s interview with Peter Rodman.
101 Kissinger, White House Years pp. 354, 361.
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circumstances had shown that, as the separation of the Soviet Union from Egypt was 
not possible during negotiations, it was preferable to bypass Moscow and deal directly 
with Cairo. Thirdly, as American concessions and movement from the Israeli position 
had not been reciprocated, the next advance in peace negotiations would have to come 
from either Moscow or Cairo. The United States and Israel were now in the 
comfortable position, or so they thought, o f being able to sit and wait for their 
adversaries to moderate their demands. Fourthly, events had shown that the package 
settlement approach had been too ambitious and that henceforth initiatives should be 
conducted privately on a step-by-step formula to ensure that the obtainable was not 
held up in the process o f waiting for the unobtainable.102
While Washington’s reassessment should have reassured Jerusalem, the ramifications
o f  its alignment with Moscow in formulating the Rogers Plan, forced the Israeli
cabinet to reach a very different set o f unpalatable conclusions. Yitzhak Rabin, the
Israeli Ambassador to Washington, took the American decision to pursue a diplomatic
initiative, apparently at Israel’s expense, as a sign of the administration’s loss of faith
in its ally. Rabin reasoned that the White House felt it was losing ground in the
Middle East because its ‘client’, was incapable o f putting an end to the war o f
attrition, which forced it to adopt a conciliatory position in negotiations with the 
1
Soviet Union. Moshe Dayan, the Israeli Defence Minister, wrote in his memoirs 
that the White House was “very worried by what they called the Sovietisation o f the 
Egyptian war.” 104 In an endeavour to redress the regional balance o f forces, Israel 
escalated the conflict and by spring 1970, Israeli planes were involved in deep 
penetration raids against targets in the Nile Delta and in Cairo itself.
Israel’s intensification o f the war o f attrition culminated in the escalation o f fighting 
along the Suez Canal as Moscow came to the aid of its client. Soviet arms, including 
the latest SAM-3 surface-to-air missiles, flooded into Egypt and for the first time, 
Soviet pilots actively defend Egyptian territory.105 By the end o f 1970, 200 Soviet
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pilots and 12-15,000 Soviet soldiers were stationed in Egypt.106 Reports from the
107Israeli government that Soviet pilots were flying operational missions from Egypt, 
in conjunction with the intensification o f Israeli deep penetration raids on Cairo 
undermined the newly emerged consensus within the administration on how to 
approach the Middle East. Increasing domestic pressure to abandon the Rogers Plan 
and grant Israel’s request for 100 A-4 and 25 F-4 jets compounded the situation. As 
congressional elections drew closer, members o f Congress became increasingly vocal 
in their support for Israel and increased military assistance.
Arms for Israel
The escalation o f the war o f attrition threatened to send US-Israeli relations to an all 
time low. Far from reassuring Jerusalem o f  Washington’s support, the conflict 
undermined the fundamental assumption o f all Israeli calculations - that if  the Soviet 
Union intervened in the Middle East, the United States would move vigorously to 
block it. Now what Dayan had feared and many predicted could not happen, had
1 A O  p
become a reality. The Soviets were militarily intervening on behalf o f Egypt, but 
the assumption about the Americans was not borne out. Washington was hardly 
reacting. Israel had never wanted or asked for US troops to fight on its behalf but the 
Israeli government desperately needed the dispatch o f the 25 additional Phantoms and 
100 Skyhawks Meir had requested during her September 1969 visit to Washington.109
The Nixon administration was now confronted with the dilemma o f how to de- 
escalate the conflict while simultaneously acquiescing to Israeli demands for arms 
supplies. Should the US undertake another peace initiative, Nasser’s favourable 
response was dependent on its non-partisan nature. This was particularly difficult to 
facilitate when American-made Phantom jets were bombing Egypt and the Israelis 
were actively pursuing the destruction o f Nasser’s regime.110 Yet superpower politics
106 Walter Laqueur, Confrontation: the Middle East and World Politics (New York: Quadrangle, 1974) 
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dictated that the administration could not stand by while ever increasing numbers o f 
Soviet personnel and armaments poured into a hostile Arab state. Kissinger argued 
that the despatch o f the jets would serve the dual purpose o f reassuring Israel and 
demonstrating US resolve to confront any Soviet or Arab challenge.111
Washington therefore, began the process o f reversing the debilitating effect that the 
Rogers Plan had exerted on US-Israeli relations, with the announcement of a change 
in strategy. In his “State o f the World” address Nixon emphasised the Soviet threat 
and the need for direct Arab-Israeli negotiations, a statement that directly contradicted
119the basic tenets o f the Rogers’ Plan. This was followed on 30 January 1970, by 
Nixon’s surprise announcement during a press conference that a decision would be 
made on Israel’s request for arms within thirty days.113
The sense o f relief the announcement generated in Israel was short lived because the 
thirty-day time limit passed without a public decision. Nixon then delivered another 
shock to Jerusalem by further delaying his decision. This change in policy has been 
attributed to a number o f factors. Firstly, the President was outraged that Mayor 
Lindsay o f New York and members o f the Jewish American community boycotted the 
February 1970 visit o f the French Prime Minister Georges Pompidou in protest 
against the recent sale o f one hundred Mirage jet fighters to Libya.114 In response, 
Nixon flew to New York and took the Mayor’s place at a dinner in honour of the 
French President and his wife. He then ordered Israel’s request for Phantoms and 
Skyhawks to be put on indefinite hold.115 Secondly, the four-power talks were 
scheduled to resume in late February and the Soviets had indicated that they and their 
client might adopt a more flexible approach to negotiations. Thirdly, King Hussein’s 
position in Jordan was growing increasingly unstable and it was feared that arms 
transfers to Israel could heighten regional instability and exacerbate tension between
111 Kissinger Years o f Upheaval p. 563.
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the superpowers.116 In March 1970 Rogers announced the “interim decision” to hold
117in abeyance a final commitment to sell the jets to Israel.
In private, however, the changing balance o f power in the region provoked the 
President to move in a different direction. He instructed Kissinger to inform Rabin 
that some o f Israel’s aircraft losses sustained in the war o f attrition would be replaced 
and the balance o f forces maintained in Israel’s favour. In his memoirs Rabin claimed 
that Nixon told him:
Whenever you request arms -  particularly planes - all the media sounds off about it and 
everyone waits for the administration’s decision. That’s such a superfluous and harmful 
dramatisation o f the matter. ... You can be sure that I will continue to supply arms to Israel, but 
I shall do so in other, different ways. The moment Israel needs arms, approach me, by way of  
Kissinger, and I’ll find a way o f overcoming the bureaucracy.118
However, on 21 May, any illusion that US arms transfers would not be used as a form 
o f leverage came to an end. The Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, was received at 
the White House, where Nixon informed him, as he had Rabin, that “you’ll get the 
stuff as long as you don’t insist on too much publicity.” 119 The quid pro quo for 
receiving the weapons was a public statement from the Israeli government indicating 
a degree o f flexibility on the terms o f an agreement with Egypt. This was
forthcoming on 26 May, when Prime Minister Meir formally announced that Israel
120continued to accept UN Resolution 242 as the basis for a settlement. In his 
memoirs, Kissinger attributed the President’s change in policy not to the presence of 
Soviet personnel in Egypt, but as a means to secure Israeli acceptance o f the cease-
This incident highlighted a paradox in US-Israeli relations that was to become an 
enduring feature. If military assistance and diplomacy were linked, Jerusalem
116 Spiegel, op. cit. p. 192.
117 NYT. 4 March, 1970, p. 3 and Kissinger White House Years p. 566.
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effectively exerted equal leverage in its negotiations with Washington. While the 
United States was keen to make diplomatic progress as a means of excluding the 
Soviet Union, Israel was in a position to demand aid in return for diplomatic 
concessions. Israel and the United States soon found themselves in a mutually 
dependent relationship in which the small state wielded almost as much diplomatic 
leverage as the superpower.
The Cease-Fire Agreement
With the White House preoccupied with domestic and international controversy 
following the Cambodian invasion, the State Department continued to control tactics 
for Middle East negotiations. Rogers and Sisco attempted to build on the credibility 
that the public decision not to sell the Phantoms to Israel had generated amongst the 
Arab states by inviting Nasser to undertake another diplomatic initiative designed to 
restore the cease-fire along the Suez Canal.
With the humiliation o f the failed Rogers Plan fresh in its mind, the State Department 
ignored Moscow’s bid for a joint initiative and continued to pursue its own unilateral 
call for a cease-fire. Despite Kissinger’s condemnation o f a proposal that failed to 
confront the problem of Soviet combat troops in Egypt, Nixon authorised Rogers to 
request the parties’ acceptance o f a ninety-day Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire along the 
Canal, accompanied by indirect talks through UN Ambassador Jarring. Rogers
177publicly revealed this, his second peace proposal, on 25 June 1970.
At this juncture, internal differences within the administration erupted publicly. In an 
anonymous press briefing -  something for which he was famed - Kissinger took a 
stance in direct opposition to the State Department. He claimed that the United States 
was “trying to expel the Soviet military presence from Egypt, not so much the 
advisers, but the combat personnel, the combat pilots, before they become so firmly 
established.” In the aftermath o f Cambodia, Kissinger’s remarks provoked an
121 Kissinger White House Years p. 572.
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immediate public controversy over their meaning and a White House spokesman 
indicated that America did not propose to expel the Soviets by force.124 However, in 
a television interview on 1 July, Nixon threatened action if Moscow upset the regional
Ibalance o f power and suggested that Israel was entitled to defensible borders. This 
last point implied that Israel should not be forced to withdraw to pre-1967 lines. By 
the end o f the month, seventy-one Senators had endorsed the President’s remarks.
At this point, just when Nixon’s comments appeared to have strangled the plan, the 
Egyptians accepted Rogers’ proposal. Nasser’s motive remains unclear but Mohamed 
Heikal, former editor o f Al-Ahram  claimed that the Egyptian President revealed his 
true intentions to Soviet President Brezhnev when he explained:
I am going to accept it [the plan] just because it has an American flag [on it]. We must have a 
breathing space so we can finish our missile sites: we need a cease-fire, and the only cease-fire 
the Israelis will accept is one proposed by the Americans.126
Believing that the Egyptians would instantly violate a cease-fire agreement,127 the 
Israeli cabinet’s initial reaction was to reject the plan. Rabin refused to deliver this 
response, giving time for the gradual modification o f Jerusalem’s position, a change 
that was aided by reassurances from Washington and a personal letter from Nixon to 
Meir reassuring her o f continued arms deliveries. Once Nixon publicly promised 
that the cease-fire would not result in an Arab military build-up, and that Israel’s 
“negotiating position” would not be “compromised or jeopardised”,129 Meir had little 
choice but to accept the initiative,130 which she did on 31 July.131 On 4 August, the 
Israeli government went a step further in committing to the peace accord with the
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1 3 “)Knesset’s acceptance of Resolution 242 “in all its parts”. In reality, the cease-fire 
agreement was an American commitment to Israel not a bilateral Israeli-Egyptian
133agreement.
Once the cease-fire had been implemented, the State Department’s pre-existing 
conceptions o f the region undermined its success. Rogers and Sisco continued to 
view Israel as the major impediment to progress and their approach was dominated by 
the need to implement the cease-fire proposal before either party could change its 
mind. This took precedence over the need to make cease-fire arrangements clear and 
verifiable to ensure the trust of both parties and to avoid violations and accusations o f 
violations.134 Starting from the premise that the first outcome o f negotiations would 
be an Israeli withdrawal from the Canal line, Soviet missile movements that would 
enable the Egyptians to cross the Canal under missile protection were considered 
immaterial. This analysis failed to acknowledge that the Israelis would not negotiate 
if  the Egyptians could gain leverage by committing cease-fire violations or i f  the 
United States refused to underwrite Israeli positions with military and diplomatic
135assistance.
On 7 August the cease-fire came into effect and provided for a complete military 
standstill to a depth o f 50 km on both sides o f  the Canal. In his memoirs Nixon 
acknowledged that the agreement was “[a] major source o f accomplishment for
136Rogers and Sisco.” The euphoria in the State Department was short lived however, 
as Israeli reports o f Egyptian cease-fire violations were received almost
137immediately. Not wishing to undermine their achievement, the administration was 
in no mood to listen and “declined to say whom [they] considered to be the truce
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violators.” Acknowledgement o f the violations would have undermined the 
premise o f future negotiations and as Nixon reminded Rabin, the American people
139were in a “peace mood.” An adversary’s actions invite far less comment. The 
need to reassure friends is a far more onerous task than deterring enemies,140 but on 
this occasion reassuring Jerusalem was not a priority. Nixon defended the 
subordination o f Israeli interests to those o f his government on the basis that even a 
violated cease-fire “established the United States as an honest broker to both sides.”141
Jerusalem’s sense of vulnerability intensified when Washington’s eventual protests to 
Cairo about the breaches were ignored, prompting Israel’s withdrawal from the UN 
sponsored talks led by Ambassador Jarring. Confronted with a growing crisis in 
Jordan and to deter a pre-emptive strike along the Canal, on 1 September Nixon 
revoked his earlier order and sent additional military aid and supersonic aircraft to 
Israel.142 Just hours later, the power o f Jewish support in Congress was demonstrated 
when the Military Procurement Authorisation Bill was passed in the Senate. The Bill 
contained an amendment initiated by Senator Henry Jackson which gave the President 
almost unlimited authority to provide Israel with arms to counter Soviet weapons in 
Egypt.143 Events were to demonstrate that the Phantoms were inadequate 
compensation because it was the Egyptian movement towards the Canal during the 
cease-fire that made the launching o f the Yom Kippur war o f October 1973 
possible.144
Crisis in Jordan
One o f the greatest casualties of the 1967 war was the cohesion and stability o f the 
Jordanian monarchy. With Palestinians comprising more than half o f Jordan’s 
population, the country was vulnerable to external pressures, particularly those
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relating to the Arab-Israeli dispute. Seeking to challenge the King’s already 
diminishing hold on power, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) established 
its headquarters in Amman in 1969. Elevating its activities to the status o f a state- 
within-a-state, through cross-border raids into Israeli territory and terrorist acts 
against the state apparatus, by late 1970 the organisation was successfully challenging 
the authority o f the monarchy.
To Nixon’s strategic mindset, unrest such as that taking place in Jordan was 
symptomatic o f Soviet machinations and another facet o f a “global Communist 
challenge”.145 The administration had little understanding o f the complexities o f 
nationalism and the quest for self-determination o f a displaced people. Palestinian 
nationalism forced itself on to the administration’s agenda as a by-product o f 
increasing discontent in Jordan. The US-sponsored cease-fire sent out warning 
signals to Arab radicals that President Nasser, the guerrilla’s most prestigious backer, 
was moving towards a political settlement with King Hussein that would undercut the 
position o f the Palestinians.146 Paradoxically, the Palestinian fedayeen  appeared to 
place great faith in the ability o f the Americans to negotiate an Israeli-Egyptian peace 
settlement because progress in the talks coincided with an escalation in terrorist 
activity. By 1 September, two attempts had been made on Hussein’s life147 and the 
King had gone so far as to enquire about Israeli intentions in the crisis. This implied 
that the King might agree to Israeli intervention should fedayeen  activities endanger 
his throne.148
The new Middle East crisis erupted on to the international stage on 6 September 1970, 
when the Popular Front for the Liberation o f Palestine (PFLP), a radical faction o f  the 
PLO, led by George Habbash, hijacked four Western aeroplanes and forced them to 
land at an airstrip near Amman. The hijackers held more than 500 people hostage, 
many o f them American citizens. The stated objective of the hijackings was to force
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Israel to release 450 fedayeen  prisoners it held and to provoke a confrontation 
between Hussein and the fedayeen  movement. With ten thousand Iraqi troops 
stationed in Jordan, and Syria just across the border, the PFLP believed the Arab 
governments would come to the aid o f  the Palestinians in a direct confrontation with 
the Jordanian monarchy.149 The hijackings were to be the catalyst that ignited civil 
war and forced Hussein’s hand in confronting the PLO.
Nixon interpreted the crisis as a clash between East and West and a confrontation 
between Arab terrorism and US-Israeli moderation. It provided an opportunity to 
finally defeat the guerrillas in Jordan and to demonstrate American strength to the 
Soviet Union, Iraq and Syria. From a purely military perspective, Secretary o f 
Defence Melvin Laird and chairman o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff Moorer opposed 
unilateral American action. Military commitments in Southeast Asia were so 
extensive that an additional and unilateral intervention in the Middle East would 
prove a logistical nightmare, while the absence o f US bases in the eastern 
Mediterranean made the deployment o f ground forces difficult. Kissinger’s 
preference was for using Israel as a proxy in the event o f Syrian and Iraqi 
intervention.150 He appreciated the logistical obstacles associated with US action but 
feared that Washington’s position would be undermined and the region thrown into 
turmoil if  King Hussein were overthrown. Ironically, the ultimate decision on action 
was not the President’s to take. When Nixon directly ordered the Secretary o f 
Defence to bomb guerrilla hideouts in Jordan, Laird cited bad weather as the reason 
for his failure to carry out the President’s order. When Laird was subsequently asked 
to explain his inaction, he stated that “[t]he Secretary of Defence can always find a 
reason not to do something. There’s always bad weather.”151
In the longer term, the preferences o f Nixon and Kissinger were destined to dominate 
purely because o f the way in which the decision-making process was structured, with 
power concentrated in the White House. The response to the Jordanian crisis is o f 
particular significance because it signalled a turning point in the administration’s
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approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. On 9 September, Kissinger convened the 
Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) which met daily to coordinate 
America’s response to the crisis.152 Kissinger was the Group’s chairman and 
members included the Deputy Secretary o f Defence, the Under Secretary o f State, 
head o f the CIA and the chairman o f the Joint Chiefs. The formation o f WSAG 
transferred, for the first time, decision-making power from the State Department to 
the NSC where it remained.
Given the prevalence o f territorial infringements in the Middle East, the belief in state 
sovereignty and territorial independence enshrined in the Treaty o f Westphalia of 
1648 does not appear to have taken hold in this region. In evaluating the alternative 
courses o f action available to ward off the challenge to his leadership, Hussein was 
concerned that Syrian and Iraqi forces would breach the territorial integrity o f his 
state if  he moved against the fedayeen. Unbeknown to him, the King’s determination 
to secure a guarantee o f assistance against external aggression was to give impetus to 
the consolidation o f a strategic alliance between the United States and Israel, to the 
eternal detriment o f the Arabs.
The response by Nixon and Kissinger to the crisis was symptomatic o f their penchant
for subordinating regional events to the imperatives o f superpower confrontation. The
encroachment o f Syria, as a Soviet backed proxy, into Jordan, was considered a
challenge that had to be met because it would determine whether the Soviet-backed
radicals or the American supported conservative states would dominate the region.
Irrespective o f the fact that Moscow had not instigated the crisis, Washington exerted
1 ^pressure on the Kremlin to rein in the radicals. The New York Times reported a 
presidential declaration that “[T]he United States is prepared to intervene directly in 
the Jordanian war should Syria and Iraq enter the conflict and tip the military balance 
against government forces loyal to Hussein.” 154 Kissinger used this threat of 
American intervention as a lever to deter Soviet and Arab radicals from seeking 
Hussein’s overthrow.
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Tension mounted as the hostage crisis continued. Three o f the hijacked planes were 
blown up and the European governments brokered a deal by which they freed seven 
Arab prisoners in exchange for the release of three hundred hostages. Finally, on 17 
September, reassured by the US military build up in the Mediterranean, Hussein 
ordered his army to move against the fedayeen. In response to the King’s actions, 
Syrian tanks rolled into Jordan.
Israel as a Strategic Asset
A US response was clearly required to this dramatic new development, but following 
the incursion into Cambodia, the domestic climate was not propitious to American 
involvement in another regional war. Laird continued to deny the need for US 
intervention, while Nixon was preparing for precisely that contingency. The situation 
intensified when Hussein requested assistance against the invading Syrian forces. In 
response to the King’s request, Kissinger concluded that “[A] quick review o f the pros 
and cons o f American military intervention strengthened our conviction that our 
forces were best employed in holding the ring against Soviet interference with Israeli 
operations.”155 The invocation of the Nixon Doctrine, whereby the US would provide 
military and economic assistance to local states,156 in this case Israel, to enable them 
to defend regional security on America’s behalf, was coming closer to reality.157 
Israel was the ideal proxy, particularly amongst conservative currents and military 
officials who admired the nation’s military prowess and characteristics o f self- 
reliance, democracy and anti-communism.
On 18 September, the Israeli option was finally put to Rabin and Meir, who were in
1 SRWashington on an official visit. In confronting the crisis, the perceived interests of 
the US and Israel converged and, based on its performance in June 1967 and its 
espousal o f American values, Washington believed it could rely on Jerusalem in an
155 Kissinger White House Years p. 620.
156 PPP 3 November 1969, pp. 548, 905.
157 Schoenbaum. op. cit. p. 181.
158 For a full account o f Kissinger’s discussions with Rabin see Rabin, op. cit. pp. 146-49.
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extremity. The perception o f mutual interest was accentuated by the fact that, for the 
first time, America actually needed Israel to defend its regional position.
By late on 20 September, the administration was united in supporting Israeli air 
strikes if necessary, but this unity was soon undermined when Rabin reported that the 
deployment o f Israeli ground forces might also be required.159 Rogers and Laird 
opposed this because o f the potential repercussions an Israeli violation o f the 
territorial integrity o f an Arab state could engender. This was countered by Moorer, 
who argued that insufficient US forces were available to undertake a viable operation 
in the Middle East. The inescapable conclusion was finally reached that if  ground 
action were required Israel would have to act.
The administration does not appear to have seriously contemplated the fact that an 
Israeli incursion into Jordan could have resulted in Israeli control o f even greater 
tracts o f Arab land. On the contrary, Kissinger worked determinedly to persuade 
Nixon of the efficacy o f Israeli intervention if  the crisis intensified.160 He differed 
from his predecessors Dulles and Kennan in recognising that that US was no longer 
powerful enough to always act alone. He worked with Rabin to formulate a strategy 
for the despatch o f 200 Israeli tanks into Jordan, in conjunction with air strikes. 
Rabin guaranteed that Israeli forces would be withdrawn from Jordan on completion 
o f the military operation, but Kissinger remained unconcerned,161 convinced that the 
massing of Israeli troops on the Golan Heights would result in a diplomatic solution 
precluding the need for direct Israeli intervention.
As it became increasingly obvious that Israeli action was the administration’s most 
viable military option, Nixon gave his approval to the plan and a presidential pledge 
to intervene in Israel’s defence if  the Soviet Union were to become militarily 
involved. On 22 September, reassured by the promise o f Israeli and American
159 Kissinger White House Years p. 625.
160 Isaacson op.cit. p. 303.
161 Kissinger and Sisco conveyed to Rabin Hussein’s preference for Israeli ground action inside Syria 
not Jordan, although such a move increased the probability of Soviet intervention against Israel.
162 Isaacson op.cit. p. 303.
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support, Hussein unleashed air attacks against the undefended Syrian tanks,163 forcing 
a gradual Syrian withdrawal from Jordanian territory. By 23 September it was 
apparent that the crisis had abated with a victory for Washington.164 A decisive show 
of American force had maintained Hussein in power, weakened the fedayeen and pre­
empted direct Soviet intervention. Judged through the prism of global concerns the 
outcome of the crisis was a complete success for the United States and its allies.
US-Israeli co-operation during the crisis created new precedents in the relationship 
and set against the psychological backdrop o f the Nixon Doctrine, Israel acquired for 
a time the coveted status o f strategic asset. The speed and success o f the hastily 
negotiated agreements between Kissinger and Rabin testified to the deep 
understanding and personal association between the two men and the strategic 
relationship between the two governments.165 Jerusalem had shown itself capable o f 
protecting American interests by deterring a full Syrian assault on Amman. Its 
argument that only a strong Israel could neutralise Soviet influence in the region thus 
became part o f official White House doctrine.
Kissinger had been instrumental in defining the administration’s response to the crisis 
and his success appeared to make the President more sympathetic to his perspective - 
and more willing to make him the pre-eminent decision-maker on the Middle East.166 
Meanwhile, the emergence o f a special relationship between Kissinger and Rabin 
undercut the position of the State Department. From September 1970 onwards, 
Kissinger interceded with Rogers on Rabin’s behalf, alleviating pressure on Jerusalem 
to make unilateral concessions during negotiations for the reopening o f the Suez 
Canal.167
Standstill Diplomacy
163 Hafez al Assad, head o f the Syrian air force, refused to enter the war, leaving Syrian ground forces 
exposed to Jordanian air attacks.
164 Isacson, op. cit.p. 312.
165 Quandt Decade o f Decisions p. 122
166 Spiegel, op. cit. p. 201
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The death o f Nasser on 7 September 1970 and Anwar al-Sadat’s assumption of the 
Egyptian presidency created a new opportunity for an understanding between 
Washington and Cairo.168 The new Egyptian President demonstrated his willingness 
to make peace with Israel by accepting all UN Ambassador Gunnar Jarring’s points 
for a settlement.169 Sadat’s quid pro quo for the agreement was the return o f Egyptian 
land and with it the country’s honour. However, Meir was adamant “that it is unreal 
and utopian to think that ... [Israeli troop] “withdrawal” will pave the way to 
peace.” 170 Under these conditions o f stalemate and with the State Department 
deprived o f its ability to influence Jerusalem, the Jarring mission, and with it the 
United States commitment to a comprehensive settlement, came to an inglorious end.
The spotlight for Mideast diplomacy now fell on Henry Kissinger, the newly 
appointed Secretary o f State. Kissinger adopted a policy o f standstill diplomacy that 
consisted o f little more than open support for Israel and effectively foreclosed 
Egyptian diplomatic opportunities for redressing the territorial balance. In an election 
year the administration wanted to avoid any bold policy moves that might prove 
unpopular and as the Secretary of State explained: “What finally got me involved in 
the execution o f Middle East diplomacy was that Nixon did not believe he could risk 
recurrent crisis in the Middle East in an election year. He therefore asked me to step 
in, if  only to keep things quiet.”171 Translating his global perspective on to Mideast 
politics and obliterating regional dynamics, Kissinger’s preference was “to produce a 
stalemate until Moscow urged compromise or, even better, until some moderate Arab 
regime decided the route to progress was through Washington.” 172
It was perhaps ironic that Sadat’s acknowledgement that Washington held the key to 
progress and his genuine interest in reaching a peaceful agreement was ignored. Eliot 
Richardson, the US ambassador to Cairo had conveyed to the White House Sadat’s 
intention to form an entirely new, friendly and co-operative relationship with
168 Heikal, op. cit. p. 115.
169 For a copy o f Jarring’s memorandum and the Israeli and Egyptian response see Arab Report and 
Record March 1-15, 1971, pp. 158-59.
170 “Israel’s Search for Peace: An extensive survey o f Israel’s political and security position given by 
the Prime Minister to the Knesset,” quoted in Golda Meir with Marie Syrkin (ed.), Golda Meir Speaks 
Out (Jerusalem: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973) p. 207.
171 Kissinger White House Years p. 1285.
218
Washington. He later recalled that he had left the meeting with Nixon and Kissinger 
with the impression that what he had said had not been heard.173 On 18 July 1972, 
Sadat reversed seventeen years o f Egyptian policy and expelled 21,000 Soviet 
advisors without seeking reciprocity from the United States.174 This spectacular 
gesture was a domestic success, secured Moscow’s undivided attention and misled the 
Americans.175 Israel reacted with slightly more caution and Meir emphasised that the 
Soviet strategic hold continued. With attention diverted by the Watergate break-in 
and the forthcoming presidential election campaign, Washington acknowledged 
Sadat’s move as little more than a complimentary bonus for the US. Although 
perturbed that the Egyptian President had taken such a bold unilateral decision 
without attempting to extract a price, American officials led him to believe that 
Washington would respond after the election.177 In the interim, the administration 
virtually ignored Sadat’s gesture and continued to do little more than enhance Israel’s
1 78military superiority.
With his landslide re-election in November 1972 and the nominal peace in Vietnam in 
January 1973, Nixon turned his attention to the Middle East, 179 setting out his 
position in a memo to his Secretary o f State:
You know that my position o f standing firmly with Israel has been based on broader issues than 
just Israel’s survival. Those issues now strongly argue for movement toward a settlement. We 
are now Israel’s only major friend in the world. I have yet to see one iota o f give on their part -  
conceding that Jordan and Egypt have not given enough on their side. This is the time to get 
moving -  and they must be told that firmly ...[T]he time has come to quit pandering to Israel’s 
intransigent position. Our actions over the past months have led  them to think we will stand by 
them regardless o f  how unreasonable they are.m
172 Ibid.. p. 1279.
173 Korn, op. cit.. p. 272.
174 Schoenbaum, op. cit. p. 196. Sadat allowed the Soviet Union to retain naval facilities at Alexandria, 
Port Said and to a lesser degree at Ras Banas on the Red Sea. Rubinstein, op. cit. p. 191.
175 Michael Handel, The Diplomacy o f Surprise. Hitler. Nixon. Sadat (Cambridge, MA : Centre for 
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“The War of Attrition and its Aftermath.” vols. 1-2: 1947-1974, 
www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp7MFAH0e3p0
177 Schoenbaum, op. cit. p. 197.
178 Handel, Ibid.. pp. 276-77.
179 Schoenbaum, op. cit. p. 197.
219
In an effort to move negotiations forward, a secret meeting was convened between 
Kissinger and the Egyptian National Security Adviser Hafez Ismail in New York in 
February 1973.181 Ismail reiterated familiar Egyptian demands that Israel withdraw 
from all conquered territory in exchange for an end to belligerency, while Kissinger 
continued to claim that the United States could not ‘impose’ an agreement on Israel. 
He did, however, hint that there might be ways o f bringing pressure to bear which 
Israel could not ignore and which his government might be prepared to consider if  a 
“moral basis” for their use existed and could be shown to exist to the American 
people.182
Though Kissinger found little reason for optimism in his discussions with Ismail, this 
did not deter him from using the meeting as a device for increasing pressure on Meir, 
during her visit to Washington three days later. However, the administration’s 
leverage over Israel was undermined by a deeper reality o f the relationship. As the 
objective o f US strategy was to maintain the regional balance o f forces and to 
militarily strengthen Israel to increase her confidence in peace negotiations, Jerusalem 
could be relatively confident that its arms request would be met irrespective o f the 
country’s intransigence on other matters. Nor did it help relations between 
Washington and Cairo that just as Ismail reached Egypt, the Washington Post 
prematurely leaked news o f a new arms agreement between Washington and 
Jerusalem. In an endeavour to alleviate embarrassment and confusion concerning 
Washington’s intentions, Kissinger moved swiftly to try to persuade Sadat that the 
article was based on false assumptions. However, the hollowness o f such assurances 
was demonstrated when, a few weeks later, the White House did indeed announce a 
new arms package for Israel. As a result, the Egyptians became unresponsive to 
further initiatives and for a time American diplomacy appeared to be stalled.183
180 Notes on memo Nixon sent to Kissinger, cited in Kissinger Years of Upheaval p. 212. Italics in the 
original.
181 It was publicly stated that the purpose o f the Egyptian National Security Adviser Hafez Ismail visit 
the US was to meet with State Department officials. He did however secretly meet with Secretary of  
Sate Henry Kissinger. Richard Thornton, The Nixon-Kissinger Years: Reshpaing America’s Foreign 
Policy (New York: Paragon house, 1989) p. 210.
182 Heikal. op. cit. p. 102.
183 Kissinger Years o f Upheaval pp. 224-25. By the end o f Meir’s visit, Kissinger and Rabin had agreed 
a formula whereby Kissinger would explore a new approach with Egypt based on Egyptian sovereignty 
over the entire Sinai in exchange for an Israeli security presence on some Egyptian territory. This was 
never put to the Egyptians because news o f the US-Israeli arms deal undermined Washington’s 
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Kissinger’s inability to deviate from his perception of Israel as a friend and ally and o f 
Egypt as a puppet of the Soviets prevented him from taking advantage o f the 
opportunity Sadat offered for peace during the period 1971-73. He also disregarded 
the potential implications of Sadat informing the Saudi government, who had never
• 1RAparticipated in diplomacy with Israel, o f his secret meeting with Ismail. The 
President himself admitted that “the interests o f the Israelis were uppermost” in
• IRSKissinger’s calculations. He was ultimately successful in his strategy to frustrate 
Arab attempts to regain their land either diplomatically and militarily to encourage 
them to break with their Soviet patron and turn to the US for help, but failed in his 
role as a peace negotiator by leaving Sadat with apparently little option but to resort to 
war to break the US imposed deadlock. By 1971 the Egyptian President had realised 
that the Soviets were impotent and were unable to deliver either American or Israeli
1 R f iflexibility. However, Kissinger’s disregard o f Sadat’s initiatives, his increasingly 
pro-Israeli policy and, following Rogers resignation, the removal o f the State 
Department as an alternative .channel o f communication created a situation o f
1R7stalemate that substituted for American policy. The Egyptian President concluded 
that “the US regrettably could do nothing ... as long as we were the defeated party
1 R Rand Israel maintained her strategic superiority.” On 6 October 1973, Sadat resorted
1 Q Q
to his ultimate political strategy when Egypt and Syria went to war to break the 
deadlock.
The October War
Washington was caught off guard when war came to the Middle East on 6 October 
1973190 because Jerusalem’s expertise in conditioning the administration’s mindset 
culminated in policy being founded on three conceptual misapprehensions. Firstly, it 
assumed that the military balance o f power in the region was the determining factor in
184 William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making o f Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (London 
& New York: I. B. Tauris, 1998) p. 433.
185 Nixon RN p. 922.
186 Author’s interview with Peter Rodman.
187 Hoff, op. cit. p. 271.
188 Mohamed Anwar al-Sadat, In Search o f Identity (London: Collins, 1978) p.238.
'89 Author’s interview with Peter Rodman.
190 Nixon RN p. 920.
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war and peace calculations, and that a rationally planned Arab war was implausible in 
light o f Israel’s qualitative military superiority. Given Israel’s demonstration of 
strength in 1967 and 1970, the White House was willing to take Prime Minister 
Meir’s claim that “we [Israel] never had it so good” and her insistence that the 
stalemate was safe because the Arabs had no military option,191 as its starting point. 
Israeli intelligence had reported that the Arabs would not attack unless the Israeli 
airforce had been neutralised and though this assumption proved valid, it was not the 
way the Israelis had expected. The arrival in Egypt o f Soviet SAMs in the canal zone 
effectively neutralised Israeli air superiority for a time and provided the necessary 
cover for the Arab attack.192
Secondly, it presumed that war was a viable option for the Arabs only if  a diplomatic 
settlement was unobtainable193 and that with Kissinger in the midst o f talks with Cairo 
and Jerusalem, this was still within the Arab’s grasp. US policy makers were 
operating on the assumption that Western logic could be applied to the Arab mind-set. 
But as Kissinger later noted in his memoirs, “[Ojur definition o f rationality did not 
take seriously the notion o f starting an unwinnable war to restore self-respect.” 194 In 
early autumn the redeployment of Syrian missiles from the Jordanian border to the 
Golan Heights and the massing o f Egyptian troops along the Suez Canal were 
dismissed as annual manoeuvres.195 Even the evacuation o f Soviet civilians from 
Egypt and Syria was interpreted as a rift in Arab-Soviet relations not as a sign o f 
impending war.196 Thirdly, it posited that progress with detente meant that Moscow 
would notify the US o f impending conflicts in the region, once again failing to 
comprehend the rapidly changing dynamics in the international situation.
When, at 6 A.M. on 6 October 1973, Sisco brought Kissinger news that another 
Middle Eastern war was imminent, the Secretary o f State mistakenly thought the
191 Conversation between Kissinger and Meir, 1 March 1973, quoted in Kissinger, Years o f Upheaval
p. 220.
192 Author’s interview with James Schlesinger: Director o f the Central Intelligence Agency February- 
May 1973 and Secretary o f Defence 1973-1975.
193 Ray S. Cline, “Policy without Intelligence,” Foreign Policy no. 17 (Winter 1974-75) pp. 121-35.
194 Kissinger Years o f Upheaval p. 465.
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196 Quandt Peace Process p. 150.
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Arabs were mobilising to pre-empt an Israeli attack,197 and wasted valuable time 
reassuring Soviet and Arab leaders that Israel was not about to strike and urging
10RMoscow to use its influence to restrain its clients. When the Arabs finally launched 
their attack, Egyptian troops crossed the Suez Canal in less than an hour and Syrian 
troops advanced on the Golan Heights.199
The administration focused on Moscow’s involvement with the Arab states and the 
international implications o f the crisis.200 Nixon and Kissinger feared that if  the 
Arabs suffered a crushing defeat, the Soviets would enter the fighting.201 In an effort 
to avoid direct superpower confrontation, the Secretary o f State sought a joint US- 
Soviet effort in the UN to establish a cease-fire based on the status quo ante.202 At the 
same time, he was anxious to prevent the diplomatic debate from reaching the UN 
General Assembly, where an automatic pro-Arab majority would be available to 
endorse the Arab’s position.203 For his part, Nixon was convinced that the US should 
not use its “influence to bring about a cease-fire that would leave the parties in such 
imbalance that negotiations for a permanent settlement would never begin.”204 He 
believed that “only a battlefield stalemate would provide the foundations on which
9 0 Sfruitful negotiations might begin.”
This war was a moment o f truth for US credibility in the Middle East. While Israel 
need not achieve a decisive victory as in 1967, Nixon was determined to prevent the 
defeat of Washington’s most prominent ally by Soviet arms. The United States had to 
demonstrate to the world that it would stand firmly by its allies and that he personally
197 NYT 7 October 1973. p. 1 reported that “Secretary o f State Kissinger was caught by surprise when 
the crisis developed.” As late as 5 October, Golda Meir sent a message to Kissinger asking him to 
reassure the Arabs that Israel did not plan to attack. Matti Golan, The Secret Conversations o f  Henry 
Kissinger: Step-bv-Step Diplomacy in the Middle East (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1976) pp. 37- 
39.
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199 Dayan, op. cit. pp. 379, 388. Kissinger reminded Haikal during their meetings following the war 
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would “not let Israel go down the tubes.”206 However, at a crucial testing point for
9 07detente, it was also a time to practice restraint and to avoid antagonising the Arabs. 
Nixon took the view that Israel should be supported so that it considered Washington 
a reliable partner in post-war diplomacy, but “in such a way that would not force an
90Rirreparable break with the Egyptians, Syrians and the other Arab nations.” The 
Arabs had to think that the administration was not assisting Israel, while the pro-Israel 
lobby had to be convinced o f the reverse.
Despite their brave words, the Israelis claimed to be in desperate need o f arms 
supplies. From the first weekend o f the war Nixon had authorised a modest re-supply 
operation and had given the Israelis permission to collect US weapons supplies, either 
in their own aircraft if  the markings were obliterated, or in chartered aircraft.209 His 
objective was to preserve the image o f US detachment,210 while ensuring Israel 
received the equipment it required. Members o f  the State Department were concerned 
that a major US re-supply effort would be seen as prejudicial and could compromise 
effective mediation after the war. Deputy Assistant Secretary o f Defence James H. 
Noyes argued that “they [Israel] don’t really need the equipment.”211 No one present 
disputed his judgement. Defence Secretary James Schlesinger suggested delaying the 
operation because “shipping any stuff into Israel blows any image that we have o f an
9 1 9honest broker.” Kissinger was the only advocate o f immediate and public action, 
but his motivations appeared to stem from foreign policy calculations rather than 
military considerations. In the absence o f Soviet co-operation in the UN to bring a 
rapid end to the war, he favoured providing Israel with large-scale aid. If the Israelis 
defeated the Arabs using US weaponry they would be obligated to Washington and 
would have an incentive to heed the administration’s views on post-war diplomacy.213 
If Washington could prove that in an extremity Israel would not stand alone,
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Jerusalem could perhaps be persuaded to moderate its position. In contrast, if the 
Arabs prevailed, there would be no reward for American restraint. Kissinger reasoned 
that because the outcome of hostilities would determine the course o f postwar 
diplomacy, not whether the US supplied arms, “[T]he time to show understanding to 
the Arab position [was] after the war.”214
The administration based its estimate of the adequacy o f Israeli resources on the 
consumption rate o f munitions during the 1967 war. However, circumstances were 
very different in 1973 and with Israel on the defensive, the consumption rate was 
much higher.215 On 7 October Meir requested that the US postpone a UN Security 
Council cease-fire resolution until 10 or 11 October by which time Israel anticipated it 
would be on the offensive on all fronts. By 8 October, as Nixon recalls in his 
memoirs, “it was clear that the Israelis had been overconfident about their ability to
917win a quick victory.” In the Golan Heights the Syrian air-defence system was 
taking a high toll o f Israeli Skyhawks an.' Phantoms. In the Sinai, over half o f all
91 ftIsraeli tanks had been destroyed and Moshe Dayan, commander o f the Israeli
910armed forces, had offered to resign. The Israeli government was concerned that it 
had insufficient resources to fight the war, but its request for increased supplies
9 9 0created political difficulties for the US administration. There were even suspicions 
that Israel had readied her nuclear arsenal, if  only as an implicit threat to reinforce
9 9  1arms requests. As Israel was a nuclear power in an unstable environment there was
9 9 9always the potential that Washington could become involved in a nuclear exchange. 
William Quandt recalled that: “Without being told in so many words, we knew that a 
desperate Israel might activate its nuclear option. This situation, by itself, created a
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kind of blackmail potential ... But no one had to say it, and I don’t think anyone 
did.-223
By 12 October, the Israelis had launched a major counter-offensive into the Golan 
Heights and were pushing beyond the initial cease-fire line. At this point, with the 
Israeli Defence Force (IDF) reversing the Arab’s fortunes, US and Israeli objectives 
began to diverge. From the American perspective, the circumstances had been 
created for the implementation of a cease-fire agreement before the Soviets further 
supplied the Arabs and the Israelis recouped their losses. In contrast, the Israelis were 
determined to redress the military balance but were dependent on American arms 
supplies to do so. This dependency forced Meir and her top military advisers to 
accept the American sponsored cease-fire out o f  concern for both the costs o f the 
continued fighting and the delay in the US re-supply mission.224 Kissinger’s strategy 
appeared to be coming to fruition. The war could be concluded without a direct 
American airlift to Israel, American oil interests in the Persian Gulf would remain
99 csecure and the basis for future diplomacy would be established. However, Sadat’s 
veto o f the initiative ensured that the cease-fire never came into effect. The 
Egyptian President foolishly gave away the chance to end the war while ahead.
Re-arming Israel
The decision to launch a massive resupply operation came in response to political 
realities: the failure o f the UN cease-fire-in-place initiative was evident and the extent
9 9 7of the Soviet airlift to Egypt and Syria threatened the regional balance o f power. It 
was the logistical aspect o f implementing the President’s decision that was 
problematic. Since 15 October, El A1 planes with their markings concealed, had been 
collecting supplies from US depots in Virginia, but the quantities were insufficient to 
replace Israeli losses. On 19 October, when Schlesinger reported that Israel was
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unable to charter planes because no insurance company was willing to issue policies
77Rfor chartered planes flying to a war zone, it was decided that US C-5s would be 
used to transport equipment to Israel. The proviso from the President was that the
77Qoperation took place under the cover o f darkness. It was at this juncture that 
Nixon’s attempts to maintain the image o f America as an ‘honest broker’ unravelled. 
For refuelling purposes the C-5 aircraft were flown to Israel via the Portuguese air 
force base in the Azores. However, adverse weather conditions delayed the departure 
o f the planes, with many arriving in Israel at dawn and not in the dead o f night. 
Visual proof o f the US re-supply operation delighted the Israeli public and the
230media, but the publicity surrounding the airlift unleashed the wrath o f the Gulf 
Arab states.231
The reasons for the delay in the resupply are multifaceted, and the decision-making 
system in the Pentagon was far more complex than Kissinger publicly
j 'l'y
acknowledged. Schlesinger, Clements and the Pentagon were aware that if  its
'y'i'X
stocks were depleted, they were unlikely to be replenished until 1981. Walter 
Isaacson, Kissinger’s biographer, suggests that a key culprit in the delay may have 
been Clements, “a Texas oilman with pro-Arab sympathies.”234 Isaacson also 
portrays Schlesinger as leaning towards Clements’ perspective. Many Jewish 
community activists remained convinced that Schlesinger’s feelings toward Israel 
were influenced by his ambivalent relationship toward Judaism. O f Jewish birth, 
he was baptised an Episcopalian as a young man. Historically, the act o f conversion 
has been regarded among Jews as a sign o f disloyalty, particularly when the
7*^7conversion is to Christianity, the faith that waged war against Judaism for centuries. 
Whether this is an accurate portrait o f the psychology that operated on James 
Schlesinger during the second week o f October 1973 is unclear and claims that he
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238played an instrumental role in delaying the airlift cannot be fully resolved. 
However, in a press conference on 26 October he stated: “The United States delayed, 
deliberately delayed, the start o f its resupply operation, hoping that a cease-fire would 
be implemented quickly.”239
In contrast, Air Force Chief o f Staff George Brown and his intelligence head, George 
Keegan, worked on their own authority to prepare for a military airlift in case the 
President should order it. Thomas Moorer, Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs, embodied 
these conflicting attitudes: while he favoured a military airlift to re-supply Israel, he 
admitted to finding the Israelis “difficult” and hoped that they would not receive all 
the hardware they requested. In contrast John Lehman, the Secretary of the US Navy, 
claims that Washington responded immediately to Jerusalem’s request for arms much 
as it did for Britain during the Falklands War o f 1982.240 According to his account, 
everyone helped to expedite arms shipments and Israel was treated as an ally. Delays 
were not attributable to the Pentagon dragging its feet but to normal bureaucratic 
friction because a pipeline had to be created for sending arms to Israel that extended 
through the embassy, the NSC and the Pentagon.241
While the precise reasons for the time taken in expediting the operation remain 
unclear, Kissinger was sufficiently powerful to create his own reality and shield 
himself from public criticism. In his memoirs, Kissinger admits to deceiving the 
Israeli ambassador on this and other issues. “When I had bad news for [Simcha] 
Dinitz, I was not above ascribing it to bureaucratic stalemates or unfortunate decisions 
by superiors.”242 Most accounts conclude that the Pentagon did not deliberately delay 
shipments and that the real failure was to recognise the impracticality of the charter 
scheme from the start.243 The eventual timing o f the airlift did offer one distinct
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advantage. It could be construed as a response to the airlift undertaken by Moscow to 
the Arab states and not as a major US provocation.244
The Financial Relationship Begins
While geo-strategic factors undoubtedly played a role in determining the 
administrations response to the October war, its actions also reflected the fundamental 
shift that had occurred in public perceptions of Israel. In 1957 when Eisenhower had 
forced an Israeli withdrawal from Arab territory, his actions had reflected the public 
mood as sympathy for Israel had dramatically declined following such an overt 
display o f aggression. All vestiges o f this were erased following Israel’s victory in 
the Six-Day War and American aid to Israel had reached unprecedented levels rising 
from tens o f millions o f dollars, to $300 million annually. By October 1973, when the 
administration provided Israel with military assistance, far exceeding that o f the past 
four years combined, the decision was supported by American public opinion.245 It 
was evident that the airlift would be expensive and that a way o f financing it had to be 
found. Kissinger argued that the Arab reaction to an aid package would be the same, 
irrespective o f its size, and that as funding was also required for Cambodia, the 
request to Congress should be for an unprecedented amount. In a crisis atmosphere it 
was anticipated that Congress would be compliant and would not hesitate to pass an 
aid package o f which Israel was the main beneficiary.
It was against this backdrop o f a quiescent political and public environment, that at a 
WSAG meeting in the midst o f the war, Kissinger took the decision to increase the aid 
level to unprecedented proportions.246 “For reasons that had a lot to do with US- 
Soviet relations, Kissinger ... [argued] that we should come up with a number that 
was huge, to demonstrate that America was going to make a massive commitment o f
947resources to ensure Israeli security after the war,” recalls William Quandt a former 
NSC aide. As Washington would need political credit with Israel to ease unpopular 
disengagement negotiations, financial aid was considered an expedient device for
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demonstrating its commitment in advance. Quandt claims that emotional 
considerations also played their part as “[i]n the end he [Kissinger] sort o f picked the 
number [$2.2 bn.] out o f the air. I don’t think anyone in the room had any doubt that 
there was a real, emotional concern for Israel.”
Nixon submitted the request for a massive boost in aid, to which there was no public 
opposition, to a receptive Congress on 19 October 1973. Once approved, “it had the 
effect o f casting in stone the special US-Israel relationship.”249 The sentimental or 
moral commitment toward Israel was elevated to a top priority of US foreign policy 
through the sheer power o f the marketplace. By transforming America into Israel’s 
largest investor, Kissinger guaranteed that Washington would stand by Jerusalem, if  
only to protect its investment.250 Prior to October 1973, Washington had continually 
restated its commitment to Israel’s security but the commitment consisted o f little 
more than words. When words needed to be backed up by action, as they did during 
the Suez Crisis in 1956, in May 1967 and the first week o f October 1973, “American 
policy-makers responded by arguing, agonising, [and] weighing their moral 
commitment to Israel against” a range o f diplomatic and strategic objectives. It can 
be argued that congressional approval o f an annual $2.2 billion commitment to Israel 
effectively ended this debate. As Arthur Goldberg claims, “America was now 
signalling to the world that it stood behind Israel’s survival and security with the same 
faith that it put behind the dollar itself.”252
It is perhaps ironic, given Nixon’s tense relationship with American Jews as an entity, 
that he was responsible for promoting the pro-Israel lobby to the status o f  a major 
player in Washington politics and securing congressional approval o f the $2.2 billion 
aid bill. Only in Washington could such an aid package become entitlement and as a 
result, Israel and its affairs became big business and the pro-Israel lobby very 
important players.253
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Israel, the Holocaust and the Palestinians
That the President could conceivably request, that Congress would approve and the 
public accept, such an enormous and unprecedented aid appropriation, gives some 
indication of the dramatic evolution that occurred in American perceptions o f Israel 
between June 1967 and October 1973. By the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, 
Israel had become firmly established as a heroic and courageous US ally that had 
joined Western forces in the battle against Communism. American culture demanded 
that in a contest between good and evil, which was how Israel’s struggle against the 
Arabs was consistently portrayed, the US had to assist the forces of good.
Yet Egyptian gains on the battlefield increased the Arabs negotiating power. After all 
the 1947 UN partition plan had given equal weight to Jewish and Palestinian claims to 
the land and had therefore voted to divide it. After the 1967 war and increasingly 
after 1973, many outside observers came to understand the conflict in terms o f the 
competing claims o f two peoples for a homeland and the Palestinians quest for a state. 
But in mobilising grassroots support for Israel, many Jewish organisations 
marginalised the Palestinian claim and attributed Israel’s diplomatic difficulties in 
retaining control o f the land, to the world having forgotten about the Holocaust. On 
occasions references to the Holocaust was evoked to make criticism o f Israel 
illegitimate and as a device for diverting attention away from the complexities o f the 
issue.254
Numerous discourses surrounding the Holocaust and its relationship to Israel 
emerged, with different authors adopting different approaches to suit varying 
audience and needs. The objective was to situate the Middle East imbroglio in a 
Holocaust framework that submerged the complexities and ambiguities o f the 
situation. The Holocaust bestowed a moral clarity, which Peter Novick argued, came 
to be for the Israeli cause, what Israel was said to be for the United States -  a strategic 
asset.”255
254 Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1999) p. 155.
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Beyond a diffuse relationship between the Holocaust and Israel’s objectives, specific 
themes were developed. One prevalent theme was the establishment in popular 
culture of a connection between Arabs, and more particularly the Palestinians, with 
Nazism. In Leon Uris’s Exodus, Palestinian terrorism is masterminded with an 
escaped Nazi in the background and in numerous thrillers, most notably Frederick 
Forsyth’s The Odessa File devious Nazis collaborate with Arabs to bring about the 
destruction o f Israel. Popular cultural equations o f Nazism and the Palestinian 
nationalist movement were also advanced in far more serious forums and by 1978 the 
then head o f Aipac I. L. Kenen felt able to credibly state that “The Arabs cannot
n e n
pretend that they played no role in the Holocaust.”
Assertions o f Palestinians complicity in the Holocaust were to a certain extent a pre­
emptive response to the Palestinian complaint that if  a Jewish homeland was 
recompense for the Holocaust, it was unjust that Muslims should pay the price for the 
actions o f European Christians. The historical validation for claims o f Palestinian 
complicity in the wholesale murder o f European Jewry is predominantly attributable 
to the Mufti o f Jerusalem, a pre-Second World War Palestinian nationalist leader who 
fled to Germany during the war to escape incarceration by the British. That he 
resided in Nazi Germany is beyond doubt but allegations that he played a significant 
part in the perpetration o f the Holocaust have never been validated. Despite this, set 
against the backdrop o f the Middle East conflict, claims o f the Mufti’s involvement 
were considered politically expedient to the extent that in the four-volume 
Encyclopaedia o f  the Holocaust the reference to him is longer than the articles on
258Goebbels, Goring and Eichmann.
In the tense atmosphere o f 1973, it was not only the Arabs that were condemned for 
complicity through inaction in the Holocaust. Coming amidst condemnation that the 
US administration had not responded swiftly enough to Israel’s requests for help, 
charges o f wartime silence and abandonment assumed a contemporary relevance. 
Arthur Morse’s 1968 book While Six Million Died, a searing indictment o f America’s
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wartime policy, gained in relevance with the October 1973 war as it was perceived by 
some American Jews to embody their contemporary fears that the US would abandon 
Israel.259
Oil Politics
To maximise the impact o f the Egyptian attack on Israel, and to keep American
support for Israel at a bearable level, Sadat needed to exert some form of pressure on
Washington through a third nation. He had focused the military training o f his
forces on crossing the Canal quickly and efficiently in the first phase o f the attack, but
knew that the Israeli Army and Air Force, resupplied by the US, would defeat
Egyptian forces once on Israeli soil. In an effort to moderate Washington’s response
to the war, Sadat convinced King Faisal o f Saudi Arabia to implement an oil embargo
designed to threaten and damage western oil consuming nations and cause them to
261press the US and Israel for a compromise outcome.
Between the 1967 and 1973 wars, demand for oil had increased and pressure was 
brought to bear on prices. As a consequence, bargaining power shifted from the 
American oil companies in favour o f the producing nations, thus giving Sadat’s 
strategy a realistic chance o f success. The tightening of the market in conjunction 
with a strong feeling amongst the Arab oil producers that their relationship with the 
western oil companies was ripe for change, set the scene for a confrontation that he 
was able to exploit. By 1973, OPEC felt sufficiently secure in its enhanced position 
to consider using the termination o f oil supplies as a form o f leverage against the 
West. On 13 October, six days before King Faisal announced an oil embargo against 
the US, Nixon received a letter from the chairman of Aramco’s four constituent 
companies, Mobil, Exxon, Chevron and Texaco, warning o f the King’s restlessness
263with the situation between Israel and the Arabs. The letter stated that:
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We are convinced of the seriousness of the Saudis and Kuwaitis and that other actions of the US 
government at this time in terms of increased military aid to Israel will have a critical and 
adverse effect on our relations with the moderate Arab producing countries ... Much more than 
our commercial interest in the area is now at hazard. The whole position of the United States in 
the Middle East is on the way to being seriously impaired, with Japanese, European and perhaps 
Russian interests largely supplanting United States presence in the area, to the detriment of both 
our economy and our security.264
Based on prior experience that Arab rhetoric would not be accompanied by action, 
Nixon did not heed the warnings o f the oil executives.
On 16 October the New York Times reported that the White House had received a 
letter from King Faisal requesting that the US terminate arms shipments to Israel and 
call upon it to withdraw to pre-1967 borders, otherwise US-Saudi relations would 
become “lukewarm.”267 On 17 October, when a positive response was not 
forthcoming, OPEC announced that it would cut “oil production by ten percent and 
then 5 percent a month thereafter” until Israel withdrew from the captured territory. 
The following day, when Kissinger met with Arab representatives, the impending aid 
appropriation was not mentioned, which may have lulled the administration into a 
false sense o f security regarding the Arab response. On 19 October, following 
Nixon’s official request for an appropriation o f $2.2 billion269 to cover the cost o f the 
airlift, the Arabs gave their response. King Faisal announced an embargo on oil 
shipments to the US, a policy that was soon replicated by the other producers.270 But 
despite the economic implications, Nixon maintained his commitment to Israel
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claiming that, “[E]ven so, I felt that we could do no less for Israel at such a critical
. ■ »»271time.
In reality, the administration had little option but to deal with the implications of the 
embargo. By abandoning the Rogers Plan and any semblance o f “even handedness”, 
and not developing an alternative policy, the administration had no choice but to place
277support for Israel above domestic oil interests. The deepening energy crisis and the 
concerns o f the oil companies did not have as profound an impact on policy as Sadat 
would have wished because attention was focused not on potential price increases or 
production cuts but on relations with Moscow and the survival o f Israel. However, oil 
politics was a consideration in Washington’s calculations and in a press conference on 
26 October 1973, Nixon acknowledged that without a settlement, Europe and Japan 
would have frozen to death that winter and emphasised the “need to avoid another
97^Mideast crisis so the flow o f oil continues.”
Nuclear Alert and the Cease-Fire Agreement
Fortified with American weapons, the Israelis launched a successful offensive against 
the Egyptians across the Suez Canal. When Cairo and Moscow became aware o f the 
extent o f  the destruction o f Egyptian forces on 18 October, Brezhnev sent a message 
to Nixon to convene urgent consultations.274 Kissinger departed for Moscow and en 
route, received a message from Nixon advising him that Brezhnev had been notified 
that he was authorised to negotiate a cease-fire without further consultations with 
Washington. Nixon instructed Kissinger that the US and Soviet Union “must step in, 
determine [the] proper course o f action to a just settlement, and then bring the 
necessary pressure to bear on our respective friends.” Kissinger was outraged that 
Nixon had deprived him o f the ability to stall, to buy the Israelis more time and to find 
a way o f  excluding the Soviets from the negotiations. Yet a telephone conversation
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with Sisco restored Kissinger’s confidence in his own authority. Nixon was so 
preoccupied with Watergate and the task of self-preservation that he did not have time
9 7 6to intervene in the Middle East, thus enabling Kissinger to ignore his instructions. 
Kissinger believed that a statesman created his own reality, in contrast to the 
politician who responded to events and he was determined to create a reality in the 
Middle East that enhanced the American national interest.
With their client’s position in jeopardy, the Soviets were eager to reach a swift 
resolution. The final cease-fire, based on Resolution 242, was passed by the Security 
Council as Resolution 338 and provided the legal basis for ending the October War. 
Once the agreement was concluded, Nixon sent Meir a letter o f  regret that there had 
been insufficient time for consultation and described the provisions o f the proposed 
agreement: it called for a cease-fire in place within twelve hours, implementation o f 
Resolution 242 “in all its parts” and negotiations between the parties. This was o f  
particular note because it was the first occasion the Soviets had agreed to direct
9 7 7negotiations between the Arabs and Israel without conditions or qualifications. The 
lack o f consultation and the presentation o f a fait accompli offended Meir, but she had 
little option but to comply. In her memoirs she wrote: “In the final analysis, to put it 
bluntly, the fate o f small countries always rests with the superpowers, and they always
970
have their own interests to guard.”
Despite his apparent diplomatic success, Kissinger demonstrated an uncharacteristic 
naivety by ignoring realities on the ground. Given the entanglement o f the Egyptian 
and Israeli armies, temptation was too great for the Israelis to resist and within hours 
of his return to Washington, the encirclement o f the Egyptian Third Army was 
complete. Kissinger was incensed because he had assured the Soviets that Israel 
would respect the cease-fire and was concerned that violations would lead to a lack o f
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US credibility in the Arab world. Brezhnev, for the first time during the Nixon 
presidency, used the hotline to request presidential intervention. Both Soviet and US 
credibility was at stake. As Kissinger told the Israeli ambassador, “[T]here were 
limits beyond which we could not go, with all our friendship for Israel, and one o f 
them was to make the leader of another superpower look like an idiot.”279
The Security Council called for another cease-fire which became known as 
Resolution 339. When this was again breached by Israel, the US was taken to the 
brink o f direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. Brezhnev threatened unilateral
•no 1
action if  the US found it “impossible to act jointly.” As Congress, under the terms 
o f the War Powers Act, had restricted the President’s authority to use military force, 
Kissinger convened a meeting o f senior aides to formulate the administration’s 
response.282 On 25 October, the decision was taken to move US forces to alert status 
on DefCon 3, the highest state of peacetime readiness. On a psychological level, the 
impact was immense. Washington had signalled its preparedness to go to war with 
the Soviet Union to preserve both Israel and its own position in the Middle East.
While observers claimed that the military alert was nothing more than a show o f 
strength from an embattled President, it was successfully employed to force Israeli 
co-operation. Moshe Dayan stated in his memoirs that Kissinger made clear to Dinitz 
that the administration would take the destruction o f the Third Army as a personal 
blow to their prestige and threatened the Israelis with an American resupply operation
7o4
to the Egyptian forces if  all else failed. As Jerusalem discovered, “the trouble with 
friends is not what they can do for you, but what they prevent you for doing for
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yourself.285 By abandoning the Soviets, Sadat had given the US a “stake in him”286 
and therefore American commitments were expanded to include both Israel and 
Egypt. In requesting the $2.2 bn. aid appropriation Nixon’s aim was to create a
987military standoff that would lead to diplomatic compromise. The resupply o f the 
Third Army was part o f that compromise. As such, Jerusalem was presented with 
little alternative but to comply.
On 25 October the UN Security Council passed Resolution 340, calling for an 
immediate cease-fire, a return to the 22 October lines and the implementation o f 
Resolution 338. On this occasion the cease-fire held and the Arab-Israeli war was 
finally brought to a close. Kissinger had become the leading force in America’s 
Middle East diplomacy. At a news conference the morning after the alert, Kissinger 
presented his position: “The conditions that produced this war were clearly intolerable 
to the Arab nations, and ... in a process o f negotiations it will be necessary to make
9 8 8substantial concessions.” The following day he convinced the Israelis to permit the 
re-supply o f the Third Army. Kissinger had succeeded in preventing a decisive Israeli 
victory and achieved the military stalemate for which he had worked throughout the
289war.
Step-by-Step Diplomacy
A parallel can be drawn between Kissinger’s cease-fire talks with Moscow during the 
Yom Kippur War and Goldberg’s during the Six Day War. Both parties put forward 
formulations to advance their client’s interests, but the framework for negotiations 
was largely determined by the military configuration on the ground. This similarity 
ended in Moscow on 21 October when Kissinger accepted a cease-fire that 
theoretically prevented Israel from encircling the Third Army and apparently placed 
Egyptian interests above those of Israel. A diplomatic opportunity was created by
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leaving the warring factions in a battlefield stalemate, that a total Israeli victory would 
have precluded. The White House had been in continuous contact with Sadat 
throughout the war and sought to facilitate his break with Moscow and move him 
towards the West. Sadat had gone to war to regain Egypt’s dignity that would enable 
him to disassociate his country from Nasser’s radicalism. The infliction o f another 
humiliation and Washington’s continued disregard o f his overtures o f peace would 
have forced him to return to Moscow’s protection.
Kissinger once said that “if the world is in flux we have the capacity and hence the 
obligation to help shape it.”290 This was true o f  the Middle East in October 1973 and 
Kissinger seized the initiative. The word ‘obligation’ would never have been uttered 
by Bismarck, but it holds the key to understanding Kissinger’s statecraft. His success 
in engineering the battleground stalemate between Israel and Egypt created a situation 
in which he could deliver Cairo from the clutches of the Communists which he 
believed he had an obligation to do. By aligning Egypt with the United States and
turning away from the Soviet Union, Sadat had adhered to the criteria Nixon and
<
Kissinger had set for working with an Arab state to reach a peace agreement with 
Israel. The spotlight now fell on Washington and the administration had to 
demonstrate that it would be as good as its word by delivering Israel to the 
negotiations. This meant that Kissinger had to pressure each side equally or at least 
be seen to do so,291 although from Jerusalem’s perspective, it appeared that their only 
friend had abandoned them. In March 1975, Kissinger took his strategy to the 
ultimate extreme by arranging for the Ford administration to announce “its 
reassessment” o f US-Israeli relations as a device for increasing pressure on Jerusalem.
In the final analysis, Kissinger can be seen as Israel’s greatest friend because he 
secured for them the peace they had so desperately sought. That the price was 
tangible Israeli concessions for intangible Egyptian commitments on paper was taken 
as a sign by many that Kissinger had betrayed his Jewish roots. Kissinger offered the 
contrary view in his memoirs when he wrote that “[T]he Geneva conference o f 1973
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opened the door to peace through which Egypt and Israel walked.” Throughout the 
remainder o f his tenure as Secretary o f State, he used a step-by-step diplomacy 
technique to broker a series of disengagements between the parties and to build the 
framework for a peace settlement. Although Brezhnev charged that Kissinger had 
disregarded the UN negotiating framework in favour o f one of his own, ultimately, 
this process culminated in Sadat’s historic visit to Jerusalem in 1977 and the signing 
o f the Camp David Accords in 1979. Kissinger’s strategy in the Middle East 
succeeded “in relating our [US] commitments to our interests and our obligations to 
our purposes.”294 While motives and strategy have remained the subject o f debate, 
Washington secured a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt that neutralised the 
only Arab country capable o f threatening Israel’s existence at that time.
Public Opinion, Israel and the War
The October war completed the transformation o f the Arab-Israeli dispute from a 
regional diversion into a conflict central to American diplomatic and strategic 
concerns. Regional and superpower politics collided in the Middle East and 
negotiations were treated as central to global foreign policy.295 The course o f the 
1973 war had a dramatic effect on the activities, arguments and positions of all the 
parties involved. The pro-Israeli camp was thrown onto the defensive because its 
cherished assumptions o f Israeli strength had been compromised and Arab forces 
appeared to have gained the upper hand.
Nixon was in the enviable position o f not having to seek re-election but once 
Watergate challenged his political survival, domestic pressures exerted a greater 
influence on foreign policy. He could no longer afford to alienate the American 
Jewish community by being seen to pressure Israel, but conversely, the war had 
proved that an Arab oil embargo could undermine the American economy and to avert 
a repeat o f this, Washington had to be cognisant o f Arab feelings. This fear
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counterbalanced the pro-Israeli sentiment that had become prevalent in the preceding 
decade and even public opinion polls reflected a decline, albeit temporary, in support 
for Israel.296
Even in the Pentagon support for Israel declined in response to losses in the first days 
o f the war and the credibility o f officials who had warned that effective diplomacy 
provided the only means to avert another war was greatly enhanced. At a lecture in 
October 1974 at Duke University, George Brown the chairman o f the Joint Chiefs o f 
Staff, said:
Jewish influence in this country ... is so strong you wouldn’t believe [it]. We have the 
Israelis coming to us for equipment. We say we can’t possibly get the Congress to support a 
programme like that. They say, “Don’t worry about Congress. W e’ll take care o f  the 
Congress.” Now this is somebody from another country, but they can do it. They own, you 
know, the banks in this country, the newspapers ... you just look at where the Jewish money
i • 297is m this country.
That the chairman o f the Jo ints Chiefs could make such a statement indicates that the 
pro-Israel lobby had been weakened by the perception of increased Arab strength and 
their own loss o f credibility. The fallibility o f the central tenet o f their argument had 
been revealed; Israeli strength had not deterred the Arab attack.
Yet the notion o f a diminution in Israeli influence was balanced by displays o f Israeli 
strength. After all, it was the Arab states that had unleashed the devastating oil 
embargo on the US economy, while Israel had sustained casualties fighting 
Communist backed forces that were the mutual enemy of Washington and Jerusalem. 
Israel continued to gamer some support at the Pentagon amongst those officials who 
could foresee an advantage in aligning themselves with the demands o f some Jewish 
leaders for increased defence expenditure to offset losses incurred during the war. In
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addition, Israel’s experience in fighting against the latest Soviet armoury was an 
invaluable source of information for US military planners.299
Popular cultural representations o f Israel remained positive, which was crucial as they 
provided the frame of reference through which the majority o f Americans made sense 
of foreign affairs. The triangulation o f Israel, America the Holocaust was made 
explicit in the 1974 television film, QB VII, based on the novel by Leon Uris. The 
film followed the libel suit brought by the Polish-born physician Adam Kelno against 
Abraham Cady, a Jewish American writer, who made allegations that Kelno was 
involved in medical experiments at a fictional concentration camp. Cady’s need to 
gather proof to acquit him self o f libel charges allowed the film to present the 
Holocaust through the testimony o f survivors and footage o f Yad Va-Shem. QB VII 
ends with a trial scene in which the Holocaust is narrated at length and demonstrated 
the new found strength o f the Jewish people as justice is served.300
Throughout the film Cady’s attachment to Israel is designed tc reflect the growing 
public attachment of American Jews to the country following the Six-Day War. The 
pride he takes in Israel’s military prowess is symbolised by an Israeli Air Force 
formation flying overhead that protected the state from its hostile neighbours. One 
significant element o f the film for post-1973 America was the way in which it 
counteracts images of Israeli weakness that emerged as a result o f its initial losses in 
the war. The death o f Cady’s son, a paratrooper in the Israeli air force, in the Yom 
Kippur War was depicted as a heroic act that contributes to strengthening not 
weakening o f the vitality o f the Jewish state. Despite the loss o f  his son, Cady 
continued to work in support o f Israel, and in so doing, was able to bring new 
meaning to his life as an American Jew, the implicit message being that viewers 
should work harder in defence o f the Jewish state in its hour o f need.
299 Edward Luttwak, “The Defence Budget and Israel.” Commentary February 1975, p. 27-37. 
According to Spiegel, sixty-one articles appeared in US technical military journals in 1974 on the 
tactics and hardware of the October war and twenty-four additional articles appeared in 1975.
300 Horowitz, op. cit. pp. 156-7.
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The Holocaust and American Life
The Holocaust truly entered American life following the October 1973 war. Though 
Israel was ultimately victorious, this came after substantial Israeli casualties and 
considerable Egyptian gains. The victory was in large part attributable to the US 
airlift o f new supplies during the war, thus undermining the illusions o f Israeli 
invincibility and self-sufficiency. A related casualty was the distinction traditionally 
drawn by Zionists between the vulnerability o f Jews in the Diaspora and the security 
Jews could find in their homeland. For some, the events o f the Yom Kippur War
in  iappeared to demonstrate that there was nowhere less secure for Jews than Israel.
The war also provoked considerable concern over Israel’s increasing international 
isolation. Washington was Jerusalem’s only real supporter and many American Jews 
feared that rising oil prices and the sought after detente with Moscow could threaten 
this support. There was also doubt amongst the American Jewish community that the 
American people, just emerging from the Vietnam nightmare, would respond 
positively to calls to defend another small state half way around the world. Leonard 
Fein, the editor o f the Jewish magazine Moment summed up the situation thus: “We 
cast about uncertainly for a way o f making the case for Israel, ... a way sufficiently 
compelling to persuade a post-Vietnam America to assume the burdens and risks of 
Israel’s defence.”302 The memory o f the Holocaust provided the solution.
Many Jewish organisations intensified their activities to counteract negative publicity 
resulting from the war, and Arab gains in Washington did not seriously diminish 
Israel’s long-term popularity with the American people or its strong support among 
American Jews. Coverage o f Israel and the importance o f the Jewish state as a safe 
haven intensified as the ‘Holocaust memory’ moved to centre stage. Norman 
Finkelstein argued that this transition occurred in response to Egypt’s impressive 
military performance which convinced the administration that a diplomatic settlement 
with Sadat, including the return o f Egyptian lands seized in 1967, could no longer be 
avoided. The Holocaust ‘industry’ stepped up its remembrance o f the atrocity, not
301 Novick. op. cit. p. 151.
302 Leonard Fein, “Right in the First Place,” Moment 1, September 1975, p. 28.
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because they feared a repeat of Hitler’s Final Solution, but to increase Israel’s 
negotiating leverage and moral claim to occupied Arab land.303
As Novick explained, “There were surprisingly few explicit references to the 
Holocaust in American Jewish mobilisation on behalf o f Israel before the war.”304 It 
was only after Israel had recouped its initial losses and its survival was ensured that 
references to the Holocaust entered into main stream discourse. These developments 
occurred within the framework of a robust US-Israeli alliance that remained fully 
intact and it was precisely because US support for Israel was so strong that the pro- 
Jewish lobby felt able to demand ever more demonstrations o f overt support. 
American Jewish leaders did what they had always done: marched lockstep with
o rv /-
American power. Finkelstein argued that if  Israel had truly been in danger o f 
abandonment, American Jewish organisations would have reverted to their post-war 
posture o f assimilation and conformity to ward off charges o f dual loyalty and the risk 
o f being ostracised from American society. The evoking o f historic persecution was 
intended to deflect pressure for territorial concessions and to guarantee continued aid, 
both o f which were achieved.
The creation o f this new awareness o f the Holocaust was evident across a broad 
spectrum of activities. Conferences were convened on the subject, notably that 
sponsored by the Institute o f Contemporary Jewry o f the Hebrew University that 
brought together sixty scholars in New York City and, more importantly, was relayed 
to a wide audience through daily coverage in the New York Times.307 Holocaust 
centres began to open across the US. The first o f these were the Rabbi Irving 
Greenberg’s National Jewish Conference Centre in New York and a Jewish 
Federation sponsored centre in St. Louis.308 There was also an increase in academic 
discourse and courses offered on the subject at American universities matched by an 
increase in academic publications. One notable work was Lucy Dawidowicz’s 1975
303 Norman G. Finkelstein, The Holocaust Industry: Reflections o f the Exploitation o f  Jewish Suffering 
(London & New York: 2000) p. 27.
304 Novick. op. cit. p. 148.
305 Finkelstein, Image and reality o f the Israel-Palestine Conflict (New York: 1995) chap. 6 .
306 Finkelstein The Holocaust Industry p. 23.
307 Israel Shenker, NYT 4, 5, 6 , March 1975.
308 Doneson, op. cit. p. 149.
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book The War Against the Jews, in which she argues that the destruction o f European 
Jewry was Hitler’s uppermost priority.309
Yet the upsurge of interest in the Holocaust did not arise solely in response to the 
1973 war. It was also a product o f the broader preoccupation with destruction,
11 A
victimisation and survival that became pervasive in American life in the 1970s. 
The interrelation of these issues are complex, but by the mid-1970s images o f 
‘survivors’ emerged everywhere in popular culture, and coping with daily routines, as 
much as actual life-and-death struggles, were portrayed in survival terms. ‘Survival’ 
guides began to appear in bookstores covering the whole spectrum o f everyday life, 
from how to survive dieting and parenthood to getting a job.
i n
Holocaust survivors are “real survivors” to quote from Henry Greenspan and it is 
more revealing to understand the renewed interest in the survivors o f the Final 
Solution in the context o f broader cultural trends, than solely in terms o f some new 
readiness on the part society to talk about it. As survival became an accolade and a 
sought after virtue in American culture, the survivors o f the Holocaust were afforded 
a new status in society. Wiesel embodied much of the moral prestige associated with 
‘surviving’ and the fact that he survived, in contrast to Anne Frank who did not,
312enabled this prestige to be assigned to a living person.
Cultural change, combined with the determination and resourcefulness o f American- 
Jewish organisations, facilitated the very swift and extensive memorialisation o f the 
Holocaust. Within five years of the Yom Kippur War, the President o f the United 
States, Jimmy Carter, announced the establishment o f a presidential commission to 
recommend a national Holocaust memorial, a memorial that was to be more extensive 
than that dedicated to the American soldiers who fell in either Vietnam or the civil 
war.
309 Ibid., p. 156.
310 Henry Greenspan, “Testimony and the Rise o f Holocaust Consciousness” in Hilene Flanzbaum 
(ed.), The Americanisation of the Holocaust (Baltimore & London: The John Hopkins University 
Press, 1999) p. 57.
311 ibid., p. 57.
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The Final Assessment of the Nixon-Kissinger Partnersh ip
Richard Nixon, perhaps ironically given his reputation as the President most noisily at 
odds with American Jews since James Buchanan, presided over the era in which the 
US-Israeli special relationship was given virtually ‘institutional’ status. By initiating 
the epoch-making chain o f events that gave rise to Israel’s receipt of $2.2 billion 
annual aid commitment, Nixon aligned Washington with Jerusalem as firmly as any 
treaty commitment could have. In Washington, a city where money talks, aid receipts 
elevated Israel to a new status and gave her and her supporters, unprecedented power 
to influence the governmental decisions o f a world superpower. In this way, Israel 
was transformed from a moral obligation and a strategic asset into an economic 
investment. The United States’ economic stake in Israel foreclosed future 
opportunities for dissenters to seriously question or challenge American support.
It was also under the presidency o f Richard Nixon that the circumstances were 
contrived in which Israel’s most threatening and powerful Arab enemy was delivered 
to the Western peace camp. Although condemned by Israel for its tough negotiating 
stance, Washington broke the Arab alignment against Israel, engaged Cairo in the 
direct negotiations that Jerusalem had long demanded and set the scene for the first 
peace agreement and recognition by an Arab state. These monumental events 
appeared to indicate that Nixon and Kissinger were the best friends Israel ever had in 
the White House.
While the benefits o f the final outcome speak for themselves, many condemn the 
Nixon administration for its grudging policy toward Israel. Theories o f its betrayal o f 
Israel focus on three events. The first was the delay in the military re-supply 
operation during the Yom Kippur War. The very fact that the airlift did not 
commence immediately is grounds amongst staunch Israeli supporters for 
condemning the administration. Other commentators focus more specifically on the 
psychology o f Kissinger. It is well documented that he sought to engineer a 
battleground stalemate as a prerequisite for negotiations, but did he go as far as to 
delay the airlift as a means o f achieving this? The idea is not inconceivable given his
312 Alan Mintz, Popular Culture and the Shaping o f Holocaust Memory in America (Seattle & London: 
University of Washington Press, 2001) p. 21.
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ability to tolerate thousands of avoidable deaths in Cambodia and Vietnam to secure a 
theoretical power balance.313 However, the evidence is inconclusive and Kissinger 
and his supporters dismissed this as pure fabrication. Secondly, it was Kissinger’s 
hastily negotiated cease-fire agreement that prevented the Israelis securing a decisive 
victory over Egypt. In this instance, his supporters claim that the objective was to 
create a military stalemate from which a fruitful peace agreement could be derived. 
This leads directly to the third issue, namely the tough posture the US took in forcing 
Israel to relinquish territory to facilitate an agreement with Egypt. At the time the 
Israeli government did not consider Kissinger’s actions to be in their best interest, but 
thirty years later with the peace agreement still intact, it is one o f Israel’s greatest 
victories in securing international legitimacy and recognition.
Throughout his presidency, Nixon construed the world in terms o f the superpower 
struggle for global supremacy. It has been argued that because he viewed events in 
the Middle East from this perspective that he forced Israel to make sacrifices to aid 
detente. Yet it is precisely because Nixon was a staunch anti-Communist that he was 
so determined to maintain Israel’s military superiority and security. Jerusalem was 
not slow to exploit the synergy between the President’s beliefs and Israel’s own 
military capability. It was precisely the imperatives o f  superpower competition 
combined with an ideological convergence that gave Israel the coveted status o f a 
strategic asset that it was so determined to defend.
In the final analysis, Israel fared well under the Nixon administration both financially 
and from a security perspective. Despite his criticism of American Jews, Nixon was a 
staunch defender o f Israel and not purely on the basis o f the military benefits the state 
could provide. He admired the Israeli’s toughness and their tenacity, and irrespective 
o f the imperatives o f the Cold War, he acknowledged that he would “not [have] let 
Israel go down the tubes.”314 In their support for Israel, the President and his 
Secretary o f State transcended the bounds o f realpolitik and made an unprecedented 
commitment to another state far beyond the norm. In terms o f sheer time 
commitment, no region in the world had been such a focus of attention amongst the 
highest echelons of the United States government. Commencing under Nixon’s
313 Goldberg, op. cit. p. 242.
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leadership and continuing under that o f Gerard Ford, Kissinger embarked on two- 
years o f shuttle diplomacy between Jerusalem and the Arab capitals, with more time 
devoted to securing this peace agreement than any other agreement in American 
history. Power politics offer an insufficient explanation for this chain o f events when 
divorced from the more poignant cultural and emotional images. Over the years 
Kissinger has said very little about the impact o f his Jewish background on his policy 
towards the Middle East. He offers only one direct comment on the subject 
throughout his extensive memoirs. Writing about his arrival in Israel on 21 October 
with the Yom Kippur cease-fire in hand, Kissinger recalled “ranks high on the list [of 
the] most moving moments o f my government service.”
It could be concluded that, in the short term, Kissinger sacrificed what Israel 
perceived as its vital interests in forcing Jerusalem to make concessions in 
negotiations with Cairo that enhanced Washington’s position with Moscow and drew 
Egypt into the Western orbit. However, it is also apparent that with his extraordinary 
intellect he did more than any other American official to enhance Israel’s security. If  
not a redemptionist in the true sense o f the word he was true Providentialist and never 
questioned the belief that the US had a unique role to play in history. He 
demonstrated this in Middle East diplomacy by unlocking the Soviet-Arab connection 
that enabled him and the administration he served to initiate the peace process that 
culminated in the neutralisation o f Israel’s most dangerous enemy at Camp David.
The brokering o f the Camp David accords by the Carter administration was a 
remarkable achievement, with Carter himself deserving o f much praise. But although 
Carter may not have realised it at the time, securing a peace treaty between Egypt and 
Israel, simultaneously sowed the seeds for the continuation o f violence and unrest. 
The cultural dimension o f American politics that mitigated against a sense o f empathy 
with the Palestinian quest for a homeland, was in stark contrast to the great lengths to 
which the Carter administration went to secure peace treaties to protect the Jewish 
homeland. By refusing to link an Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement with the question 
o f the Palestinian refugees and the occupation o f the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the 
US gave Israel what they most wanted -  the neutralisation of Egypt, the most
314 Nixon RN p. 924.
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threatening Arab state, and continued, albeit disputed, control of Palestinian land. 
Once Egypt and Israel were at peace, Prime Minister Menachem Begin o f Israel had 
little incentive to engage in negations with the Palestinians or to conclude peace 
agreements with the other Arab states. As a consequence, the Carter administration 
bequeathed the Republicans a very frustrated Arab world and a very confident, 
militarily strong Israel that sucked the US back in to the Middle East quagmire when 
it embarked on its first ‘war o f choice’ in Lebanon.
315 Coker, op. cit. p. 74.
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Chapter 6 
Reagan, the Neo-Conservatives and Israel
The policy o f Ronald Reagan’s administration toward Israel is characterised by 
contradictions. During his first term in office there were more conflicts between the 
United States and the government o f Israel than under any previous administration, 
which was perhaps somewhat unexpected as Reagan was demonstrably extremely 
pro-Israeli. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin had initially welcomed Reagan’s 
election but throughout the early months o f his presidency the atmosphere in relations 
between the two countries underwent a change. On occasions Israel came under 
unprecedented criticism from officials within the administration and the ability o f 
Israel’s American-Jewish supporters to influence US decision-makers was not 
assured. This change occurred not because o f a sudden conscious reorientation o f 
American policy to Israel’s disadvantage, but because Israel implemented policy 
decisions that had long been in the making.1
Despite this, Israeli leaders were able to capitalise on Reagan’s propensity to view 
international affairs as an extension o f personal relationships as opposed to an 
expression of abstract principles. Reagan tended to “choose sides in conflicts more on 
the basis of friendships and loyalty than on any attempt at a dispassionate appraisal o f 
the conditions o f a particular conflict.” By the time Reagan was elected to the
presidency, a lifetime of experience had conditioned him to see Israel as part of the
1
‘us’ group in his ‘us-against-them’ mindset. The ‘us’ referred to the American 
democratic world against the ‘them ’ o f the Soviet led non-democratic world. 
Therefore, in times o f conflict in the Middle East, Reagan’s natural sympathies lay 
with Israel, a propensity that was to consolidate and enhance the special relationship 
between the two countries by the time he left office.
1 Alexander Haig, Caveat: Realism. Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: MacMillan Publishing 
Company, 1984) p. 167. This included the Israeli bombing of Osiraq and the annexation of the Golan 
Heights.
2 W olf Blitzer, Between Washington and Jerusalem: A Reporter’s Notebook (New York & Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1985) p. 238.
3 Ibid.. p. 238.
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Reagan’s early life was to have a profound impact on shaping the basic premises on 
which he operated as President. He was raised in a religious family environment. His 
father was a practising Catholic and his mother was a member o f the Protestant 
Church o f the Disciples of Christ. Reagan was raised in this tradition by a mother 
who emphasised the role of religion in everyday life.4 As a boy, Reagan was an 
active participant in his religious community. He worked at the church after school 
and later attended a college run by the Disciples o f Christ. He acquired an in-depth 
knowledge o f the Bible and in accordance with the Disciples traditions, interpreted 
the Bible literally.5 As President, Reagan quoted scripture, recounted Bible stories 
from his childhood and regarded Christ as his personal saviour. In 1968, he told the 
television interviewer David Frost that Jesus Christ was the historical figure he most 
admired.6 His religious upbringing led him to believe that his could be the generation 
that would witness Armageddon, a belief that was to become a constant theme 
throughout his presidency. According to the Bible, Armageddon would be heralded 
by war in the Middle East and the destruction o f Israel. Reagan’s fear o f Armageddon 
made him more inclined to support Israel’s cause because he believed that Israel was 
the only stable democracy the US could rely on in a spot where Armageddon could 
com e.7
Hollywood provided the environment in which Reagan formed his political ideas and 
achieved an enduring identity. Reagan once said that, “an actor knows two important 
things -  to be honest in what he is doing and to be in touch with the audience. That’s 
not bad advice for a politician either. My actor’s instinct simply told me to speak the
Q
truth as I saw it and felt it.” However, what Reagan felt frequently did not 
correspond with reality. He recognised this and in a conflict with feelings and facts 
he generally gave greater weight to his feelings.9 As will be shown, this proved to be
4 Albert J. Menendez, Evangelicals at the Ballot Box (New York: Prometheus Books, 1996) p. 145.
5 Garry Wills. Reagan’s America: Innocents at Home (Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday, 1987) pp. 17- 
18.
6 Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role o f a Lifetime (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991) p. 288.
7 Blitzer, op. cit. p. 240. Despite Reagan’s sympathetic discussions with fundamentalists preachers 
about the fulfilment o f biblical prophecies of Armageddon, he was forced to publicly modify his stance 
in response to a statement by the Roman Catholic Bishop, Thomas Gumbleton, that “it is disturbing 
that any political leaders -  especially leaders with responsibility for decisions affecting war and peace -  
might identify themselves with extremists who believe that nuclear Armageddon is inevitable and 
imminent.” See Menendez, op. cit. p. 145.
8 Cannon, op. cit. p. 38.
9 Ibid., p. 38.
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the case on at least four occasions when Israeli acts of intervention conflicted with 
Reagan’s image o f Israel as a vulnerable state.10
In addition to his religious upbringing, Reagan’s sentimental attachment toward Israel
was in part attributable to his Hollywood experiences. In Hollywood, Reagan
encountered many more Jews than Arabs and came to consider the professional and
business success o f American Jews as confirmation and realisation o f the ‘American
dream.’11 Many o f  Reagan’s Hollywood friends were Jewish and during the late
1940s he spent considerable time on the banqueting circuit giving speeches at charity
dinners for Jewish organisations. He believed that the Jews deserved a nation o f their
own and had favoured the establishment o f Israel. In 1948 Reagan resigned from a
lakeside country club because it refused to admit Jewish members. This belief that he
owed loyalty to his Jewish friends was later to translate into his foreign policy. As
President he approached Middle Eastern problems from the presumption that he was
1 ?dealing with the fate o f friends both on a personal and national level.
Perhaps as a legacy o f his Hollywood days, film was to play an influential role in 
shaping Reagan’s opinion and perception o f events. He was an anecdotal thinker who 
expressed his views through stories and communicated through anecdotes when trying 
to make a point. An image was the most effective way for Reagan’s aides to convey a
message, with his advisers briefing him through short films rather than traditional
11briefing books. For example, Reagan’s belief in the legitimacy o f the State o f 
Israel was in part attributable to his responsibility for editing film footage brought 
back from the allies’ liberation o f the European concentration camps. Hours spent 
with graphic images o f the horrors that had befallen the Jewish people reinforced his 
commitment to the Jewish homeland. His revulsion at the images o f the Holocaust 
were replicated throughout much o f American society as in 1978, NBC’s presentation 
o f the mini series Holocaust had brought the atrocity into the living rooms of one 
hundred million Americans. During his presidency, many o f Reagan’s opinions o f 
world conflicts were to be influenced by CNN footage shown on American television.
10 The four incidents were the bombing o f Osiraq, the Iraqi nuclear reactor, on 7 June 1981, the 
annexation of the Golan Heights, the invasion o f Lebanon in 1982 and the response to the Intifada.
11 Blitzer. op. cit. p. 238.
12 Ib]d., pp. 238-239.
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As a politician, Reagan remained staunchly pro-Israeli. As an economic liberal he felt 
the US owed protection to the survivors o f the Holocaust. As a political conservative, 
he came to regard Israel as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism. Reagan was a 
New Right neo-conservative President, and from an ideological perspective, his 
philosophy was commensurate with that of Begin. In Reagan, the Likud found a 
President who identified with their penchant for conservative realism and professed 
economic liberalism. On a cultural level and from a neo-conservative perspective, 
liberal democracy was a product o f a Western culture that was not accessible to all 
nations o f the world. Neo-conservatives identified with Israel as a part of the western 
Judeo-Christian tradition, in contrast to the non-democratic and dynastic regimes o f 
the Arab states. As Reagan once stated, “there is no nation like us except Israel.”14 
The special relationship or ‘meeting o f ideologically aligned minds’,15 was also 
enhanced by the two leader’s mutual obsession with the Holocaust. Reagan shared 
the neo-conservative belief that the world had let down the Jewish people during the 
Second World War and felt a strong personal commitment to Israel’s security. He 
explained that: “My dedication to the preservation of Israel was strong. The 
Holocaust I believe, left America with a moral responsibility to ensure that what 
happened to the Jews never happens again.”16 This sense o f ‘moral obligation’ had 
taken hold in the minds of countless Americans following the 1978 television mini- 
series Holocaust which was one o f the first popular American dramas that awakened
17them to the horrors o f the atrocity as never before. Thus Reagan’s pre-existing 
views and images made him susceptible to Begin’s Holocaust rhetoric and made him 
more patient and less inclined to pressure Israel.
13 Beth A. Fischer, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy at the End of the Cold War (Columbia & 
London: University o f Missouri Press, 1997) p. 118.
14 P. Golden Quiet Diplomat: A Biography o f Max Fisher (New York: Herzl Press, 1992) p. 424 quoted 
in Jonathan Rynhold Israeli Political Culture in Relations with the U.S. over the Palestine Question. 
1981-96 (Ph.D. thesis, University o f London, London, 1998) p. 129.
15 For a practical example o f the personal closeness of the relationship see the “Dear Menachem” 
salutation and signature o f “Ron” in “Letter to Prime Minister Menachem Begin,” 16 February 1982, 
Public Papers o f the Presidents: Ronald Reagan, vol. 2 1982 (Washington, 1983) p. 177 and “Letter 
from Prime Minister Begin to President Reagan, 5 September 1982.” Israel. Ministry o f Foreign 
Affairs, vol. 8 : 1982-84, www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp7MFAH0ics0
16 Ronald Reagan, An American Life (London: Hutchinson, 1990) p. 410 cited in Ibid.. p. 129.
17 Judith Doneson, The Holocaust in American Film (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2002) p. 
149.
253
Few men have come to the presidency with as clearly a defined vision of the world as 
Ronald Reagan. The basic tenets of Reagan’s policy were virulent anti-communism, 
the heightening of tensions with the Soviet leadership and a dramatically increased 
defence budget. Reagan saw the Soviets as responsible for US problems worldwide 
and attributed most global conflict to the machinations o f the ‘evil empire’. His 
negativity towards the Soviet Union was blatantly articulated during his campaign for 
the presidency, by statements such as, “Let’s not delude ourselves. The Soviet Union 
underlies all the unrest that is going on. If they weren’t involved in this game o f
1 o
dominoes, there wouldn’t be any hot spots in the world.” Similarly, in a 1983 
speech, Reagan spoke o f the Soviet Union in the following terms, “Let us pray for the 
salvation of those who live in that totalitarian darkness -  pray they will discover the 
joy o f knowing God. But until they do, let us be aware that while they preach the 
supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over individual man and predict its 
eventual domination o f  all peoples on Earth -  they are the focus o f evil in the modem 
world.” 19
This statement demonstrates that the President’s vision o f the world was organised 
around a number o f simple beliefs: an ardent belief in God, the Soviet Union as a 
source o f evil and the curtailment of human liberty imposed by an overbearing 
government apparatus. Reagan’s problems in government arose when circumstances 
did not adhere to his basic premises for dealing with the outside world. Every 
President since Eisenhower has set out the administration’s foreign policy objectives 
and the policies it would pursue. Reagan did not do this. Instead, he spoke in general 
terms of his determination to thwart Soviet advancement wherever it threatened the 
interests o f the United States, a policy that was to have disastrous repercussions in 
Lebanon and Central America. However, the appearance o f flexibility in policy­
making and apparent deviation from the New Right agenda would compromise the 
President’s deep-seated principles and risk alienating his right-wing supporters.
18 From an interview cited in Karen Elliott House, “Reagan’s World,” Wall Street Journal. 3 June 1980, 
p. 1, quoted in William Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
Since 1967 (Washington D.C. & Berkeley, Los Angeles: The Brookings Institute, & University of 
California Press, 1993) p. 338.
19 Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from 
Truman to Reagan (Chicago & London: University o f Chicago Press, 1985) p. 400.
254
Compromise was only considered in cases o f extreme pressure. In this way, “the
90administration maintained the purity o f its philosophical perspective.”
Reagan’s preoccupation with the Soviet Union translated into his Middle Eastern 
policy. In contrast to the Carter administration, Reagan did not focus on peace­
making but on building a strategic consensus between both the Arabs and Israel aimed 
at blocking Soviet expansion in the area. In a speech in 1980 he stated, “We must 
prevent the Soviet Union from penetrating the Mideast. The Nixon administration 
successfully moved them out; if Israel were not there, the United States would have to
9 Ibe there.” Under Reagan’s leadership, the importance attached to Israel’s position 
as a strategic asset increased, as did the military assistance it received. In conjunction 
with his Secretary o f State Alexander Haig, Reagan also attempted to create a 
‘strategic consensus’ whereby the military prowess o f what he saw as the moderate 
Arabs, particularly Saudi Arabia, would be enhanced to enable them to contribute 
more effectively to the defence of the ‘free world’. The administration believed this 
arrangement would be acceptable to the two parties because o f the increased 
weaponry they would both receive. In an interview with New York Times reporters on 
11 February 1985, Reagan justified the continued supply o f arms to the Arab states on 
the basis that he felt “that we [America] have to make the moderate Arab states 
recognise that we can be their friend as well as the friend o f Israel.”22 This summed 
up the administration’s basic approach to the Middle East and highlighted one o f the 
major causes o f antagonism between the US and Israel. In pursuing this policy, Haig 
and Reagan ignored regional dynamics, thus limiting the effectiveness o f their 
policies by attempting to subordinate regional issues to the conflict between East and 
West. They failed to appreciate that for both the Arabs and Israel, the greatest threat 
to their security emanated from each other and not the Soviet Union.
If the philosophy o f the Reagan administration was strong on rhetoric, it tended to 
lack clear guidance and structure. While Reagan was a pro-Israeli and anti- 
Communist ideologue, he was not interested in the nuances o f policy making, leaving 
the interpretation and implementation o f his policy directives to his advisers.
20 Ibid.. p. 400.
21 Blitzer, op. cit. p. 240. This was the conclusion Nixon reached in agreeing to the use of Israel as a 
US proxy during the Jordanian crisis of September 1970.
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Throughout his presidency, Reagan was, like a Chairman o f the Board, heavily 
dependent on his closest advisers. As a result, his three top foreign policy advisers, 
Alexander Haig, Secretary o f Defence Caspar Weinberger, National Security Adviser 
Richard Allen, exercised considerable influence over Reagan’s conduct o f Mideast 
affairs.24 Haig was a realist in his approach to foreign policy. He had served in the 
military, as Kissinger’s deputy at the White House and as Nixon’s chief o f staff. He 
was pro-Israeli in the sense o f supporting Israel over the Arabs, suspicious o f the 
Soviet Union and sceptical o f the Middle East peace process. Israel played a crucial 
role in both Reagan’s and Haig’s conception o f the strategic consensus against 
Moscow. Weinberger was also staunchly anti-Soviet, but his strategic 
conceptualisation o f the Middle East contrasted with that o f Reagan and Haig. 
Weinberger came from a business and economics background and had worked with 
Bechtel, a large construction company with extensive contracts in the Middle East. 
He was very familiar with the Arab view and saw Saudi Arabia not Israel, as a
*yc
valuable force for moderation and stability. As a hereditary monarchy, Saudi Arabia 
was opposed to dramatic change or regional turbulence that could potentially create 
social unrest. Saudi Arabia’s virtually exclusive reliance on oil exports also required 
a quiescent regional environment and good relations with the west to ensure the 
uninterrupted export o f oil. The competing perspectives and advice o f  Reagan’s 
advisers created inconsistency and vacillation in the formulation and implementation 
o f policy.
Reaganism: The First Year
In the early months o f Reagan’s presidency, the assumption that “Israel was
26automatically right” and that the United States would always support Jerusalem in a 
contest of interests with its Arab neighbours was severely challenged. The first 
challenge came on 7 June 1981, when Israel destroyed Osiraq, Iraq’s only nuclear
22 Public Papers o f the Presidents: Ronald Reagan. 1985 (Washington. 1986) 11 February 1985.
23 Within the Reagan administration there was a formal mechanism for formulating the administration’s 
policies coupled with a strong emphasis on collegial cooperation amongst advisors and limited 
presidential involvement. John Durke, The Institutional President (Maryland: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1992) p. 140.
24 Quandt, op. cit. p. 337.
25 Ibid.. p. 337.
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reactor.27 Reagan sympathised with Israel’s claim that its security interests were 
threatened by the Iraqi capability to produce nuclear weapons. However, until the
reactor raid Reagan had believed that Israel was America’s friend and was puzzled
28and angry that he had not been consulted before the pre-emptive strike. Under the 
Carter administration, the US and Israel had engaged in detailed discussions on this 
issue. The Begin government had made it clear that if  the US did not take care o f ‘the 
threat’ using diplomatic means, Israel would intervene militarily. Both states agreed 
that Iraq presented an impending danger, but disagreements centred on how soon ‘the 
threat’ would come. The psychological environment o f fear o f invasion in which the 
Israelis lived, caused Begin to call for an immediate halt to the potential nuclear threat 
stating that, “I f  the US doesn’t succeed diplomatically, we have to look after our own 
interests.” It was differences in the perception o f the immediacy o f the threat that
' l  A
caused Israel to act alone.
From the perspective o f Middle Eastern dynamics, the raid was a dangerous act. It 
undermined US claims that weaponry delivered to Israel was required for purely 
defensive purposes and was a clear violation o f  the 1952, US-Israel Mutual Defence 
Assistance Agreement.31 Under the terms o f the agreement, Israel had pledged to use 
American-supplied equipment solely to maintain its internal security and for its 
legitimate self-defence, and not for acts o f aggression. From the Israeli perspective, 
the destruction o f Osiraq was an act o f legitimate pre-emptive self-defence. In this 
way, Washington absolved itself of the responsibility for the actions o f its client 
because Israel had breached the terms on which the weapons had been supplied. A 
parallel can be drawn with the British claim in 1999 that weapons delivered to 
Indonesia were for purely defensive purposes and should not have been used in the 
suppression o f rebellion in East Timor. However, even though the Iraqi reactor was 
located only ten miles outside Baghdad, Haig cited the fact that the bombing was not 
technically an attack on a peaceful nation (Iraq and Israel had been in a state o f war
26 Cannon, op. cit. p. 391.
27 The Iraqi nuclear reactor Osiraq was constructed by French and Italian technicians.
28 Author’s interview with Samuel W. Lewis: U.S. Ambassador to Israel 1977-85, Chief State 
Department Policy Planning / Assistant Secretary o f  State, Policy Planning 1992-95.
29 Author’s interview with Samuel W. Lewis.
30 Reagan was unaware o f past discussions on this issue and when he was presented with the ‘full 
history’ surrounding Israel’s actions, relations were smoothed over and Begin was invited to 
Washington for talks.
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with each other since 1948), as a means o f legitimating the raid. Almost as a form 
o f justification, Haig recalled in his memoirs that the Israelis took the decision not to 
notify the US of their intention, because diplomatic considerations would have forced
33Washington to insist that Israel terminated the operation.
In the testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, on 17 June 1981, 
the traditional dichotomy between Israel’s supporters and those who were critical o f 
Israel’s misuse o f US weapons was revealed.34 For example, Representative Stephen 
Solarz (D.-N.Y.) claimed that Osiraq was obviously intended for the production o f 
nuclear weapons, in contrast to Paul Findley (R.I11.) who was critical o f the 
governments arms sale policy: “To my knowledge,” he declared, “this new 
administration has not seen fit to issue any warnings whatever to the State o f Israel
c
concerning the use of US-supplied weapons.”
In formulating an appropriate response to the Israeli attack, both realist and emotional 
considerations played a role, and a clear divide emerged between the White House 
and the State Department. Under Secretary o f State Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., expressed 
the view that “[W]e have condemned the Israeli attack and cannot but be dismayed by 
the damage which has been done to the search for peace in the Middle East.”36 In 
contrast, Haig argued that while US disapproval o f the attack had to be demonstrated, 
the overt humiliation and weakening o f Israel would be detrimental to the American 
national interest. In his memoirs, Haig also claimed that, “[T]he Presidents deep 
natural sympathy for Israel and his understanding that she depended on American
3 7friendship came into play also.” As a means o f chastising Israel for the raid, the 
decision was taken to delay the shipment o f four F-l 6 aircraft. However, Weinberger
31 DSB August 1981, p. 79.
32 Haig, op. cit. pp. 182-183.
33 Ibid.. pp. 182-183.
34 George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East (Durham & London: Duke University 
Press, 1990) p. 257.
35 “Israeli Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Facilities”, Hearings before the Subcommittees on International 
Security and Scientific Affairs, on Europe and the Middle East, and on International Economic Policy 
and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House o f Representatives, Ninety-Seventh Congress, 
First Session, June 17 and 25, 1981 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 15. Paul 
Findley later lost his government seat and blamed his electoral defeat on the pro-Israel lobby’s 
smearing o f his campaign and its financial support o f his opponent.
36 Ibid.. p. 258.
37 Haig, op. cit. p. 184.
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leaked the decision to the press before Israel had been officially informed, thus 
intensifying the displeasure with which the Begin government received the news.
The bombing also raised the fundamental question as to how Israel and the US should 
deal with each other. The American ambassador to Israel, Samuel W. Lewis, claimed 
that after the attack Israeli officials were informed that their actions had had a direct 
impact on US interests. If  Israel wanted to be America’s ally, greater consultation 
between the two governments was required and Israel was not to inflict further
-io
surprises. While the Israeli raid did not leave an indelible impression on US-Israeli 
relations, it did raise awkward questions about the general orientation o f America’s 
policy in the Middle East, the apparent discord between the US, the Arabs and Israel 
on the issue o f arms policy and the real threats to state security in the region. From a 
US perspective, the major threat to Middle Eastern security was posed by the 
perceived expansionist aspirations o f the Soviet Union. The administration 
considered it possible to create a ‘strategic consensus’ between Israel and the 
moderate Arab states whereby each party would receive advanced weapon systems 
from the US to be used in the defence o f the region against possible Soviet 
encroachment. The policy failed to take into account the political perspectives o f the 
regional states involved. Neither the Arabs nor Israel considered the Soviet Union to 
be a significant threat and operated on the premise that the greatest risk to their 
security originated with each other. The Osiraq raid coincided with another challenge 
to the American strategic consensus in the region -  the controversy over the sale o f 
advanced fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia.
The A W  A C S D ebate
Every administration that sells arms to the Arab states engenders controversy on both 
a domestic and international scale. For Haig, the “establishment of stronger ties with
39the Arab states depended upon the sale o f sophisticated arms,” because the lightly 
populated Persian G ulf states saw advanced technology as the solution to their
38 Author’s interview with Samuel W. Lewis.
39 Haig, op.cit. p. 168.
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defence requirements. The problem was how to send equipment to the friendly Arab 
states without weakening Israel.
Reagan inherited the controversy o f the sale o f five AWACS aircraft and sixty-two F- 
15 flghter-bombers from the Carter administration. The judgement that Saudi Arabia 
required these radar-equipped, technologically superior planes to deter possible 
attacks from revolutionary Iran and Soviet client states, was “made by men deep in 
the American bureaucracy talking to their counterparts in the Saudi defence 
establishment on the basis o f technical needs rather than political considerations.”40 
As the NSC meeting to debate the sale took place on 1 April, the day after Reagan 
was shot, the President was not in attendance at the meeting that was punctuated by 
the traditional divide within the administration. In principle, Haig supported the sale 
o f an airborne warning and surveillance system but was unconvinced that the 
continued security o f Saudi Arabia was dependent on the sale o f the five AWACS. In 
contrast, Weinberger vehemently endorsed the sale and convinced the NSC to sell the 
sophisticated equipment. He believed that strengthening Saudi Arabia would promote 
regional stability.41
Osiraq was to impact on the AWACS controversy because Israel revealed that it had 
overflown Saudi territory on the way to bomb the reactor. As a consequence, Saudi 
officials argued that they required the AWACS to defend themselves against Israeli 
‘aggression’ and to fulfil their pan-Arab responsibilities o f detecting and warning 
other Arab states of an impending Israeli attack.42 In September 1981, Begin 
travelled to Washington on an official visit and met with Reagan to discuss the sale. 
The Israeli Prime Minister was concerned that a strengthened US commitment to 
Saudi Arabia would increase Riyadh's leverage in Washington and undermine the US- 
Israeli alliance.43 When the meeting concluded, Reagan was under the impression 
that Begin would not publicly campaign against the sale, accepting that the legislation 
was inherited from the Carter administration. Despite assurances to the contrary, 
Begin met American-Jewish leaders to lobby against the sale and spoke before an 
assembly o f Congressmen to register his opposition to the transaction. Believing that
40 Ibid.. p. 175.
41 MECS 1981-82, p.27.
42 Ibid.. p. 184.
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an agreement had been reached between himself and the Israeli Prime Minister, 
Reagan felt that he had been deliberately misled him over the issue, and was 
infuriated that the latter had actively intensified protests against his administration.44
In addition to the perennial concern for the preferences o f American Jewish 
constituents, Congress advanced two arguments against the sale: the ostensible risks 
to Israel’s security per se and the potential risks to US security were Saudi Arabia to 
become ‘another Iran’.45 The exertion o f congressional pressure on the White House 
was fuelled by the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (Aipac) which 
distributed a copy o f the novel Holocaust, based on the television mini-series to every 
member of Congress,46 in attempt to reinforce the moral obligation of the US to 
Israel’s security. As late as October, with administrative attention diverted towards 
the budget and tax cuts that would launch the ‘Reagan revolution’, opposition to the 
sale appeared insurmountable. There were counter-pressures, and the political tables 
were turned in part by the powerful lobbying undertaken by Boeing and United 
Technologies both with evident interests in plane sales, and oil companies such as 
Mobil with lucrative stakes in Saudi oil.47 But the decisive weapon in the campaign 
for the sale was the President himself.
Epitomised in the slogan ‘Reagan or Begin’, the President effectively made the 
AWACS sale a test o f his personal prestige and authority. At a news conference on 1 
October, he declared that “As President, it is my duty to define and defend our broad 
national security objectives ... And while we must always take into account the vital 
interests o f our allies, American security must remain our internal responsibility. It is
A O
not the business o f any other nation to make American foreign policy. His speech 
implied that those senators and congressman who opposed the sale were unpatriotic 
and put the interests o f Jerusalem above those o f Washington. Six days after the news
43 Ibid.. p. 28.
44 Blitzer, op. cit. p. 247.
45 The term ‘another Iran’ refers to the administration’s fear that the Saudi monarchy could be 
overthrown by an Islamic revolution as had been carried out against the Shah o f Iran in 1979.
46 Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1999) p. 156.
47 Nimrod Novik, The United States and Israel: Domestic Determinants o f a Changing US 
Commitment (Boulder: Westview Press/Tel Aviv: The Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv 
University, 1984) pp. 127-29.
261
conference, Anwar al-Sadat the President of Egypt was assassinated by a group of 
Islamic militants. They believed that Sadat had ‘sold out* both the Arab and Islamic 
cause by recognising Israel’s right to exist and by signing a peace treaty with the 
Jewish state at Camp David in 1979. Sadat’s assassination intensified the executive’s 
fear o f the spread of what it termed ‘Islamic Fundamentalism’ and became part o f the 
argument in favour of the AWACS sale. While Congress argued that the sale of 
AWACS to Saudi Arabia should be avoided in case the monarchy was overthrown 
and a radical government was brought to power as occurred in Iran, the White House 
claimed the sale was required to prevent this by enhancing the power and stability o f 
the monarchy.
In the final weeks of campaigning prior to the final vote, the Senate became the focus 
o f presidential attention. The House, with a Democratic majority, rejected the sale by 
a vote o f 301 -  111, but the Senate was more vulnerable to presidential pressure. On 
7 October, Reagan held a private meeting with forty-three Republican Senators 
affiliated with the New Right. These legislators were among the most adamant 
opponents o f the White House and a President they had been instrumental in bringing 
to office. The New Right viewed Israel as an anti-Communist bastion in the region, 
while some o f the most militant Protestant fundamentalists involved in New Right 
causes had swung to Zionist policies across the board for both religious and political 
reasons. Jerry Falwell, founder o f the Moral Majority, one o f the major political 
organisations o f the New Christian Right,49 was the most prominent example and was 
considered by Begin to be a personal friend.50 However, the support o f his 
organisation was insufficient to determine the outcome and in the final vote, the sale 
was endorsed by fifty-two votes to forty-eight.
While the sale marked a victory for the President, it was not without its price in 
political capital.51 Numerous restrictions were placed on the use o f the AWACS 
while the F-15s were sold with smaller than usual fuel tanks and denude of bomb
48 Laurence I. Barrett, Gambling with History Ronald Reagan in the White House (Doubleday & Co., 
Inc.: Garden City, New York, 1983) p. 275.
49 John Simpson, “Support for the Moral Majority and its Sociomoral Platform” in David Bromley & 
Anson Shape (ed.), New Christian Politics (Mercer University Press: USA, 1984) p. 65.
50 Barrett, op. cit. p. 275.
51 Author’s interview with Marshall Breger, special assistant to President Reagan and his liaison to the 
Jewish Community, 1982-84.
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racks.52 Confrontation between the two leaders over the AWACS sale resonated 
deeply, as Haig acknowledged:
[T]he question of five planes is tiny when held against the universe of American politics. But 
every issue between two nations is a microcosm of their whole relationship, containing within 
itself, in a kind o f genetic code, all the energy, all the goodwill and trust, all the resentment and 
suspicion o f the parent body.53
Defeat over the AWACS sale encouraged Israeli leaders to seek specific evidence of 
their ostensibly elevated status as a strategic asset to Washington. Almost as a 
consolation prize the administration concluded a strategic cooperation agreement with 
the Israeli government in November 1981. Weinberger opposed an official alliance 
with Israel because o f the detrimental effect it could exert on relations with the 
Arabs.54 As Weinberger’s department was responsible for the implementation o f any 
security agreement, the eventual Memorandum o f Understanding (MOU) between the 
United States and Israel outlining the parameters on strategic cooperation, was a 
diluted version o f the initial proposal. The Memorandum embodied the two 
fundamental principles o f Reagan’s foreign policy: the desire to form alliances against 
the So\iet Union and the need to protect Israel’s psychological and physical security. 
The document advanced strategic cooperation “against the threat to peace and security 
o f the region caused by the Soviet Union or Soviet-controlled forces from outside the 
region introduced into the region, joint military exercises and cooperation in R&D.”55
The MOU received a mixed reception in Israel. While Israel’s Foreign Minister Ariel 
Sharon was unimpressed by the substance o f the agreement, Begin considered the 
exact terms unimportant. For him “the issue was that the US and Israel were 
behaving as allies. Israel was not a puppet and wanted to be treated as an ally, the 
security agreement offered this.”56 While Begin heralded the MOU as a major 
triumph, many Israelis interpreted it as a one-sided agreement that directly involved 
Israel in protecting the American national interest. The clause in the document that 
explicitly pitted Israel against the Soviet Union was the most virulently condemned.
52 Lenczowski, op. cit. p. 259.
53 Haig, op. cit. p. 191.
54 Author’s interview with Samuel W. Lewis.
55 For the text of the Memorandum o f Understanding, see, DSB December 1981, pp. 45-46 and NYT 1 
December 1981, p. A 14.
56 Author’s interview with Samuel W. Lewis.
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There was no corresponding US commitment to come to Israel’s aid against 
‘aggressive’ Arab forces.
On 14 December 1981, just days after the publication of the MOU, Begin inflicted a 
second shock on Washington. He convened a special weekend session o f the Knesset 
to formally ratify the extension of Israeli law to the Golan Heights. The rationale 
behind Begin’s decision is unclear. Lewis claimed that radio broadcasts o f Syrian 
President Assad’s speeches, denouncing Israel and reiterating Syria’s refusal to make 
peace, convinced Begin that he had nothing to lose by effectively annexing the
57territory. Yet this ignores the pressure Begin was susceptible to from right-wing 
elements within his own party and his need to take steps to retain the support o f all 
members within his government. The law was a superb political move but the act in 
itself was o f minimal scope because it merely ratified the application of Israeli law
c o
which had been in de facto  operation since 1969. Whatever his motivations, Begin 
either disregarded or failed to adequately account for Washington’s reaction and his 
action reflected the lack o f understanding by each side o f developments within the 
other.59 That the US administration was caught by surprise is beyond doubt60 and 
following so closely after the signing o f the MOU, Reagan was infuriated. The timing 
of the move gave the impression o f US complicity, whilst the change in legal status 
had no relevance to Israel’s security needs.61
Tensions ran so high that Haig and Weinberger were unified in their mutual
ff)condemnation o f the Begin government. In a token gesture o f retaliation, the 
disillusioned administration suspended the MOU and temporarily suspended aircraft 
deliveries. Begin was outraged by the decision and vented his anger on the US 
ambassador, “Are we a vassal state o f yours? Are we a banana republic?” he 
demanded. When Lewis responded that reinstatement o f the MOU depended on
57 Author’s interview with Samuel W. Lewis.
58 Steven Spiegel, “The Middle East: a consensus of error”, Commentary vol. 73, no. 3, March 1982, p. 
22 .
59 Ibid., p- 22.
60 At a news conference following the annexation Reagan stated, “We were caught by surprise. This 
was done without any notification to US.” Public Papers of the Presidents: Ronald Reagan. 1981 
(Washington, 1982) 17 December 1981.
61 Barrett, op. cit. p. 277.
62 Weinberger stated that the annexation constituted a “clear violation” of UN resolutions and the Camp 
David agreements. Lenczowski, op. cit. p. 262.
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progress in the autonomy talks and the situation in Lebanon, Begin declared that 
“[t]he people o f Israel have lived without the MOU for 3700 years, and will continue 
to live without it for another 3700 years.”63 Yet despite the public reports o f tension 
between the two governments, the deep-seated unity between Israel and the US 
appeared to cushion the American response, which was in reality quite muted. As Ed 
Meese, one o f Reagan’ closest advisors explained:
It’s important to understand that the U.S. remains the best friend Israel could possibly have. We 
have been disappointed by the events in the last week. We’re obviously disappointed by this 
reaction. Just as with friends, occasionally you may be disappointed, but that doesn’t end the 
friendship.64
Even the annexing o f the Golan Heights coming so soon after the AWACS 
controversy and Osiraq raid, did not exhaust Reagan’s patience with Israel. However 
this is as much attributable to calculations o f realpolitik as it is to the existence o f a 
‘special relationship’. The administration was not in a position to take a very harsh 
line with Israel that could seriously impair relations, for two very pragmatic reasons. 
Firstly, there was the potential for domestic political backlash against the government 
from pro-Israeli factions. Secondly, there was the fear that international isolation 
would only intensify Israeli intransigence.65 In the Middle East, events are 
interrelated. A harsh American backlash could well have threatened to derail the final 
withdrawal o f Israeli forces from Sinai, as agreed in the Camp David Accords, at a 
time when the credibility and presidency of Hosni Mubarak, the successor o f Sadat, 
were in their infancy.66 The boundaries o f the permissible as delineated by the special 
relationship, in conjunction with the incestuous nature o f Middle Eastern politics, 
inevitably provided a reason for American restraint in its dealings with Israel. The 
forthcoming invasion o f Lebanon was to put the special relationship to the test, but 
not before yet another demonstration o f Reagan’s inability to restrain Begin was 
provided.
63 Author’s interview with Samuel W. Lewis.
64 Meese spoke on “Meet the Press,” 20 December 1981, quoted in Barrett, op. cit. p. 278. Ed Meese 
was Reagan’s transitional director when he assumed the presidency in 1980. Durke, op. cit. p. 140.
65 Ibid.. p. 278.
66 Mubarak succeed Sadat as President of Egypt following Sadat’s assassination by Islamic extremists 
on 6 October 1981. The completion of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and the return of Egyptian 
land to Egypt, under the terms of the Camp David agreement, was a key test of Mubarak’s ability to 
govern the country. Had the Israeli withdrawal been delayed, the US feared that Mubarak would be 
ousted from power and replaced by a more radical, Islamic leader.
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The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon
In the world o f pure Reaganism, conflicts such as those in Lebanon were considered
either unimportant or symptomatic o f Soviet interference. The administration had
(\1little patience for the intricacies o f Lebanon’s sectarian politics and the country 
forced itself onto the US agenda as a by-product o f  Israeli involvement. The war 
Israel fought in Lebanon was very different from previous Arab-Israeli wars. It was a 
long war (compared with those o f 1967 and 1973) that lasted almost three months, 
was fought in densely populated urban areas and under the close scrutiny o f  the 
world’s media. Moreover, Israel’s participation caused dissension within Israel and 
outrage in the international community. America was the crucial factor in 
determining the course o f the war because as long as the Reagan administration 
viewed the war as conducive to or, at least congruent with its interests, it enabled the 
Begin Government to continue to pursue its own aims.
The Israeli invasion o f Lebanon in June 1982 was a product o f growing tensions 
between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) along the Israeli- 
Lebanese border. Following its eviction from Jordan in 1970, the PLO had moved its 
headquarters to Beirut and had established an autonomous territorial base and military 
infrastructure in South Lebanon. As the PLO’s military capability in Southern 
Lebanon increased, conflicts between the Palestinians and Israelis intensified. By 
summer 1981, Jerusalem perceived the PLO’s increasing strength in Lebanon as 
posing a more serious threat than did Syria. During the fighting o f July 1981, the 
PLO’s artillery and rockets shelled northern Galilee and Israel was unable to 
adequately respond. Such was the PLO’s success that the very future viability o f 
settlements in the Galilee was called into question.69 In late August, with Saudi 
assistance, Philip Habib, Reagan’s special negotiator to the Middle East, brokered a 
cease-fire.70 Habib was an Arab-American from a Lebanese Christian family who
67 This view is expressed in Quandt, op. cit. p. 340.
68 MECS 1981-82. p. 109.
69 Zeev Schiff, “The Green Light” Foreign Policy pp. 73-85, vol. 50. Spring 1983, p. 76.
70 The three most significant direct consequences of this agreement were:l) Saudi assistance convinced 
the administration that the sale of the AW AC jets was a positive decision, 2) the success of diplomacy 
in the region was demonstrated, 3) Habib increased in stature, particularly in the eyes of the President. 
Spiegel, op. cit. p. 415.
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71had grown up in a Jewish neighbourhood in Brooklyn. He was well placed to deal 
with the complexities o f the crisis in his homeland.
Contrary to American expectations, the Israeli-PLO cease-fire agreement did not 
resolve hostilities. The Israeli government knew that the events o f summer 1981 
would repeat themselves were the cease-fire to break down. A permanent solution 
had not been found to the PLO’s shelling o f northern Galilee, and the Israeli coffers 
did not have sufficient funds for the construction of an adequate shelter system. As 
the PLO derived legitimacy and popular support from its war against Israel, from its 
perspective, the cessation o f hostilities was virtually impossible. The Palestinians 
were not a monolithic group. While the PLO considered itself ‘the legitimate 
representatives o f the Palestinian people’, a number o f other factions vied for this 
role. Were PLO leader Yassir Arafat to have relented in his battle against Israel, or to 
have failed to retaliate against Israeli provocation, more radical groups, such as the 
Popular Front for the Liberation o f Palestine (PFLP), would have challenged his 
status and credibility as the leader o f the Palestinians. In an endeavour to adhere to 
the cease-fire and to continue its campaign against Israel, i.e. to be perceived as 
moderate by Israelis and radical by the Palestinians, the PLO found other means o f 
pursuing its cause for which it did not acknowledge responsibility: terrorist attacks in 
Europe and against Major Sa’ad Haddad in South Lebanon were two such examples.73
The primary motivation behind the Israeli invasion was the conviction that the PLO 
had to be driven beyond artillery range o f the Israeli border. This culminated in the 
formulation o f the ‘security belt’ concept, known under the code name of Little Pines, 
in which the PLO would be driven back 25 miles into Lebanese territory. However, 
while Yithak Rabin and Mordechai Gur o f the Labour party remained sceptical that a 
full-scale military operation could solve the problem, the Likud formulated a grand- 
scale plan for an invasion o f Lebanon. Sharon’s preferred strategy, ‘Operation Big 
Pines’ planned for operations as far north as Beirut. Sharon reasoned that once the 
invasion was underway, the Israeli army should advance to the Beirut-Damascus 
highway and link up with the Phalangists, a Christian militia force that was opposed
71 George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1993) p. 45.
72 MECS 1981-82, pp. 109-110.
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to PLO operations in Lebanon, led by Bashir Gemayel. Gemayel’s forces would then 
enter West Beirut and root out any remaining PLO fighters. With the Lebanese 
presidential election scheduled for September 1982, the invasion provided the ideal 
opportunity for Israeli intervention to bring Bashir Gemayel to power. A strong 
central government friendly to or allied with Israel was thought to offer the solution to 
the defence o f Israel’s northern border.74 The election o f Gemayel was also viewed 
favourably by the US. He was well known to the CIA and in meetings with top 
American officials had once indicated that he thought Lebanon should become the 
fifty-first state.
The author Zeev Schiff describes America as an ‘implicit partner’ in the Israeli
7Sinvasion o f Lebanon. Washington knew o f Israel’s intentions in the months 
preceding the war. It was only the exact timing o f the invasion o f which the 
administration was unclear. In January 1982, Sharon secretly visited Beirut to meet 
Phalangist commanders in an endeavour to coordinate an Israeli operation with the 
Maronites, the largest Christian sect in Lebanon. Sharon laid out exactly which 
significant military areas in and around Beirut the Israelis would have to seize to 
eradicate PLO strongholds. Whatever information the US had not uncovered in Israel 
about the forthcoming invasion, was revealed to American intelligence in Lebanon,
7 7when Sharon and Bashir Gemayel apparently agreed upon a joint military strategy.
For Israeli attempts at a full-scale invasion o f Lebanon to be successful, coordination 
with Washington, or at least its tacit consent, was essential. During visits to 
Washington in early 1982, Israeli officials outlined their ambitious plans for Lebanon. 
The relationship was once again complicated by the multiplicity o f contacts between 
the two governments. The administration was divided, and Jerusalem received 
contradictory messages from different branches o f the government. When Sharon 
outlined his invasion plans, Weinberger was outraged by his suggestions and
70
threatened sanctions should Israel proceed. In February 1982, Major General
73 Ibid.. p. 110.
74 Ibid.. p. 111.
75 Schiff.op. cit. p. 73.
76 Ibid.. p. 78.
77 MECS 1981-82. p. 111.
78 David Schoenbaum, The United States and the State of Israel (New York & Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993) p. 283.
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Yehoshua Saguy, Chief o f Israeli Military Intelligence, met with officials at the 
Pentagon and with Haig in an attempt to discover what the US would consider an
70unquestionable breach o f the cease-fire. This was followed in March by a dispute 
between Begin and Habib regarding the scope of the 1981 cease-fire. Begin 
contended that the accord held worldwide, while Habib claimed that it applied only 
with regard to attacks across the Israeli-Lebanese border. Within Israel itself an 
agreement emerged that the point o f origin o f an attack was the criterion for judging 
whether there was a violation.80
One principle the Reagan administration felt strongly about was the right o f every 
country to defend its people. Reagan would never have relinquished that right for the
o «
American people and would not deny an ally the right to defend its citizens. By 
repeatedly informing Israeli leaders that they “would never tell Israel not to defend
R7itself from attack,” the message from Reagan and Haig, which did not include an 
outright ‘N o’, was tantamount to a green light to proceed. Haig repeatedly informed 
the Israeli government that if  it was contemplating an invasion o f Lebanon that 
“unless there was a clear, internationally recognised provocation -  and even then, 
unless Israeli reaction was proportionate to that provocation -  any such course would
O'!
have very grave effects in the US.” Sharon took Haig’s message at face value: a 
military operation had to be quick and in response to a clear provocation. Reagan 
never issued an ultimatum warning against an invasion, he merely sent a letter to 
Begin urging restraint. Begin outwardly complied with this condition, stating, “We 
agree that you will make, in the near future, diplomatic and political efforts, provided 
that no attack whatsoever on Israeli citizens or territory or any border sector is carried 
out.”84
The Israeli definition o f a breach of the cease-fire was applied unilaterally and not just
85in terms o f raids across the northern border. Under these circumstances, all the
79 Schiff.op. cit. p. 79.
80 Raymond Tanter, Who’s at the Helm? Lessons of Lebanon (San Francisco & Oxford: Westview 
Press, 1990) p. 80.
81 Author’s interview with Samuel W. Lewis.
82 Haig, op. cit. p. 326.
83 Ibid.. p. 184.
84 Ibid.. p. 333.
85 In a statement to the Knesset Begin argued that Israel could not accept an agreement with that only 
prevented terrorist attacks on Israel from Southern Lebanon and that did not extended to the protection
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Israelis needed was sufficient provocation. This was provided on 3 June 1982, when 
the Israeli ambassador to London was shot and seriously wounded. Although the 
attack was neither carried out nor sanctioned by the PLO, Israel responded by 
bombing West Beirut on 4 June. As anticipated, and despite US warnings to the 
contrary, the PLO retaliated by firing on Israeli settlements in the Galilee. As a 
consequence, the Israeli cabinet approved the invasion “Operation Peace for Galilee.” 
On 6 June, six Israeli divisions crossed into Lebanon and signalled that Israel had 
embarked on its first ‘war o f choice’, a discretionary war that lay siege to an Arab 
capital. In response to condemnation from Lewis and Reagan, Begin reiterated that 
Israel does not “covet one inch o f Lebanese territory” and reaffirmed Israel’s 
objective as pushing the PLO north to a distance o f 25 miles. Instead o f  limiting 
themselves to this zone as expected, Israeli forces moved forward and were within 
sight o f Beirut by 11 June.
The Conflict Intensifies
The White House response to the invasion was muted. Reagan believed that Israel 
would halt its advance after establishing a 25 mile security zone along the border. 
Conceivably, by June 1982, the administration had come to view the war as inevitable 
and decided that it was better to capitalise on the potential such a war provided rather 
than engage in a futile attempt to prevent it. Even the escalation o f the war beyond 
the 25 mile zone provoked only a moderate American reaction that revealed a certain
R7tolerance for a protracted conflict. Both Israel and the US believed they could gain 
from the severe weakening o f the PLO and the establishment o f a stable government 
in Lebanon.
American support for Israel was commensurate with the new means o f successful 
containment the administration pursued that provided an effective means o f using 
force without cost to the body politic, or even the national treasury. Reagan’s
of Jews everywhere. Israel. Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, vol. 8: 1982-1984, Statement to the Knesset 
by Prime Minister Begin, 8 June 1982, www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp7MFAH0icu0 
8 Author’s interview with Samuel W. Lewis. The US advised Arafat not to respond to Israeli raids as 
Begin was looking for an excuse to launch a larger scale attack.
87 Schiff, op. cit. p. 83.
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preferred method was not to intervene himself, but to force the Soviet Union onto the 
defensive. He also found it cheaper to use proxies such as South Africa and Israel to 
destabilise the Soviet Union’s clients in Southern Africa and the Middle East. For 
example, during the 1980s, it cost the US only $250 m. a year in military aid to the 
Afghan rebels to tie down 100,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Washington 
doubled military aid to Israel immediately before the invasion of southern Lebanon in 
1982, and then tacitly supported the drive across the Litani river into the heart o f 
Beirut in the hope of ‘taking out’ the PLO as well as Syria, the Soviet Union’s two
Q O
principle clients in the region.
On the second day o f the war Habib flew to Jerusalem and then Damascus to press for 
a cease-fire. American ambassadors took on the role o f intermediaries between the 
hostile factions, but to a large extent became conduits for conveying Israeli demands 
to the Syrians and PLO. Habib’s willingness to convey Israeli demands to Assad that 
PLO men in the midst o f Syria’s forces leave the 25 mile zone enhanced Israel’s
OQ
confidence in America’s support, and while Habib was waiting to meet with Assad, 
Israel destroyed the Syrian missile system situated beyond the ‘security zone.* The 
Israeli strategy o f escalation exceeded the limited objectives announced at the onset o f 
the war, undermined Habib’s credibility as an impartial negotiator and implied 
American complicity in Israeli actions.
On this occasion, Israeli action united the entire Reagan team in pressing for an 
immediate cease-fire.90 Sharon appeared not to have considered the possibility o f 
intervention from Reagan and the way scenes o f violence could elicit an emotional 
response from him. On 9 June Reagan signed one o f the harshest letters ever 
delivered to an Israeli Prime Minister:
I am extremely concerned by the latest reports o f additional advances o f Israel into central 
Lebanon and the escalation o f violence between Israel and Syria. ... Menachem, a refusal by
88 Fred Halliday, “The Reagan Administration and the Middle East”, Atlantic Quarterly , 2:3 (Autumn 
1984) p. 229.
89 Ibid.. p. 83.
90 Spiegel, op. cit. p. 415.
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Israel to accept a ceasefire will aggravate further the serious threat to world peace and will 
create extreme tension in our relations.91 
At the United Nations, a unanimous resolution was passed calling for an Israeli 
withdrawal and a general cease-fire.
However, US ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick vetoed a second UN Resolution a few 
days later that condemned Israeli ‘aggression’ and threatened sanctions. Once again 
the ‘special’ nature o f US-Israeli relations interposed themselves between Israeli 
actions and the full backlash o f an American retaliatory response. When Turkey 
illegally used American supplied weapons in the invasion o f Cyprus, the US 
suspended all weapons supplies to Ankara. In contrast, American condemnation of 
the Israeli violation o f the Arms Export Control Act by using American-supplied 
weapons for non-defensive purposes was muted. It was not until 19 July, more than 
two weeks after the event, that Reagan issued an order halting further shipments of 
cluster bombs to Israel in response to their use on the civilian population o f Beirut.92
By 11 June Israeli troops had cut off West Beirut, closed the Beirut-Damascus road 
and connected with Phalangist forces, trapping the PLO’s military and political 
leadership inside the city. However, the Phalangist militia did not enter Beirut from 
the north as previously agreed with Sharon, preventing the encirclement o f the city.
With Israeli forces slowly strangling Beirut, through relentless bombing and the 
termination o f the water and electricity supply to the civilian population, Haig became 
the only leading administration figure who continued to oppose a tough stance against 
Israel. Haig believed that the US should exploit the Israeli invasion to the utmost, to 
ensure a permanent change in the political situation in Lebanon and to drive out the 
PLO. Even Reagan began to speak out against Israeli actions, warning Begin that 
“[i]f you invade West Beirut, it would have most grievous consequences for our 
relationship. Should these Israeli practices continue, it will become increasingly 
difficult to defend the proposition that Israel’s use of US arms is for defensive
91 Translated from the Hebrew version of the letter from Reagan to Begin, 9 June 1982, as published by 
Ayre Naor, Cabinet at War (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Lahav, 1986) p. 76, quoted in Quandt op. cit. p.
342.
92 Lenczowski, op. cit. p. 220.
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93purposes.” Reagan implied that he would cease to oppose the use o f statutory 
provisions and suspend the supply o f American military equipment to Israel, the 
ultimate sanction, if the advance continued.
American threats did more to cast doubt on the endurance o f its relationship with 
Israel than to weaken the resolve o f  the opposing forces because Washington’s 
attempts at diplomacy undercut Israel’s use of force. Threats o f diplomatic sanctions 
failed to restrain Israel but convinced the PLO to stand their ground in Lebanon. Only 
Haig and Habib appeared to understand the need to use the prospective threat o f an 
Israeli invasion of West Beirut to induce a PLO withdrawal.94 In an insightful 
editorial in the New York Times, William Safire described the situation thus:
While Israel moves in tanks to squeeze the West Bank, President Reagan moves from impatient 
scowls to vague threats to squeeze Israel. He says that Israeli advances are unhelpful to efforts 
to get the PLO out o f Lebanon. Yet it is only the Israeli threat that makes the PLO willing to 
consider withdrawing.95
With its effective military defeat by Israeli forces the PLO could only renew its 
political life through the protection o f  a third party96 and whether intentionally or 
not, the US became this third party.
When on 21 June, Begin flew to Washington for talks with Reagan, the earlier 
cordiality between the two leaders was gone.97 Begin presented Israel’s position to 
the President and Reagan replied by reading aloud from file cards prepared for him by 
NSC staff. The Oval Office meeting was concluded before Begin had the opportunity 
to respond, with the threat o f sanctions imminent if  Israel failed to comply with the 
cease-fire and withdraw. The talks continued in the presence o f aides where a 
promise was extracted from Begin not to invade Beirut. However, at the press 
briefing Reagan’s bland comments and Begin’s emphasis on mutual points o f 
agreement and common interest in Lebanon, made the two countries appear closer
98than was actually the case. The public image o f the meeting between the two
93 Shultz, op. cit. p. 54.
94 Tanter, op. cit. p. 131.
95 William Safire, NYT editorial, 5 August 1982 quoted in Ibid., p. 186.
96 Robert Tucker, “Lebanon: the case for the war”, Commentary vol. 74, no. 4, October 1982, p. 21.
97 Begin had wanted a private meeting with Reagan because he thought this would provide the 
opportunity for him to convince the President o f Israel’s way of thinking. It was finally agreed that the 
two leaders would meet in the presence of their respective ambassadors, Sam Lewis and Moshe Arens.
98 Schiff, op. cit. p. 84.
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leaders reinforced Haig’s strategy o f public support for Israel but was detrimental to 
that of the President and the majority o f his aides who favoured a de-escalation of 
Israeli military action."
For Israel to blatantly ignore the US will perplex to those who believe that the 
dependence of a small state automatically translates into influence for the large 
benefactor.100 Such, however, was the nature o f the relationship that sanctions were 
not perceived as credible by either Israel or the American public. No one believed 
that the US would abandon its ally during a military conflict, an action that would risk 
Israel’s defeat by a Soviet supported enemy. Reagan’s threat to recall Ambassador 
Habib was far more credible than that o f military sanctions. Consequently, there was 
no reason for Israel not to call America’s bluff. In the final event, sanctions were not 
imposed for a number o f reasons. Firstly, experience showed that the imposition o f 
sanctions against Israel were an ineffective deterrent. Suspension o f the delivery o f 
jet aircraft to Israel after the bombing o f Osiraq did not deter the annexation o f the 
Golan, while the suspension o f the shipment o f cluster bombs did not prevent an 
escalation o f the fighting in and around Beirut. Secondly, the administration believed 
that sanctions might encourage escalation and lead to an all-out Israeli attack. 
Thirdly, sanctions were not an effective lever or means o f crisis management, 
particularly when, given the closeness of the US-Israeli alignment, they would have 
been imposed in a half-hearted manner.101
By late June, divisions within the administration had reached breaking point. Haig 
was now in constant opposition with Bush, Weinberger, Kirkpatrick, Clark, Baker,
107Deaver and Meese. On 24 June Haig met with Reagan and the President accepted 
his resignation. However, despite Haig’s departure, the orientation o f American 
policy remained relatively unchanged. The administration continued to provide Israel
99 It was left to Weinberger, Vice-President Bush, and Senator Charles Percy, chairman o f the Foreign 
Relations Committee to reassure the Arabs, on the occasion of King Khalid’s funeral in Riyadh. 
Spiegel, op. cit. p. 415.
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with sufficient political backing in the international arena as to facilitate its imposition
i rnof a profound change in the political and military configuration in Lebanon.
With Haig’s resignation, attention now turned to his successor George Shultz and his 
relationship with Bechtel, the large Californian contracting firm with extensive 
connections in the Arab world. He was more of a ‘team player’ than Haig and more 
inclined to allow a strong role for the Middle East experts in the State Department.104 
Shultz had been Weinberger’s boss at Bechtel and was viewed by the Israelis with 
deep suspicion. At his Senate confirmation hearing Shultz referred to “the legitimate 
needs and problems of the Palestinian people”.105 For some, this confirmed his pro- 
Arab sympathies. He avoided his predecessors’ extensive references to the Soviet 
Union and on the situation in Lebanon commented, “I believe that strength is not 
simply military strength, but what you do with it and what you do with the situation 
that may be created by it. It is not military strength that we want; it is peace that we 
want.” 106 This statement was poignant in view of Israel’s military gains and the 
opportunity this provided in land could be effectively negotiated for peace and 
security guarantees.
Certain US actions during the invasion served to undermine Israel’s gains on the 
ground and gave impetus to the reluctance o f Syria and the PLO to withdraw from 
Lebanon. Reagan’s agreement, on 6 July, to “contribute a small contingent” o f US 
troops to a multinational force for temporary “peacekeeping” in Beirut, undermined 
Habib’s negotiations with Assad for the relocation o f the PLO to Syria and realigned 
the Soviets with Syria. Confronted with the prospect of US militarily involvement, 
Moscow and Damascus set aside their disagreements over responsibility for the Israeli 
defeat o f Syria. Assured o f Soviet backing, on 9 July Assad rejected the plan to 
transfer PLO fighters to Syria. American emphasis on diplomacy rather than the use 
o f force strengthened the position o f the PLO. Arafat became more intransigent
103 Rabinvovich, op. cit. p. 117. For example, the US protected Israeli interests at the UN by vetoing 
any resolution that sought to impose sanctions or penalties of any kind on Israel. On numerous 
occasions the US and Israel were the only two UN member states to vote against certain resolutions.
104 Coral Bell, The Reagan Paradox: U.S. Foreign Policy in the 1980s (New Jersey: Rutgers Univeristy 
Press, 1989) p. 95.
105 Shultz, op. cit. p. 21.
106 See “Nomination of George P. Shultz.” Hearings, House Committee on Foreign Relations. 
Washington, 1982, for a full account of the statements delivered during the nomination hearings.
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because he felt reassured that the American preference for diplomacy and influence 
over Israel would deter a full-scale Israeli attack on PLO fighters in Beirut and he 
determined to extract a political price from Washington in exchange for 
withdrawal.107
The administration’s approach to the conflict and the objectives it hoped to achieve 
were based on false premises. Firstly, Washington wrongly assumed that Israel would 
voluntarily relinquish the security zone it had just fought to strengthen to a 
multinational force o f countries that had demonstrated their hostility to Israeli actions. 
Secondly, the administration failed to appreciate that while it was protecting the PLO 
from an Israeli attack, the organisation had little incentive to disarm and evacuate 
Beirut. Thirdly, Washington failed to acknowledge that Damascus would not accept 
PLO fighters as this would indirectly strengthen Lebanon’s central government in
1 ORdirect contradiction o f Assad’s aim o f extending Syrian authority over the country.
In many respects, American diplomacy was detached from the harsh realities o f 
Lebanese politics.
The deployment o f the multinational force ushered in weeks o f stalemate. The PLO 
leadership would not allow themselves to be pushed out o f Beirut, but lacked the 
power to leave independently. The Israelis were reluctant to enter West Beirut 
because o f the high casualties they were certain to incur through house to house 
combat. Habib continued the thankless task o f brokering one hopeless cease-fire after 
another, whilst simultaneously seeking a deal that would allow the PLO to leave 
Beirut.
The stalemate convinced Sharon of the futility o f securing a PLO withdrawal through 
diplomatic means. American mediation efforts had to be backed up by an Israeli 
show of force. On 6 August Sharon ordered the advancement of Israeli units into 
West Beirut. For the first time the Israeli army occupied an Arab capital in its ‘war o f 
choice’ against the PLO.
107 Tucker, op. cit. p. 21.
108 Tanter. op. cit. p. 134.
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The Siege of B eirut
On 12 August Israeli planes bombed West Beirut for eleven hours. The severity o f 
the raid equated with some of the worst bombing of civilian population centres during 
the Second World War. It was a rare event during the Reagan presidency that 
produced an emotional reaction among White House aides that cut across divisions. 
Mike Deaver informed Reagan that, he could not “be a part o f this anymore, the 
bombings, the killing o f children. It’s wrong. And you’re the one person on the face 
of the earth right now who can stop it. All you have to do is tell Begin you want it 
stopped.” 109 With his staff demanding intervention, Reagan personally called Begin 
to demand an immediate halt to the bombings.110 “Menachem, this is a Holocaust,” 
he told the Israeli Prime Minister. With the most evident irony Begin replied, “Mr. 
President, I think I know what a Holocaust is.” Begin nevertheless returned the call in 
twenty minutes to inform Reagan that Sharon had been ordered to stop the 
bombing.111 Deaver recounts in his memoirs that when Reagan had hung up the 
telephone, he said “I didn’t know I had that kind o f power.”112 This image o f US 
power over Israel was deceptive. In ordering the attack o f West Beirut, Sharon had 
over reached his authority and while it appeared that Begin was misleading the White 
House, Sharon was in reality misleading him .113 In response, the Israeli cabinet had 
ordered him to end the raids before Reagan’s phone call.114 If  anything, the call 
delayed the process.
The Israeli bombing o f Beirut came as a profound shock to Reagan. He had believed 
that the invasion was designed to clear a 25 mile security zone and as a result, it had 
been greeted with a mild US response. Reagan’s reaction when he watched television 
footage o f bodies being removed from Beirut apartment buildings after a raid was 
both emotional and negative. Television pictures mattered to Reagan and their 
importance was increased because what he was seeing was not commensurate with his 
fundamental beliefs about Israel. The image that most moved Reagan was that o f a
109 Michael K. Deaver, Behind the Scenes (New York: William Morrow, 1987) p. 166.
110 Howard Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise o f Zionism to Our Time (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1996) p. 909.
111 Spiegel, op. cit. p. 285.
112 Deaver, op. cit. p. 166.
113 Author’s interview with William Quandt, former National Security Council aide, Nixon and Carter 
administrations.
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photograph of a baby that had lost its arms that appeared in the Washington Post. In 
reality the picture was deceptive and UPI issued a correction the following month: the 
baby’s arms had been bandaged after being burned in a PLO attack on East Beirut and 
he was recovering satisfactorily.115 However the damage had been done. For Reagan, 
the symbol of the war had become “a baby without arms”. It was this image that 
prompted him to order a halt to the fighting.
Before the war, Reagan had behaved as though America had no interest in pushing for 
a settlement of the Palestinian issue,116 but with Shultz in the driving seat as the new 
Secretary o f State, US attention was refocused on the peace process. Shultz believed 
that the Israeli invasion o f Lebanon would destroy the prospects for peace in the 
region unless the US undertook a new initiative. However, this reorientation o f 
American policy was still couched in terms that were favourable to Israel. Shultz 
stated that: “We owe it to Israel in the context o f our special relationship to work with 
her to bring about a comprehensive peace acceptable to all the parties involved, which
117is the only sure guarantee o f true and durable security.”
On 21 August, after endless negotiations, the PLO began its evacuation o f Beirut. 
President Reagan pledged a US contingent of a hundred Marines to join French and 
Italian troops in guaranteeing the safe departure o f PLO fighters. Three days after 
their departure, Bashir Gemayel was elected President o f Lebanon. Shultz was 
determined to use the period o f relative calm to move forward with a peace initiative 
and on 1 September Reagan made his first and only major speech on the Middle East.
The Reagan Peace Plan
September 1 heralded a new phase in the Lebanese war and accentuated the 
contradictions between Israeli and American objectives in the Middle East. President 
Reagan’s peace initiative highlighted the context in which the Lebanese war had been 
fought and the contradictions between the position o f the US and Israel regarding the
114 Spiegel, op. cit. p. 417.
115 WP 2 August 1982, p. A 16.
116 Tucker, op. cit. p. 30.
117 Shultz, op. cit. p. 22.
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West Bank. From the US perspective, Jordan’s ‘unique and enduring character’ was a 
fact o f political life, which America was committed to uphold. Therefore, the 
administration would not permit the removal o f the Palestinians from the West Bank 
and the establishment o f Jordan as the Palestinian homeland would not occur as a
110
result o f the peace process. Paradoxically, the Israeli invasion o f Lebanon and 
attempts to remove the PLO shifted Palestinian issues to the front of the US agenda. 
Contrary to Israeli expectations, its threats placed the PLO in a position to benefit 
from American willingness to make concessions in the pursuit o f peace. Raymond 
Tanter argues that the “Israeli threat o f war had the unintended consequence o f 
planting the seeds o f peace in Washington.” 119 These seeds grew into the Reagan 
peace initiative.
Ambiguity regarding the final status o f the occupied territories was crucial to the 
success o f the 1979 Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt. In contrast, the 
Reagan Plan was far more ambitious. By putting forward a final solution to the 
Palestinian question the Plan was destined to failure because it tried to do too much 
too soon. It rejected both an independent Palestinian state and the Israeli annexation 
o f the West Bank and Gaza. As an alternative, Reagan advanced four key ideas. 
Firstly, [s]elf-govemment by the Palestinians o f the West Bank and Gaza in 
association with Jordan,” 120 as the solution that offered “the best chance for a durable,
191just and lasting peace.” Secondly, an immediate freeze on Israeli settlement 
building in the West Bank because, “[fjurther settlement activity is in no way
necessary for the security of Israel and only diminishes the confidence o f the Arabs
122that a final outcome can be freely and fairly negotiated.” Thirdly, Israel would not 
return to the narrow and indefensible borders o f pre-1967. Reagan explained that 
“[I]n the pre-1967 borders Israel was barely 10 miles wide at its narrowest point. The 
bulk o f Israel’s population lived within artillery range of hostile Arab armies. I am
1 9^not about to ask Israel to live that way again.” Fourthly, Jerusalem would remain 
undivided.
118 Tanter, op. cit. p. 90.
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122 PPP 1 September 1982, p. 1095.
279
Samuel Lewis presented an advance text to Begin on 31 August without prior warning 
or consultation.124 The Knesset rejected the proposal because it required Israel to 
relinquish the occupied territories in exchange for peace and offered an interpretation
Iof the Camp David Accords that differed from its own. Israel also feared that the 
agreement would culminate in the establishment of a PLO state in the West Bank that 
would further compromise Israeli security. As opposed to outright rejection, the Arab 
states, at a summit in Fez, presented a plan of their own. The plan attempted to find 
consensus between the differing Arab perspectives and called for the immediate 
Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories followed by the creation o f an 
independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. It also envisaged the 
drawing up by the Security Council o f guarantees for peace for all states of the region. 
Although Israel was not explicitly mentioned, US officials consoled themselves with 
the fact that reference to “all states o f the region” included Israel. While it differed in 
substance to the Reagan proposal, it provided America and the Arabs with a basis for 
discussion.126
Sabra and Shatila
The Reagan Plan over-stretched the administration by forcing it to deal with the 
question o f Lebanon and the Palestinians simultaneously. The problem was 
exacerbated by Bashir Gemayel’s assassination on 14 September, five days after the 
enunciation o f the Fez Plan. Fearing that the death o f the Maronite President would 
undermine military gains already made in Lebanon, Sharon ordered General Rafael 
‘Raful’ Eytan to move Israeli forces into west Beirut in direct violation of the cease­
fire. The objective was to rout out two thousand Palestinian terrorists suspected o f 
hiding in the city.127
123 Ibid.. p. 1095.
124 Israel was not consulted about the Plan because Washington feared a leak. MECS 1995, p. 31 and 
Author’s interview with Lewis..
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127 Spiegel, op. cit. p. 422.
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Israeli operations with Phalangist forces were to have horrific consequences. On 16
September, Sharon allowed the Phalangist militia to enter the Palestinian refugee
camps of Sabra and Shatila to rout out PLO installations and personnel stating that he
128did not want to see “a single one o f the terrorists left.” By the evening, Israeli 
intelligence officers watching the camps intercepted radio conversations between 
Christian militia men, which indicated that indiscriminate violence may have been 
perpetrated. They relayed their suspicions to army headquarters. After several hours 
o f confusion, General Amir Drori, the northern front commander, ordered the 
withdrawal of Phalangists from the camps. The order was not carried out and the 
following day additional Phalangists entered the camps. Through the initiative o f 
several Israeli journalists, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir was notified o f events, 
but he did not investigate. It was only on the morning of 18 September, when Sharon 
entered the camps and witnessed the evidence of the massacres for himself, that he 
ordered them to leave.129
By the 18 September the foreign media were reporting news o f the massacre. The 
remains o f 2,300 men, women and children had already been found in the camps, 
while dozens o f additional bodies were disinterred in front o f the world’s media. It 
was reported that Israeli forces had provided the night time illuminations that 
facilitated the perpetration o f  the massacre and that the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) 
had done nothing to stop it, even though it happened right under their noses.130 
Revelations o f the atrocity provoked outrage in both Israel and the US, leading to the
131establishment in Jerusalem o f a commission o f enquiry.
While the international community was shocked by events, reaction from inside the 
Reagan administration was mild and slow in coming. American officials were 
concerned that the premature withdrawal o f the Marines had culminated in the 
massacre and by their evident failure to guarantee the safety o f Lebanon’s Palestinian 
population. If only by virtue of bad conscience for the refugee camp massacres, on 20 
September Reagan recommitted the Marine contingent, in direct contradiction of the 
advice o f his Secretary o f Defence. Weinberger objected to the redeployment of the
128 Sachar, op. cit.. p. 914.
129 Ibid.. p. 914.
130 Yossi Beilin, Israel: A Concise Political History (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1992) p. 124.
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Multi-National Force (MNF) because they lacked a clearly defined role.132 As a 
component of the MNF, the role of the Marines was understood to be neutral, with the 
stated mission of “enabling the Lebanese government to restore full sovereignty over 
its capital, the essential precondition for extending its sovereignty over the whole
133country.” Weinberger argued that the objective o f the force was “demonstrably 
unattainable,”134 because there was nothing neutral about the Syrian, Israeli or
I 1 C
Lebanese forces involved in the conflict.
In Israel itself, news o f the massacres was greeted with a public outcry as the 
appearance of bloodstained corpses on national television implied that the country had 
been reduced to the level o f its Arab neighbours. On 24 September a protest was 
staged by over 400,000 demonstrators in Tel Aviv’s Municipality Square, 
condemning the government’s handling o f the incident. In response, on 28 September 
Begin announced that a commission o f enquiry would be convened under the 
chairmanship of Yitzhak Kahan, the President o f  the Supreme Court. The three-man 
panel took testimony from all available sources: Israelis and Lebanese, military 
officers and journalists, Sharon and Begin.
In February 1983 the commission issued its report. While it exonerated Begin o f the 
decision to send the Phalangists into the refugee camp, it noted that for “two days 
after the Prime Minister heard about the Phalangist entry, he showed absolutely no
1 "Xfsinterest in their actions in the camps.” The verdict against Sharon was yet more 
damning, with the report stating: “As an official responsible for Israel’s security 
affairs, the defence minister had the duty ... not to disregard ... the [possibility] ...
I ^ 7that the Phalangists were liable to commit atrocities.” Equivalent culpability was 
also assigned to Shamir, Eytan and his generals.
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As the cabinet debated their response to the Kahan Report, crowds gathered outside 
the Prime Minister’s office, demanding the resignation of Sharon, Shamir and Begin. 
Finally a compromise was reached, whereby Sharon would step down as Minister o f 
Defence but remain in the cabinet as a Minister without Portfolio. But by then the 
damage was down and the aftermath o f the Lebanese war continued to polarise Israeli 
society until the final withdrawal of troops in 2001.
The public horror that galvanised Israeli society was not replicated to the same extent 
in the US. The atrocity did not cause a breach between Washington and Jerusalem 
because the massacre was not committed directly by Israeli forces and the government 
had swiftly ordered an enquiry. The US administration accepted the Israeli enquiry, 
considering its findings to be reputable, comprehensive and open because it was 
conducted by a democratic country which operated under the rule o f law. Moreover, 
the Israeli government was perceived to have acted on the recommendations o f the 
Kahan Report, despite the fact that all government personnel implicated through 
complicity in the massacres, remained in office. While the administration did not 
approve o f all Israel’s actions, they continued to perceive it as a politically righteous 
society, deserving o f their support.138
In America, despite public incredulity that Israel could be complicit in such an event,
the people were nevertheless receptive to explanations as to why it had occurred and
tended to be assuaged by newspaper reports that the Israeli government had not been 
11 0directly responsible. After all, allegations that Israel had perpetrated a massacre o f 
innocent civilians did not adhere to the stereotypical image o f the vulnerable and 
heroic Jewish state and were therefore met with resistance. In general Americans do 
not relate to “victims in their faraway country with their unpronounceable names and 
odd clothing”.140 As Philip Lopate explained, “those piles o f victims are not as 
significant as Jewish corpses” 141 because Jews are commonly portrayed as individuals 
in contrast to Arabs who are depicted as masses. In sum, the American public dealt 
with revelations o f the less palatable aspects o f Israeli involvement in Lebanon “with
138 Earl Raab, “Is the Jewish Community Split?” Commentary vol. 74, no. 3, March 1982, p. 23.
139 Author’s interview with William Quandt, former National Security Council aide, Nixon and Carter 
administrations and author’s interview with Marshall Breger.
140 Epstein, “A Dissent on Schindler’s List,” New York Review of Books 41 (21 April 1994) cited in 
Novick, p. 235.
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dissatisfaction and criticism, but without ultimate alienation or withdrawal of basic 
support”.142
In replicating the relatively muted response o f the administration to the events at 
Sabra and Shatila the media collaborated in the people’s apparent willingness “to see 
or take sufficient account o f the ethical shortcomings o f those with whom they share a 
sense of political, cultural or ideological kinship.” 143 As a consequence, the atrocities 
o f Palestinian terrorists committed against Israelis were portrayed as more egregious 
than those o f the Israelis, even if those latter acts resulted in a far greater death toll.144 
Noam Chomsky argued that this is because the media serves a propaganda function in 
which the atrocities committed by official allies are not deemed newsworthy in the 
same way similar acts carried out by ‘rouge’ actors are. Furthermore, because the 
country is deemed to have a free press it is illogical for the people to believe that 
coverage is biased145 or that there is a misrepresentation o f facts. But another equally 
important reason for the US willingness to ‘forgive’ Israeli culpability was that the 
majority o f Americans simply did not pay attention to international events and were 
uninterested in the intricacies o f foreign relations.146
To the present day, Sabra and Shatila are rarely mentioned in the American media and 
in 2002, on the thirtieth anniversary o f the massacre, the only reference in the 
mainstream press appeared at the end o f an article in the New York Times which first 
discussed the bombing o f a Palestinian school by Israeli settlers and the twenty-ninth 
anniversary o f the surprise attack on Israel that launched the 1973 war. Similarly, 
between 27 August and 10 September 2002, the Los Angeles Times ran a series of 
articles to commemorate the thirtieth anniversary o f the kidnapping and murder of 
eleven Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics by Palestinian terrorists. The series 
contained twenty articles, totalling over 18,000 words or 500 column inches. The
141 Philip Lopate, “Resistance to the Holocaust,” Tikkun 4 (May-June 1989, p. 58.
142 Raab, op.cit. p. 23.
143 Geoffrey Stem, “Moral Judgments and Political Prejudice,” Contemporary Review May 1975, pp. 
231-2.
144 Tom Gorman, “Worthy and Unworthy Victims: Munich Matter, Sabra and Shatila Don’t”, 
CounterPunch 21 September 2002, p. 2.
145 Edward Herman & Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent
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disparity between the coverage o f Israel and that o f the Palestinians speaks for 
itself.147
Furthermore, a break with Israel over Sabra and Shatila was inconceivable when it 
was fighting Communist backed Arab radical states and terrorist organisations which
i A n
were opposed to the values o f the US and western civilisation. However, there was 
a growing concern for Lebanon’s civilian population within the US administration, 
tinged with a sense o f guilt, which was demonstrated through the redeployment o f the 
multinational force and renewed efforts to convince King Hussein o f the viability o f 
the Reagan Plan.
The Failure of the Reagan Plan
American reliance on Jordanian participation in the peace accord proved to be the 
final insurmountable obstacle in the implementation o f the plan. King Hussein 
considered American involvement in Lebanon to be a test o f how effectively it could 
deal with the Palestinian issue. Hussein felt that if  Washington could not get the 
Israelis out o f  Lebanon, there would be little prospect o f securing their withdrawal 
from the West Bank. Reagan further undermined the success o f his initiative by 
publicly stating that the Palestinian question could not be resolved until there was 
agreement on Lebanon.149 In this, he effectively provided the opponents o f his 
initiative with the means to destroy it. Begin, Assad and the Soviets took this 
statement as an invitation to exacerbate the difficulties in Lebanon to ensure that 
“another Camp David,” as the Syrians dubbed it, would not succeed.150
The Reagan initiative included a five-year transitional period during which the 
territory would move from Israeli to Jordanian control. The King was reportedly 
tempted to accept the Reagan initiative and travelled to Washington in December 
1982 for talks with the President. In exchange for his cooperation, Hussein was 
promised increased weapons supplies and a freeze on Israeli settlement activity in the
147 Gorman, op. cit. p. 1.
148 Norman Podhoretz, “J’Accuse”, Commentary vol. 74, no. 3, September 1982, p. 31.
149 William B. Quandt, “Reagan’s Lebanon Policy: Trial and Error,” Middle East Journal, vol. 38 
(Spring 1984) pp. 241-42.
150 Quandt Peace Process p. 347.
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West Bank once negotiations were underway. However, the administration 
overlooked the fact that they could not force Israel to comply with American promises 
to Hussein o f a halt to settlement building. Jordanian-US dialogue was followed up 
by Jordanian-PLO talks over the next few months. However, in April 1983, Hussein 
concluded that a joint negotiating position with the PLO could not be established. In 
the absence o f a favourable Arab consensus, Hussein felt powerless to accept the 
Reagan Plan on behalf o f the Palestinians. On 10 April 1983, he called Reagan to tell 
him that his talks with Arafat had failed and that he was not prepared to act alone.151 
Hussein had not ruled as King of Jordan for over thirty years by taking bold initiatives 
that risked alienating other Arab states or his Palestinian citizens. With the failure o f 
the Reagan Plan, the US refocused its attention on Lebanon. Amin Gemayel 
succeeded his dead brother to the presidency and Begin set in motion steps to realise 
the true objective o f the war -  a peace agreement with Beirut that would guarantee
1 c7
Israeli control o f South Lebanon.
The Lebanese-Israeli Peace Initiative
Begin’s quest for a peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon was not shared by 
Assad who opposed the move for the same reason Washington and Jerusalem 
favoured it. The withdrawal o f PLO forces and an Israeli-Lebanese peace agreement 
would have undermined Syrian influence in Lebanon. Pressure from conflicting 
forces put the Lebanese President in an untenable position. To maintain Christian 
hegemony over the Muslim population and to liberate Lebanon from the control o f 
foreign armies required a US guarantee. Lebanese peace therefore, depended on the 
same ingredient as that between Egypt and Israel, the main difference being that 
unlike Egypt, Lebanon was small, vulnerable and easily penetrable by outside powers. 
By guaranteeing an Israeli-Lebanese peace agreement America pledged to defend 
Gemayel against his adversaries. In the complex interaction of Mideast politics the 
Americans were now committed to defend the settlement against Syria which was
151 The text of “Jordan’s Statement on Its refusal to Join the Reagan Peace Initiative,” appeared in the 
NYT. 11 April, 1983, p. A12.
152 George W. Ball, Error and Betrayal in Lebanon: An Analysis o f Israel's Invasion of Lebanon and 
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supported by the Soviet Union and the Lebanese Shi’ites who were supported by 
Khomeini’s Iran.153
Tensions were heightened in April 1983 when the American embassy in Beirut was 
bombed killing sixty-three people. Among the dead were seventeen Americans 
including Robert Ames, the CIA’s chief Middle East analyst, and William Casey’s de 
facto  liaison officer to the PLO and an unofficial adviser to Shultz.154 The attack was 
later attributed to Iranian allies of Lebanon.
Two days after the bombing, Shultz flew to Jerusalem with an agreement acceptable 
to the Israeli cabinet. However, Assad, whose views had not yet been sought, 
considered the clause that made Israeli and Syrian troop withdrawal mutually 
dependent on each other, a capitulation to Israel,155 and refused to accept the accord.
Despite Syrian intransigence, on 17 May, Israeli and Lebanese officials signed an 
agreement that terminated the state o f war between the two countries, stipulated 
mutual regard for sovereignty and established a security zone in Southern Lebanon.156 
For Israel, it was a win-win proposition. If  observed, the treaty offered peace, if  
violated, that is if  Syrian and PLO forces remained in Lebanon, Israeli forces could do 
likewise. In this way, the US assumed responsibility for an agreement it could not 
implement.
Following the Soviet rearming of the Syrians, fighting resumed in Beirut. As the 
fighting intensified, the Israelis began to disengage from the Shouf mountains leaving 
the position o f the US Marines exposed. Beginning in September 1983, US offshore 
forces gradually became embroiled in inter-Lebanese battles and the American role 
changed from that of peacekeeper to co-belligerent on the side o f the Lebanese
1 S7Christian forces.
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On 23 October, as tensions between America and Syria escalated, a truck loaded with 
explosives was driven into the compound of the marine barracks. When the truck
I SRexploded, two hundred and forty-one American servicemen were killed. 
Simultaneous attacks were carried out on French and Israeli units. Reagan responded 
with a powerful statement condemning the attack and emphasising the inability o f 
terrorists to change American policy. “The struggle for peace is indivisible. The 
United States will not be intimidated by terrorists,” Reagan declared.159 However, 
immediately following the attack, plans for American troop withdrawal were drawn 
up. The effect of this terrorist attack was to push America back into an alignment 
with Israel and the adoption o f a policy designed to punish Syria.
Within days o f the attack, Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 111, 
outlining the parameters for strategic cooperation between Israel and the US, thereby 
reviving the agreement that had been suspended in December 1981. Under Secretary 
o f State Lawrence Eagleburger believed that by restoring the strategic cooperation 
agreement, the American administration would be better placed to influence Israeli 
decisions that impacted upon American interests.160 Impetus was given to the 
rapprochement between the US and Israel by the Israeli general election and the 
emergence o f Yitzhak Shamir and Moshe Arens as leaders. The change in personnel 
in itself eased tensions between the two governments but made little difference to the 
situation in Lebanon. By early 1984, the politics of re-election were uppermost in the 
minds o f Reagan’s advisers. The death o f American servicemen overseas was 
detrimental to the President’s image and re-election prospects, which contributed to 
the decision to redeploy US forces offshore. Reagan, who had pinned American 
prestige on a stable settlement in Lebanon, now “cut and ran”, removing the most 
tangible sign o f that commitment. In so doing, America abandoned Lebanon to 
factional infighting and the mercy o f its two powerful neighbours.
Despite the tumultuous events in Lebanon, relations between Washington and 
Jerusalem continued virtually unscathed. The next crisis to assail them was inflicted
138 Ibid.. pp. 348-49.
159 Public Papers o f the Presidents: Ronald Reagan. 1983 (Washington, 1985); 24 October 1983.
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by the Reagan administration and was an involved a battle entirely separate from 
those fought in the Middle East.
B itburg, Reagan and the American Jews
Reagan was renowned for his mastery o f political symbolism and impeccable political 
instincts, but his talent appeared to desert him in 1985 when he engaged in a symbolic 
act of reconciliation between the US and the Federal Republic o f Germany, that set 
him on a collision course with the American Jewish community, Israel and Congress.
The furore stemmed from an announcement that Reagan would accept an invitation 
from the West German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, to participate in a symbolic act o f 
reconciliation between Washington and Bonn to mark the 40th anniversary o f V-E 
Day, on 8 May 1945. First reports indicated that the chosen site would be a Nazi 
concentration camp, but this was dropped in favour o f the Kolmeshohe Cemetery at 
Bitburg. A fierce debate erupted when it was revealed that approximately 49 
members o f the Waffen SS were buried at Kolmeshohe.
Requests were made by the Zionist and pro-Jewish lobbies and members o f  the 
American public for Reagan to change his itinerary and the White House received a 
storm o f protests when he refused to do this. As a result, a storm gathered in the US 
Congress in response to protests from angry constituents that spilled out into the 
media and ultimately threatened relationships between Jews, Christians, politicians 
and the governments o f the two countries involved.161
The origins o f the visit dated back to 30 November 1984, when during an informal 
discussion in Washington, Chancellor Kohl invited Reagan to visit Germany during 
the Economic Summit in May. The act o f reconciliation between the two countries 
was to consist o f a handshake and the laying of a wreath at a cemetery where 
American and German soldiers were buried. Unfortunately no one seemed aware that 
the remains of all US soldiers had long since been removed from German soil.
161 Ilya Levkov, Bitburg and Beyond: Encounters in American. German and Jewish history (New York: 
Shapolsky Publishers, 1987) p. 22.
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During the discussion o f the visit, Kohl presented Reagan with a number o f suggested 
sites for inclusion in the itinerary, o f which Dachau concentration camp was one.
Within days of the discussion and without explanation, the Germans asked that
Dachau be withdrawn from the programme and expressed their displeasure when as
late as March 1985 the camp remained on the agenda. To ease tensions between the
governments, on 21 March Reagan announced that he would not visit Dachau because
he didn't want to risk "reawakening the passions of the time" or to offend his hosts.
His aides would later contend that the West Germans were privately pleased with this
decision, implying that Kohl had made the offer only as a courtesy. Yet being
intensely aware o f the need for good public relations and to avoid the perception that
he had succumb to pressure from Bonn, Reagan inadvertently compounded the
situation by stating that “since the German people have very few alive that remember
even the war, and certainly none o f them who were alive and participating in any way,
1[they should not have feelings of] guilt imposed upon them.”
The White House announcement, on 11 April, that Reagan would not visit Dachau but 
would visit Kolmeshohe, gave rise to what was perhaps the worst public relations 
disaster o f his presidency. It appeared that the President was willing to substitute a 
visit to a concentration camp in favour o f  a wreath-laying ceremony near the graves o f 
the Waffen SS who were directly involved in the perpetration o f the Holocaust.164
In an endeavour to defuse the growing tide o f public protest, on 19 April, Reagan 
announced that he would visit a concentration camp and chose Bergen-Belsen, 
explaining the delay in his decision thus: “I thought that there was no way that I, as 
guest of the government [of the Federal Republic o f Germany] ... could on my own 
take off and go some place and, then, run the risk of appearing as if  I was trying to say 
to the Germans, “Look what you did.” He later elaborated on this saying “I think that 
there's nothing wrong with visiting that cemetery where those young men are victims 
o f Nazism also, even though they were fighting in the German uniform, drafted into 
service to carry out the hateful wishes o f the Nazis. They were victims, just as surely
162 PPP 21 March 1985.
163 WP21 March 1985.
164 Levkov, op. cit. p. 24.
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as the victims in the concentration camps."165 The shock of hearing a pro-Israeli 
President equating criminals and victims reverberated around the world.
The legislature’s response to the President’s remarks was swift. In the Congress, 53 
senators, 11 of them Republicans, signed a letter urging him to cancel the visit, while 
257 representatives, including 84 Republicans, signed a letter asking Chancellor Kohl 
to withdraw the invitation. The following day the Senate passed a resolution urging 
the President to reconsider his itinerary.
The Bitburg visit generated unprecedented controversy because it exposed three 
controversial issues to international scrutiny. The first was the American 
commemoration o f the Holocaust. For various reasons, as has been discussed, since 
the 1970s the Holocaust had occupied a sacred place in American consciousness. 
Therefore any act that was considered detrimental to this memory or the uniqueness 
o f the Jewish experience, particularly when it was initiated by the President o f the 
United States, was destined to generate controversy.
The second was the clash between conventional politics and moral considerations. 
Conventional political behaviour is generally based on compromise but when one 
group has a claim to moral absolutism, a compromise is no longer possible. In 
staging a US-German reconciliation at Bitburg, the leaders were perceived as 
somehow diluting the absolute evil o f Nazism.166 The visit to the cemetery was 
transformed into a classic political situation o f confronting contradictory demands 
from unyielding friends. The contemporary presidency, for all the power it wields, 
sometimes operates akin to a brokerage house, where “they owe us one” or “we owe 
them”.167 This held true with regard to Bitburg. Reagan felt he owed Kohl who, 
despite considerable public and political opposition, had stood firm with Reagan on 
the deployment o f Pershing missiles in West Germany a few years earlier, when 
Reagan had been determined to respond to the placement of Soviet missiles that 
threatened Europe. He was also seeking the Chancellor’s support for the Strategic
165 PPP 18 April 1985.
166 Levkov, op. cit. p. 27.
167 Raul Hilberg, “Bitburg as a Symbol” in Geoffrey Hartman (ed.), Bitburg: In Moral and Political 
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Defence Initiative. Kohl, in turn, saw Reagan’s visit as an opportunity to further his 
own political interests and to help secure his victory in the upcoming state elections in 
North Rhineland Westphalia. The events and decisions leading up to and including 
the visit were a product o f conventional politics but touched on an issue in the realm 
o f moral absolutism. In so doing, the circumstances were created in which a clash 
between the administration and the American Jewish community was inevitable.169
The third issue concerned two national memories -  that o f the Jews and that of the
1 70Germans. For the Jews, the memory o f  the Holocaust is inextricably interwoven 
with their concept o f present day Jewish nationhood and for them it is inconceivable 
that the Holocaust should be detached from their national and ethnic experience. The 
efforts o f Reagan and Kohl to change the frame o f reference o f the Holocaust, and by 
implication that memory, was perceived as an affront to Jewish history.171 Set against 
this was the contemporary memory o f  modem Germany that came into existence in 
1949. The modem memory is based on the belief that the Germany o f  today is not 
responsible for the atrocities o f Nazism and that the past should not impinge on the 
moral fibre o f the present day state. Reagan’s visit to a concentration camp was 
therefore, viewed as antithetical to the values o f the German people.
The Bitburg visit impinged upon all three highly contentious issues which begged the 
question o f why Reagan agreed to a state visit that was destined to be highly 
controversial. The answer seems to lie in the fact that the administration’s decision 
was a political not a moral one. The Bitburg visit was about the administration’s 
relationship with Germany and Kohl, and Reagan agreed to the visit before he fully
172understood the implications o f the move he was making. Once Reagan had given 
Kohl his word, it was impossible for him to recant without enduring the political 
fallout that was destined to follow. Perhaps what is most surprising is that a staunchly 
pro-Israeli President would act in such a way as to antagonise both American Jewish 
opinion and the Israelis. But this was never Reagan’s intention and he did not see a 
direct contradiction between a state visit to Germany and his unswerving support for
168 Levkov, op. cit. p. 27.
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the Jewish state. For Reagan, the politics of present day Germany and the Nazi 
Holocaust were two distinct entities and he did not waver in his belief that his visit to 
Bitburg was “morally right.” He was therefore able to endure the storm of protest that
17Tdescended on him.
Bitburg made American Jews both unhappy and uncomfortable.174 It did not cause 
them to doubt the reliability o f the American political system or the good will o f the 
President, but it did make them aware once again o f their vulnerability and how even 
in a democracy the “tune is called on high.” 175 Symbols are of great salience in a 
pluralistic society, and Reagan was perceived to have altered the symbolic reference 
o f the Holocaust, as the ultimate atrocity perpetrated against a distinct ethnic group, 
for which he was never quite forgiven.
From the perspective o f the American people, both the visit and Reagan’s comment 
that SS members were themselves victims o f Nazism were out o f kilter with popular 
opinion. Popular productions such as ABC/TV’s 1983 The Winds o f  War that re­
enacted graphic scenes from the Final Solution including the Babi Yar massacre o f 
thirty thousand Jews outside Kiev, provided the generally accepted, and expected,
177media representations o f the Holocaust. The visit was even more inappropriate as 
the ensuing public debate coincided with the release of Claude Lanzmann’s 
documentary film Shoah based on first-hand accounts and probing interviews with 
Holocaust survivors and non-Jewish bystanders. With a running time o f nine hours 
and twenty-three minutes, Shoah was not intended for a mass audience but provided a 
quality representation o f the Holocaust sought by intellectuals. Its commercial release 
received an outstanding critique and due to its length and complexity most public
1 TO
knowledge o f the film was derived from such sources.
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Although over time the Bitburg controversy was sidelined, its ramifications continued 
to be felt by the American Jewish community.179 But the intention of the Reagan 
administration was never to undermine US relations with Israel and, three years later, 
when Israel became involved in one o f the most controversial human rights issues o f 
its history, the Reagan White House stood firmly by its side.
The Intifada and the Shultz Plan
In more than thirty-five years of occupation o f the West Bank and Gaza, Israel had 
not considered the costs excessive and life for the Palestinians and the Israeli settlers 
had assumed some type o f routine. But the illusion that “Palestinian docility under 
occupation would go on forever” 180 was shattered on 8 December 1988 when in the 
Jebaliya refugee camp in Gaza, an Israeli vehicle crashed into an automobile carrying 
Palestinians to work in Israel. Four Palestinians were killed and eight others seriously 
injured. A Palestinian leaflet circulated in Gaza that day denouncing the Israeli action 
and when the funerals were held that evening stones were thrown at a nearby Israeli 
military post. Angry protests erupted the following day and Israeli military patrols 
were stoned and petrol bombed by Palestinian youths. In response, Israeli soldiers
1 Q I
fired lived ammunition and two Arabs were killed, including a schoolboy.
The disturbances or Intifada as it became known spread to the West Bank and it soon
1 R9became clear that something “qualitatively new” was happening. The spontaneity
1of the Intifada caught the PLO leadership by surprise but they quickly endorsed it 
and gave the appearance o f coordinating the protests with the United National 
Leadership o f the Uprising, as the internal leadership referred to itself. Israeli 
Defence Minister Rabin was in Washington when the fighting broke out and “the 
issue was discussed at almost every meeting Rabin was to have, be it with the press,
179 Author’s interview with Norman Podhoretz. Some authors like Norman Finkelstein take the view 
that because the avowed concern o f American Jews for the Holocaust was contrived for use as a “chip 
in a high-stakes power game” they quickly forgave Reagan for visit to Bitburg. See Norman G. 
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184his advisers or American officials, both in Congress and the administration.” CBS 
footage o f Israeli soldiers beating Palestinian youths was broadcast world-wide and 
even Reagan was said to be concerned about the disturbances.185
One o f the first criticisms o f Israel’s response to the Intifada came on 17 December 
1987 from the Office of the US Secretary o f State, which described Israel’s actions as 
sometimes inconsistent with international standards. For the Israeli government, overt 
lack o f support from Washington was both unexpected and unwelcome. This 
condemnation was followed up on 22 December when the UN Security Council voted 
unanimously (the US abstained) in favour o f a resolution deploring the lack o f respect 
for human rights Israel was exhibiting by opening fire on civilians and implementing 
wholesale detention without trial, over 900 Palestinians having been taken into 
custody since the Intifada began. On 3 January 1988 when Israel served deportation 
orders on nine Palestinians who were accused o f subversive activities, the UN 
Security Council approved a resolution condemning the deportations, and on this 
occasion the US supported the motion -  this was the first time the US had voted 
against Israel in the Security Council since 1981, when Israel annexed the Golan
1 8AHeights. Nevertheless, further deportation orders followed.
Despite international censure, the Israeli leadership intensified their violent response
to the crisis. On the 17 January the Israeli cabinet endorsed an “iron fist” policy, the
first priority o f which, according to Rabin “was to use might, power and beatings” to
restore order.187 These violent methods provoked revulsion in the US and televised
pictures o f children using slingshots and hurling rocks at fully armed Israeli soldiers
generated sympathy for the Palestinians and improved the moral standing o f the
188Palestinian cause worldwide. The use o f lethal force aroused condemnation in the 
West and sentiment grew that the US government should do something to bring peace 
to the area. From this point on, foreign journalists found it increasingly difficult to
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1 RQobtain official permits to cover incidents or gain information about them. Even 
Reagan publicly condemned Israeli press censorship and by implication its policy o f 
violent retaliation. “I’m a great believer in a free press and the right o f people to 
know, and so I would have to be opposed to it, [banning television coverage] thinking 
that they want to conduct operations in which they would rather not have public 
knowledge.” 190
Given the fate which had befallen the Reagan Plan, Shultz was reluctant to commit 
American prestige to another Middle East peace plan without some guarantee o f 
success. The President and his Secretary o f State had never considered movement 
towards a peace accord as a crucial objective in the region. To them, Cold War 
regional balance o f power concerns took precedence. As an Israeli diplomat 
intimately involved in the talks with the US noted: “In the eight Reagan years you 
didn’t have the feeling that he was a President who lost any sleep over the lack o f a 
peace process in the Middle East.” 191 But public opinion was pushing the 
administration towards intervention, while the Egyptian government warned that the 
Intifada could lead to the radicalisation o f the entire region.
In February 1988, Shultz visited Israel with a hastily-drafted peace plan largely based 
on the Camp David Accords. It called for six months o f negotiations -  to commence 
on 1 May -  between Israeli and joint Jordanian-PLO delegations. The objective o f 
the plan was Palestinian autonomy which would be implemented over a period o f 
three years. The process was to begin with an international conference, which would 
include the five permanent members o f the UN Security Council and representatives
1 Q9from all the countries involved. A final settlement was to be based on Resolutions
242 and 338. But its concentration upon Jordan as the principal negotiator for the
Palestinians and the inclusion of the “land for peace” formula which was unacceptable
1 0^to the Likud, meant that the plan was fatally flawed.
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190 Public Papers o f the Presidents: Ronald Reagan. 1988 (Washington. 1989) 10 March 1988, p. 314.
191 Y. Melman and D. Raviv, Friends in Deed: Inside the US-lsraeli Alliance (New York: Hyperion, 
1994) p. 408.
192 O’Balance, op. cit. p. 38.
193 Hunter, op. cit. p. 150.
296
In the months that followed his initiative, Shultz worked determinedly to overcome 
the objections o f Israel and the Arabs. His biggest obstacle was Shamir who stated 
his “strong reservations concerning the proposed international conference which ... is 
not conducive to peace.” 194 Despite repeated displays o f intransigence, the 
administration was reluctant to pressurise Shamir because o f their special regard for 
Israel. Starting from a position of sympathy, Reagan and Shultz tended to accept the 
procedural and ‘security’ concerns o f Shamir and the Likud as genuine, particularly as 
these points reinforced their own feelings as to the unreliability o f the Arab 
moderates. The fact that in contrast to Begin and Sharon, Shamir and Arens had a 
pragmatic style and that Arens in particular was skilled at presenting the Likud case in 
Cold War/neo-conservative terms, served to reinforce this tendency. Only when 
Shamir publicly stated in 1988 that the exchange of territory for peace was foreign to 
him, did Shultz reach the conclusion that the Likud were using procedure as an 
excuse.195 Only then was pressure considered, and by then it was too late.
Although American Jewish leaders, distressed by daily television images coming 
from Israel, had reportedly played a significant role in persuading Shultz to resume an 
active American role in reviving the moribund peace process, they were unwilling to 
pressurise Israel to accept specific American proposals. This was in keeping with 
their traditional view that since the Israelis had to bear the risks o f any concessions, a 
peace agreement should be the result o f direct Arab-Israeli negotiations. At the same 
time, however, there was growing concern amongst the Jewish leadership that the 
Likud should not be perceived as obstructive to the administrations efforts to reach a 
peace settlement. To bring the message home to Shamir, on the eve o f his visit to 
Washington in March 1988, thirty senators, including many of Israel’s staunchest 
supporters, sent a letter to Secretary Shultz “to express our support for your efforts to 
break the dangerous Middle East stalemate that has led to the current cycle o f 
violence and counter violence.” 196 The letter reflected their misgivings over the
iy4PPP 16 March 1988, p. 343.
195 Shultz, op. cit. p. 1026.
196 George Gruen, “Impact of the Intifada on American Jews” in Robert O. Freedman, (ed.), The 
Intifada: its impact on Israel, the Arab world, and the superpowers (Florida: Florida International 
University Press, 1991) p. 238.
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stalemated peace process that had become widespread among their constituents and 
their preference for a “land for peace” formula to end the uprising.197
The US and the PLO
The success o f the Shultz Plan, as the initiative was dubbed, was dependent upon the 
cooperation o f King Hussein of Jordan, which Shultz tried to secure during four visits 
to the Middle East in the first half o f 1988. However, in exerting pressure on Hussein 
to endorse the plan he ignored the complex regional pressures operating on the King 
and succeeded only in reinforcing his desire to extricate his kingdom from the 
negotiations. On 31 July, in an official statement, King Hussein relinquished all 
Jordan’s legal and administrative ties to the West Bank, stating that the PLO would
1 Oftnow be responsible for the Palestinians residing there.
The Intifada, which prompted Hussein’s disengagement from the West Bank, 
shattered the American complacency that surrounded the ‘peace process’ and proved 
that peace could not be made between the Arabs and Israel without the consent and 
participation o f the people most directly involved -  the Palestinians themselves.199 
After the King’s speech it became apparent that the peace process could only remain 
alive if it sprang from Palestinian-Israeli discussions. Yet with both the Labour Party 
and the Likud bloc firmly set against talks with the PLO, the initiative once again fell 
on the White House.
The idea o f establishing direct talks between Washington and the PLO had been 
deliberated in the past and as early as 1974 Kissinger had authorised meetings 
between the PLO and Vernon Walters o f  the CLA.200 But after Kissinger’s declaration 
in 1975 that the US would not recognise or negotiate with the PLO until it 
acknowledged Israel’s right to exist, renounced terrorism and accepted Resolution
197 In May 1989 a New York Times/CBS poll asked a national American sample, “Do you believe 
Israel has done enough to prove that it is interest in peace, or hasn’t it done enough?” 17% voted ‘Yes’, 
while 70% o f respondents voted ‘N o’. See “The New York Times/CBS News Poll Foreign Policy 
Survey, May 9-11 1989 cited in George Gruen, “Impact o f the Intifada on American Jews” in Robert 
O. Freedman, (ed.), The Intifada: Its impact on Israel, the Arab world, and the superpowers (Florida: 
Florida International University Press, 1991) p. 240.
198 Sachar, op. cit. p. 960.
199 Hunter, op. cit. p. 149.
200 Quandt Peace Process p. 368.
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242, contacts had been rare. By 1989 circumstances were propitious for a change in 
strategy and if  somewhat unexpectedly it was the pro-Israeli Reagan and his equally 
pro-Israeli Secretary of State that reversed US policy. The establishment o f a 
dialogue between Washington and the PLO would enable Jerusalem to talk indirectly 
with the PLO without having to alter its official posture. Washington was aware that 
Arafat was seeking to establish a dialogue, not just to gain further legitimacy for his 
organisation but in an endeavour to secure a role for the PLO in future peace 
negotiations. If talks could be established, America stood to gain as it would acquire 
new leverage over the PLO as both Israel and the PLO would be forced to rely upon 
it. If real progress were ever achieved, the US administration could take full credit,
901without having to share accolades with the UN or any other world power.
One obstacle remained to opening a US-PLO dialogue and that was the 1975 
commitment to Israel in which the US had pledged that it would not negotiate with 
the PLO until it acknowledged Israel’s right to exist and accepted resolution 242. The 
Reagan administration adopted a legalistic approach to the PLO’s adherence to these 
criteria, insisting that Arafat say certain words. In return, Shultz pledged that 
Washington would announce that it was prepared to begin substantive discussions 
with the PLO and that the Palestinians had the “right to pursue an independent state 
through negotiations.” On 14 December at a special session o f the UN in Geneva, 
convened specifically to hear Arafat who was prohibited as a terrorist from entering 
the US,203 he met the American conditions when he stated his acceptance of:
The right o f  all parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to exist in peace and security 
... including the state o f Palestine, Israel and other neighbours according to the resolution 
242 and 338.
As for terrorism, I renounced it yesterday in no uncertain terms, and yet, I repeat for the 
record that we totally and absolutely renounce all forms o f terrorism, including individual, 
group, and state terrorism.204 
In response, Reagan approved the commencement of US-PLO discussions at the level 
o f the American ambassador in Tunisia, and Washington lifted the ban on dealing
90Swith the PLO. Reagan defended his administration’s decision, which was objected
201 Hunter, op. cit. p. 159.
202 Quandt Peace Process p. 373.
203 Sachar, op. cit. p. 975
204 Yassir Arafat, quoted in Quandt Peace Process p. 375.
205 Quandt Peace Process p. 375.
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to by members o f the Likud, on the basis that it would “help Israel achieve the 
recognition and security it deserves.”
Despite this breakthrough, by the autumn of 1988, any practical plans for the peace 
process ran afoul o f the campaign season for national elections in both Israel and the 
US, which fortuitously coincided in early November. In Israel, another inconclusive 
vote eventually produced another divided National Unity Government, this time with
207the reins o f foreign policy more firmly in Likud’s hands. In the US, the landslide 
victory o f George Bush, the first incumbent Vice President elected since Martin Van 
Buren, a century and a half before, promised a considerable measure o f continuity in 
foreign policy. The political reality confronting the Bush administration was that the 
Intifada had greatly increased the salience of Arab-Israeli conflict management 
without indicating a better means to that end.208
Explaining the Reagan Administration’s Response to the Intifada
While it might appear that the Reagan administration had done little to condemn 
Israel’s “iron fist” policy in Gaza and the West Bank, a significant departure did occur 
from the usual convivial tone o f the relationship. Reagan reiterated his concern for 
“the human rights of the Palestinians ... and made it clear that we [America] oppose 
deportations and any denial o f the due process o f law.”209 He also condemned any 
policy that the government o f Israel would want to conceal through press censorship 
and highlighted the “legitimate rights o f the Palestinians” in the 1988 State o f  the
7 1 0Union Address. More significantly, Reagan took the virtually unprecedented step 
o f authorising the US representative at the UN to vote in favour o f a resolution 
sanctioning Israel.
Despite these relatively superficial moments of dissension, the US-Israeli alliance 
remained firm throughout the period o f the Intifada and aid levels remained
206 PPP 15 December 1988, p. 1627.
207 David Pollock, “The American Response to the Intifada” in Robert O. Freedman, (ed.), The 
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unaffected. Although the widely used analogy o f Israel as the tiny David fighting the 
Goliath of the Arab world was no longer appropriate, the sympathy Reagan felt for 
the Jewish state and the commitment o f the American Jewish community and the 
administration did not falter. To criticise the actions o f an ally is one thing but to take 
action to force it to change its policies is quite another. In reality, the most the 
administration did was to antagonise the Likud by advancing a peace plan that 
favoured a final status outcome o f the Palestinian question that was almost identical to 
Labour’s official position. As one Israeli official noted, the biggest problem for
^ I 1
Likud was: “How can we get him [Shultz] to go home and stay home?”
The reason why Israeli violations o f Palestinian human rights in the occupied 
territories elicited a relatively muted response is rooted in American culture and 
common perceptions o f the world. A statement Reagan made in 1983 is very 
revealing o f this:
It’s no coincidence that the same forces which are destabilising the Middle East -  the Soviet 
Union, Libya, the PLO -  are also working hand in glove with Cuba to destabilise Central 
America. ... The question isn’t who has the most perfect democracy. The question is, 
who’s trying to build democracy and who is determined to destroy it. Many nations, 
including the United States, which once condoned slavery, have evolved into better 
democracies over time.212 
Even though Israel had demonstrated itself to be an imperfect democracy, it 
remained a democratic state that was firmly aligned with American values and 
interests.
Americans are quick to support any ally that is considered important to their country, 
particularly when that ally’s values are consistent with their own. Under these 
circumstances they will treat their ally’s defects in the same way they treat their own 
country’s defects: with dissatisfaction but with the acceptance that some events are 
unavoidable necessities. Americans who thought that Israel was ill-treating the 
Palestinians continued to support it because they believed that “politically evil acts are 
mitigated through the creation and maintenance o f politically righteous societies.”213 
Those Americans who say they are proud o f their country but are ashamed o f some
211 Shultz, op. cit. p. 1023.
212 PPP p. 848, 10 June 1983. Remarks at the Annual Convention of the Anti-Defamation League of  
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aspects o f its past or even its present are accepting this proposition. This same 
proposition is applied to Israel as while Americans, and even Reagan and his advisors, 
did not necessarily approve of all Israel’s actions, they continued to perceive it as a 
politically righteous society, deserving o f their support.214 The subordination o f the 
human rights o f the ‘enemy’ in the pursuit o f state security was deemed if  not 
acceptable then at least tolerable by the administration and was a mode o f behaviour 
subsequently adopted by Washington in dealing with suspected al-Qaeda suspects in 
2002-03.
Reagan and the Neo-Conservatives
Reagan’s continued support for Israel was greeted with relief by the neo­
conservatives who had increasingly criticised his foreign policy since January 1984 
when the White House abandoned its confrontational policy towards Moscow and 
began seeking a rapprochement. The transformation o f Reagan from the “chief 
spokesman for realism in defence issues into a quixotic advocate o f nuclear 
disarmament”215 was anathema to his conservative core constituency. The neo­
conservatives were unhappy with Reagan for failing to live up to the promise he had 
held out in 1981. Not only had there been no roll-back, no sanctions o f note against 
the Soviet Union and no attempt to challenge Soviet control o f Eastern Europe, the 
US had even abandoned the propaganda war which, at least, had been endorsed by 
John Foster Dulles. The deputy programme director o f the Voice o f America who 
had wanted to ‘destabilise’ the Soviet Union and its satellites by promoting 
‘disaffection between people and rulers’ was forced to resign.
Admittedly, the President’s fundamental belief that the battle between Communism 
and democracy was the axis upon which international politics turned and that US- 
Soviet Union relations were central to his understanding o f international politics
1 1 firemained unaltered. What had changed during his second term in office was not
213 Earl Raab, “Is the Jewish Community Split?” Commentary vol. 74, no. 3, March 1982, p. 23.
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his perception o f the evil o f Communism but his image of the Kremlin under 
President Mikhail Gorbachev. As Gorbachev embarked on a process o f domestic 
liberalisation and sought to integrate the Soviet Union into the world economy, 
Reagan began to differentiate the Soviet leadership from “Communists” more 
generally, although they were part o f a Communist government.
With a more congenial government in the Kremlin, Reagan turned his attention to 
nuclear arms reduction. He felt that the development o f nuclear weapons represented
917a step backward for mankind and wrote in his memoirs: “Looking back at the 
recent history o f the world, I find it amazing how civilisation has retrogressed so
7  1 Rquickly.” Existing arms control treaties did little to mitigate the threat o f nuclear 
war that hung over the world. Underpinning the President’s abhorrence o f  nuclear 
weapons and MAD was his fascination with the biblical story o f Armageddon.219 To 
Reagan’s mind, the existence o f nuclear weapons threatened people around the globe 
and he rejected traditional approaches to arms control, such as SALT I and SALT II, 
which limited the growth o f nuclear arsenals, so that some kind o f balance between 
the superpowers was maintained. Reagan wanted to reduce those arsenals and he 
embarked on a series o f summits with Gorbachev to achieve this goal.220
Reagan’s policy reversal achieved its stated goal o f abolishing whole classes o f 
nuclear missiles, but provoked condemnation within the right-wing o f the Republican 
Party who described him as “lacking the moral self-confidence to pursue measures for 
the nations defence.”221 Yet what they failed to appreciate, and what Reagan seemed 
to understand, was that Washington was now operating from a position o f  strength in 
its dealings with Moscow. Despite the popular appeal o f  Gorbachev, the US held 
most o f the cards. In 1969, the US had been engaged in Vietnam while tacitly
Ibid.,p. 103.
2,8 Ronald Reagan, An American Life (London: Hutchinson, 1990) p. 549.
219 Fischer, op. cit. p. 106.
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supporting a string o f dictatorships against left-wing forces. In the 1980s, the Soviet 
Union was saddled with a string o f  weak, precarious allies and economic distress. 
Washington held the key to Moscow’s access to the global economy through its 
control of the world’s commodity and currency markets and Reagan used economic 
incentives as a source o f leverage to secure reductions in nuclear weapons.
Reagan’s commitment to arms reduction did not mean that he was willing to bargain 
away the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) for an arms control treaty as some neo­
conservatives had feared. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), 
which Reagan and Gorbachev signed, was designed to eliminate intermediate-range 
and shorter-range missiles. While this was disastrous for the Europeans who relied on 
these weapons for their protection, it was a triumph for the hardliners in Washington. 
The neo-conservatives wished to dilute extended deterrence, while concentrating on a 
qualitative conventional arms race which would enable the US to confine a war with 
the Soviet Union to Europe, and prevail on the battlefield without recourse to nuclear 
weapons. Reagan understood that opposition to nuclear arms reductions would not be 
offset by the tremendous increase in spending on conventional weapons but he
maintained that it was his role to convince the public that his approach was in
000America’s interests. While he may have been successful with the public at large, 
the neo-conservatives did not acknowledge the foresight of his policy until after Bush 
took office and the Soviet Union collapsed.
Yet the neo-conservatives fear that arms control would lead the administration to 
renege on its other foreign policy commitments was without foundation and 
throughout his term in office Reagan did not waver in his support for Israel.
Conclusions
“Israel has never had a greater friend in the White House than Ronald Reagan” is the 
opening line of Haig’s memoirs. Four years later, in 1988, Israel’s Premier Shamir 
echoed similar sentiments: “This is the most friendly administration we have ever 
worked with. They are determined that the strong friendship and cooperation will
222 Ib id . ,P -61.
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continue and even be strengthened despite the differences that crop up from time to 
time.” “ Similar sentiments spoken by both American and Israeli leaders reflected 
the fundamentals of the relationship during the Reagan presidency. Such sentiments 
were deeply felt by Reagan himself. On the occasion of welcoming Premier Begin to 
Washington in September 1981 he said, “I welcome this chance to further strengthen 
the unbreakable ties between the United States and Israel and to assure you of our 
commitment to Israel’s security and well-being.”224 Reagan, of all the American 
Presidents, undoubtedly had the greatest sense o f affinity for the state o f Israel and, 
George Lenczowski concluded that he “strove to form an almost symbiotic 
relationship with Israel.”225 Yet despite this, policy throughout his presidency 
exhibited many similarities to that pursued by previous administrations toward the 
Arab-Israeli dispute.
Throughout Reagan’s two terms in office, relations with Israel figured prominently on 
the US foreign policy agenda. This was predominately attributable to Israel’s 
propensity for transforming its own security concerns, through unilateral action, into a 
potential Mideast crisis. On numerous occasions, Israel’s pursuit o f her own security 
interests led to tensions with Washington because American and Israeli national 
interests were not identical. However, the Reagan administration’s condemnation o f 
Israeli transgressions was always relatively muted and short-lived when compared to 
the extent and possible consequences o f Israel’s perceived misdemeanours and human 
rights violations during the invasion o f Lebanon and the Intifada. This is attributable 
to a number o f factors.
Firstly, many o f the tensions that arose between the US and Israel during the Reagan 
administration were a product o f the two states divergent geostrategic and political 
priorities, due to their differing status within the international hierarchy and the 
consequent difference in perceptions o f the international system. As a small state, 
Israel had the luxury o f concentrating on a narrow range o f vital interests and 
disregarding almost everything else. It could also disregard or discount the effects o f 
its actions on the stability o f international politics in general. For example, Israel did
223 W P22 April 1988.
224 PPP 9 September 1981, p. 767.
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not need to consider the global implications o f a war with an Arab state. When an 
Arab-Israeli dispute occurred the US would support Israel while the Soviet Union 
would back the Arab states. This type o f indirect confrontation between the 
superpowers had the potential to escalate into a full-blown US-Soviet conflict. As in 
the case o f the bombing of Osiraq and the annexation of the Golan Heights, Israel had 
acted unilaterally in its own interests without prior consultation with Washington. In 
so doing, it had failed to acknowledge the extent to which its actions affected 
Washington, causing Reagan great disillusionment and consternation.
Secondly, one o f the notable phenomena of international relations during the Cold 
War was that alliances had a curious way of increasing the leverage o f small states in
7 7 6their dealings with the big. It ceased to be the case that the “possession o f superior 
military or economic force [could] guarantee small-power compliance with big-power 
interests.”227 In an increasingly interdependent world bristling with nuclear weapons, 
lesser allies were not only able to act independently, they were also able to use 
alliances to influence the policy o f Great Powers and to alter the latter’s policy 
perspectives. Both Hanoi and Havana successfully exercised leverage over Moscow 
from time to time, while the extent o f Jerusalem’s influence over Washington has 
been sufficient, in certain cases, to alter American perceptions o f  its national interest. 
In part, this was attributable to the open and pluralist nature o f the American political 
system which allowed interest groups to influence political decisions and also to the 
perception o f the Communist challenge.
Thirdly, on assuming the presidency in 1981, the most powerful initial assumption o f
Reaganism concerned the nature o f the international system and o f  the American role
within it. Throughout his presidency Reagan was forced to come to terms with
reality, and foreign policy premises were transformed by January 1989 when Reagan 
228left office. For the first two years o f his presidency, Soviet ideology was seen as 
the central threat to international order, and the President saw it as America’s duty to 
support what he termed “forces o f freedom” in international conflicts, utilising 
economic strength and national morale to provide the sinews o f international
226 Robert O’Keohane, “The Big Influence o f Small Allies”, Foreign Policy (Spring 1975), no. 2, p. 23.
227 Ibid., p. 24.
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assertiveness. For example, George Ball asserted that Reagan’s simplistic approach 
to the complex problems o f the Lebanese crisis was influenced by his conviction that 
the Soviet Union and the ideology o f Marxism-Leninism, were the primary cause o f 
world tensions. Inspired by this belief, he employed a convoluted logic to produce a 
curious symbiosis. The fact that the Druze obtained arms for Damascus made them 
surrogates o f the Syrians. The Syrians in turn obtained arms from Moscow, which 
made them surrogates o f the Soviets. It could therefore be deduced that a successful 
Druze repulse o f the Maronites would be a triumph for the Soviet Union which, from 
Reagan’s perspective, was seeking to extend its influence in the Middle East. It was 
this “geopolitical gloss” that gave the crisis in Lebanon its importance and news 
worthiness.229
But even with the evolution o f Reagan’s perception o f the Soviet Union and the de- 
escalation o f tension between the superpowers, his support for Israel remained firm. 
This is attributable to one o f the most fundamental aspects o f the relationship: the 
prevalent belief that Israel was a politically righteous society and was deserving o f 
Washington’s virtually unconditional support.
When Reagan left office in 1988, Vice-President George Bush succeeded him, and it 
could therefore have been assumed that US policy toward the Middle East would have 
continued in a similar vein. However, Bush was to preside over an era o f great 
change in the international system, characterised by the disintegration o f the Soviet 
Union and the US led war in the Gulf against Iraq. These changes were further 
accentuated by Bush’s very different personal feelings for Israel. For these reasons, it 
might have been expected that US policy toward Israel during the 1990s would be 
markedly different from that o f the past. Superficially at least this appeared to be the 
case. What had been described as Reagan’s overvaluation o f Israel as a strategic asset 
and the underinvestment in peace-making were reversed under Bush, but at a 
fundamental level many consistencies remained.
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Chapter 7
Bush, the Gulf War and Israel
Like most individuals, historians and journalists can be very selective in their 
interpretation and recollection o f events. Nowhere is this more the case than in 
popular perceptions o f the policy o f the George Bush Sr. administration toward Israel. 
While Bush was never the popular choice amongst American Jews, securing only 29 
percent o f their vote in the presidential election,1 no one in 1989 would have accused 
him of being anti-Israeli. After all, Bush’s Middle East team included four American 
Jews, Dennis Ross, Aaron Miller, Daniel Kurtzer and Richard Haass, who were 
emotionally committed to the Jewish state and who devised much o f the 
administration’s policy toward the region.4 During the course o f his administration, 
Bush adopted a peace plan proposed by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, 
incapacitated Iraq, Israel’s most threatening neighbour, albeit temporarily, and 
convened a peace conference that enabled Israel to negotiate directly with her Arab 
neighbours while prohibiting the attendance o f PLO representatives.5 Yet by the end 
o f his term in office, George Bush was considered by the pro-Israel lobby and many 
American Jews to have been the most anti-Israeli President to occupy the White 
House. As will be shown however, the reality was very different from the common 
perception and the fundamental position o f the Bush administration toward an Arab- 
Israeli peace agreement did not differ markedly from that adopted by Johnson in 
1967.
Few Presidents have assumed office with more impressive foreign affairs credentials 
than Bush. He was former director o f the Central Intelligence Agency, head o f the 
American diplomatic mission to China and ambassador to the United Nations and had 
spent eight years as Vice-President under Ronald Reagan.6 He had also been elected 
to Congress, was a Texas businessman and had been national chairman o f the
1 NYT Thomas L. Friedman, “Special Relationship Reaches Its Limits,” 21 October 1990.
2 William Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 
(Washington D.C. & Berkeley, Los Angeles: The Brookings Institute, & University of California Press, 
1993) p. 388.
3 Newsweek 1 June 1992, p. 57.
4 Ibid.. p. 57.
5 NYT 16 May 1992 p. 2.
6 Quandt, op. cit. p. 383.
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Republican Party. Yet, while Bush’s credentials were impressive, they revealed little 
about his own views of foreign affairs in general or the Arab-Israeli conflict in 
particular. It was common knowledge that he had been critical of Israel’s bombing o f 
Osiraq and had recommended that Reagan take a hard line against Israel following the 
invasion o f Lebanon in 1982.7 He was on good terms with the Saudi ambassador to 
Washington, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, and in the mid-1980s had travelled to Riyadh 
to urge the Saudis not to allow the price o f oil to fall.8 It was also rumoured, and 
based on the available evidence, that Bush did not share Reagan’s emotional 
attachment to Israel, but given the depth o f Reagan’s personal affinity for the Jewish 
state, this was insufficient grounds to consider him anti-Israeli.
When Bush was elected President in 1988, early commentators described it as 
Reagan’s third term. But these neo-conservatives were soon to be disappointed 
because Bush’s brand o f conservatism was marked by tradition and moderation in 
contrast to the ideologically motivated approach o f his predecessor.9 He defined his 
own political creed as conservatism and as Vice-President had told the Ripon Society, 
a moderate Republican research and policy organisation, that “I am a conservative. I 
voted along conservative lines when I was in Congress. I took conservative positions 
before assuming this job. I take conservative positions now.” 10 There is little doubt 
that in the broadest sense of the word, Bush was a conservative. He tended to favour 
the status quo and resist innovation and perceived o f the role o f government in limited 
terms. Yet there were many on the right o f the Republican Party who challenged his 
claim to the conservative label. These were the same people who had criticised 
Reagan’s policy o f rapprochement with Moscow until it contributed to the fall o f the 
Soviet Union and they once again became devotees to Reaganism.
Bush’s early commitment to conservatism was a product o f his upbringing combined 
with his early experience of living and working in Texas. His life was marked by 
wealth and privilege. He was raised in Greenwich, Connecticut, the second son o f a
7 MECS 1989. p . 15
8 Ibid.. p. 384.
9 Author’s interview with Norman Podhoretz, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute and former editor-in- 
chief o f Commentary 1960-95 and Marshall Breger, special assistant to President Reagan and his 
liaison to the Jewish Community, 1982-84.
10 Robert Shogan, The Riddle of Power: presidential Leadership from Truman to Bush (New York: 
Dutton, 1991) p. 259.
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wealthy investment banker and attended the elite educational establishment o f
Andover. He served with distinction as a bomber pilot during the Second World War
and completed his education at Yale thereafter. Although he exhibited little interest in
politics in his early years, he did acquire the values and attitudes that would later
become politically relevant.11 He embodied the “Eastern establishment creed” which
was based on the maxims o f ‘the meek shall inherit the earth’, ‘real men don’t boast’,
‘it’s more blessed to give than to receive,’ and ‘public service is the purpose for 
12entering politics.’ Bush’s father personified this creed and despite working long 
hours as a businessman he set aside time for voluntary community work and 
impressed upon his children the obligation o f the privileged to enter public service. 
At the age o f 55 his father entered the Senate where he proved to be a moderate 
conservative with a commitment to the status quo. An overt emphasis on duty and 
public service was commensurate with the lack o f vision that Bush was often charged 
with.13
The conservatism in which Bush was raised was moderate, in the sense o f being 
largely content with society and government as they were and against radical change, 
non-confrontational and relatively non-ideological, marked by civility, compassion 
and community.14 However, more than two decades o f life in Texas exposed him to a 
very different type o f conservatism. After graduation from Yale in 1948, he moved to 
Texas where he began work as a trainee in the oil industry. It was here that he came 
under the influence o f a very different conservative tradition, based on the 
individualistic political culture of the Southwest. In this environment, the role models 
were not the traditional well bom and bred elite, but self-made men from inauspicious 
beginnings who had carved their fortune in a region where unfettered capitalism m led 
and all forms o f  government were despised.15 In this part o f America a neo-populist 
brand o f conservatism dominated. It was harsher than its Eastern counterpart, lacking 
the sense o f moderation and compassion and untempered by the belief in public 
service and duty. This was the brand o f conservatism advocated by Barry Goldwater 
and that came into its own under the Reagan administration. Although his exposure
11 George Bush with Victor Gold, Looking Forward (London: The Bodley Head, 1988) p. 81.
12 Fitzhugh Green, George Bush: An Intimate Portrait (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1991) p. 78.
13 David Mervin, George Bush and the Guardianship Presidency (London: Macmillan, 1996) p. 17.
14 ibid., p. 17.
15 Ibid.. p. 18.
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to this sort of conservatism had an impact, Bush remained predominantly a product o f 
his upbringing, an inheritance that was evident throughout his presidency.
One character trait that was to be o f considerable note throughout his presidency was 
the emphasis Bush placed on personal relationships rather than political ideas. As his 
elder son, the current President of the US explained: “The problem with my old man 
is that he thinks you can solve problems one at a time, with good character, good 
judgement, a good team, and all that stuff. Jebby and I understand that you need 
ideas, principles, based on belief.” 16 Bush was a “pragmatist more attuned to the
I 7interpersonal dynamics o f politics than devoted to ideology” and this lack o f interest 
in ideas was to haunt him throughout his presidency because it was interpreted as a 
lack o f ‘vision’.
While much has been made o f the insignificance o f the office o f the Vice-President, 
Reagan made noteworthy use of Bush for foreign policy purposes. By the spring o f 
1987 Bush had been on official visits to 73 countries, improved his comprehension o f 
international issues and expanded the network o f personal contacts that were to be
I ftcrucial to the conduct of his administration’s foreign policy.
One essential requirement o f the office o f the Vice-President is the sacrifice o f 
independence and the adoption o f a position o f complete deference to the President. 
Bush was meticulous in meeting this requirement and despite having campaigned for 
the Republican Party nomination on a platform at odds with Reaganism, on accepting 
the position as Reagan’s running mate he told his staff: “We’re now a wholly owned 
subsidiary and we’re going to behave like one.” 19 In the long term this was a prudent 
move and demonstrative o f a certain amount o f vision for the fulfilment o f his 
personal objective at least. His presidential ambitions demanded that he not alienate 
the right-wing Republicans who already doubted his neo-conservative credentials, but 
were a vital element in the coalition required for his 1988 election campaign.
16 George W. Bush, quoted in Ruth Shalit, “What I Saw at the Devolution”, Reason 9 March 1993, pp. 
27-33, cited in Mervin, op. cit. p. 20.
17 Ronald Elving, “House Service Set Course for New President”, Congressional Quarterly Weekly 
Report 14 January 1989, pp. 55-57.
18 Bush, op. cit. p. 234.
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Soon after taking office, Bush publicly expressed sentiments that were anathema to 
Reaganites who disliked extensive institutions of government and all they 
represented. When speaking to an audience o f senior career bureaucrats in the federal 
government, he told them: “You are one o f the most important groups I will ever 
speak to. What we really have in common is that each of us is here to serve the 
American people. Each of us is here because o f a belief in public service as the 
highest and noblest calling.20
Bush selected like-minded individuals to be his closest advisors. As Secretary o f 
State, he appointed James A. Baker III, a close personal friend and political ally o f 
more than thirty years. Baker had extensive political credentials. He had managed 
Bush’s unsuccessful Senate campaign in 1970 and on the latter’s recommendation 
was appointed Under Secretary o f State for Commerce in the Ford administration. He 
then ran Ford’s election campaign in 1976 and did likewise for Bush in 1980. During 
Reagan’s first term he served as Chief o f Staff and in 1985 was appointed Secretary
y io f the Treasury before managing Bush’s successful bid for the presidency in 1988. 
Bush appointed Brent Scowcroft as his National Security Adviser. Scowcroft had a
I
Ph.D. in international relations and was an Air Force lieutenant general, prior to 
becoming Henry Kissinger’s deputy at the National Security Council (NSC). He later 
became National Security Adviser in the Ford administration. This coincided with 
Bush’s appointment as Director o f the Central Intelligence Agency where Scowcroft 
had provided the channel through whom he reported to the President.22
For a President determined to retain control o f foreign policy, Baker and Scowcroft 
were perfect choices. Their loyalty was beyond doubt and their world view reflected 
that o f Bush. To take the Bush-Baker relationship first. The President had far greater 
knowledge o f international affairs, while Baker’s credentials rested on his political 
acumen. Their approach to politics was very similar and they were both highly 
pragmatic, problem orientated and tactical in their approach. Baker was wary o f
19 Gail Sheehy, Character: America’s Search for Leadership (New York: Bantam Books, 1990) p. 198.
20 Burt Solomon, “Bush’s Lack of Ambitious Policies ... Makes His Plans Seem Thin Gruel”, National 
Journal 6 May 1989, no. 18, p. 1102.
21 Baker also managed Bush’s unsuccessful bid for re-election in 1992.
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grand strategy and was a manager rather than a conceptualises William Quandt, a 
former member of the National Security Council claimed that “[i]f politics was the art 
o f the possible, then Baker was a supreme politician.”23 Under the Reagan 
administration he had been criticised by conservatives for his willingness to 
compromise and make deals at the expense o f the implementation o f Reagan’s 
ideological agenda. His lack o f vision was condemned by the director o f the 
conservative Centre for Security Policy, Frank Gaffney, in a magazine article in 
which he said the Secretary of State, “believes in success for its own sake and often 
finds specific goals inconvenient. That’s not leadership or vision.”24 It was this lack 
o f vision, combined with his intention to be “the President’s man at State and not 
State’s man at the White House”,25 that qualified Baker for the job.
Likewise, in his autobiography Bush explained that he appointed Scowcroft to be his 
National Security Adviser because he knew he would not make the NSC into a policy 
making agency and would accurately report the views o f all council members.26 Bush 
was correct in his assessment because Scowcroft defined his own role in limited 
terms: “The President runs the government. He has expert advice from State and 
Defence, and it is my job to ensure the integration to help provide a strategic concept 
which covers the whole field o f national security.” He adopted a multiple advocacy 
approach whereby he played the final role o f broker and balancer, offering the 
President advice and counsel. In view o f the central role the NSC had played in the 
Iran-Contra affair, when in August 1985, the US had participated in secret dealings 
with Iran involving the sale o f military equipment which was linked to efforts to 
obtain the release o f American hostages held in Lebanon and funding to rebel forces 
in Nicaragua, it was crucial that someone whom the President could trust managed the 
organisation. In Scowcroft Bush found that man.
Baker and America’s Middle East Strategy
22 Henry Allen, “The Quintessential Establishment”, Washington Post National Weekly Edition. 9-15 
January 1989.
23 Quandt, op. cit. p. 384.
24 Christopher Ogden, “Visions Problems at State . . .” Time (International Edition), 25 September 
1989, p. 36.
25 Ibid., p. 36.
26 Bush, op. cit. p. 174.
27 NYT 3 November 1989, p. A 16.
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The Bush administration was often accused o f undermining US-Israeli relations 
because its approach to the peace process was perceived by some as detrimental to 
Israel’s interests. After all, neither Baker nor Bush shared Reagan’s, Shultz’s or 
Haig’s special regard for Israel as a sister democracy, a moral responsibility or a 
strategic asset. The administration’s approach to world affairs was based on a state- 
centric balance o f power system and not sharing Reagan’s ideologically charged 
vision, Bush often saw the Israelis as more o f a “strategic irritant than a strategic 
asset.” Yet the personal beliefs of their key State Department advisors, Ross, 
Miller, Kurtzer and Haass, all o f whom were American Jews, exerted a profound 
influence on policy. A friend o f the team commented that they:
Came to this [peace negotiations] with a sense o f mission -  on top of their commitment to 
America’s interests -  about trying to achieve a secure peace for Israel. They believe it’s the 
greatest thing they can do for the Jewish people.30 
But, as Miller acknowledged, he and his colleagues also believed “that the Arab- 
Israeli conflict is not a morality play, not a conflict between good and evil. It is a 
conflict between competing claims and competing justices”31 and must be approached 
from this perspective. In this they favoured the less ideologically inclined approach 
of the Israeli Labour party to the peace process, a policy that was inherited from the 
Reagan administration.
The State Department took the initiative in devising the administration’s strategy 
towards the Middle East and it was here that those members o f the administration 
with an emotional affinity for Israel worked. Dennis Ross believed that the Intifada, 
now in its second year, had created a new dynamic, and was a source o f political 
ferment within Shamir’s National Unity Government (NUG). As the Israeli 
government continued to respond to the uprising with increased repression in the form 
of administrative detentions and deportations of Palestinian protestors, domestic 
politics in Israel was polarising. Labour adopted its firmest and least equivocal stance
28 Author’s interview with Dennis Ross: Director o f State Department Planning Policy 1988-92 and 
Special Middle East Co-ordinator 1992-2000.
29 Jonathan Rynhold Israeli Political Culture in Relations with the U.S. over the Palestine Question. 
1981-96 (Ph.D. thesis, London School o f Economics & Political Science: London, 1998) p. 180.
30 Ibid.. p. 59.
31 Ibid.. p. 23.
32 James Baker III, Politics and Diplomacy (New York: Putnam Publishing, 1995) p. 117.
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in favour o f compromise with the Palestinians33 and threatened to withdraw from the 
government unless Shamir abandoned his dream of “greater Israel” and commitment 
to territorial maximalism.34 Israeli Defence Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who had pursued 
a policy of beatings in the territories as part of an attritional strategy designed to
i f
demonstrate Israeli determination not to yield to force, now believed that a military 
solution was not possible. As he came to understand the Intifada as a popular 
uprising he concluded that “you can’t rule by force over one and a half million 
Palestinians.” These factors, combined with an apparent shift in public opinion, 
pushed Shamir to adopt a more flexible approach towards the territories.37
The State Department team considered the environment conducive to the 
establishment o f an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, but in view o f mainstream Israeli 
public opinion, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) could not be involved 
directly in the talks. However, Washington also acknowledged that in order to work 
with Palestinians from the territories, Arafat’s tacit approval would be required. The 
vehicle for this strategy was the US-PLO dialogue in Egypt and Tunis. Although 
the State Department was sceptical about Shamir’s commitment to the peace process, 
attempts by Rabin to establish a dialogue with the Palestinians, amongst other things, 
persuaded them that a breakthrough was possible.
As Labour’s position on the “land for peace” question was closer to Washington’s 
than the Likud’s, there was potential for cooperation between Washington and a 
Labour government. This was especially true while Rabin held a senior position in 
the party, as one o f his ostensible goals was to work closely with America to advance 
the peace process 40 The short-term objectives of Washington and Rabin were also 
aligned as both wished to initiate a dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians from
33 Howard Sachar, A History o f Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1996) p. 967.
34 Shamir’s commitment to ‘greater Israel’ was a product of religion and ideology, both o f which had 
been key issues in the 1988 Israeli elections. For a more detailed account o f their salience and 
influence on policy see Robert Freedman, “Religion, Politics, and the Israeli Elections o f 1988,”
Middle East Journal Winter 1989.
35 E. Inbar, “Rabin and Israeli National Security” BESA Security and Policy Study no. 25 1996.
36 JP 24 March 1988, p. 3.
37 Sachar, op. cit. p. 967.
3K Quandt, Peace Process pp. 385-8.
39 Baker, op. cit. pp. 116-8.
40 Author’s interview with Dennis Ross.
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the territories that excluded the PLO from the process. On a tactical level the views 
of the two parties also coincided. They both saw the perpetuation of the NUG, a 
coalition between Labour and the Likud, as the most effective device for drawing 
Israel into the negotiating process and opposed Peres moves to bring down the 
government and establish what would have been a weak Labour government in its 
place. As a result, Baker and the State Department worked closely with Rabin during 
this period.41 The secret Ross said, “was to design a process so tailored to Israel’s 
needs that Shamir politically couldn’t afford to refuse.”42
The difference between Shultz’s and Baker’s approach to negotiations was that Baker 
was prepared ‘to play the game’. Shultz had always been reluctant to intervene in 
Israeli politics even to facilitate a peace agreement he endorsed. In contrast, Baker’s 
priority was in ‘doing the deal’ and he was prepared to pressurise the Likud, albeit 
subtly, to achieve it. In general terms, the Likud perceived Shultz had been interested 
in the historical and philosophical aspects o f Israel, in contrast to Baker whom Shamir 
believed was “interested in what happened today, not yesterday and perhaps not even 
tomorrow.”43 During Baker’s first visit to Israel after the G ulf War, the Likud tried 
to encourage greater sympathy for their position by taking him on a helicopter flight 
designed to demonstrate the strategic importance o f the Golan Heights and West 
Bank. This effort was perceived as a failure by the Israelis and Baker’s subsequent 
visit to the Israeli Holocaust Museum, Yad Vashem, also had no discemable political 
impact.44 For the Likud government, the inability of the Holocaust memory to visibly 
move the US Secretary o f State must have been particularly frustrating, when Begin 
had successfully pursued the same strategy with Reagan.
Baker was more pragmatic than sentimental and hoped to work closely with Rabin to 
comer Shamir into the opening of an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. In an endeavour to 
induce a positive Israeli response, Baker told the House o f Representatives
41 Arens, op. cit. p. 75 and Baker, op. cit. pp. 116-8
42 Author’s interview with Dennis Ross.
43 Yitzhak Shamir, Summing Up: An Autobiography (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994) p. 201.
44 Moshe Arens, Broken Covenant: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis between the U.S. and Israel 
(London: Simon & Schuster, 1995) p. 219 and J. Baker, Politics and Diplomacy (New York: Putnam 
Publishing, 1995) p. 421.
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Appropriations Committee that if the US could not progress talks between Israel and 
the Palestinians, the US might be forced to look to the PLO.45
Despite Baker’s forceful rhetoric, the administration’s policy toward the peace 
process was initially based on a report entitled “Building for Peace” prepared prior to 
the 1988 presidential election by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy that 
urged a slow “ripening” process and confidence building moves as a precursor to full 
peace negotiations.46 According to this rationale, the US should concentrate on 
making small efforts to improve the environment until the parties were ready to 
negotiate, thereby making the conflict “ripe for resolution.”47 This was a low-key 
strategy that did not require American pressure to be exerted on any participant or 
entail the risk o f policy failure. Baker was unprepared to put his own credibility and 
that o f the administration on the line to kick-start negotiations and therefore 
Washington would no longer be at the forefront o f diplomatic initiatives. Henceforth, 
greater emphasis would be placed on the Arabs and Israel to co-operate directly with
48each other. Despite the change o f personnel at the helm o f US policy and their 
fundamentally different attitudes toward Israel, Shamir remained confident in his 
perception that the balance o f interest on the Palestinian Question resided with Israel 
and not the US.
Popular Opinion and the Peace Process
By the late 1980s, the idea o f Israel as a safe haven for world Jewry following the 
horrors o f the Holocaust was a deeply ingrained tenet of American culture and foreign 
policy. Popular cultural representations o f survivors and the frequent reminders of the 
Second World War and the need to protect the Jews militated against the exertion of 
political pressure on Israel to make tangible, territorial concessions to secure a peace 
agreement with the Arabs. At the same time, courses on the Holocaust had become a 
staple of high school education and there were more than seventy centres
45 Arens, op. cit. pp. 55-57.
46 For complete details o f the Report see, The Washington Institute presidential Study Group,
“Building for Peace: An American Strategy for the Middle East”, (Washington: The Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, 1988).
47 Ben Zvi, The United States and Israel: The Limits of the Special Relationship (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993) p. 165.
48 Quandt, op. cit. p. 387.
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commemorating the Holocaust across the United States. For lovers of classical music, 
there were in preparation a series o f CD’s to commemorate the music of Jewish 
composers such as Erwin Schulhoff, Viktor Ullman and Pavel Haas, who had 
perished in the concentration camps.
By the time o f the Bush presidency, the safe haven afforded to Jews by the very 
existence o f Israel was reinforced by the increasing frequency throughout the late 
1980s and early 1990s o f ‘personal documentaries’ o f return. This phenomenon had 
grown into what could be described as a subgenre o f the Holocaust film, especially as 
children of survivors increasingly journeyed with a camera into Europe and into the 
past.49 In films o f return, the director, often a member o f the second generation, goes 
back to the scene o f the crime or o f the rescue. Some o f these documentaries are 
investigative like, Loving the Dead, Birthplace and Shtel, in which the subjects 
attempt to discover how their Polish-Jewish parents were murdered. Some are 
celebratory, like The Children o f  Chabannes and The Optimists, which depict the 
rescue o f Jews from, respectively, France and Bulgaria. Others are commemorative 
such as the Holocaust documentaries Back in Auschwitz and The Last Days,50 the 
latter winning an Academy Award.
The physical return o f a survivor to the ashes o f European Jewry was first presented 
in 1980 through simple documentaries, such as Kitty: Return to Auschwitz. In 1990 
Emanuel Rund’s documentary All Jews Out includes on camera interviews with the 
survivor and her daughter returning to their German town and the former prison o f  
Theresienstadt. By the late 1980s, these films had also begun to seek out those who 
had hidden and then aided the Jews to escape. For example, the 1987 documentary 
The Righteous Enemy directed by Joseph Rochlitz, begins with the story o f his father 
who was interned by the Italians, and then explores the Italian resistance and the 
saving o f forty thousand Jews. Many o f these documentaries juxtaposed images o f 
the past with vibrant images o f Jewry in the present, particularly of American Jewry.
49 Annette Insdorf, Indelible Shadows: Film and the Holocaust (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 2003) p. 300.
50 Ibid., p. 300.
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Once again the American gentiles were invited to identify with the victims of the 
Holocaust and to see the victims as one removed from themselves.51
The Holocaust rhetoric o f Shamir, his devotion to greater Israel and opposition to a 
land for peace solution to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute had a certain resonance with 
popular images o f survivors returning to Eastern Europe and the concept o f Israel as a 
safe haven. As a result, in the early years o f the Bush presidency, it was not 
considered prudent for Washington to exert pressure on Israel to facilitate movement 
toward a peace agreement.
The American Reaction to the Shamir Plan
In May 1989, following discussions with the US administration, Israel publicly 
presented its four-point peace plan. The proposal was typically vague. It mentioned 
elections amongst the Arabs o f Judea, Samaria and Gaza, but failed to specify which 
Arabs Israel was prepared to negotiate with and who was going to be arbiter o f the 
debate. Washington had already stated its position that the elections be based on a 
mutually agreed formula, which implied modifications to the Shamir plan and the 
inclusion o f the US as a negotiator with the Palestinians over the modalities o f the 
elections. Baker also requested that Israel find a way to allow Palestinians from 
outside the territories to participate in the elections. Dennis Ross embraced the plan 
because it gave his team something to work with and it was regarded in Washington 
as a plan o f “constructive ambiguity.”53 Yet while ambiguity was the hallmark o f 
success o f every peace plan since UN Resolution 242, because it facilitated 
agreement, it was this very ambiguity that in the long-term stifled progress.
The NUG was predictably divided in their response to the conditions Baker imposed 
on Palestinian representation. Rabin was willing to allow the electoral participation 
o f East Jerusalem Arabs with the proviso that they voted outside the municipal 
boundaries. It was assumed that this would set a precedent whereby they could 
express their political rights in the territories and not in Jerusalem itself which would
51 Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1999) p. 235.
52 Baker, on. cit. pp. 120-1.
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remain an undivided part of Israel. Shamir, in representing the Likud position, took 
his opposition to Baker’s proposal to the Israeli people. In a speech to the Likud 
faction o f the Knesset, he opposed the participation o f Arabs resident in East 
Jerusalem in elections and declared that Israel would never cede territory to the 
Arabs.54 It was this that provoked Baker to deliver what was to become a highly 
controversial speech to the Aipac convention in an attempt to restore American 
credibility as an ‘honest broker’. Baker’s speech began with the traditional reiteration 
o f the shared democratic values and strategic partnership between the two countries 
but then struck a discordant note when he spoke o f the future of the occupied 
territories and the missing element in the Shamir peace plan. He spoke o f “territorial 
withdrawal”55 as the potential culmination o f negotiations and then, making a blatant 
reference to the ideology of Shamir, asserted that:
For Israel, now is the time to lay aside, once and for all, the unrealistic vision of greater Israel. 
Israeli interests in the West Bank and Gaza -  security and otherwise -  can be accommodated in 
a settlement based on Resolution 242. Forswear annexation. Stop settlement activity. ... Reach 
out to Palestinians who deserve political rights.56
Baker’s speech provoked outrage amongst his American Jewish audience and much 
consternation in Israel. The fact that he enunciated a comparable list o f exacting 
requirements for the Palestinians did nothing to redress the balance. However, 
Baker’s alleged lack o f sympathy for Israel did not translate into sympathy for Syria 
or the Palestinians, and minimal effort was made to capitalise on the US-PLO 
dialogue begun in December 1988. His speech also heralded the development o f a 
more proactive peace effort on the part o f the Bush administration, premised on the 
need to modify Israeli requirements, as defined in the Shamir plan, into something 
more palatable to the Palestinians.
The right-wing faction o f the Likud now perceived the Bush administration as openly 
hostile and tried to withdraw the elements of ‘constructive ambiguity’ from the plan 
that the Americas so prized. Shamir argued that Baker had completely misread Israeli
53 FBIS 23 January 1989, p. 31.
54 MECS 1989. pp. 71,74.
55 Shlaim, op. cit.p. 469.
56DSB July 1989, pp. 24-27.
57 Christison, op. cit. p. 44. The US began a dialogue with the PLO began under the Reagan 
administration and with the full knowledge and consent o f then Vice-President George Bush.
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sentiment, with all its nuances, dilemmas and contradictions and that his speech had 
reinforced Israeli extremists and weakened the NUG.58 The Likud Central Committee 
demanded that Shamir attach four explicit conditions to his plan: No East 
Jerusalemites be permitted to participate in elections, the Intifada be terminated 
before the convening o f elections, Israeli settlement activity be continued and no tract 
o f land be relinquished.59 The Likud amendments to the Shamir plan increased 
tensions within the Labour-Likud alliance and even Rabin began to question the 
utility o f continuing in the NUG under the new conditions. However, Ross warned 
that if  Labour left the coalition it would be accused o f sabotaging the peace initiative 
and eventually, in order to protect Israel’s remaining credibility in Washington, 
Shamir resolved the crisis by dropping the changes to his original plan.60
The Ten Point Plan
With negotiations stalled, the next initiative came from Egypt in June 1989 when the 
Minister o f State Boutros Ghali visited Jerusalem to discuss the peace process. The 
Egyptians offered a ‘ten-point’ programme for working out the terms o f  elections -  
the centre piece of discussions on the peace process.61 The proposal had a number o f 
merits: as it was submitted by an Arab party at peace with Israel and with close ties to 
the PLO, neither side could reject it as tainted, and as it was proposed by a regional 
actor, American prestige would not be directly affected by its success or failure.
However, the ‘ten-point’ programme soon undermined the semblance o f  accord 
within the NUG because it was tailor-made to fit Labour’s approach but showed no 
concern for the Likud’s proscriptions. O f the ten-points, those most objectionable to 
the Likud were those that advocated that Arabs from East Jerusalem participate in 
elections, a settlement freeze be implemented, negotiations be explicitly premised on 
a land for peace formula and the political rights o f the Palestinians be acknowledged.
58 Shamir op. cit. p. 203. For a detailed account o f the religious and political composition o f the 
Knesset during this period and its impact on policy see Shmuel Sandler, “Israel’s 1988 Knesset 
Elections and the Transformation o f the Israeli Polity,” Middle East Review no. 1, 1989-90.
59 MECS 1989. p. 22.
60 Author’s interview with Ross.
6' Eytan Bentsur, Making Peace in the Middle East: A First-Hand Account o f the Arab-Israeli Peace 
Process (Westport, CT. & London, Praeger, 2001) p. 23.
62 MECS 1989. p. 24.
63 Ibid., p. 73.
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Despite virulent opposition from elements within Fatah, at the end of August, Arafat 
stipulated that the PLO would accept the ten-points if the Israelis did so,64 thereby 
putting the ball back in Israel’s court.
The Egyptian initiative highlighted the contradictory policy pursued by different 
factions o f the NUG. Peres adopted all ten-points and while Israel’s Foreign Minister 
Moshe Arens travelled around the US promoting the Shamir plan, Peres followed him 
promoting the ten-points which the Likud had not accepted.65 Simultaneously, Baker 
and Rabin were trying to operationalise the Egyptian connection to the PLO to 
construct a compromise that would enable a meeting to be convened between Israel 
and the Palestinians within the confines o f the NUG. While Labour and the US were 
permitting the PLO to play a role in the process, the Likud was activating its 
transnational connections to exert pressure on Congress to end the US-PLO dialogue. 
This highlighted the differing perceptions and ideological beliefs o f the various 
parties. What concerned Shamir was not so much the ten-points themselves as the 
American attitude towards them. The Americans saw the Egyptian proposal as a way 
to implement the Shamir plan while Shamir saw it as a contradiction to it.66
The US administration was reluctant to take an active position but to break the 
deadlock between Shamir and Rabin, on 10 October, Baker submitted a five-point 
proposal that was intended as an elaboration o f the Shamir plan.67 Israel objected to 
the proposal but when the administration refused to amend it, Jerusalem accepted with 
qualifications. These qualifications focused on the Likud’s previous demands on 
Palestinian representation and the agenda for talks in Cairo. The divide between 
Israel and the Palestinians was great and the challenge for American diplomacy was 
huge. To try to accommodate the Likud’s concerns, the administration demonstrated 
its opposition to increasing the public role o f the PLO by opposing the Arab states’ 
attempts to have its observer status upgraded from ‘observer organisation’ to
/ : o
‘observer state’. Rabin and Baker met in Washington on 18 January 1990 to try to 
reach a compromise on the issue of Palestinian representation, whereby the ‘outsiders’
64 Ibid., PP- 24, 90.
65 Arens, op. cit. pp. 75, 78.
66 MECS 1989. p. 73.
67 Bentsur, op. cit. p. 27.
68 Author’s interview with Dennis Ross.
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would be recent deportees, and East Jerusalemites would be required to have a dual 
address in the territories, thereby bridging the requirements o f both the Likud and the 
PLO.
Labour publicly accepted the American terms and with Egyptian and PLO support 
virtually assured, Baker sought a commitment from the Likud. However, the Likud 
stalled and Peres reacted by trying to break up the government by offering Yitzhak 
Peretz, a leading figure in the Shas party, a Cabinet position in a Labour led 
coalition.69 Rabin tried to negate Peres position by continuing to work with Baker to 
secure Shamir’s compliance. He once again submitted his compromise to the Israeli 
Cabinet adding that Egypt and not the PLO would announce the names o f the 
Palestinian delegation, while Baker continued to pressure Shamir for a positive
70response.
In an endeavour to convince Shamir to accept the compromise, Rabin asked the 
Labour party to pass a resolution pledging their commitment to the integrity o f 
Jerusalem and excluding the prospect o f direct negotiations with the PLO.71 His 
efforts were in vain, for although Shamir was aware that the majority o f Likud 
ministers favoured the Rabin compromise, he remained unyielding and on 13 March 
sacked Peres from the NUG. Peres then won a vote o f no confidence that resulted in 
the collapse o f the NUG. This ultimately worked to Shamir’s advantage as, with the 
support o f the ultra-Orthodox parties, he succeeded in forming the most right-wing 
government in the history o f the Jewish state,72 with himself at the head. The new 
government rejected the proposal put forward by Baker and Rabin for negotiations. 
Despite the change in America’s government from neo-conservative to the pragmatic, 
‘even handed’ approach o f the Bush team, American policy continued to be 
constrained by the radicalism o f the Likud, which was reinforced domestically by the 
pro-Israel lobby. It was the Iraqi occupation o f Kuwait on 2 August 1990 that broke 
the impasse.
69 FB1S 16 February 1990, p. 25.
70 MECS 1990. p. 105.
71 Ibid., p. 107.
72 Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1994).
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The G ulf W ar 1990-91
When Iraqi troops occupied Kuwait, Bush immediately demonstrated his 
administration’s commitment to defending US interests in the Gulf. He demanded an 
immediate Iraqi withdrawal and announced his intention to substantiate his demands 
with the use of military force. On 8 August, he declared the defence o f Saudi Arabia 
to be a vital US interest73 and cautioned the Saudi monarchy that they too were in 
danger. In response, the White House received an invitation from King Fahd to 
station American personnel in the Saudi Kingdom and by 12 September, over 100,000 
American soldiers had been deployed.74
Holocaust imagery figured prominently in mobilising public support for the G ulf War.
ne
Bush described Saddam Hussein as worse than Hitler and although “worse than”
76was too strong for many commentators, the analogy stuck. A columnist for the New
7 7York Times wrote o f Saddam “carrying out his own version of the final solution” 
while The Simon Wiesenthal Centre claimed that German firms had built “gas 
chambers” in Iraq.78 Geopolitical considerations rather than fear o f the perpetuation 
o f another Holocaust underpinned the rationale behind Operation Desert Storm, 
although Holocaust imagery may have contributed to building support in Congress 
and amongst the public.
Far from acting as an asset in the crisis, Israel was dependent on America for 
protection. If  Israel entered the war, it was hypothesised, the Saudis, Egyptians and 
Syrians would withdraw from the US led coalition, refusing to align themselves with 
Israel against another Arab state. Although Bush publicly stated that if  Israel became
7Qdirectly involved in the conflict “the coalition would not fall apart,” his actions
73 MECS 1992, p. 28. The US was concerned that if  Saddam Hussein’s military forces were left intact 
and occupying Kuwait, he would be able to threaten Saudi Arabia and force the House of Saud to 
follow foreign and oil-pricing policies dictated by Baghdad. This combination could have effectively 
allowed Saddam to control 20% of world oil reserves and thus the global price of oil. Kenneth Pollack, 
“How Saddam Misread the United States,” in Micah Sifry & Christopher Cerf (eds.), The Iraqi War 
Reader (Touchstone: New York, 2003) p. 76.
74 Ibid.. p. 28.
75 Public Papers of the Presidents: George Bush. 1990 (Washington. 1992) 1 November 1990, p. 1509.
76 Novick, op. cit. p. 249.
77N Y I9  April 1991, p. A25.
78 David Willis, “Germans Built Gas Chambers for Iraq, Wiesenthal [Centre] Says,” Forward 15 
February 1991, p. 20, cited in Novick, op. cit. p. 249.
79 PPP 18 December 1990, p. 1807.
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belied his public rhetoric. Considerable American pressure was exerted on Shamir to
resist demands by his Generals to retaliate or act in the absence o f close co-ordination
• 80with Washington. Shamir reportedly summed up the situation by saying that as the 
destruction o f Iraq’s military capability was the prime objective and the Americans 
could effectively do this, Israel should not act in any way to hamper their efforts.81 
Yet Israel’s inaction cannot be attributed solely to American pressure because 
Jerusalem had its own reasons to desist, among them fear of catalysing a war with 
Jordan that had the potential to destroy the Hashemite regime. King Hussein o f 
Jordan knew that if  he opposed Iraq he risked losing his throne or his life so he had 
little option but to align with Saddam Hussein. As Jordan is situated between Israel 
and Iraq, any Israeli action would have involved entering or transversing Jordanian 
territory and Jordan had pledge to fight to defend itself were its sovereignty violated.82 
While Israel was confident that it could take Jordan, such an event would have been 
potentially damaging to the coalition.
Nevertheless, the closeness o f the relationship, or the lengths to which Washington 
was forced to go to restrain Jerusalem, was demonstrated by the decision to grant 
Israel access to prime intelligence material not usually divulged to other countries.83 
Bush stated that he was “in close touch with the key players there [in Israel] in terms 
o f our objectives,”84 and a hot line was established between the Pentagon Crisis 
Situation Room and the Israeli Defence Ministry in Tel Aviv. Avi Shlaim, a professor 
at Oxford University, claimed that the “hot line provided a significant inducement for 
Israel to maintain a low profile and to closely co-operate with the United States
oc
throughout the crisis.”
The G ulf War was the first and only occasion that US troops physically defended 
Israeli territory, as the newly arrived Patriot missile batteries, intended to upgrade
o r
Israel’s air defences, were operated by American crews. However, the Patriots were
80 Arens, op. cit. p. 184.
81 Jerusalem Report 31 January 1991, p. 10.
82 Shamir, op.cit. pp. 221-23.
83 Shlaim, op. cit. p. 477.
84 PPP 8 November 1990, p. 1584.
85 Shlaim, op. cit. p. 477.
86 PPP 1 October 1990, p. 1334. The Patriot success rate was 41 for 42: 42 scuds were engaged and 41 
were intercepted. Not every intercept resulted in total destruction, but Bush claimed that the Patriot 
was proof positive that missile defence worked. Public Papers of the Presidents: George Bush. 1991
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87only partially successful in intercepting the Iraqi ‘Scud’ missiles fired on Tel Aviv 
and on 11 February, Minister of Defence Moshe Arens and Deputy Chief o f Staff 
Ehud Barak made a secret visit to Washington to urge the President to reconsider his 
position and give Israel a green light to intervene in the fighting.88 Bush and his 
advisors were prepared to acquiesce to some o f Arens demands for weapons and 
financial aid, but they refused to support direct Israeli intervention and maintained
QQ
their veto on operational co-ordination. Shamir recalled in his memoirs that 
“nothing ... went more against my grain as a Jew and a Zionist, nothing more 
opposed the ideology on which my life had been based”90 than not retaliating against 
Iraqi scud missile attacks.91
The Gulf War was replete with contradictions and paradoxes for Israel’s special 
relationship with America and demonstrated the differing perspectives from which 
small states and large states operate. Operation Desert Storm achieved America’s 
stated objective o f ousting Iraqi forces from Kuwait but not the Israeli objective o f 
totally neutralising Iraq as a military threat. Amongst members o f the Knesset, the 
unstated hope was that, as opposed to Israel coming to America’s aid, Israel’s greatest 
ally would seize the opportunity to defeat Israel’s most powerful enemy. For the first 
time in its history, Israel found itself aligned with the majority o f the Arab nations. 
However, the similarity ended there because o f a fundamental difference in their 
approach to the crisis. The Arabs, for the most part, wanted the restoration o f Kuwaiti 
sovereignty and the status quo, whereas Israel advocated the destruction o f the Iraqi 
war machine.92
In the final outcome, Iraq’s military capability was only partially destroyed, leaving 
Saddam with the opportunity to pose a future threat to Israel’s security and by 2003 
potentially to the Western world. Israel’s own capacity to deter future Arab
(Washington, 1993) 15 February 1991, p. 150 and Karen L. Puschel, US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation 
in the Post-Cold War Era: An American Perspective (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post Press, 1992) p. 133.
87 This was the first occasion Israel itself had been subject to aerial attack since 1948.
88 Puschel, p. 125 and Shlaim, op. cit. p. 481.
89 Shlaim, op. cit. p. 481.
90 Shamir op. cit. p. 217.
91 For a more detailed account of the impact the Gulf War exerted on Israel see Ze’ev Schiff, “Israel 
after the [Gulf] War,” Foreign Affairs February 1991.
92 Ibid.. pp. 473-4.
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aggression was probably weakened by the deliberate choice to abandon its doctrine of 
immediate retaliation and to allow the US to act on its behalf, because this resulted in
93a perceived decrease in its capacity for conventional deterrence. However, in 
response to Iraqi provocations, Washington co-operated with Israel’s efforts to 
acquire advanced defences against a potential missile attack. Two batteries o f US 
Patriot missiles costing $200 million were scheduled for deployment to Israel in late 
1991.94
While US military actions against Iraq were beneficial to Israel, Israel was a 
diplomatic and military liability to the US. On 12 August, ten days into the crisis, 
Saddam suggested that Iraq might withdraw from Kuwait if  Israel withdrew from all 
the occupied territories and Syria withdrew from Lebanon.95 This proposal 
introduced the concept of “linkage” into the Middle Eastern diplomatic lexicon. 
Instantaneously, the Gulf crisis and the Arab-Israeli conflict became linked in the 
public mind, which encouraged the direct comparison between Israeli policy and that 
o f Iraq. Washington responded by dismissing Saddam’s rhetoric as a propaganda 
ploy, but the damage had been done and the proposal provided the Bush 
administration with a difficult dilemma. At a time when the President was attempting 
to unite the Arab and Western worlds behind his nation’s policy, he was forced to 
defend the unpopular actions o f its client against international scrutiny. He denied a 
direct parallel between the Iraqi occupation o f Kuwait and the Israeli occupation of 
the West Bank and Gaza, but pledged that once Iraq left Kuwait, a resolution o f the 
Arab-Israeli dispute would be a top priority.96 His policy o f “deferred linkage”97 put 
Israel on the defensive, because from the perspective o f the Likud, Israel’s status as a 
‘strategic asset’ had been usurped by governments that had in the last fifty years
go
joined forces to eradicate it.
93 Author’s interview with David Bar-Ilan: Israeli Director of Communications and Puschel, op. cit. p. 
133.
94 MECS. 1992, p. 25.
95 Ibid.. p. 31.
96 Dilip Hiro, Desert Shield to Desert Storm (London: Paladin, 1992) p. 449.
97 Shlaim, op. cit. p. 474.
98 Shamir, op. cit. p. 221.
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By spring 1991, the administration had begun to prove that it was as good as its word 
and on 6 March Bush addressed a joint session of Congress stating that:
We must do all that we can to close the gap between Israel and the Arab states and between 
Israelis and Palestinians .... A comprehensive peace must be grounded in United National 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace. This 
principle must be elaborated to provide for Israel’s security and recognition, and at the same 
time for legitimate Palestinian political rights. Anything else would fail the twin tests of 
fairness and security. The time has come to put an end to Arab-Israeli conflict."
Within days of the President’s speech, Baker departed on the first o f eight trips to the 
Middle East that resembled the shuttle diplomacy of former Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger. He held meetings with the leaders o f Saudi Arabia, Israel, Syria and the 
Palestinians that culminated in the convening o f the Madrid peace conference on 30 
October 1991.
The Road to M adrid
The objective o f the Madrid process, which was launched in autumn 1991, was to 
build a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. The conference brought together 
representatives o f all the main parties to the conflict and was facilitated by the 
fundamental transformation in the geopolitical situation both internationally and 
regionally. Firstly, with the end o f the Cold War, Washington and Moscow no longer 
viewed the Middle East as an area o f superpower rivalry and were prepared to work 
together to advance the peace process. Secondly, Bush had pledged that once Iraqi 
forces had withdrawn from Kuwait, movement in the Arab-Israeli peace process 
would be a key US priority. Thirdly, the position of the PLO had been weakened by 
its support of Iraq during the G ulf crisis which had resulted in a sharp decline in Arab 
political and financial support.100
Between the Gulf War and Syria’s agreement to attend the Madrid conference in July 
1991, US-Israeli negotiations focused on the modalities for the conference. Shamir 
thought it unlikely that Damascus would attend a conference that did not guarantee in 
advance the return o f all territory captured by Israel in the June 1967 war.
99 WP 7 March 1991, p. 1.
100 Tim Youngs, Developments in the Middle East Peace Process 1991-2000 (London: House of 
Commons Library, 2001) p. 17.
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Consequently his tactics consisted o f conceding just enough to the Americans to 
prevent Israel from being accused o f causing the collapse of the peace process, while 
holding firm on procedural formulas as a device for maintaining American pressure 
on the Arabs. The American intention was for a regional conference sponsored by 
Washington and Moscow based on UN resolution 242 and incorporating a Palestinian 
negotiating team consisting o f seven individuals, none of whom were resident in 
Jerusalem. Shamir agreed that the conference be based on resolution 242 on the 
proviso that each party was permitted to maintain their own interpretation o f the 
resolution. The Likud believed that Israel had complied with the territorial 
component o f the resolution when it returned the Sinai to Egypt in 1979.
Baker’s main objective was to get the Likud into the negotiating process and in this 
endeavour he was prepared to accommodate Shamir’s demands on the composition of 
the Palestinian delegation. He rejected virtually all the Palestinian demands, 
including that for an overt role for the PLO, partly as punishment for its alignment 
with Iraq in the recent war. In contrast, Jerusalem got its own way on the question of 
Palestinian representation to the point where Shamir was permitted to see the names 
o f the Palestinian negotiation team prior to its announcement.101
On 14 July, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, formally agreed to attend the 
conference. Shamir had little choice but to do likewise or risk being blamed by 
Washington for the breakdown o f the process. American prestige was at an all time 
high in the region and as Washington had made the peace process a major policy 
priority, it was difficult for the parties to reject the initiative. For the first time since 
Camp David in 1979, the US was ready and able to apply serious pressure against a 
Likud government that sought to avoid negotiations.
Once the Israeli government accepted it had no choice but to participate, Shamir 
invested extensive diplomatic efforts in trying to neutralise the forum. The talks in
101 Baker op. cit. p. 497, 504.
102 The dramatic change in Syria’s position was attributable to the collapse of the Soviet Union which 
had been its main source o f support and the defeat o f Iraq which had been seen as providing strategic 
depth in its confrontation with Israel. Hiro, op. cit. p. 451.
103 Neill Lochery, The Israeli Labour Party: In the Shadow o f the Likud (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1997) 
p. 189.
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Madrid were convened on the basis o f the Shamir plan104 and Israel succeeded in 
excluding the PLO, confined the remit o f the UN to observer status, and established 
that peace should emerge as a product o f direct negotiations between the parties and 
not by superpower edict.105
In his opening speech on the conference’s first day, Bush spoke o f the need for 
territorial compromise but said that Washington had no map for final borders. He 
spoke o f the need for “fairness” for the Palestinians, but said nothing about either 
Palestinian self-determination or statehood. Bush also made no mention o f his 
opposition to the continued construction o f Israeli settlements in the West Bank and 
Gaza.106 In defining how he saw the conference progressing, he embraced the Israeli 
position in its entirety. The real negotiations he said, would take place in bilateral 
talks between Israel and its various Arab interlocutors. Washington’s role was to act 
as a “catalyst” or “facilitator,” with the opportunity for real progress and compromise
1 0 7remaining in the hands o f the parties themselves. Ross emphasised that the 
considerations the President outlined in his speech demonstrated that American policy 
had been crafted in a manner sensitive to Israeli concerns.108
The delegations then progressed to the bilateral negotiations which lasted from 10-18 
December. The first face-to-face meetings and speeches o f the bilateral committees 
were o f symbolic significance, although little substantive progress ensued.109 
Shamir’s opening speech focused on past Jewish tragedy, particularly the Holocaust 
and referred to the Jews exclusive claims to the land. He emphasised that the origins 
o f the conflict were existential and not territorial.110 However, the Israeli-Palestinian 
track did not get beyond corridor diplomacy because the Palestinian team demanded 
that Israel negotiate autonomy with it separately and not with the full Jordanian-
104 NYT 16 March 1992, p. 3. The Likud government would not agree to talks on any other basis. F. 
Robert Hunter, The Palestinian Uprising: A War by other Means (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1993) p. 278.
105 The Economist 2 November 1991, p. 80. The results o f the conference were not binding and it only 
served as a preamble to bilateral talks scheduled to take place in Washington five weeks later. Lochery 
Israeli Labour Party p. 189.
106 Address by President George Bush, PPP 30 October 1991.
107 Ibid.. p. 80.
108 Bentsur, op. cit. p. 166.
109 Youngs, op. cit. p. 18.
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Palestinian delegation. The Israelis refused to countenance this as it constituted a 
breach o f the Madrid rules on a joint delegation. By the third round of bilaterals, this 
issue had been resolved and the Palestinians submitted an outline for interim self- 
government that was tantamount to a state in the making. The radical elements in 
Shamir’s government prevented him submitting a full plan for autonomy, but by the 
fifth round of talks, Israel proposed municipal elections and ‘early empowerment’ that 
would give the Palestinians immediate control over 19 hospitals in the territories.111 
This was rejected by the Palestinians because Israel would still retain control o f the 
territories.
Despite the lack o f progress Washington remained aloof from the negotiations. They 
saw the bilaterals as essentially ‘getting to know you’ sessions and did not expect 
much progress until after the Israeli elections. The American role as facilitator rather 
then mediator adhered with Shamir’s strategy on the Palestinian issue and did not 
threaten the ‘whole land o f Israel’ ideology o f the Likud. Yet while the Americans 
were accommodating on procedure, they were prepared to confront Shamir over 
substance, and in particular the expansion o f settlements.
Loan Guarantees and Settlements
From the outset, the question o f loan guarantees and settlements was a source o f
tension in relations between the Bush administration and the Shamir government.
Shamir’s perception o f Israeli security was based on an ideological view o f  the land
112and the assumption o f Israel’s intrinsic right to it. For him, settlement activity was 
imperative to making future territorial compromise impossible and his approach to the 
peace process must be understood in this context. Shamir recognised that Bush did 
not support Israel’s settlement policy but he relied on the fact that the President would 
not consider the issue crucial to American interests. As he explained to the Jerusalem  
Post in February 1990:
110 Israel. Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, Address by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, “Opening 
Remarks at the Madrid Peace Conference,” 31 October 1991, 
www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp7MFAH0bvt0.
111 MECS 1992, p. 124.
112 Rynhold op. cit. p. 266.
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There are things we do not agree on with the US government. For example settlements. ...
It is an old thing. There was also no agreement with the Reagan administration. But it has 
not harmed the advancement o f friendly ties between both countries. The principles in our 
relations with the US is that there is friendship, common interests and joint strategic co­
operation, despite differences o f opinion.113
Thus Shamir made a crucial error in underestimating Bush’s strength o f feeling on the 
question o f settlement activity, which the President saw as the touchstone o f 
American credibility in the Arab world. He made a subsequent error by inadvertently 
transforming settlements into a personal issue for Bush. Following their first meeting 
in Washington in April 1989, the President was angered when Shamir reneged on a 
promise he believed had been made to slow settlement construction.114 At the 
meeting Shamir had tried to present settlements as a purely domestic issue and was 
surprised by Bush’s hostility to the subject. To end the discussion Shamir had told 
Bush that settlements “wont be a problem,” by which he seems to have meant that as 
settlements were not an impediment to US-Israeli relations in the past they would not 
be in the future.1 However for Bush, the settlement issue was the “litmus test” o f 
Shamir’s attitude towards the United States116 and he understood this as the Prime 
Minister’s commitment to curb settlement activity. When two week later a new 
settlement was established Bush concluded that the Israeli leader was “playing him
117for a fool” and was outraged when Shamir told the US Ambassador to Israel, Bill 
Brown, that “settlements are not an earth shattering matter for the President.” 118
The administration did not permit the subject o f settlements to recede to the back o f 
the US-Israeli agenda. On 22 May, appearing before a House Foreign Affairs 
subcommittee, Baker overturned Reagan’s policy o f tacitly endorsing settlement 
activity and labelled the expansion o f  Israeli settlements a major obstacle to peace. 
The following day, Bush echoed this view119 and in his June 1989 Aipac speech 
Baker called on Israel to “stop settlement activity.” However, the administration
113 JP23 February 1990.
114 NYT Magazine Maureen Dowd & Thomas L. Friedman, “The Fabulous Bush & Baker Boys” p. 42.
115 M1CS 1989, p. 19.
116 Ibid.. p. 27.
1,7 See Dowd & Friedman, op. cit. pp. 34-67 for a more detailed account of the settlement issue.
118 Melman & Raviv, Friends in Deed: Inside the U.S.-Israel Alliance (New York: Hyperion, 1994) p. 
410.
119 NYT 23 May 1991. p. 5 and NYT 24 May 1991, p. 3.
120 MECS 1989. p. 21.
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did not have a form of leverage with which to press its views until Peres mentioned
the possibility o f $400 million in loan guarantees to cover the cost of absorbing new
immigrants. Baker asked Congress to attach a proviso to the guarantees that Israel
undertake to freeze all settlement activity, otherwise US dollars would free up other
money in the Israeli budget for settlement construction. Congressional reluctance to
endorse Baker’s request culminated in Israel obtaining the loans without a settlement
freeze, but with the proviso that Israel not use the money directly for settlement
1 1activity or provide incentives for immigrants to move beyond the green line.
Following congressional approval o f the loan, Baker became aware that Israel was 
planning to build a further 12,000 new homes for settlers. When asked, Shamir’s 
office informed the Americans that the cabinet had not approved the plans and the 
guarantee was granted. But three weeks later Sharon told reporters that the true figure 
was 13,500 homes and authorisation had already been given, alleviating the need for a 
cabinet agreement. Embarrassed and angered by the Likud’s actions, the 
administration was determined that such a situation would not be repeated.
The $10 Billion Question
On 22 January 1991, six days after coalition forces launched the air campaign against 
Saddam’s forces in Kuwait and Iraq, Israel announced that it would shortly seek 
$10bn. in loan guarantees for the resettlement o f Soviet Jews.122 In acting with 
restraint throughout the Gulf War, the Shamir government believed it had imposed a 
moral claim on the administration.123 The President took a different view, as by his 
calculations, the need to protect Israel had placed a burden on the US in terms o f 
diverted military resources. Israel’s moral claim, therefore, did not produce a change 
in Bush’s attitude towards ongoing Israeli settlement activity and the ill-timed loan 
guarantee request exacerbated tensions.124
121 Frankel, op. cit. p. 298.
122 Baker, op. cit. p. 544.
123 Sachar, op. cit. p. 981.
124 Ibid.. p. 981. On 11 February 1991, Baker told Defence Minister Moshe Ames, that it “is 
inappropriate to request aid at a time when United States soldiers [are] dying in a war beneficial to 
Israel.”
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The administration had wanted to link the guarantees to a settlement freeze or at the 
very least for Israel to delay its request for 120-days until after the Madrid Conference 
had opened. However, the Shamir government had such confidence in the special 
relationship, based on its congressional support, that it refused both ideas and 
formally submitted its request on 6 September. The Israeli strategy was to use Aipac 
to mobilise grass roots support among Israel’s sympathisers in the US. They did this 
by using media friendly figures, including Deputy Foreign Minister Binyamin 
Netanyahu and Health Minister Ehud Olmert to promote the message that this was 
‘humanitarian assistance.’ Simultaneously with this, Aipac and the Israeli Embassy 
worked Capitol Hill to drum up legislative support behind the Israeli demand. This 
activity was to culminate on 12 September with a rally in Washington DC in support 
of the loan guarantees.
However, Bush undercut the position o f the lobby by appealing directly to the 
Congress and the American people. The President asked “every single Member o f
10 f kCongress to defer, just for 120-days, consideration o f this absorption aid package,” 
because the construction o f settlements did “not enhance the prospects for peace.” 127 
Following what was perceived to be the successful execution o f the Gulf War, Bush’s 
approval rating with the American people was at an all-time high. He leveraged o ff 
his popularity in a televised address in which he both reiterated American support for 
Israel and explained his position on the loan guarantees.
For more than 40 years the U.S. has been Israel’s closest friend in the world, and this remains 
the case and will as long as I am President. This is a friendship backed up by real support. Just 
months ago American men and women in uniform, risked their lives to defend Israel in the face 
o f Iraqi scud missiles. And indeed, Desert Storm ... achieved the defeat o f Israel’s most 
dangerous adversary. ... The Congress charges the President with the conduct o f the Nation’s 
foreign policy ... there’s an attempt by some in the Congress to prevent the President from 
taking steps central to the Nation’s security.128
125 Glenn Frankel, Beyond the Promised Land Jews and Arabs on the Hard Road to a New Israel (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1994) pp. 292-302.
126 PPP 6 September 1991, p. 1121. Ironically, although the pro-Israel lobby accused Bush and Baker 
of anti-Semitism, Haass wrote Bush’s comments in September 1991, criticising Israel’s congressional 
push for loan guarantees.
127 PPP 23 May 1991, p. 547.
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Israel was financially vulnerable and Bush exploited America’s unprecedented 
economic leverage to the full. When asked during a press conference on 23 May 
1991, if  he was willing to use US aid as a lever to pressure Israel, Bush claimed that 
he was “not pressuring anybody” and was taking “the credibility that I believe the 
U.S. has now in Israel and the Gulf countries and in other countries in the Middle East 
to try to be a catalyst for peace.” 129 Shamir interpreted Bush’s address as being about 
more than just opposition to settlement activity and claimed that it revealed the
1TOPresident’s “true feelings and most basic attitudes towards the Jewish state.”
Against the backdrop o f massive public support for the President, his speech
undermined Israel’s support in Congress and his request for a 120-day moratorium on
a decision was granted. Even when negotiations recommenced in January 1992, the
Israeli government was unable to mobilise sufficient support within the US to secure
1^1the guarantees on its own terms. The pro-Israel lobby would not use its full force
to pressure the administration and although Shamir was confident that a compromise
could be reached whereby Israel would not have to commit to a settlement freeze but
11?allow the US some control over the money granted, his optimism was misplaced. 
The administration required a settlement freeze that was unacceptable to the 
radicalism of Shamir’s government and by mid-March either Bush or Shamir had 
rejected all the compromises submitted. Yet Shamir remained confident that he 
would be able to extract the money at a later date as the US presidential election drew 
near and Bush would be in need o f Jewish money and votes. However, once again 
Shamir made a tactical miscalculation as Baker allegedly summed up the 
administration’s position thus: “F**k the Jews. They don’t vote for us anyway.”
Public acquiescence in Bush’s request for a moratorium on a decision on the loan 
guarantees was not indicative o f a decline in grassroots support for Israel, but was a 
reflection of a change in priorities and perceptions that occurred in the aftermath o f 
the Gulf War. For weeks the American public had witnessed an intensive media
PPP 23 May 1991, p. 547.
130 Shamir, op. cit. p. 234.
131 Rynhold op. cit. p. 247.
132 FBIS 3 February 1992, p. 26.
133 New York Post 6 March 1992; MECS 1992, p. 18.
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spectacle of the coalition attack on Iraq, with coverage replicating that o f the latest 
Hollywood blockbuster rather than a serious, news worthy event. The American 
people had seen first hand the courage and bravery of their armed forces and the 
precision and sophistication of American weapons systems. Their President had 
promised them a short and decisive war with minimal casualties and was perceived to 
have delivered on his promise. The US had liberated Kuwait and in so doing had 
once again demonstrated the nation’s power to do good.
In addition, US forces had risked their lives to defend Israel and in this endeavour 
they were also perceived to have been successful. Although Iraqi scud missiles had 
hit Israeli towns, casualties were minimal and US patriot missiles had successfully 
intercepted a number o f scuds. At the President’s request, Israel had remained out o f 
the conflict and had relied on America for its protection. Against this backdrop, the 
majority o f the American people were in no doubt o f Bush’s commitment to Israel’s 
security and believed his claim that withholding loan guarantees was not detrimental 
to Israel’s national security and served the American national interest. In the wake o f 
the Gulf War, Americans believed they had demonstrated their country’s support for 
Israel. This, combined with his personal prestige and the general reticence with 
which the American people confront requests for foreign aid, gave Bush his victory.
Bush’s decision-making was characterised by a case-by-case approach that centred on 
the details and circumstances immediately at hand and less on ideology or concern 
with consistency.134 For Bush, settlement construction was a major ‘detail’ that was 
an obstacle to peace negotiations and with little ideological calling o f his own, he was 
unable to comprehend Shamir’s ideological commitment to them. He was not asking 
Israel to adopt a policy that he perceived as threatening to either its security or 
national interest. But by withholding the $ 10 billion in loan guarantees he had forced 
Shamir to the negotiating table and from this perspective his approach had been 
successful. Bush himself felt that he owed no debt to either Israel or American Jewry. 
On the other hand he did not want to alienate Israelis across the political spectrum and 
attached conditions to the loan guarantees that he knew Shamir, but not the majority 
of Israelis, would find impossible to accept. In so doing, he presented Shamir with a
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stark choice: “either halt settlements and enter into serious negotiations with the 
Arabs, or lose American economic and political support.”135
The price the Shamir government paid for alienating the American President was not
simply its failure to attain the loan guarantees, but the break down in the Likud’s
relationship with the administration. The consequences o f this became evident in the
run up to the Israeli election, when the administration apparently tried to undermine
the Likud position by intimating that the US-Israeli special relationship would be
1
under threat if  the party remained in power. This was reinforced a week prior to 
the Israeli elections when Baker publicly accepted Rabin’s campaign distinction
I <17
between political and security settlements. Ultimately it was clear that in the post- 
Cold War world, the relationship depended on the peace index; i.e. to what extent in 
American eyes Israel was committed to the peace process, and the administration had 
concluded that the Likud was not.
Operation Solomon
US administrations have always supported the emigration o f Jews to Israel and the 
Bush White House was no different and it was through humanitarian gestures that 
Bush most overtly demonstrated his support for Israel.
In 1989 as Israel resumed diplomatic relations with Ethiopia and the war that ravaged 
the country intensified, the Shamir government embarked on a strategy to rescue the 
remnant Jewish population stranded there. By late May, as forces hostile to the 
Ethiopian President Mengistu Haile Mariam were converging on Addis Ababa, 
Jerusalem decided that the Falasha Jewish community, now acutely at risk, would 
have to be evacuated without delay. In fact, in the proceeding months, the Israeli 
government had transferred $40 mn. into the Swiss bank accounts of influential
1
Ethiopian ministers, to facilitate the enterprise. The objective o f the plan that 
became known as Operation Solomon was to evacuate approximately fourteen
134 David Hoffman, “One Hundred Days of Solicitude”, Washington Post National Weekly Edition. 8- 
14 May 1989, p. 13, cited in Mervin, op. cit. p. 86.
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136 WP 9 February 1992.
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thousand Ethiopian Jews from Addis Ababa to Tel Aviv, in under thirty-six hours. In 
addition to the logistical challenge o f a mass airlift, Washington’s intercession proved 
crucial.
Mengistu made a ‘covering letter’ from the White House a pre-condition for allowing 
the Jews to be flown out and after a personal appeal from Shamir, Bush exhorted the 
Ethiopian government to cooperate in the Falasha evacuation.139 Consequently, 
Operation Solomon was a logistical success. The Israeli air force crews managed to 
fit the entire refugee aggregation into thirty three aircraft, transporting them to the 
safety o f Israel.
Shamir recalled in his memoirs that Bush’s part in the process “won him my deepest 
gratitude, the more so because my request for his help came at a time when he and his 
administration were angered by what they believed was Israel’s hampering o f  the 
peace process.” 140 Despite discord in both the inter-state relationship and the personal 
relationship between the two leaders, the Bush administration proved once again that 
in an extremity Jerusalem could rely on Washington. As had proved the case in the 
past, discord and disagreement in one area o f the relationship, however serious, did 
not impact on the fundamental bonds that united the two states.
Bush and Rabin
Many o f the periods o f crises that categorised the Bush-Shamir relationship were 
attributable to personal conflicts and the contradictory ideological beliefs o f the two 
leaders. As a result, the administration covertly intervened in the 1992 Israeli election 
by using the lure o f loan guarantees as a device for encouraging the Israeli electorate 
to vote for the Labour candidate Yitzhak Rabin. The administration made the 
question of financial aid personal and publicly indicated that it was being withheld 
from Shamir and not the Israeli people. This strategy proved successful, and the 
election o f Rabin as Prime Minister on 23 June 1992 ushered in a turning point in US- 
Israeli relations. The New York Times claimed that from America’s perspective, the
138 Sachar, op. cit. p. 982.
139 Ibid.. p. 982.
140 Shamir, op. cit. p. 216.
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election result was “a good one.” 141 Steven Spiegel, a Professor of Political Science 
at the University of California, Los Angeles, said that in celebrating Rabin’s victory 
people were expressing more than relief. “It is a sense that our friends are back.” 142
The policy o f the Labour government was predicated on the view that Israel was a 
normal state and not on an ideological crusade to fulfil the destiny of the Jewish 
people through control of the whole land o f Israel. Labour did not subscribe to the 
view that land had an existential value and this enabled Rabin to support territorial 
compromise and encourage an expanded US role in the peace process. This resulted 
in an improvement in US-Israeli relations. Bush set out to signal a warmer 
relationship between the two countries by evoking the language o f the ‘special 
relationship’. He referred to Israel as a ‘strategic partner’, and emphasised their 
shared commitment to “democracy, and to common values, as well as a solid 
commitment to Israel’s security, including its qualitative military edge.” 143 
Immediately after the election, he invited Rabin to the United States and on 10-11 
August demonstrated the personal closeness o f US-Israeli ties144 by hosting him at his 
Kennebunkport home in Maine.145 This was a meeting between political allies in the 
broader sense o f the word and both leaders stood to gain domestically and 
internationally.146 For Bush, Rabin was a constructive player in the Middle East chess 
game, while Rabin acknowledged that Bush was responsible for his electoral victory 
and could deliver the financial wherewithal necessary to strengthen his political base 
at home.147 Both parties sought to improve military cooperation and Bush 
demonstrated his commitment to Israel’s security with the agreement to sell Apache
14Rand Black Hawk helicopters to Israel from US stockpiles in Europe.
141 W E  25 June 1992 p. 14.
142 Spiegel cited in Ibid.. p. 14.
143 NYT 12 August 1992.
144 Rabin developed a close working relationship with Bush and their personal affinity was beneficial to 
the advancement o f the peace process. Author’s interview with Ira Sharkansky, professor o f political 
science & public administration, Hebrew University o f Jerusalem.
145 Ofira Seliktar, Divided We Stand: American Jews. Israel, and the Peace Process (Westport, CT. & 
London, Praeger, 2002) p. 120.
146 Leon T. Hadar, “Thawing the American-Israeli Chill”, Journal o f Palestine Studies vol. XXII, no. 2 
(Winter 1993), p. 82.
147 Ibid.. p. 82.
148 MECS 1992. p. 19.
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Bush and Rabin also found common ground on the question of settlements. The 
Israeli Prime Minister perceived a partial settlement freeze to be in Israel’s interest 
because it facilitated territorial compromise. Rabin retained the right to increase 
‘security settlements’ to enhance the demographic balance in the territories Israel 
would seek to annex in the final status agreements, but the construction o f 7000 
‘political’ housing units were frozen and government incentives for settlement were 
ended. In response, the President re-evaluated his position on the loan guarantees and 
pledged to secure congressional approval now that the two leaders had an agreement 
on basic principles. Irrespective o f the fact that 80 percent o f Americans opposed the 
$10 billion loan guarantees, as part o f a more general hostility to foreign aid, Bush 
authorised the legislation in the form o f an amendment to the foreign aid bill. His 
actions were a stark illustration o f how party political Washington’s involvement in 
the Middle East had become.149 The seeming parity o f influence in the relationship 
was also demonstrated when in apparent return for the loan guarantees, Rabin made 
only mild protests over the subsequent $9 billion sale o f seventy-two F-15XFs to 
Saudi Arabia.150
Bush then urged a quick and intensive round of new negotiations that began in 
Washington on 24 August and lasted for one month. The administration had 
apparently learnt its lesson from dealing with Shamir and left the parties meeting in 
the talks to pursue their own discussions. But what proved to be a real breakthrough 
in the peace process was to wait until the Clinton administration and the auspices of 
the Norwegians. In September 1992 Baker departed the State Department to run 
Bush’s re-election campaign which signalled that for the remaining tenure o f the 
administration, domestic politics, not foreign affairs, would be the top priority.
Bush’s Declining Fortunes
The backdrop against which the Bush administration devised its Middle East policy, 
provided a stark contrast to that of Johnson, Nixon and Reagan, because it occurred at 
a time o f great change in the international system and was presided over by a
149 Neill Lochery, The Difficult Road to Peace in the Middle East (Lebanon: Itaca Press, 1999) p. 212.
150 Hadar, op. cit. p. 82.
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President and Secretary o f State who had only minimal affinity for the Jewish state.151 
Despite this, four American Jews for whom Israel was o f great emotional significance 
formulated the diplomatic strategy Bush and Baker pursued. Starting at different ends 
of the emotional spectrum, Ross, Miller, Kurtzer and Haass, worked to devise and
I S2implement a negotiating strategy designed to guarantee Israeli security. Given the 
changing international system and the diminution o f the Soviet threat, had the US- 
Israeli relationship had been based solely on American calculations of strategic or 
economic interest, pressure should have been exerted on Israel to relinquish territory 
as a form o f appeasement to the Arabs. After all, there are far more Arabs than there 
are Israelis and oil is to be found in abundance in the Arab world not Israel. Yet the 
administration stood firmly behind Israel, adopted the peace proposal submitted by 
Shamir and convened a peace conference that adhered to Israel’s exact criteria for 
negotiations.
Bush’s team was convinced that security for the Jewish state would remain elusive 
until a peace settlement was concluded and that such a peace could not be reached
Iwithout American firmness toward both sides. Despite the lack o f  overt pressure 
on Israel to conclude a peace agreement, the commitment o f these men to the 
enhancement o f Israeli security was viewed with come scepticism because o f public 
perceptions o f the administration’s policies. The administration came under 
increasing attack from Israel, the American Jewish community and members o f 
Congress. Mel Levine, a congressman for California told Newsweek reporters that 
“President Bush and Secretary Baker appear[ed] determined to destroy the special 
relationship between Israel and the United States.” 154 Ross, Kurtzer, Miller and Haass 
found themselves attacked on three sides: by Arabs, by Israelis and by American 
Jews.
The paradox for Baker’s team was that their administration had worked hard to 
tangibly improve Israel’s security.155 Bush had crippled Iraq, Israel’s most 
threatening neighbour, won repeal o f the UN resolution equating Zionism with
151 Author’s interview with Marshall Breger.
152 Author’s interview with Dennis Ross.
153 Ibid..
154 Newsweek 1 June 1992, p. 57.
155 Ibid.. p. 57.
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racism; cajoled other states, most notably the Soviet Union and China, to open 
diplomatic relations with Israel, and helped tens of thousands of Ethiopian and Soviet 
Jews to immigrate to the Jewish homeland. Most of all, the Baker-generated peace 
talks delivered what Israel had sought since its creation: face-to-face talks with all o f 
its Arab neighbours. Whatever the administration’s critics might think, the actual 
conduct of the peace talks was not hostile to Israel’s position. Talks followed the 
Camp David framework, the administration supported Israel’s refusal to allow the 
participation of the PLO or Palestinians from East Jerusalem or the territories and 
refrained from putting forward its own proposal for a settlement.156 Moreover, the US 
government steadfastly supported Israel’s position on an interim period o f autonomy
1 S7and made no stipulations about the final outcome. Settlement construction was not 
stopped during this period and once Rabin replaced Shamir as Prime Minister, Bush 
contravened the wishes o f the American people, as expressed in the press, by granting 
Israel’s request for financial aid.
However, these successes were overshadowed by the distorted account o f  the loan 
guarantees promoted by the Israeli leadership.158 Shamir in particular was incensed 
by Bush’s refusal to grant the loan without a settlement freeze in exchange. It was as 
if  he believed his country had an inalienable right to financial support.159 On the 
domestic front, American Jews were furious over Bush’s supposed questioning o f the 
loyalty o f those who dared to lobby Congress for the guarantees.160 If greater 
emphasis had been placed on publicly reassuring both American Jews and the Israeli 
leadership o f Washington’s commitment to Israel, perhaps open hostility to the 
administration’s position might have been avoided. As Kurtzer acknowledged, 
“People have an uneasy feeling because o f words. But the bottom line is, you have to 
watch what Bush and Baker have done. What they’ve done has been good for
N Y T 16 May 1992, pp. 2-3.
157 WP 6 March 1992, p. 2.
158 Steven Spiegel argues that the damage inflicted on the Bush administration’s relationship with 
American Jews by the President’s refusal to authorise the loan guarantees, was not redressed by the 
convening of the Madrid conference. Steven Spiegel, “Israel and Beyond: American Jews and US 
Foreign Policy” in L. Sandy Maisel (ed.), Jews in American Politics (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: 
Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford, 2001) p. 264.
159 Jonathan J. Goldberg, Jewish Power: Inside the American Jewish Establishment, (Reading 
Massachusetts: Addison Wesley, 1996) p. 248. Following congressional ratification of Nixon’s 
decision to grant Israel a $2.2 billion aid appropriation, Goldberg argued that Israel came to view 
financial aid as a right.
160 Author’s interview with Dennis Ross.
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Israel.” 161 It was the polarisation of views between the Likud and Labour that enabled 
Washington to advance its own agenda. If the administration acted in a way that 
could be considered contrary to Israel’s interests, it was its ideological interests as 
defined by the Likud not its security interests as defined by Labour.
The Middle East preoccupied the administration o f President Bush to an 
unprecedented degree and he placed his credibility as President on the advancement 
o f the Arab-Israeli peace process. The term during which he served as President, is of 
particular note because o f the minimal impact fundamental changes in the national, 
strategic, economic, bureaucratic and domestic spheres, appeared to exert on US 
policy toward Israel. As the undisputed global hegemon, Washington should have 
been in a unique position to shape the Middle East peace process and its relations with 
the Jewish state. Yet as was described above, even the most determined efforts at 
peace-making met with limited success and the Israeli government, appeared to exert 
almost equal leverage as the White House in determining the course o f negotiations. 
The following chapter explores the changes that occurred in all the key factors 
traditionally adopted to explain US policy toward Israel, and seeks to provide some 
insights into how and why the unique characteristics o f this relationship have endured 
and in certain respects been enhanced.
161 Kurtzer, quoted in Newsweek p. 58.
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Chapter 8
Framing American Foregin Policy in the New World Order
Between the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War in 1990-91 and the 
election o f George W. Bush as President of the United States and Ariel Sharon as 
Prime Minister o f Israel, in 2001, the relationship between the two countries received 
perhaps its most significant challenges. For in the aftermath o f the Cold War, 
Washington’s strategic and geopolitical priorities had shifted, and perceptions o f the 
national interest were subject to re-evaluation. In analysing US policy toward Israel 
during this critical decade, the following chapter reverts to the themes explored in 
chapter two. By exploring changes in the national, strategic, economic, and domestic 
spheres and their comparatively limited impact on Washington’s policy toward Israel, 
the analysis seeks to illuminate the real foundations o f  the relationship and the reasons 
for its longevity.
The Strategic Interest Approach
Since the June weir of 1967, Israeli politicians had attempted to ground their country’s 
special relationship with the United States in terms o f Israel’s contribution to 
America’s strategic interests. As was discussed in chapter two, this rationale was 
premised on Israel’s ability to act as a bulwark against the perceived threat o f the 
Soviet Union and as both a counter to, and deterrent against, the forces of Arab 
radicalism. But with the evident decline of the Soviet Union, the traditional threat to 
American interests was considerably reduced and Israel’s role as a strategic asset was 
called into question.
Yet in April 1990, Congressman Les Aspin argued that “the demise o f the Cold War 
should not change our [Americas] strategic relationship with Israel.” 1 He argued that 
the relationship was not premised on the Soviet threat but on Israel’s need to deal with 
the threat to its existence posed by the Arabs and on the continuing strategic needs of
1 Les Aspin, “Session IV, Congressman Les Aspin, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee,” in 
The Soref Symposium: The Middle East in an Era of Changing Superpower Relations. Washington 
D.C.. April 29-30. 1990 David Segal (ed.), (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East
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the United States despite the absence of any recent Soviet threat.2 Two conclusions 
can be drawn from this assertion: firstly that the strategic relationship should be 
maintained because it served Israel’s strategic needs and secondly that Israel 
continued to be a strategic asset in terms of other regional threats to American 
interests. Yet an analysis o f the events of the 1990s demonstrates that Israel was 
hardly in a position to protect America’s strategic interests in any of the areas in 
which they came under threat.
The G u lf War
The Gulf War challenged US perceptions of Israel as a strategic asset because the 
Jewish state had potentially become a dangerous liability and more dependent than 
before on America for protection. In contrast to the Jordanian crisis o f 1970, when 
Israel had been called upon to act as a US proxy, Washington’s efforts throughout 
the Gulf War centred on counselling Israel to practice restraint. As Avi Shlaim 
explains:
Here was a conflict which threatened Americas most vital interests in the region and the best 
service that Israel could render to her senior partner was to refrain from doing anything. Far 
from being a strategic asset, Israel was widely perceived as an embarrassment and a liability.4 
Ironically therefore, Israel’s greatest contribution to the war was to show “great 
understanding for the interests o f the U.S. and interests o f others involved in th[e] 
coalition,”5 by doing nothing. In this singularly important respect, Israel emerged 
from the crisis as an ultimate loser and its government was forced to find a new logic 
to defend its status as a strategic asset.
Defending the New Strategic Interest
In a renewed effort to demonstrate Israel’s continued relevance to US policy, Israeli 
politicians increasingly argued that the country could now play a new strategic role in 
the Middle East by containing the forces o f radicalism and maintaining the status quo 
in a region where religious militancy was on the rise. Superficially at least, this
Policy, 1990) p. 40 quoted in Bernard Reich, Securing the Covenant: United States-Israel Relations 
After the Cold War (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1995) pp. 58-59.
2 Reich, op.cit. pp. 58-59.
3 See chapter five for a detailed explanation of Jordanian crisis of September 1970.
4 Avi Shlaim “Israel and the Conflict,” in A. Danchev & D Keohane (eds.), International Perspectives 
on the Gulf Conflict 1990-91 (London: Macmillan, 1994) p. 77.
5 Public Papers of the Presidents: George Bush. 1991 (Washington, 1993) 17 January 1991, p. 47
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appeared to be a convincing argument because the American administration still 
considered its interests to be under threat. It was just the nature of the threat that had 
changed.
In the post-Cold War world, the greatest threat Washington perceived to its interests 
in the Middle East derived from radical states such as Iraq and Iran, and the increasing 
appeal o f what its opponents call Islamic Fundamentalism. This perceived threat 
manifested itself in three distinct ways. Firstly through the proliferation o f non- 
conventional weapons as the radical states such as Iraq, Iran, Syria and North Korea 
intensified their quest for non-conventional weapons. Secondly through the threat 
militant Islam posed to the more traditional conservative leaders of the Middle East6 
who provided America’s traditional basis o f support. Thirdly through the threat o f 
Islamic terrorist organisations against Western targets globally. Set against this 
backdrop, for Israel to continue to be perceived as a strategic asset, it was necessary 
for the Jewish state to demonstrate how it could assist the US in preventing nuclear 
proliferation in the Middle East (apart from its own) and thwarting the spread o f 
fundamentalism and terrorism.
Nuclear Proliferation
In the early 1990s, the US Defence Department turned its attention to missile 
proliferation in the Third World.7 Both the Departments o f State and Defence focused 
on those countries that had previously been armed by America: Iran under the Shah 
and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq during the 1980s. Iran was accused of seeking to develop 
nuclear, biological and chemical missile systems and Iraq o f being able to renew germ 
weapon production if UN inspections ended. Yet Washington’s approach to non- 
conventional proliferation in the Middle East was contradictory. While the 
government imposed stringent measures to thwart the spread of nuclear material, 
American decision-makers accepted Israel’s somewhat oblique nuclear status and 
manipulated the threat of Israeli nuclear capability to constrain the radical states. 
Washington could therefore be seen as “selectively condemning the development o f 
weapons o f mass destruction by its ‘enemies’,” and “actively supporting] weapons
6 Uri Savir, The Process: 1.1000 Days that Changed the Middle East (New York: Vintage Books, 1998) 
! ? • 4 -
7 JP 30 March 1992.
8MECS 1997, p. 17.
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programmes when undertaken by its own clients and when it thus serves to 
consolidate US hegemony.9
For example, during the Gulf War, American intelligence alerted the administration to
signs that indicated Israel had gone on full nuclear alert,10 and had moved missile
launchers armed with nuclear warheads into the open, and deployed them facing Iraq.
In response, and to deter Saddam Hussein from unleashing a chemical attack,
Washington exploited media reports about the increasing number of Israelis who
argued that a chemical attack would justify the use o f nuclear weapons. For example,
Secretary of Defence Richard Cheney stated on 2 February 1991 that if  Iraq used
chemical weapons against Israel, its government might retaliate with non-
conventional weapons.11 Cheney’s statement was significant for a number o f reasons.
Firstly because the warning was issued not in Washington’s name but in Israel’s,
secondly because it confirmed that Israel was capable o f realising a non-conventional
option, and thirdly because the warning to refrain from escalation was directed solely 
1 ?at Iraq not Israel. In this way, Washington used Israel’s nuclear capability as a 
device for attempting to restrain the radical states and curb the spread o f non- 
conventional weapons.
The importance placed on preventing nuclear proliferation was demonstrated in May 
1995 by the level o f American diplomatic activity devoted to securing the renewal 
and ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).13 The debate 
surrounding the ratification o f the NPT is demonstrative o f the complex and 
unconventional nature o f US-Israeli relations. By signing the NPT Israel would have 
openly acknowledged her status as a nuclear power, thus diminishing the legitimacy 
of US calls to curb the global spread o f non-conventional weapons. By supporting 
Israel’s refusal to sign the treaty, Washington signalled to Iran and Iraq14 that if  they 
developed their own nuclear weapons programmes that threatened Israel or other
9 Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, Behind the War on Terror: Western Secret Strategy and the Struggle for 
Iraq (East Sussex: Clairview, 2003) p. 155.
10 Shlaim The Iron Wall pp. 480-1.
11 Ibid.. p. 481.
12 Ibid.. p. 481.
13MECS 1995. p . 34.
14 In securing ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), US efforts focused on Iran 
and Iraq. No significant pressure was exerted on Israel. Ibid.. p. 34
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American allies in the region, the US would endorse Israel’s ability to retaliate in 
kind. In this intangible way, it could be argued, Israel maintained its position as a 
strategic asset while consolidating the region’s existing balance of power structure.
However, the NPT offers little protection against the covert proliferation o f non- 
conventional weapons. In March 2003, when the administration of George W. Bush 
resolved to take military action against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, with the stated 
objective o f destroying weapons of mass destruction, it was London not Jerusalem 
that provided the diplomatic and military support for the war. While Israel may have 
temporarily thwarted the Iraqi nuclear programme with the bombing o f Osiraq in 
1981, the level o f distrust with which it is viewed by the Arab world, meant it was 
unable to actively participate in either o f the two subsequent US led wars against Iraq 
in 1991 and 2003. From this perspective, Israel’s status as a strategic asset in the 
traditional sense, is highly questionable.
Islamic Terror
In the eyes o f the Western world, Islamic Fundamentalism and terrorism are 
inextricably interwoven. This is because many organisations that use terror as a 
political weapon, including Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and al-Qaeda, make 
selective use o f Islamic doctrines to try to legitimate their actions. The US State 
Department’s list o f countries sponsoring terrorism compiled in 1995 included five 
supposedly Islamic Middle Eastern states: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Sudan. The 
reports categorised Iran, as “the premier state sponsor o f international terrorism,”15 
with Sudan running a close second.16
During the 1990s, the battle against terrorism consolidated the US-Israeli relationship 
by providing a mutual enemy and a coalescence of interests in collaborating against 
terrorist organisations. This was one area where Israel’s experience proved 
particularly valuable because, until September 11 2001, Washington had been the 
junior partner in terms of first hand experience of the material and psychological 
devastation terror inflicts on the civil society o f a state. While Israel had been the 
habitual victim of terrorist attacks since its creation in 1948, America’s first
i5MECS 1995. p. 30.
16 Ibid.. p. 30.
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experience of terrorist activity on its soil had occurred only with the bombing of the 
World Trade Centre (WTC) in New York in 1993.17 Though far less devastating than 
its successor, as a result o f this attack, Islamic terrorism became an increasingly
1 Rimportant factor in US policy calculations in the Middle East. Given Israel’s 
experience in defending the state against terrorism, Jerusalem became a natural ally in 
what Washington saw as an American led battle to defend the world. Reports in early 
2001 that Osama bin Laden had begun to target Israel as well as the US only 
underscored the opportunities for collaboration.19
However, this coalescence o f interests proved to be somewhat superficial. As during 
the Gulf War, when America acted to defend its vital interests, Israel was sometimes 
seen as a hindrance rather than a help. In retaliating against the terrorist attacks on the 
WTC and Pentagon America sought to marshal the support o f the Western and 
Muslim worlds. In so doing, Washington relied on Britain rather than Israel to act as 
its foremost ally. Meanwhile, in the guise o f assisting Washington, Israel’s Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon, exploited the situation for Israel’s advantage. By describing 
Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat as Israel’s Osama bin Laden, Sharon tried to win 
American acquiescence in Israel’s reoccupation o f Palestinian land from October 
2001. In so doing, Israel inflamed regional tensions, further alienating Arab and 
Muslim opinion at a time when America sought their support.
Islamic Democracy
The ability o f Israel or any state to prevent the spread o f militant Islam is highly
questionable. This is because its real growth has often occurred at least as much
through democratic elections as by state sponsorship or violent revolution. Given the
value attributed to Israel’s democratic status, it is ironic that it is through expressions
of the popular will that fundamentalism is posing its most significant challenge to the
existing political and social order. The Western world and those Middle East
governments that have undertaken tightly controlled experiments in political
20pluralism have been shocked by its potency. In the Egyptian parliamentary
17 In contrast to the American experience, Israel has been a victim of habitual terrorist attacks since its 
creation in 1948.
18MECS 1997. p. 17.
19 JP 14 February 2001, p. 2.
20 Martin Kramer, “Islam vs. Democracy”, Commentary vol. 95, no. 1, January 1993, p. 36.
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elections of 1987, the coalition dominated by the fundamentalist Muslim Brethren
emerged as the biggest opposition party in a contest engineered to assure victory for 
21the ruling elite. Similarly, fundamentalists outdistanced all other opposition parties 
in the 1989 election for the Tunisian parliament, although the winner-takes-all system 
gave every seat to the ruling party. In the same year, the fundamentalists nearly 
captured the Lower House o f the Jordanian parliament and in 1990, fundamentalism 
swept the countrywide local election in Algeria.24 Following Algerian independence, 
it was only France’s support o f the Algerian government that prevented the expansion 
o f Islamic democracy. For Western theorists o f democracy, it was “as if the Arabs 
had defied the laws of gravity.” Jeane Kirkpatrick went so far as to claim that: “The 
Arab world is the only part o f the world where I’ve been shaken in my conviction that 
if  you let the people decide, they will make fundamentally rational decisions.” O f 
course, Kirkpatrick was referring to a particular Western definition o f rationality and 
it is not altogether unusual for partisan politicians, diplomats and academics to 
consider as irrational people who hold beliefs different from their own.
Conclusions
For decades, the strategic relationship between the US and Israel was premised on the 
perceived threat o f the Soviet Union. However, it could be claimed that this was 
something o f a fa?ade because the “ease with which Washington adjusted to losing its
77primary rationale for strategic cooperation,” indicated that the relationship was more 
than a military alliance based solely on hostility to another party.28 It would therefore 
be inaccurate to contend that either the end o f  the Cold War, the impact o f the G ulf 
War or the rise o f Islamic extremism, has precluded Israel from continuing to perform 
the role o f a strategic asset in the Middle East. On the other hand, as this thesis 
sought to demonstrate, there is more to the US-Israeli relationship than a mutuality o f
21 Daniel Price, Islamic Political Culture. Democracy, and Human Rights: A Comparative Study 
(Westport, CT. & London: Praeger, 1999) p. 60.
22 Kramer, op. cit. pp. 36-37.
23 Price, op. cit. p. 55.
24 Ibid.. p. 118.
25 Kramer, op. cit. p. 37.
26 Quoted in Kramer, op. cit. p. 37.
27 Karen L. Puschel, US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era: An American 
Persepctive (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post Press, 1992) p. 155.
28 Reich, op. cit. p. 3.
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strategic interest. Karen Puschel provides an apt summation for the longevity of the 
relationship:
It is this complex mix of motivations for strategic cooperation that serves as its greatest 
protection. Because there was no one imperative for strategic cooperation, there will likely 
never be one reason for its decline. Strategic cooperation exists, in the final analysis, 
because an extremely close US-Israeli relationship exists.29
The Economic Interest Approach
At the end o f the Cold War the United States re-evaluated many o f its financial 
commitments to its allies across the globe. Aid to Pakistan, Japan and Germany was 
reduced, as was America’s contribution to the NATO budget. As threat perceptions 
initially decreased following the collapse o f the Soviet Union, some diminution in 
foreign aid seemed a rational response to the new international reality. In this regard, 
Israel remained something o f an anomaly because it was excluded from Washington’s 
review o f  its foreign economic obligations. Aid to Israel was not revised downward
TOfrom Cold War levels and in certain circumstances it was actually increased.
Neither the strategic interest nor the idea o f an ‘economic investment trap’ adequately
explains the economic ties between the two countries. An ‘investment trap’ refers to
circumstances in which a patron maintains a commitment to a client, not because it
directly enhances its own well-being, but in an effort to protect previous economic
*11
and political investments and as a device for maintaining credibility or prestige. 
Such was the case during the latter stages o f US involvement in Vietnam, when 
Washington acted in an effort to maintain prestige and to protect its previous military 
and economic stake in the country.32
However this type o f argument is not wholly convincing in the case o f Israel. In the 
absence o f the Soviet Union, or another state to rival its global supremacy, 
Washington could have curtailed its commitment to Jerusalem without the fear that its 
position o f influence would be usurped by another power. This argument also 
overlooks the fact, as was discussed in chapter two, that economic relations were a
29 Puschel. op. cit. p. 155.
30 In 1991, following the Gulf War, Israel received an additional $2bn. in aid - $5bn. as compared with 
the usual $3bn annual payment.
31 Leopold Yehuda Laufer, “U.S. Aid to Israel: Problems and Perceptions,” in Gabriel Sheffer (ed.), 
Dynamics of Dependence: U.S. Israeli Relations (Boulder & London: Westview Press, 1987) p. 3.
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product of an existing relationship between the governments of the two states. That 
the rationale for financial aid to Israel is not confined to that o f economic necessity is 
demonstrated by the fact that the vast majority of Congress opposed foreign aid in 
general but consistently voted in favour o f aid to Israel.
Traditionally, for political cultural reasons -  their belief that the role of government in 
the economic sphere should be limited, the Republican Party had been more 
stringent with the management of the foreign aid budget that the Democrats. In view 
of the Republicans’ aversion to foreign aid, their resounding victory in the 1994 
congressional elections generated concern amongst the governments o f the Middle 
East that US foreign aid commitments to the region would be reduced.34 When 
Republican Senator Jesse Helms o f North Carolina, became Chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, he was critical of what he described as American 
“overspending” on the Arab-Israeli peace process. Helms estimated that Middle East 
peace had cost the US $80bn.-$100bn. since the Camp David agreement and 
determined to use his position to reduce future expenditure. In contrast, the Clinton 
administration defended foreign aid as a fundamental US commitment to the peace 
process and as a tangible demonstration o f American credibility in the region.
Despite fierce opposition from some quarters, the special status accorded Israel across 
the government as a whole, was demonstrated by the congressional decision in 1995 
to leave levels o f assistance to the Middle East unchanged, while reducing foreign aid 
appropriations elsewhere. In the fiscal year 1996, the total foreign aid bill was 
reduced by 11 percent from $13.6bn. for the fiscal year 1995 to $12.1bn.36 Despite 
this, in accordance with the terms o f the Camp David Accords, Egypt and Israel 
continued to receive an annual $2.15bn. and $3bn. respectively. In addition, in 1995, 
the US Defence Department signed contracts to buy in excess o f $3bn. o f military
17
products from Israeli companies. Aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA), which first
32 Ibid.. p. 4.
33 David Baldwin, Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy: A Documentary Analysis (New York, 
Washington & London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966) p. 5.
34 MECS 1995. p. 38.
35 Ibid.. pp. 38-39.
36 Ibid.. p. 30.
37 Mideast Mirror 24 March 1995, p. 3.
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3 8began after the signing of the Oslo Accords, was also increased in February 1995, 
when Vice-President A1 Gore, announced that the United States would provide 
$73mn. to finance three projects in Gaza to generate employment for the Palestinians
• IQand to improve the region’s infrastructure. In June, Congress supported the White 
House’s proposal to give $75mn. in economic assistance to the PA and extended by 
45 days the Middle East Facilitation Act, which permitted US aid to the 
Palestinians.40
From a realpolitik perspective, US economic support and foreign aid to Israel could 
be said to have exceeded the rationale for its existence, in that US influence in Israel 
is assured and is not challenged by any other power. Therefore, the argument that 
financial support was merely a product o f the Cold War is greatly undermined. 
Similarly, economic aid is no longer linked to the need to sustain the Israeli economy 
which has become one o f the strongest in the Middle East. In 1998, Israel’s GDP 
exceeded $96bn.,41 exports totalled $30bn. and GDP per capita stood at $16,000, 
putting it on a par with the Western world. The increasing openness o f the Israeli 
economy enables its large conglomerates to raise capital by floating equity issues on 
the New York Stock Exchange. Direct investment in Israel has reached over $2bn. 
and strategic alliances between foreign and domestic conglomerates have multiplied 
in recent years.42
Although aid to Israel is impacted upon by a more stringent budgetary environment in 
the US,43 the fact remains that Washington will use all the economic means at its 
disposal to guarantee the security o f Israel and the longevity o f another free market
38 Under the Oslo provision, a $2 bn. fund was established to restore the Palestinian economy, o f which 
a quarter was to come from the US. For a more detailed account o f Israeli and American Jewish 
responses to aid packages resulting from the Oslo Accords see Ofira Seliktar, Divided We Stand: 
American Jews. Israel, and the Peace Process (Westport, CT. & London, Praeger, 2002) p. 136.
39 These projects included: $40m. to improve the sewage system o f Gaza City; $25m. to provide 
thousands of public works jobs; and $8m. to pave streets and upgrade shelters for the elderly and ill in 
refugee camps. See MECS 1995, p. 29.
40 This budget was administered by USAID, the official aid organisation of the US. Denis Sullivan, 
“International Aid and the Peace Process” in Structural Flaws in the Middle East Peace Process 
(Hampshire & New York: Palgrave, 2001) p. 171.
41 David Rothkopf, The Price o f Peace: Emergency Intervention and US Foreign Policy (Washington, 
D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1998) p. 54.
42 Simson Bichler, “Between Capitalism and Jewish Voters: Electoral Economics in Israel, 1977 to
1997” in J.W. Wright, Jr., (ed.), Structural Flaws in the Middle East Peace Process (Hampshire & New 
York: Palgrave, 2001) p. 218.
43 Ibid.. p. 108.
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economic system44 and to underwrite the cost of peace in the Middle East.45 On 
occasions, political reality is such that the most prudent economic policy is politically 
unacceptable to the nation, and non-economic benefits are considered to out-weigh 
the economic costs46 The financial commitment to Israel, therefore, is not 
necessarily a product o f economic prudence and the rationale for its longevity must be 
found in another dimension of the US-Israeli relationship.
The Domestic Politics Approach
It could be argued that in the absence o f the Soviet threat, the American Jewish 
community is perceived to have become the principal bulwark against the erosion o f 
US support for Israel. While this offers a one-dimensional view o f US-Israeli 
relations, it reflects the perceived power o f the pro-Israel lobby and the perceived 
importance o f the American Jewish vote in influencing Congress. According to this 
argument, if  the pro-Israel lobby failed to support the government o f Israel or if  
relations between Israel and the Diaspora deteriorated, US support for Israel would 
diminish.47 However, this commonly held assumption was not necessarily bome out 
by events, and crises in relations between American Jews and the Israeli 
administration, were not automatically reflected in US policy towards the Jewish 
state. In any case, from 1982, the predilection of the government of Israel and the 
pro-Israel lobby in America to speak with one voice dissipated. Criticism of Israel 
and the policies o f the Israeli government publicly emerged amongst the American 
Jewish community following the Israeli invasion o f  Lebanon in 1982 and were 
reinforced by the Palestinian Intifada o f 1987. For the first time, the mass media 
portrayed Israel as an aggressor state and relayed televised pictures o f Israeli troops 
breaking the bones o f stone throwing Palestinian children.48 The image o f Israel as an 
“embattled” state was replaced by that o f a regional military and economic
44 Ibid.. p. 126.
45 The US financial commitment to the peace process is crucial as if  peace is to take root in the wake of  
conflict, economic growth is vital. Economic failures can quickly reverse political and military 
successes. Rothkopf, op. cit. p. 6.
46 Richard J. Trethewey, “International Economics and Politics: A Theoretical Framework” in Robert 
A. Bauer (ed.), The Interaction o f Economics and Foreign Policy (Charlottesville: University Press of 
Virginia, 1975) p. 24.
47 JP27 March 1989.
48 F. Robert Hunter, The Palestinian Uprising: a war by other means (London & New York: Tauris & 
Co., 1991) p. 82.
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superpower as capable of acts of aggression as her Arab neighbours. This stark 
revelation challenged the perceived need for unquestioning support from the 
Diaspora.
The changing nature o f the Israeli state and the disunity between its citizens was also 
revealed by debates surrounding the direction of the peace process. The debate on the 
status o f the occupied territories created internal divisions in the Labour and Likud 
parties and forced them to adopt pragmatic positions rather than concrete policies to 
maintain party cohesion.49 This deep divide was reflected in public opinion in both 
Israel and the Diaspora. For the first time, disunity amongst the Israeli population 
was so great and the moral issue o f the occupied territories so potent, that American 
Jewish organisations took sides in the political debate. Once the climate for 
questioning Israeli policy developed and the American Jewish consensus began to 
fragment, conflict between American Jewish organisations and the Israeli government 
openly emerged. But the disagreements were about policy and the peace process, the 
substance o f the relationship, that o f support for Israel as an entity remained firm. It 
is to an analysis o f changes in the transnational relationship in the 1990s that we now 
turn.
Israel and the Pro-Israel Lobby
One o f the first examples o f direct and enduring confrontation between Israel and the 
American Diaspora occurred following the election of Yitzhak Rabin as Prime 
Minister of Israel in 1992. For the first time, an Israeli Prime Minister directly 
charged that the lobby’s attempts to aid Israel, by lobbying Congress for $10 billion in 
American loan guarantees,50 had actually been detrimental to the interests o f the 
state.51 He claimed that the lobby’s confrontational tactics had soured Israel’s ties 
with its chief ally and that waging battles “that were lost in advance” was 
counterproductive. From this point on, Rabin informed the organisation, they should 
take their instructions from the Israeli embassy in Washington, rather than pursue
49 Neill Lochery, The Israeli Labour Party: In the Shadow of the Likud (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1997) p. 
267.
50 Financial assistance was requested by Israel to meet the cost o f absorption o f Soviet Jews.
51 Leon T. Hadar, “Thawing the American-Israeli Chill”, Journal o f Palestine Studies vol. XXII, no. 2, 
Winter 1993, p. 84.
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their own initiatives.53 Rabin told the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee 
(Aipac) officials that he personally would conduct diplomacy directly with the White 
House and went so far as to demand that they not interfere.54 But his criticism of 
Aipac should not be overstated and must be placed in context of his broader political 
style that was fundamentally different from his predecessors. His experience as Chief 
of Staff of the Israel Defence Forces and as ambassador to the United States, had 
made him direct in his approach and an advocate o f one-to-one diplomacy.
However, the Israeli government was not the only critic of Aipac and prominent 
American Jewish figures became embroiled in Israel’s domestic political battles 
between Labour and Likud. Israel’s newspaper H a ’Aretz argued that Aipac was 
involved in the “covert intelligence o f American politicians, including senators and 
congressmen, who did not agree with Likud’s policies.”55 Israeli Labour activists, 
including editorial writers for Davar, called for the resignation o f Aipac’s executive 
director Thomas Dine, accusing him o f prolonging Likud’s rule by helping to secure 
American support for its policies.56 The irony that the role o f Aipac was ostensibly to 
assure the Israeli government of US support appeared to escape his accusers. It was 
somewhat paradoxical, given Dine’s support for Likud, that he was eventually forced 
to resign over some unflattering remarks about Orthodox Jews that were attributed to
cn
him. Tension between the Rabin government and Aipac was not easily dispelled 
and Harvey Friedman, the lobby’s vice-president, also resigned in 1993 after 
revelations that he called Rabin’s deputy Foreign Minister “a little slime-ball.”58
Aipac’s leaders had welcomed the defeat o f George Bush and the election o f Bill 
Clinton as President o f the United States, in November 1992, because they anticipated 
that he would transform Capitol Hill, to use Pat Buchanan’s characterisation, into
52 NYT 22 August 1992, p. 2.
53 NYT 22 August 1992, 1, p. 2.
54 Leon Hadar, “The Friends o f Bibi (FOB’s) vs. The New Middle East,” Journal of Palestine Studies 
vol. XXVI, no. 1, Autumn 1996, p. 90.
55 Quoted in “AIPAC charged with Maintaining a Blacklist to Silence Criticism of Israel’s Lobby is 
Also Criticised by Prime Minister Rabin,” Special Interest Report published by American Council o f  
Judaism (Sept.-Oct. 1992), in Hadar Thawing p. 84.
2,6 Hadar Thawing p. 84.
57N Y I 14 July 1996, p. 2.
58 Seliktar, op. cit. p. 10
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“Israeli-occupied territory.”59 This relief was short lived. Although leader of one o f 
the most pro-Israeli governments to occupy the White House, Clinton was committed 
to a land-for-peace formula as the device for ending the Arab-Israeli dispute - a 
strategy both the Israeli and American right-wing opposed. To achieve this objective, 
he formed a close working relationship with Rabin, who had very different views on 
the future o f the peace process from those held by much o f the pro-Israel lobby. As a 
result, American Jewish groups bypassed the administration and went directly to the 
legislature with their objections.60 Rabin lamented that “[njever before have we 
witnessed an attempt by U.S. Jews to pressure Congress against the policy o f a 
legally, democratically elected government.”61 Rabin warned that lobbying against 
the policies o f the Labour government could cause a serious breach in Israeli relations 
with the American Jewish community. To redress this imbalance, in 1993, the 
Israeli Policy Forum (IPF) was founded at the behest o f Rabin and his deputy Shimon 
Peres, to counteract the leaders o f traditional American Jewish organisations whom 
they felt were not sufficiently supportive o f the Labour party or of the Oslo peace 
process.
Israel and American Jewry
Tensions between Israel and the Diaspora were not limited to relations with the 
official lobby, and conflict emerged between the Rabin government and members o f 
the American Jewish community who opposed the direction o f the Oslo peace 
process. Protests against the autonomy talks were registered in June 1995 by the 
3,000 strong International Rabbinical Coalition for Israel. In a ruling issued in New 
York, the rabbis stated that “uprooting Jewish settlements in the Golan Heights, 
Judea, Samaria and Gaza Strip as part o f the ‘false Israeli peace* is a national crime, 
and it is forbidden for Jews to lend a hand to such a deed.’* Rabin retaliated by 
claming that “only those who send their children and grandchildren to the Israeli 
army, not some rabbis from New York, have the right to express views on the peace 
process.”64 Late in 1995, the Saudi Arabian ambassador to Washington found himself 
in the unusual position of defending the peace process to a gathering of unconvinced
59 Hadar Thawing p. 85.
60 NYT 30 September 1995, p. 1.
61 Ibid.. p. 1.
62 Ibid.. p. 1.
63 MECS 1995. p. 371.
64 Ibid.. p. 371.
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American-Jewish leaders in New York.65 Perhaps the ultimate discontent amongst 
members of the American Diaspora was registered when a right-wing zealot from 
Brooklyn took the unprecedented step of assassinating Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak 
Rabin on 4 November 1995.
The Likud victory in the 1996 elections restored some o f the former equilibrium
between the Israeli government and the right-wing American Jewish organisations.66
During the election campaign, many independent Jewish organisations had been
careful not to openly ally themselves with either the Labour or Likud candidate. Yet
much o f Aipac’s leadership and Malcolm Hoenlein, the executive director o f the
Conference o f Presidents o f Major Jewish Organisations, were perceived as lukewarm
in their support o f the Oslo Accords and in favour o f Likud leader Binyamin
Netanyahu’s candidacy.67 The pro-Likud coalition in Washington comprised all the
68major orthodox groups and think tanks, including Aipac, the spearhead o f the Jewish 
lobby. The conservative Heritage Foundation in Washington, with close ties to the 
Republican Party, became a major forum for the enemies o f Clinton and the Labour 
government’s efforts to implement the Oslo Accords.69 He activated these 
connections during the 1996 Israeli election campaign, when he and three former 
Israeli diplomats (former ambassador to Washington Zalman Shoval, Yoran Ettinger 
and Yosef Ben-Aharon) travelled to Washington on several occasions to lobby
70lawmakers against Labour policy. Netanyahu “built a certain aura around him self’ 
that appealed to parts o f the American population and he has been described as the
65 Hadar The Friends o f  Bibi p. 91.
66 Seliktar, op. cit. p. 152.
67 MECS 1996. p. 385.
68 Hadar The Friends o f  Bibi p. 92.
69 Ibid.. p. 92.
70 Leading newspaper columnists, including William Safire and A. M. Rosenthal o f the New York 
Times and Charles Krauthammer and George Will of the Washington Post were transformed into the 
American media’s voice o f the Likud. Similarly, Netanyahu appeared so often on Nightline, that the 
wags began referring to “Ted Netanyahu” and “Bibi Koppel”. See Hadar The Friends o f Bibi p. 93. 
The part played by a small, but highly influential group o f American Jewish businessmen in 
Netanyahu’s rise to power also deserves attention. The group included Mervyn Adelson, the former 
chairman o f Lorimar-Telepictures and the former US ambassador to Austria, Rinald Lauder. This 
clique had reportedly spent years financing Netanyahu’s career and introducing him to congressmen 
and State Department officials. Nurturing shared views on the peace process, Lauder was said to be 
active in raising funds for Likud and reportedly connected Netanyahu with Republican political 
consultant Arthur Finkelstein. See MECS. 1996, p. 385.
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“Israeli Ronald Reagan” in terms of his capacity to express himself to the public and 
on television.71
Who is a Jew?
As 1996 drew to a close, the struggle over religious pluralism re-emerged as a source 
o f tension in Israeli-Diaspora relations. Religious controversy had first appeared as a 
major factor in 1988, when the “who is a Jew?” question was raised by Israel’s 
orthodox rabbis, and Israel’s Shas party, a Sephardi Orthodox party, petitioned to 
prevent Reform and Conservative conversions to Judaism performed abroad from
7 7being recognised in Israel. The move generated an unprecedented backlash amongst 
America’s generally non-Orthodox Jewish community and a delegation o f the top US 
leadership flew to Israel to confer with Shamir. Pressure from the Diaspora was so 
great that Shamir dissolved his coalition national unity government and formed a new 
government that was not dependent on the religious parties, thus enabling him to
7*Xwithstand orthodox pressure and to avert a confrontation with American Jewry.
An illusion o f calm returned to religious politics until 1996, when the election o f 
Netanyahu fused the separate issues o f security and religion for the first time.74 The 
Likud leader slowed down the peace process and formed the most religiously right- 
wing dependent government in Israel’s history. The “Who is a Jew?” debate came to 
the fore once again, with an Israeli Supreme Court decision that opened the door to 
non-Orthodox conversion. To forestall such a possibility, Shas proposed an 
amendment to the Law o f Return that would have invalidated Reform and 
Conservative conversions to Judaism performed outside Israel. If  passed, the bill 
would have given full conversion power to the Israeli Orthodox Rabbinate and barred
♦ 7Snon-Orthodox representatives from local religious councils. This would have 
effectively disenfranchised 85 percent o f American Jews who were either Reform or
7 6  77Conservative and challenged their very legitimacy as Jews.
71 Author’s interview with Ira Sharkansky, professor o f political science & public administration, 
Hebrew University o f Jerusalem.
72 Shmuel Sandler, Robert O’Freeman & Shibley Telhami, “The Religious-Secular Divide in Israeli 
Politics” Middle East Policy vol. VI, no. 4, June 1999, p. 142.
73 Ibid.. p. 142.
74 Ibid.. p. 142.
75 Seliktar, op. cit. p. 161.
76 NYT 17 November 1997, p. 1.
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On this occasion, Reform and Conservative Jews used legal means to retaliate against 
the bill and petitioned the Supreme Court for equal treatment under the law, including 
service on local and religious courts. The Supreme Court supported their claims and 
also demanded that ultra-orthodox men serve in the Israeli army. The ruling drew a 
virulent response from Israel’s ultra-orthodox rabbis, who denounced the Court. They 
claimed that religious law transcended secular law and demanded that the Knesset 
pass legislation upholding the authority o f Chief rabbis over religious councils. 
Reform and Conservative Jews responded by threatening to withhold financial 
support for those members o f the Knesset who voted for the bill and to ban them from 
appearing in their synagogues.79
More than in previous rounds o f the “who is a Jew?” controversy, the new discourse 
was fraught with extreme anger and bitterness and Netanyahu forced to take action to 
defuse the tensions. In a visit to the United States that coincided with the debate, 
Netanyahu claimed that he understood the threat posed to American-Jewish-Israeli 
solidarity and assured American Jewish leaders that “no power on earth can rob any 
Jew o f his or her identity.”80 However, he was careful not to directly criticise the 
legislation. He needed to balance the concerns o f American Jews with domestic 
political realities -  the ultra-Orthodox religious parties controlled 23 o f the 66 Knesset
Q |
seats in his coalition and if not appeased could have toppled his government.
To avoid the perception that it was taking sides, the Netanyahu government devised a 
compromise. Accordingly, there would be a simultaneous moratorium on the 
conversion bill and the Reform and Conservative challenges in the course, while a 
commission chaired by Finance Minister Y a’akov N e’eman was tasked with 
providing a long-term solution. Although the N e’eman commission eventually 
decided on a “conversion institute” that represented all three denominations, the 
Israeli Orthodox circles dismissed it. This did little to heal the rift with the majority 
o f the American Jewish community.
77 Meryl Hyman, Who is a Jew: Conversion. Not Conclusion (Woodstock, Vt.: Jewish Light 
Publishing, 1998) p. 178.
78 FT 10 December 1998, p. 8.
79 Sandler, O’Freeman & Telhami, op. cit. p. 143.
80 NYT 26 November 1997, p. 26.
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Perhaps as a result o f domestic pressure, Netanyahu apparently misread the deeply 
held sentiment o f many American Jews. The real issue for them was that Israel, a 
country they supported both emotionally and materially as the legitimated homeland
of tthe Jewish people, would refuse to recognise their brand o f Judaism as valid in the
82Jewish state. Their disillusionment with Israel’s policy was registered economically 
when the diversion of donations from the United Jewish Appeal (UJA) to 
Conservative and Reform-oriented charities in Israel, contributed to a $20 mn. 
shortfall in the UJA budget.83
The ‘Who is a Jew’ debate had profound implications and caused many American 
Jews to take a closer look at the array o f political parties in the Likud government. 
Despite Netanyahu’s ‘American’ background, the pivotal place o f the Shas party, 
which represented the growing Sephardi-Orthodox population, raised feelings o f 
discomfort regarding the right-wing elements in Israeli political culture. The 
controversy opened up a ‘Pandora’s box’ as once American Jews had started down 
the path o f questioning Israel, they began to question other aspects o f Israeli policy, 
including its control o f the West Bank and Gaza.84
Demographic Change in the American Jewish Community
Religious challenges to the right o f American Jews to consider themselves Jewish, 
reflected more fundamental changes amongst the community that Israeli Jews, having 
enjoyed the status o f nationhood for over fifty years, did not share. Although many 
Jewish communities were no longer persecuted, assimilation had increased and it 
could be legitimately argued that the American Jewish community was itself in
o c
decline. The community had been experiencing a very low birth rate and a rate o f 
intermarriage exceeding 50 percent. The low birth rate adhered to the life style o f 
traditional middle class families, while inter-marriage showed the increasing
81 NYT 17 November 1997, p. 1.
82 Horvoitz, 1996, op. cit. p. 386.
83 Ira Stoll, “Conversion Crisis Will Cause $100 Million Drop in American Giving to Israel, Reform 
Leaders Warn,” Forward 8 January 1999.
84 Author’s interview with Lewis Roth, Representative, Americans for Peace Now, Washington, D. C.
85 Irving Kristol, “Why Religion is Good for the Jews”, Commentary vol. 98, no. 2, August 1994, p. 19.
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oz:
acceptance o f Jews by the non-Jewish community. As Jews become more woven
• 0 7into the fabric o f American life their coloration becomes less distinctive. The World 
Jewish Congress projected in 1998 that the Jewish population outside of Israel, about 
8 million people, would decline to about 4 million by 2020.88 This is partly because
o n
the large majority o f the children o f intermarried couples did not remain Jewish and 
posed a potential threat to the longevity and future influence o f world Jewry and the 
Diaspora’s relationship with Israel.90 Joel Meyers, the executive vice-president o f the 
conservative movement’s Rabbinical Assembly accurately described the implications 
o f the changing relationship between Israel and American Jewry thus:
There is an emotional distancing going on between U.S. Jewry and Israel that is very difficult to 
overcome. It could have practical implications in terms of feeling part o f the same family even 
politically. The American Jewish community has been a strong lobbyist on behalf o f  Israel.
Can this still happen?91
This sense o f pessimism appeared to be vindicated in October and November 1997, 
when Congress twice temporarily suspended aid to Israel.92 Jonathan J. Goldberg the 
American bureau chief for The Jerusalem Report, claimed that this was a direct result 
o f a decline in American Jewish support for Israel:
Members o f  Congress could get away with it because they didn’t get hit with protest phone calls 
because American Jews are too angry at Israel now and the people who usually mobilise them 
are slow to move. Everybody’s mad. In America being Jewish has become something you do.
In Israel it’s an attribute o f  being.93 
At a time when conflict between the executive and legislature had brought the 
government to a virtual standstill, the rationale behind Congress’ decision were far 
more than constituency pressure. Nevertheless, it does give credence to the political 
importance generally attributed to the power o f American Jewry to influence 
Congress.
86 Ibid.. p. 19 and Seymour Lipset & Earl Raab, Jews and the New American Scene (Cambridge, MA.
& London: Harvard University Press, 1995) p. 206.
87 David Shribman, “Hosts not Visitors: The Future o f Jews in American Political Life,” in in L. Sandy 
Maisel (ed.), Jews in American Politics (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: Lanham, Boulder, New 
York, Oxford, 2001) p. 276.
88 NYT 16 November 1998, p. 8.
89 Ibid.. p. 8.
90 There is a feeling in some circles that funds raised by American Jews should not be sent to Israel but 
used in the US to retard the process o f assimilation and “Jewish disappearance”. Author’s interview 
with Ira Sharkansky.
91 Jerusalem Report IMarch 1999, p. 32 cited in Sandler, O’Freeman & Telhami. op. cit. p. 143.
92 N Y I 16 November 1997, p. 8.
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The most recent and greatest testament to Jewish integration into American society 
and the evolving influence of American Jews was the consensus that A1 Gore 
strengthened his bid for the presidency, by selecting Joseph Lieberman as his running 
mate in the 2000 presidential election. Prior to this, Jonathan Goldberg explained, 
there had “been a sense that there is a glass ceiling that the Jews will never get past, 
that the highest levels in the land will be closed to us.”94 “The fact that a Jew was 
nominated by one o f the two major parties to be Vice-President of the United States 
has ... made th[e 2000] election a symbol o f where American Judaism stands,” said 
Ed Rettig, director o f Educational Programmes on American Jewry for the American 
Jewish Committee.95 While Henry Kissinger held the second most powerful office in 
the United States, he was appointed to this post by Richard Nixon and not popularly 
elected. The crucial issue in Lieberman’s candidacy was the recognition amongst the 
major political parties that Jews are sufficiently integrated into society that the 
American people as an entity could elect a Jew to high office. The future o f 
individual American Jews seems bright.96
The Future o f  Israel’s Relationship with the American Diaspora Community
The American Diaspora is a voluntary community based on networks o f
“confederate” associations. There is no single hierarchical structure but a matrix o f
consisting o f numerous institutions tied together by crisscrossing memberships,
shared purposes and common interests, whose role and power fluctuate in accordance
to issues and circumstances.97 This built-in pluralism means that individuals and
groups are free to break with the community consensus and to pursue their own
agendas. As the patterns o f Jewish funding and philanthropy have changed in recent
years, traditional umbrella organisations have been passed over in favour o f smaller
groups where donors can exert more control over the agenda. Nowhere has this
phenomenon been more apparent than in the realm o f peace advocacy where both the
right and left wing have been willing to put their beliefs above traditional loyalty to
the policies o f the democratically elected government o f Israel.
93 Ibid.. p. 8.
94 JP 7 November 2000.
95 Ibid..
96 Shribman, op. cit. p. 276.
97 Seliktar, op. cit. p.208.
363
Such fragmentation has effected the functioning of the umbrella organisations that 
represent Israel’s interests in Washington. Aipac, which in the mid-1990s was rated 
as the second most powerful lobby in the US, has seen its membership stagnate and its 
influence undermined by internal discord. The Presidents Conference, which 
embraced the specialised advocacy groups, has been virtually paralysed by the 
constant struggle between those who favour a land-for-peace settlement and those 
who oppose it.98
The cleavage in the American Jewish community is reflected in the polarisation o f the 
Israeli electorate and enables both the Israeli right and left wings to use sympathetic 
segments in the Diaspora to advance their foreign policy goals. While such trends 
have potential implications for Israel’s appeal as a symbol o f Jewish unity, 
particularly amongst the younger generation, they can also be viewed as a reflection 
o f the affinity between the two communities rather than a cause for concern. As 
Rabbi Alexander Schindler, former president o f the Union o f American Hebrew 
Congregation, explained, “I’m less nervous than other people are because from the 
perspective o f Jewish history there was never a time in Jewish life o f ideological 
consensus.”99
Israel and American Christian Evangelicals
Despite tensions between Israel and some American Jews, the commitment o f 
America’s Christian evangelicals to the state o f Israel remained fundamentally firm. 
In view o f their increasing numerical superiority, in contrast to the American Jewish 
community which will be smaller in absolute number by the middle o f the century,100 
they have been perhaps an even more important source o f support. The was 
demonstrated in 1998 when the Christian right aligned with the Netanyahu 
government to undermine Clinton’s policy towards the peace process. For example, 
Reverend Jerry Falwell told the New York Times that there were approximately 
200,000 evangelical pastors in America and that he would ask them to go into their 
pulpits and use their influence to oppose pressure on the Israelis by the Clinton
98 Ibid., p. 208.
99 NYT 16 November 1997, p. 8.
100 Lipset & Rabb, op. cit. p. 206.
364
administration to give up more territory to the Palestinians.101 E. Brandt Gustavson, 
president of the National Religious Broadcasters, sounded a similar theme when he 
assured Netanyahu that Christians “stand with the Prime Minister for an undivided
IQ2
Jerusalem” and by implication, opposed its own government’s support o f a land- 
for-peace formula.
Traditionally the Democrats have been considered the bastions of Israeli causes.
However, it is the argument o f this thesis that this distinction effectively came to an
end with the election o f Ronald Reagan in 1982 on what can be described as a
1 01Christian fundamentalist/evangelical ticket. In return for this support, Reagan had 
an obligation to address their concerns - moral, economic and social - and their 
support for Israel based on biblical prophecy. This was the beginning of an increasing 
shift in the voting patterns of evangelical Protestants that culminated in the 
unexpected Republican victory in the 1994 congressional elections that gave them 
control o f both Houses o f the Senate for the first time since Dwight Eisenhower’s 
1952 election.104 Although “evangelicals were not yet a political monolith” they were 
believed to “constitute a substantial Republican voting bloc” 105 and based on election 
results since 1982, this bloc now included at least three-fifths of the voters in this 
populous religious tradition. The Christian Right’s campaign to increase voter turnout 
among evangelicals was successful, and in recent elections an average o f 75% o f 
those contacted cast their vote.106 The late Arthur Kropp, president o f the religious 
organisation, People for the American Way, predicted that the Republicans would be 
forced to accede to many o f the demands o f the Religious Right. He commented that: 
“Precinct by precinct, Religious Right activists were the single largest organised 
group doing the tedious chores o f voter registration and ‘get out the vote’ activities. 
He described this as “a huge political debt Republican leaders can be expected to
101 NYT 21 January 1998, p. 6 and Chicago Tribune 21 January 1998, p. 9.
102 Mideast Mirror. 20 January 1998, vol. 12, no. 12, p. 18.
103 Reagan’s appeal to the fundamentalists appeared to translate into votes when 22 million Christian 
fundamentalist and evangelists shifting from a pro-Democratic 56-43% margin in 1976 to an 81-19% 
Republican sweep in 1984. See Albert J. Menendez, Evangelicals at the Ballot Box (New York: 
Prometheus Books, 1996) pp. 135-183 for a detailed account o f  changes in religious voting patterns 
between 1980 and 1994.
104 Menendez. op. cit. p. 175.
105 Stephen Bates, Battleground (New York: Poseidon Press, 1993) p. 301.
106 Menendez, op. cit. p. 177.
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repay with interest.” 10' This alignment has perhaps reached its zenith under the 
presidency o f George W. Bush who has brought the neo-conservatives and Christian
I Q Q
fundamentalists to coexist in his administration. The long-term political impact of 
the Religious Right on the separation o f church and state, women’s rights and 
alternative lifestyles exceed the bounds of this thesis. But what is important to 
acknowledge is the increasing political influence o f a sector o f the electorate that 
advocates American support o f Israel.
It is also interesting to note that because much American Christian support for Israel 
is founded on the Biblical prophecy that the Jews have a right to a homeland in 
Palestine and to the lands o f Judea and Samaria, they have tended to be far less 
critical than American Jews o f the more questionable aspects o f Israeli policy. For 
this reason the Religious Right could be considered a more unquestioning source o f 
support. This demonstration of the depth o f Christian evangelical feeling can be 
traced to the original religious beliefs o f the Pilgrim Fathers and the values and 
cultural premises on which the United States was founded. The extent to which the 
‘special relationship’ and sense of affinity Christian evangelicals feel for Israel is 
explicable in cultural terms will be discussed later in this chapter. As a consequence 
o f the increasing electoral significance o f the Religious Right, support for Israel was 
no longer the preserve o f the Democrats and became an issue both parties would 
highlight in future election campaigns. Given the interests o f both American Jews 
and Christian evangelicals, it could be argued that domestic political constituencies 
are largely responsible for funding Middle Eastern politics.109 Dennis Bernstein, the 
Jewish host o f KPFA Radio's Flashpoint current affairs programme has gone so as to 
acknowledge that a combination o f Israeli lobbyists and conservative Christian 
fundamentalists have in effect censored all free discussion o f Israel and the Middle 
East out o f the public domain in the U S.110
107 Quoted in Ibid.. p. 183.
108 Both neo-conservatives and Christian fundamentalists hold senior positions within the George W. 
Bush administration. John Ashcroft, the Attorney General is a Christian fundamentalist and Paul 
Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary o f Defence is a neo-conservative. Alain Frachon & Daniel Vemet, 
“The Strategist and the Philosopher,” CounterPunch 2 June 2003.
109 Author’s interview with George R. Salem: member o f the Palestinian negotiating team at the Madrid 
talks 1991-93.
110 Robert Fisk “A strange kind of freedom,” The Independent 9 July 2002.
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Conclusions
In view o f changes in the objective circumstances that influence decision-making, US 
policy in the 1990s, might well have taken a somewhat different course than in 
previous years, with Washington determining the direction of both US-Israeli 
relations and the nature o f the Arab-Israeli peace process. Such an eventuality did not 
occur and at the beginning of the twenty-first century US-Israeli relations have defied 
explanation in terms of traditional inter-state relations. What we are left with is the 
sense that ‘political culture’ as a mechanism which shapes the beliefs and value 
systems o f those who take crucial decisions and acts as a guide to policy, is perhaps 
worthy o f further scrutiny as a means o f illuminating the relationship between states 
o f unequal power and influence.
American Political Culture and Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century
The last decade o f the twentieth century was a time o f international change as old 
empires crumbled and new states were bom. The United States found itself at the 
apex o f this new world order, rejoicing in the collapse of the Soviet Union, its 
bitterest enemy for more than forty years, but uncertain of the new dangers that would 
threaten America and international stability. The one constant during this period was 
the values and beliefs o f American decision-makers and the continuing role played by 
political culture in shaping the framework o f American perceptions, expectations and 
aspirations in policy formulation.
The end o f the Cold War had many different implications at many different levels, as 
the global superstructure underwent tremendous change. The Soviet Union withdrew 
troops from Afghanistan and other Third World states and the fall o f the Berlin Wall 
provided the most visible symbol o f how the change would affect the Western world. 
With the collapse o f the Soviet Union, the United States became the only global 
superpower and by default, could claim victory in the battle for global ‘freedom’. 
Washington once again took the lead in ‘post-war’ reconstruction, much as it had in 
the past. W ilson’s Fourteen Points o f January 1918, setting out his vision for a world 
free of strife, and Truman’s 1947 programme o f Marshall Aid, designed to assist 
countries to be free from Communism, was followed by Bush’s repackaging o f
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‘freedom’ in the “New World Order” 111 of 1990. For Bush, a new world order, it is a 
big idea, “where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the
119universal aspirations of mankind: peace and security, freedom, and the rule o f law.”
Yet in contrast to his predecessors, Bush lacked one vital ingredient in motivating the 
American people in support o f ‘freedom’ and domestic regeneration -  an enemy with 
the equivalent stature o f the Soviet Union to oppose. Trumpeting rock music over the 
walls of the Papal Nuncio’s residence in Panama did not command the same enduring 
attention as earlier crusades. In fact, it brought a smile to the face of many non-
i n
Americans, although the US violation o f Panama’s sovereignty with thousands o f 
troops enhanced Bush’s presidential rating.114
‘Freedom’ remained the central theme in US foreign policy. Aid to former 
Communist East European countries was made dependent on adherence to 
Washington’s ‘democratic’ criteria. The administration celebrated ‘democratic’ 
advance when the Sandinistas were defeated in the 1990 Nicaragua elections, despite 
the fact that Washington had contributed to the undermining o f Nicaraguan 
democracy, by arming o f guerrilla opposition forces, in what became known as the 
Iran-Contra affair,115 while Wilsonian self-determination, was the publicly proclaimed 
reason for forcing the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait in the 1991 G ulf conflict.116 At 
least the world would be spared the spectacle o f the 1930s when countries such as 
Abyssinia, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were 
annexed, with little or no active protest from Washington. Yet even in the post-Cold 
War world there were numerous occasions when Washington sacrificed democracy 
and freedom for the kind o f stability that was seen as best serving the national
117interest. For example, as the Russian Federation fumbled its way towards a new
111 Scott Lucas, Freedom’s War: The US Crusade Against the Soviet Union. 1945-56 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1999) p. 283.
112 President Bush’s Speech to Congress, PPP 6 March 1991.
113 Noam Chomsky, World Orders Old and New (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) pp. 12- 
13. The US vetoed two Security Council Resolutions condemning its aggression, along with the 
General Assembly resolution that denounced the invasion as a violation o f international law and o f  the 
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity o f states.
114 David Ryan, US Foreign Policy in World History (London & New York: Routledge, 2000) p. 186.
115 The World Court condemned America’s use of force in Nicaragua. Chomsky, op. cit. p. 12.
116 Ryan, op.cit. p. 186.
117 Avi Shlaim, War and Peace in the Middle East (New York: Penguin Books, 1995) p. 135.
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democratic and capitalist order, Bush continued to support Gorbachev, even though 
Boris Yeltsin had contested a democratic election and had won.118 Neither did 
America support oppressed minorities like the Kurds and irredentist groups like the 
Shi’ites in their struggle for political reform in Iraq.119
The term the ‘evil empire’, originally coined in reference to the Soviet Union, but 
expanded to include other Communist states, was once again redefined to exclude 
China. In this instance, the commitment to the democratic agenda was disregarded, as 
the one billion people still living under Communism and the students in Tiananmen 
Square in 1989 paid a high price to discover. This selective response was not new 
and had characterised much o f American history when the pursuit o f the “national 
interest had vied with the promotion o f the national narrative.” 120 The New World 
Order was hardly distinguishable from the old. It was based on the status quo, on 
existing states, existing frontiers and the quest for stability.
Bush’s State o f the Union address in 1990 illuminated the long-running contradictions 
in US policy between freedom and order and the conflict between moral rhetoric and 
the national interest.
The anchor o f our world today is freedom, holding us steady in times o f change, a symbol of  
hope to all the world. And freedom is at the very heart of the idea that is America ... America, 
not just the nation, but an idea, alive in the minds o f  people everywhere. As this new world 
takes shape, America stands at the comer o f a widening circle of freedom -  today, tomorrow, 
and into the next century.... This nation, this idea called America, was and always will be a new 
world -  our new world.122
This idea o f America as a symbol o f  goodness permeated the Clinton White House. 
Clinton echoed similar themes to those o f his predecessors and in his State o f the 
Union address in 1997 told the American people that:
Fifty years ago, a farsighted America led in creating the institutions that secured victory in the 
Cold War and built a growing world economy. As a result, today more people than ever
118 Ryan, op.cit. p. 186.
119 Shlaim War and Peace p. 135.
120 Ryan, op.cit. p. 187.
121 Shlaim War and Peace p. 135.
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embrace our ideals and share our interests....For the first time ever, more people live under 
democracy than dictatorship, including every nation in our own hemisphere but one -  and its 
day too, will come.123
Despite the lofty rhetoric, the resolve that characterised American actions in the Gulf 
and to a lesser extent in Somalia were not matched by comparable action in Bosnia. 
While American leaders sought to be viewed as moral actors, their response was 
circumscribed to meet the public temperament of the post-Vietnam era. In the 
absence o f an enemy in the form o f a significant ‘other’, demonstrations o f American 
power in Rwanda and Bosnia were symbolic and largely ineffective in terms o f their 
stated objectives.124
Under the Clinton administration, America’s world role remained extensive and this 
activism contrasted sharply with the early months of the administration o f George W. 
Bush, whose limited knowledge o f foreign affairs contributed to the domestic
orientation o f policy. This insular approach to politics continued until September 11\
2001 when America became the victim o f the largest terrorist attacks in world history 
as hijackers flew two passenger airliners into the World Trade Centre in New York 
and a third into the Pentagon in Washington D.C. A fourth airliner crashed into a 
field in Pennsylvania, apparently after the passengers overpowered the hijackers, 
preventing the plane reaching its target in the heart o f the capital.125
The response o f the Bush administration to the events of September 11 revealed the 
essence of the beliefs and values on which the state was founded. In deploring these 
devastating acts of terrorism, the nation’s leaders returned to the rhetoric o f the past 
and the political cultural beliefs on which America was founded, provided the rallying 
call for action. Perhaps nowhere was the legacy o f America’s cultural heritage more 
starkly profiled than in President Bush’s first State o f the Union Address, delivered to 
Congress on 29 January 2002. For it was imbued with references to the values on 
which America was founded: ‘freedom’, ‘liberty’ and ‘justice’, and to the United
122 Bush’s address at http://odur.let.rug.n1/~usa/P/gb41/speeches/su90ghwb.htm
123 Clinton address at http://www.usis.usemb.se/speeches/stateoft.html quoted in Lucas, op. cit. p. 283.
124 David Ryan, “Asserting US Power, in Philip Davies (ed.), An American Quarter Century: US 
Politics From Vietnam to Clinton (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995) pp. 120-1 cited in 
Ryan, op.cit. p. 188.
125 The Economist 15 September 2001, p. 15.
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States as an exemplary nation with a responsibility and “obligations to each other, to
1our country and to history.” In calling on the American people to continue to bear 
the financial and human burden necessary to pursue the ‘war’ on terrorism, Bush 
called on the traditional American sense o f mission: “We want to be a Nation that
197serves goals larger than se lf’ -  a belief dating back to the Puritans and enshrined in 
the Constitution of the United States in the words “we hold these truths to be self- 
evident.” In declaring “we will defend liberty and justice because they are right and
19R 1 9 0true and unchanging” and “we can overcome evil with greater good,” Bush was 
effectively reverting to the timeless nature o f American values. As the Founding
iFathers believed that America was a “shining light amongst the nations”, so Bush 
asserted that the United States had “been called to a unique role in human events.” 131 
As God was a pervasive force for the Puritan settlers, so it remained for contemporary 
American’s who believe and take seriously the assertions o f their President that “God
■ 5*132is near.
If  the moralistic element o f American foreign policy has remained undiminished for 
more than two hundred years, the legalistic approach to foreign affairs has remained 
equally pervasive. The war against terrorism was defined in legalistic terms with 
reference to “outlaw regimes” and the pursuit o f a just cause to create a “just and 
peaceful world.” 133 The war against Iraq o f March-April 2003, was also defined in 
these terms as the US sought to remove the leader o f a ‘rogue’ state from power and 
to prevent the proliferation o f weapons o f mass destruction. In defining foreign 
policy objectives in the legalist-moralistic language of the past, the Bush 
administration, like its predecessors, claimed that America was the judge o f good and 
evil in the world and defined its allies in terms o f those states that shared its values.
126 Transcript of President Bush’s first State o f the Union address, delivered to Congress on 29 January 
2002. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-1 l.html
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
130 Byron Shafer Introduction p. v in Byron Shafer (ed.), Is America Different? (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991).
131 www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/2002Q129-l l.html
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
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George W. Bush and the State of Israel
For the first eight months o f George W. Bush’s term in office, the US-Israeli 
relationship was lukewarm as the President focused his attention on domestic affairs. 
In early 2001, the administration had shown little interest in the escalating Intifada 
despite the increasing mortality rate amongst both Israelis and Palestinians. 
Repeatedly he had made it clear that his administration would not be sucked into 
assisting the two parties in reaching a compromise on how to live together.134 Just 
months after his election, Israel went to the polls and elected Ariel Sharon as their 
new Prime Minister. Sharon’s election was greeted warmly in Washington despite 
the death knell it sounded for the peace process. The Likud leader categorically stated 
that he would not discuss the future o f Jerusalem or relinquish control over East 
Jerusalem to the Palestinians. He then announced that the terms for a peace 
agreement offered by his predecessor Ehud Barak at Camp David in November 2000, 
had been withdrawn from the negotiating table and that the peace talks would not 
continue at the point at which they ended in January 2001.135 More ominously for the 
peace process, the Bush administration legitimated Sharon’s position and 
compounded the stalemate by stating that commitments made by the Clinton 
administration to the peace process would not necessarily be honoured. This created 
additional complications, as when negotiations foundered, the disparate parties often 
looked to the United States to break the deadlock.
Sharon himself had little if  any personal affinity with the power brokers in 
Washington. Even Netanyahu, while openly disliked by the Clinton administration, 
formed a firm relationship with the Republican right wing that had effectively vetoed 
Clinton’s attempts to pressurise Israel. As much as Sharon tried to disregard 
American preferences, the very nature o f international relations forced him, in the first 
months o f his premiership, to take American interests seriously and to demonstrate an 
element o f compatibility between his policies and theirs. In the aftermath o f the 
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre, Sharon discovered to his cost the 
implications o f misreading American sentiment and attempting to further the Israeli 
national interest at what Washington perceived to be its own expense. After initially
134 The Economist 26 May 2001, p. 11.
135 Middle East International 9 March 2001, p. 3
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acting and speaking uncompromisingly by calling Arafat Israel’s Osama bin Laden, 
Sharon agreed to an attempted cease-fire, after Washington made both Israel and the 
Palestinians understand that they could not afford to cross America in its hour o f need
] 36and peril. As Bush endeavoured to build the widest possible coalition before 
launching his counterstrike against terrorism, the televising around the Arab world o f 
the unequal struggle in the Palestinian territories, made it difficult for Muslim
1 'K lcountries to join an alliance led by Israel’s chief ally. If September 11 was a 
turning point in how the United States dealt with terrorism, many in the Arab world 
hoped it would also change the American approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
In late September these hopes appeared vindicated when Bush spoke of his vision for
no
a Palestinian state.
However, Hamas undermined the prospects for the reconvening o f peace talks with 
the assassination o f Rehavam Zeevi, an ultra-right Israeli minister who had just 
resigned from the Sharon government. The assassination reignited the cycle o f 
assassinations, suicide bombings and Israeli re-occupations o f Palestinian land. Less 
than two months after demanding a cease-fire between Israel and the Palestinians, the 
bombing of Afghanistan bore fruit. It then appeared that Bush’s rhetoric about a 
Palestinian state had been nothing more than political expediency designed to secure 
the assistance or at least quiescence o f the Muslim world. Once the immediate 
political objective had been realised, Washington and the American people began to 
identify with Israel once again as an ally in the war against terrorism.
As operations in Afghanistan uncovered the extent o f the al-Qaeda network and the 
scale o f its intended terrorist actions against Western targets, Bush became 
increasingly receptive to Sharon’s comparisons between America’s war on terror and 
that o f Israel.140 During late 2001 and early 2002, as Israel bombed, shelled and 
reoccupied Palestinian areas, America remained silent.141 Americans identified with 
the Israelis as victims o f Islamic terror, with the White House stating that “Israel has
136 The Economist 22 September 2001, p. 61.
137 Ibid.. p. 61.
138IHT 4 February 2002, p. 5.
139 Author’s interview with Lewis Roth, Representative, Americans for Peace Now, Washington, D. C.
140 Author’s interview with William Quandt, National Security Council aide, Nixon and Carter 
administrations.
141 The Economist 8 December 2001, p. 57.
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the right to defend itself.” 142 Professor Makiya, of Brandeis University, speaking on 
the BBC’s Newsnight stated that 77% of Americans believe that Palestinian suicide 
bombings are terrorism in the sense o f the war on terror.143 Washington claimed that 
the United States had the right to undertake any action it considered necessary against 
perceived terrorist targets to protect its national security, was tacitly extended to the 
Israelis in their war against the Palestinians. In contrast to his father who lived up to 
his word of convening an international peace conference in Madrid, after the Gulf 
War, George W. Bush appeared to renege on his short-lived commitment to an Israeli- 
Palestinian peace process, thus increasing popular distrust o f the United States in the 
Arab world. Even Saudi Arabia and Egypt, America’s staunchest regional allies, 
were mystified by the fact that the United States could live through September 11 and 
not move forcefully to resolve a dispute that appeared to encourage suicide bombing 
and increased the popularity of Islamic radical groups.144
In early 2002, Israel, as a close ally o f the United States, had been granted virtually 
free rein to continue a conflict that inflamed Arabs and Iranians alike and fuelled the 
flames o f Islamic terror. In writing about the Arab relationship with the United 
States, Fawaz Turki, columnist for the English-language Saudi newspaper Arab News 
questioned whether the Arabs had “been left by the wayside and become irrelevant in 
the global dialogue o f cultures.” 145 In June 2002 Bush spoke o f his “road map for 
peace” in the Middle East, but it was only towards the end of 2002, as Washington 
sought to marshal international support for the war against Iraq, that serious 
consideration was given to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As threats o f Islamic 
terrorism persisted, efforts to capture Osama bin Laden failed and anti-American 
rhetoric increased throughout the Muslim world, the Bush administration appeared to 
become aware that the Israeli-Palestinian dispute could not be separated from the 
broader Middle East landscape and that movement in the peace process could actually 
serve the American national interest. To this end, in May 2003, Bush published his 
“Road Map for Peace in the Middle East” and his vision o f the creation o f a 
Palestinian state by 2005. The plan calls on both parties to make concessions for 
peace but the onus has been put on the Palestinians to re-structure their government,
142 Ibid.. p. 57.
143 Professor Makiya, Brandeis University, speaking on Newsnight BBC 1, 4 April 2002.
144 1HT 4 February 2002, p. 5.
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creating a new constitution that separates the powers o f government, and allows for a 
free-market economic system. The American approach is very much a product o f its 
political culture and is premised on transforming a putative Palestinian state into a US 
style democratic entity.
145 Ibid., p. 5.
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C o n c lu s io n s
This thesis sought to explain the emotionally charged, multi-dimensional relationship 
the United States and Israel have shared since 1948. In so doing, it has analysed the 
traditional explanations o f US-Israeli relations: strategic interest, economic 
considerations, domestic politics and bureaucratic rivalry, and found them to offer 
incomplete explanations o f perhaps the most atypical bilateral bond in inter-state 
relations. After all, Washington had aligned itself with a small state o f little over 5 
million people and negligible resources, in contrast to the vast mineral wealth o f 
Israel’s 300 million or so Arab neighbours. And even if  it could be argued that the 
Jewish state’s strategic significance was o f over-riding importance during the Cold 
War, the argument was much more difficult to sustain after it. As for the widespread 
notion that US policy toward Israel is almost entirely explicable in terms o f  the power 
o f the Jewish lobby, it beggars belief that some 6 million people, even if they are well 
organised, influential, articulate and well funded, could determine the policy o f some 
280 million Americans. Since for more than half a century the fundamentals o f the 
US commitment to Israel seemed to remain largely unchanged, clearly some 
alternative mode of explanation was called for, and this thesis has attempted to 
provide it.
Since it is an axiom o f foreign policy that its main purpose is to serve the national 
interest, the thesis proposed that in its long standing commitment to Israel, the US was 
taking a somewhat idiosyncratic view o f that term. It hypothesised that both 
government and people were strongly imbued with values which conditioned the 
framework of perceptions, preferences, prejudices and expectations on which policy is 
based and that the notion o f the American national interest was, therefore, informed 
by these values. The analysis detailed the origins and development o f the value 
structure in terms o f the concept o f political culture -  admittedly a somewhat 
amorphous concept, but one utilised in this thesis to refer to the stock o f political 
ideas, ideals and codes o f conduct that are transmitted in a society from one 
generation to another. It was argued above that in perceiving their society to be a 
beacon o f what they like to call ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’, in a world in which such
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values were often distinguished by their absence, the Americans had been encouraged 
to believe that they shared a political kinship with societies similarly imbued and that 
they had an obligation to assist where such values were under threat. Such forces as 
European colonialism, Fascism and Communism were seen traditionally to constitute 
such a threat, and, as this dissertation revealed, increasingly what was termed ‘Islamic 
Fundamentalism’ was held to hazard such bastions of ‘freedom’ and ‘democratic 
values’ as Israel and the US. Furthermore, with the Zionist lobby able to count on 
upwards o f 40 million Right wing Christian evangelical supporters in addition to the 
influential organisations o f concerned Jews, successive governments could ignore it 
only at their peril. With the small State of Israel widely portrayed in the US as a kind 
o f democratic David against a series o f powerful Goliaths, the most recent o f which 
made widespread use of indiscriminate terror, menacing Israel and the US alike, its 
fate, it was argued, had a continuing resonance that has made it a prime focus o f 
American concern.
It was the contention o f this thesis that among the elements in American political 
culture that conditioned official policy toward Israel were three in particular:
Firstly, Americans have always been interested in Jews. Though America is 
culturally Christian, the core metaphor o f its exceptionalism as the Chosen People o f 
the New World knowingly imitated the Biblical saga o f the return of the Jews to 
Israel. A common ethical and religious belief, the Judaic tradition and the Judeo- 
Christian heritage were perceived to bind the US and Israel together. While 
theological elements of the American fascination with the Jews have been attenuated, 
secularised equivalents are still played out on the stage o f Arab-Israeli diplomacy and 
American politics and foreign policy. The feeling o f moral responsibility for the 
preservation o f  Israel because of the role the US played in its creation was reinforced 
by revulsion and horror at the Holocaust and o f American complicity through inaction 
in its perpetration. The ‘Americanisation o f the Holocaust’ that has occurred since the 
late 1970s, as the atrocity permeated American life through media images and 
national memorials, accentuated feelings o f guilt and the sense that the Jewish people 
have a ‘right’ to their own state and protection from external sources o f persecution. 
That America has continued to view itself as the protector o f the Jewish state is
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evident in Washington’s approach to Middle East politics, although its actions are 
generally legitimated in terms o f the US strategic interest, and, rather more 
questionably, on the important contribution Israel’s democratic status makes to 
regional stability.
Secondly, the American Jewish community can be described as the hypotenuse o f the 
US-Israeli triangle, because it is perceived to exercise substantial political influence 
for Israel. Elected officials consider it ‘safe’ to support policy decisions that are 
favourable to Israel and may sacrifice their political careers if  they openly challenge 
aid to the Jewish state. However, in recent years as American Jews have come to act 
as much out o f their own parochial interests and ill-defined identity as for the 
quotidian concerns o f the Jewish state, Protestant Fundamentalists have become an 
increasingly important source o f domestic support for Israel. The growing 
recognition by the Republican Party o f Christian Evangelicals as an important voting 
bloc o f more than forty million people, has further increased the prominence placed 
on issues relating to Israel in the agendas o f both major political parties.
Thirdly, personalities have made a profound contribution to the dynamics o f US- 
Israeli relations. Ronald Reagan and Menachem Begin shared a right wing 
perspective while Bill Clinton and Yitzhak Rabin also found common political 
ground, forming a partnership in their endeavour to implement the Oslo Accords. In 
contrast, George Bush Sr. and Yitzhak Shamir moved in divergent directions, while 
their conflicting personalities reinforced policy differences. Nevertheless, Israel 
continued to be perceived as an American alter ego and even George W. Bush, a man 
who came to office with little interest in Middle East affairs or emotional affinity for 
Israel, in less than one year, came to identify closely with the Jewish state. On the 
other hand, while personal relations do play a role, decision-makers are a product of 
the political cultural environment and tend to embody the values o f their society. The 
US-Israeli relationship therefore, is not so much determined by random collisions o f 
egos as by real differences or similarities in perceptions and interests grounded in 
culture and history.
378
Despite this apparent congruence o f cultural and ideological values, the US-Israeli 
partnership is, o f course, an unequal one. As was essayed above, the relationship is 
not without tensions, many of which are as much a product o f Israel’s own identity 
problems as to inconsistencies in American foreign policy. As a Zionist state, Israel is 
bent on maximal independence and dedicated to the remaking o f the Jewish image 
from hapless victim of history to that o f a people shaping its own destiny. Yet the 
patterns of Israeli dependence on the US, particularly since 1973, more accurately 
resembled those o f the European Diaspora in centuries past, where the fate o f Jewish 
communities depended on the external power brokers o f the age. While Jerusalem 
enjoys great autonomy in its relations with Washington, it is the subordinate power 
and, as this thesis has attempted to indicate above, on occasions is forced to comply, 
albeit grudgingly, with the preferences o f the superpower.
As the parties embark on a new phase o f the peace process, a divergence o f tactics is 
beginning to appear, even though there is general agreement between Washington and 
Jerusalem on the need to end the Arab-Israeli dispute, thus promoting regional 
stability, combating terrorism and ensuring the survival o f Israel. While discord and 
tension may emerge over the means to achieve these ends, they go no deeper than the 
nuances o f the relationship. The fundamentals of commitment appear to remain 
unchanged. For the relationship has proved itself to be “of such a kind as to exceed or 
excel in some way that which is usual or common; exceptional in character, quality or 
degree ... admitted to particular intimacy; held in particular esteem ... marked off 
from others o f the kind by having some distinguishing qualities or features; having a 
distinct or individual character.” 1 While taking political culture as the starting point 
for analysing the relationship may be both imprecise and ambiguous, it is the 
framework that appears to explain the most. As this thesis has tried to demonstrate, 
both in form and substance, the covenant between the United States and Israel is that 
of a special relationship reinforced by the notion widely shared in the former that the 
two countries share a common political culture based in part on mutual values, history 
and a congruent religious heritage.
1 See Alex Danchev On Specialness: Essays in Anglo-American Relations (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1998) p. 7.
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Appendix A
Joint U.S.-USSR Working Paper, Fundamental Principles
(The Rogers Plan)
October 28, 1969
Israel and the UAR,
In consideration of their obligations under the Charter o f the United Nations,
Confirming their obligations under Security Council Resolution 242 o f November 22, 1967 and expressing their 
readiness to implement it in good faith in all o f its provisions,
Recognising the inadmissibility o f the acquisition o f territory by means o f war,
Recognising also the need to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East under the terms o f  which each 
State in this area can live in security,
Agree that their representatives under the auspices o f Ambassador Jarring will follow the procedures the parties 
utilised at Rhodes in 1949 to work out without delay, starting on the basis o f the following provisions, a final 
and reciprocally binding accord on ways o f  implementing Security Council Resolution 242 o f  November 22, 
1967 to establish a just and lasting peace.
Point 1
The parties, in reaching a final accord (contained in a final document or documents) on a package settlement on 
the basis o f  these Fundamental Principles, would determine a timetable and procedures for withdrawal o f Israeli 
armed forces from UAR territory occupied during the conflict o f 1967 to boundaries to be delineated in 
accordance with Point 3 as well as an agreed plan for interrelated fulfilment of all other provisions o f  Security 
Council Resolution 242.
Point 2
The state o f war and belligerency between Israel and the UAR would be terminated and a formal state o f  peace 
would be established between them, and both parties would refrain from acts inconsistent with the state o f  peace 
and the cessation of the state of war.
In particular:
1. No aggressive action by the armed and other forces—land, sea, or air~of either party would be undertaken or 
threatened against the people or the armed forces o f the other.
2. Both parties would undertake to do all in their power to ensure that acts o f hostility and belligerency whether 
by government agencies, personnel, or private persons or organisations will not originate from and are not 
committed from within their respective territory.
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3. Both parties would refrain from intervening directly or indirectly in each other's domestic affairs for any 
political, economic, or other reasons.
4. Both parties would confirm that in their relations with each other, they will be guided by the principles 
contained in Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the UN Charter.
Point 3
The parties would agree on the location of the secure and recognised boundary between them, which would be 
shown on a map or maps approved by the parties which would become part o f the final accord. In the context o f  
peace, including the inter alia agreement between the parties on the establishment o f demilitarised zones, on 
practical security arrangements in the Sharm al-Shaykh area for guaranteeing freedom o f navigation through the 
Strait o f Tiran, and on practical security arrangements and final disposition o f Gaza, the former international 
boundary between Egypt and the mandated territory o f Palestine would become the secure and recognised 
boundary between Israel and the UAR.
Point 4
For the purpose o f ensuring the territorial inviolability o f the parties and guaranteeing the security o f the 
recognised boundary, the parties, following the procedures set forth in the last preambular paragraph o f this 
document, would work out an agreement on:
(a) Zones to be demilitarised and procedures o f ensuring their demilitarisation;
(b) Practical security arrangements in the Sharm al-Shaykh area to assure freedom o f navigation through the 
Strait o f Tiran; and
(c) Practical security arrangements for and final disposition o f  Gaza.
Point 5
The parties would agree and the Security Council would reaffirm:
(a) That the Strait o f Tiran is an international waterway; and
(b) That the principle of free navigation for vessels o f all countries, including, Israel, applies to the Strait o f  
Tiran and the Gulf o f Aqaba.
Point 6
The UAR would affirm that, in its exercise o f sovereignty over the Suez Canal, the ships o f all nations, 
including Israel, will have the right of freedom o f navigation without discrimination or interference.
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Point 7
The parties would agree to abide by the terms o f a just settlement of the refugee problem as agreed upon in the 
final accord between Jordan and Israel, and to participate as Ambassador Jarring may deem desirable in working 
out the terms of said settlement.
Point 8
The UAR and Israel would mutually agree to respect and acknowledge each other's sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, inviolability and political independence and each other's right to live in peace within secure and 
recognised borders free from threats or acts o f force.
Point 9
The final accord would be recorded in a document which is to be signed by the parties and immediately 
deposited with the UN. After the parties have deposited such a document, the Secretary General o f the UN 
would be requested by the parties immediately to inform the Security Council and all UN Member States to that 
effect.
In the implementation of the final accord, it would be understood by the parties that their respective obligations 
would be reciprocal and interdependent. The final accord would provide that a material breach o f that accord by 
one o f  the parties shall entitle the other to invoke the breach as a ground for suspending its performance in 
whole or in part until the breach shall be cured. From the moment o f deposit, the document would become 
binding on the parties and irrevocable, and implementation and observance by the parties o f the provisions of 
the accord would begin.
Point 10
Both parties would agree that the final accord, including the map or maps delineating the final boundaries, 
would be submitted to the Security Council for its endorsement.
It would be understood that the accord between the UAR and Israel would be paralleled by an accord between 
Jordan and Israel, which would include agreement on a just solution o f the refugee problem. Implementation of 
both accords would begin only after agreement had been achieved on the entire package.
It would also be understood that France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Union o f Soviet 
Socialist Republics would submit and support an appropriate Security Council resolution and pledge that they 
would concert their future efforts to help the parties abide by all of the provisions o f the final accord or accords.
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A p p en d ix  B
U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 
November 22, 1967
The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,
Emphasising the inadmissibility o f the acquisition o f territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting 
peace in which every State in the area can live in security,
Emphasising further that all Member States in their acceptance o f the Charter o f  the United Nations have undertaken 
a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 o f the Charter,
Affirms that the fulfilment o f  Charter principles requires the establishment o f a just and lasting peace in the Middle 
East which should include the application o f both the following principles:
•  Withdrawal o f Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
•  Termination o f all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement o f  the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political independence o f every State in the area and their right to live in peace 
within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts o f force;
Affirms further the necessity
•  For guaranteeing freedom o f  navigation through international waterways in the area;
•  For achieving a just settlement o f the refugee problem;
•  For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence o f every State in the area, through 
measures including the establishment of demilitarised zones;
Requests the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and 
maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful 
and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;
Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts o f the Special 
Representative as soon as possible.
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A p p en d ix  C
United Nations Security Council Resolution 338  
October 22,1973
The Security Council
1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity 
immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment o f the adoption of this decision, in the positions 
they now occupy;
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of  
Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all o f its parts;
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties 
concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.
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Appendix D
The Camp D avid  Accords 
September 17, 1978
A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AGREED AT CAMP DAVID
Mohamed Anwar el-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic o f  Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime 
Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President o f  the United States o f America, at Camp David 
from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the 
Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to adhere to it.
Preamble
The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:
— The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement o f the conflict between Israel and its neighbours is United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.
— After four wars during thirty years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the 
cradle o f civilisation and the birthphce o f three great religions, does not yet enjoy the biasings o f  
peace. The people o f the Middle East yeam for peace so that the vast human and natural resources o f  
the region can be turned to the pursuits o f peace and so that this area can become a model for 
coexistence and cooperation among nations.
— The historic initiative o f President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by 
the Parliament, government and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit o f Prime Minister Begin to 
Ismailia, the peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception o f these missions by 
the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be 
lost if  this generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies o f war.
— The provisions o f the Charter o f  the United Nations and the other accepted norms o f international 
law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct o f relations among all states.
— To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit o f Article 2 o f  the United Nations Charter, future 
negotiations between Israel and any neighbour prepared to negotiate peace and security with it, are 
necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles o f Resolutions 242 and 338.
— Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence o f every 
state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from 
threats or acts o f force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era o f  
reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in 
maintaining stability, and in assuring security.
385
— Security is enhanced by a relationship o f peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy 
normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of 
reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarised zones, limited armaments 
areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for 
monitoring, and other arrangements that they agree are useful.
Framework
Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and 
durable settlement o f the Middle East conflict through the conclusion o f peace treaties based on 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good 
neighbourly relations. They recognise that, for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been 
most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework as appropriate is 
intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between 
Israel and each o f its neighbours which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With 
that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:
A. West Bank and Gaza
1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in 
negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that 
objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:
(a) Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and 
taking into account the security concerns o f all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for 
the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the 
inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration 
will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants o f  
these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details o f a transitional 
arrangement, the Government of Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis o f this 
framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle o f  self- 
government by the inhabitants o f these territories and to the legitimate security concerns o f  the parties 
involved.
(b) Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing 
authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations o f Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians 
from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an 
agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be 
exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal o f Israeli armed forces will take place and there
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will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement 
will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong 
local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and 
Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the 
security of the borders.
(c) When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is 
established and inaugurated, the transitional period o f five years will begin. As soon as possible, but 
not later than the third year after the beginning o f the transitional period, negotiations will take place to 
determine the final status o f the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbours, and to 
conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end o f the transitional period. These 
negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the elected representatives o f  the 
inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one 
committee, consisting o f representatives o f the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final 
status o f the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbours, and the second committee, 
consisting of representatives o f Israel and representatives o f  Jordan to be joined by the elected 
representatives o f the inhabitants o f the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between 
Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached on the final status of the West Bank and 
Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles o f UN Security Council 
Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and 
the nature o f the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognise the 
legitimate rights o f the Palestinian people and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will 
participate in the determination o f their own future through:
(1) The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives o f the inhabitants o f the West 
Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status o f the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by 
the end o f the transitional period.
(2) Submitting their agreement to a vote by the elected representatives o f the inhabitants o f the West 
Bank and Gaza.
(3) Providing for the elected representatives o f the inhabitants o f the West Bank and Gaza to decide 
how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions o f their agreement.
(4) Participating as stated above in the work o f the committee negotiating the peace treaty between 
Israel and Jordan.
2. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its 
neighbours during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong 
local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed o f inhabitants 
o f the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain continuing liaison on internal security matters 
with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.
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3. During the transitional period, representatives o f Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing 
authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities o f admission 
o f persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to 
prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters o f common concern may also be dealt with by this 
committee.
4. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed 
procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation o f the resolution o f the refugee problem.
B. Egypt-Israel
1. Egypt and Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any 
disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 o f  the 
Charter o f the United Nations.
2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal o f  
concluding within three months from the signing o f  this Framework a peace treaty between them, while 
inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar 
peace treaties with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for the 
Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between 
them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the timetable for the implementation o f their 
obligations under the treaty.
C. Associated Principles
1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace 
treaties between Israel and each o f its neighbours—Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.
2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one 
another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions o f the Charter o f the United 
Nations. Steps to be taken in this respect include:
(a) full recognition;
(b) abolishing economic boycotts;
(c) guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens o f the other parties shall enjoy the protection 
o f the due process of law.
3. Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context o f final peace 
treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship 
which is their common goal.
4. Claims Commissions may be established for the mutual settlement o f all financial claims.
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5. The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on matters related to the modalities of 
the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the 
obligations o f the parties.
6 . The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that 
their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members o f the Security Council shall be 
requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect for their provisions. They shall also be 
requested to conform their policies and actions with the undertakings contained in this Framework.
For the Government o f the Arab Republic o f Egypt:
A. Sadat
For the Government of Israel:
M. Begin 
Witnessed by:
Jimmy Carter,
President o f the United States o f America
FRAMEWORK FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A PEACE TREATY BETWEEN EGYPT AND
ISRAEL
In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal o f  
concluding within three months of the signing o f this framework a peace treaty between them.
It is agreed that:
The site o f the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually 
agreed.
All o f the principles of UN Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution o f the dispute between Israel 
and Egypt.
Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms o f the peace treaty will be implemented between two and 
three years after the peace treaty is signed.
The following matters are agreed between the parties:
(a) the full exercise o f Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognised border between Egypt 
and mandated Palestine;
(b) the withdrawal o f Israeli armed forces from the Sinai;
(c) the use o f airfields left by the Israelis near El Arish, Rafah, Ras en Naqb, and Sharm el Sheikh for 
civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use by all nations;
(d) the right o f free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf o f Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis 
o f  the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait o f Tiran and the Gulf o f  
Aqaba are international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable 
freedom o f navigation and overflight;
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(e) the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Elat with guaranteed free and 
peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and
(f) the stationing of military forces listed below.
Stationing o f Forces
A. No more than one division (mechanised or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed 
within an area lying approximately 50 kilometres (km) east of the Gulf o f Suez and the Suez Canal.
B. Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police 
functions will be stationed within an area lying west o f  the international border and the Gulf o f  Aqaba, 
varying in width from 20 km to 40 km.
C. In the area within 3 km east o f the international border there will be Israeli limited military forces 
not to exceed four infantry battalions and United Nations observers.
D. Border patrol units, not to exceed three battalions, will supplement the civil police in maintaining 
order in the area not included above.
The exact demarcation o f the above areas will be as decided during the peace negotiations.
Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms o f the agreement.
United Nations forces will be stationed: (a) in part o f the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km o f  
the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, and (b) in the Sharm el Sheikh area to 
ensure freedom o f passage through the Strait o f Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such 
removal is approved by the Security Council o f the United Nations with a unanimous vote o f the five 
permanent members.
After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be 
established between Egypt and Israel, including: full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and 
cultural relations; termination o f economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement o f  goods and 
people; and mutual protection o f citizens by the due process o f law.
Interim Withdrawal
Between three months and nine months after the signing o f  the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will 
withdraw east o f a line extending from a point east o f  El Arish to Ras Muhammad, the exact location o f  
this line to be determined by mutual agreement.
For the Government o f  the Arab Republic o f Egypt:
A. Sadat
For the Government o f Israel:
M. Begin
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Witnessed by:
Jimmy Carter
President of the United States o f America
Bibliography
Primary Sources 
Interviews
American Officials
Marshall Breger, special assistant to President Reagan and his liaison to the Jewish 
Community, 1982-84.
Samuel W. Lewis: U.S. Ambassador to Israel 1977-85, Chief State Department Policy 
Planning / Assistant Secretary of State, Policy Planning 1992-95.
John Lehman: Secretary of the US Navy 1981-87.
Richard Murphy: U.S. Ambassador to Syria 1974-78, to Saudi Arabia 1981-83 and Assistant 
Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 1983-89.
Wayne Owens: Congressman for Utah 1972-74 and member of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Vice Chairman of the Centre for Middle East Peace and Economic Cooperation 
1993-95, President of the Centre 1995-present.
William Quandt, National Security Council aide, Nixon and Carter administrations.
Peter W. Rodman: Member of the National Security Council staff and a special assistant to 
Henry Kissinger 1969-1977. Participant in nearly all of Kissinger’s negotiations and missions 
1972-1977. Pri ncipal research and editorial assistant to Kissinger in the preparation of his 
memoirs.
Dennis Ross: Director of State Department Planning Policy 1988-92 and Special Middle East 
Co-ordinator 1992-2000.
James Schlesinger: Director of the Central Intelligence Agency February-May 1973 and 
Secretary of Defence 1973-1975.
American Jewish Community
Geoffrey Aronson, Director for Research and Publications, Foundation for Middle East 
Peace.
Gene Burger: Member of the Israeli Policy Forum, 1995-present.
Norman Podhoretz, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute and former editor-in-chief of 
Commentary 1960-95.
Lewis Roth, Representative, Americans for Peace Now, 1998-2002 
American Arab Community
Khalid Jahshan: President, National Association of Arab Americans, 1997-2000.
George R. Salem: member of the Palestinian negotiating team at Madrid talks 1991-93.
Other Americans
James M. Ennes, Jr., crew member, USS Liberty.
392
John Hrankowski, crew member, USS Liberty 
Israeli Officials
David Bar-Ilan: Israeli Director of Communications.
Other Israelis
Ira Sharkansky, professor of political science & public administration, Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem.
Government Documents
Congressional Hearings 
Congressional Record
Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.).
Department of State Despatch (Washington, D.C.).
Israel. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Egypt and the Suez Canal, 1948-56,” Jerusalem, 1956.
Israel. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Egypt’s Unlawful Blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba,” 
Jerusalem, 1967.
Israel. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Message from Prime Minister Eshkol to King Hussein of 
Jordan,” Jerusalem, 5 June 1967.
Israel. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Eshkol,” 
Jerusalem, 27 June 1967.
Israel. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Soviet Involvement in the War of Attrition,”
Government Statement, Jerusalem, 29 April 1970.
Israel. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Meir,” 
Jerusalem, 26 July 1972.
Israel. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “The War of Attrition,” Statement to the Knesset by 
Defence Minister Dayan,” Jerusalem, 13 August 1970.
Israel. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “The Yom Kippur War and Aftermath,” Statement to the 
Knesset by Prime Minister Golda Meir, Jerusalem, 13 November 1973.
Israel. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin,” 
Jerusalem, 8 June 1982.
Israel. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Prime Minister Begin’s speech to the Knesset on the 
Reagan Plan,” Jerusalem, 8 September 1982.
Israel: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Opening Remarks at the Madrid Conference,’’Address 
by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Jerusalem, 31 October 1991.
Lyndon Baines Johnson Oral History Interviews (Austin, Texas).
393
National Security Agency, US Cryptological History Report, “Attack on a Sigint Collector, 
the USS Liberty", 1981.
National Security Agency, “Aftermath of Israeli Attack on USS Liberty \  22 June 1967.
National Security Files “Talking Points for Prime Minister Eshkol,” memorandum for the 
president, 5 January 1968, (Washington) 1963-69.
Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon Johnson, 1963-64 (Washington, 1965); Lyndon 
Johnson, 1967 (Washington, 1968); Richard Nixon, 1969 (Washington, 1971); Richard 
Nixon, 1970 (Washington, 1972); Ronald Reagan, 1981 (Washington, 1982); Ronald Reagan, 
1982 (Washington, 1983); Ronald Reagan, 1985 (Washington, 1986); George Bush, 1990 
(Washington, 1992); George Bush, 1991 (Washington, 1993).
United States: “Weekly Compilation of presidential Documents” (Washington, D. C.).
United States. Department of State. “Joint US-USSR Working Paper, Fundamental Principles 
(The Rogers Plan),” October 28, 1969.
United States. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943 
(Washington, D.C. 1965); FRUS, 1945 vol. VII, (Washington, D.C. 1965); FRUS, 1945 vol. 
VII, (Washington, D.C. 1965); FRUS, 1946 vol. VIII, (Washington, D.C. 1965); FRUS, 1947 
vol. V. (Washington, D.C. 1972); FRUS, 1948 vol. V. (Washington, D.C. 1972).
United States. Congress: House Committee cn Foreign Affairs. “The Impact of the October 
1973 War.” Washington, D.C., 1974.
United States. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. “The Multinational 
Force and Observers (MFO) for the Sinai.” Washington, D.C., 1982.
United States. Hearings, House Committee on Foreign Relations. “Nomination of George P. 
Shultz.” Washington, 1982.
United States. “US Assistance to the State of Israel,” Report of the Comptroller General of the 
United States Washington 1983.
United States. “US Assistance to Israel,” General Accounting Office United States, 24 June 
1983.
United States. The Washington Institute presidential Study Group, “Building for Peace: An 
American Strategy for the Middle East,” (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy, 1988).
Secondary Sources 
Articles
Allen, H.C. “A Special Relationship?” Journal of American Studies 19, (1985).
Almond, Gabriel & Bingham Powell. Comparative Politics Today 6th ed., (New York: 
Harper Collins, 1996).
Art, Robert J. “Bureaucratic Politics & American Foreign Policy: A Critique” Political 
Sciences 4 (1973).
394
Baldwin, David. Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy: A Documentary Analysis (New 
York, Washington & London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966).
Bentsur, Eytan. Making Peace in the Middle East: A First-Hand Account of the Arab-Israeli 
Peace Process (Westport, CT. & London, Praeger, 2001).
Bichler, Simson. “Between Capitalism and Jewish Voters: Electoral Economics in Israel,
1977 to 1997” in J.W. Wright, Jr., (ed.), Structural Flaws in the Middle East Peace Process 
(Hampshire & New York: Palgrave, 2001).
Boniface, Pascal. “Reflections on America as a World Power,” Journal of Palestine Studies. 
vol. XXIX, no. 3, (Spring 2000).
Christison, Kathleen. “Splitting the Difference: The Palestinian-Israeli Policy of James 
Baker,” Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. XXIV, no. 1, (Autumn 1994).
Cline, Ray S. “Policy without Intelligence,” Foreign Policy no. 17 (Winter 1974-75).
Gorman, Tom. “Worthy and Unworthy Victims: Munich Matter, Sabra and Shatila Don’t”, 
CounterPunch (21 September 2002).
Clifford, Clark. “Annals of Government: Serving the President in the Truman Years” New 
Yorker 25 (March 1991).
Cordesman, Anthony. “The Middle East and the Cost of the Politics of Force,” Middle Hast 
Journal (Winter 1986)
Fein, Leonard. “Right in the First Place,” Moment 1, (September 1975).
Frank, Charles & Mary Baird, “Foreign Aid: Its Speckled Past and Future Prospects,” 
International Organisation 29. (Winter 1975).
Freedman, Robert O. “Religion, Politics, and the Israeli Elections of 1988,” Middle East 
Journal Winter 1989.
Grimmett, Richard. “Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1983-1990,” 
Congressional Research Service (Washington, 2 August 1991).
Hadar, Leon T. “Clinton’s Tilt,” Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. XXII, no. 4, (Summer
1993).
Hadar, Leon T. “The Friends of Bibi (FOB’s) vs. The New Middle East,” Journal of Palestine 
Studies, vol. XXVI, no. 1, (Autumn 1996).
Halliday, Fred. “The Reagan Administration and the Middle East”, Atlantic Quarterly ,2:3 
(Autumn 1984).
Hudson, Michael C. “To Play the Hegemon: Fifty Years of US Policy Toward the Middle 
East,” Middle East Journal vol. 50, no. 3, (Summer 1996).
Hays, Sharon. “Structure and Agency and the sticky problem of culture”, Sociological Theory 
vol. 12, no. 1, (March 1994).
395
Helmreich, Jeffrey. “The Israel Swing Factor: How the American Jewish Vote Influences US 
Elections”, Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs no. 446, (20 Tevet 5761 / 15 January 2001).
Hilsman, Roger. “The Foreign-Policy Consensus: An Interim Report.” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution vol. 3, (December 1959).
Inbar, E. “Rabin and Israeli National Security” BESA Security and Policy Study no. 25, 
(1996).
Kenen, I. L. “Twisted Comparison Cheapens Memory of Holocaust,” Near East Report 22, (3 
May 1978).
Khalidi, Walid. “The Ownership of the U.S. Embassy Site in Jerusalem,” Journal of Palestine 
Studies 116, vol. XXIX, no. 4, (Summer 2000).
Kramer, Martin. “Islam vs. Democracy”, Commentary , vol. 95, no. 1, (January 1993).
Kristol, Irving. “Why Religion is Good for the Jews”, Commentary, vol. 98, no. 2, (August
1994).
Lewis, Samuel. W. “The United States and Israel: Evolution of an Unwritten Alliance,” 
Middle East Journal, vol. 53, no. 3, (Summer 1999).
Luttwak, Edward N. “The Defence Budget and Israel,” Commentary (February 1975).
Luttwak, Edward N. “Strategic Aspects of U.S.-Israeli Relations”, in Israel Affairs vol. 2, no. 
3&4 (Spring/Summer 1996).
Muravchik, Joshua. “Misreporting Lebanon,” Policy Review (Winter 1983).
Neff, Donald. “The Clinton Administration and UN Resolution 242,” Journal of Palestine 
Studies vol. XXIII, no. 2 (Winter 1994).
Parker, Richard B. “The June War: Whose Conspiracy?” Journal of Palestine Studies vol. 
XXI, no. 4 (Summer 1992).
Quandt, William B. “Reagan’s Lebanon Policy: Trial and Error,” Middle East Journal, vol. 38 
(Spring 1984).
Sandler, Shmuel. “Israel’s 1988 Knesset Elections and the Transformation of the Israeli 
Polity.” Middle East Review no. 1,(1989-90).
Schiff, Ze’ev. “The Green Light” Foreign Policy vol. 50 (Spring 1983).
Solomon, Burt. “Bush’s Lack of Ambitious Policies ... Makes His Plans Seem Thin Gruel”, 
National Journal no. 18, (6 May 1989).
Stem, Geoffrey. “Moral Judgments and Political Prejudice”, Contemporary Review (May 
1975).
Stock, Raymond. “Prestige Press at War,” Middle East Journal (Summer 1985).
Stoll, Ira. “Conversion Crisis Will Cause $100 Million Drop in American Giving to Israel, 
Reform Leaders Warn,” Forward (8 January 1999).
396
Telhami, Shibley. “From Camp David to Wye: Changing Assumptions in Arab-Israeli 
Negotiations,” Middle East Journal vol. 53, no. 3, (Summer 1999).
Thome, Christopher. “American Political Culture and the End of the Cold War” Journal of 
American Studies vol. 26 (1992).
Wald, Kenneth D., James L. Guth, Cleveland R. Fraser, John C. Green, Corwin E. Smidt, & 
Lyman A. Kellstedt, “Reclaiming Zion: How American Religious Groups View the Middle 
East,” Israel Affairs vol. 2, no. 3 & 4 (Spring/Summer 1996).
Ze’ev Schifif, “Israel after the [Gulf] War,” Foreign Affairs February 1991.
Books
Ahmed, Nafeez. Behind the War on Terror: Western Secret Strategy and the Struggle for Iraq 
(East Sussex: Clairview, 2003).
Allison, Graham. Essence of Decisions (New York: Little, Brown & Co., 1999).
Apter, D. E. (ed.), Ideology and Discontent (London & New York: The Free Press, 1964).
Arens, Moshe. Broken Covenant: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis Between the U.S. 
and Israel (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995).
Arian, Asher, Ilaii Talmud & Tamar Hermann National Security and Public Opinion in Israel 
(Boulder: Westview, 1988).
Axelrod, Robert. Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites. (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976).
Badeau, John S. The American Approach to the Arab World (New York: Harper/Collins, 
1968).
Bailey, Sydney D. The Making of Resolution 242 (Dordrecht, Boston & Lancaster: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1985).
Baker, J. Politics and Diplomacy (New York: Putnam Publishing, 1995).
Ball, George W. Error and Betrayal in Lebanon: An Analysis of Israel’s Invasion of Lebanon 
and the implications for US-Israeli Relations (Washington D.C.: Foundation for Middle East 
Peace, 1984).
Bar-Zohar, Michael. Embassies in Crisis: Diplomats and Demagogues behind the Six-Day 
War (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).
Bard, Michael. “Ethnic Group Influence on Middle East Policy,” in Mohammed Ahrari (ed.), 
Ethnic Group Influence and U.S. Foreign Policy (Westport, CT.: 1987).
Bames, James F., Marshall Carter, & Max J. Skidmore. The World of Politics: A Concise 
Introduction, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984).
Barrett, Laurence I. Gambling with History Ronald Reagan in the White House (Doubleday & 
Co., Inc.: Garden City, New York, 1983).
397
Bartlett, Christopher. cThe Special Relationship’: A Political History of Anglo-American
Relations Since 1945 (London & New York: Longman, 1992).
Baritz, Loren. Backfire: A History of How American Culture Led us into Vietnam and Made 
Us Fight the Wav We Did (Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press, 1998).
Beilin, Yossi. Israel: A Concise Political History (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1992).
Bell, Coral. A Study in Diplomatic Management (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971).
Bell, Daniel. “The Hegelian Secret: Civil Society and American Exceptionalism” in Byron 
Shafer (ed.), Is America Different? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
Bellah, Robert. Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World (Berkeley & 
Oxford: University of California Press, 1970).
Bellah, Robert. The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in Time of Trial (New York:
1975).
Bellah, Robert, R. Madsen, W. Sullivan, A. Swidler S. Tipton, The Good Society (Alfred A. 
Knopf: New York, 1991).
Ben-Zvi, Abraham. The United States and Israel (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993).
Bishop, Jim. FDR’s Last Year (New York: William Morrow Co. Inc., 1974).
Blitzer, Wolf. Between Washington and Jerusalem: A Reporter’s Notebook (New York & 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).
Bloom, William. Personal Identity. National Identity and International Relations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990).
Boggs, Carl. The Two Revolutions: Gramsci and the Dilemmas of Western Marxism (Boston, 
MA: South End Press, 1984)
Boorstin, Daniel. The Image, or What Happened to the American Dream (London:
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1961).
Boulding, Kenneth. The Image (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1956).
Brands, H. W. The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American Power 
(New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
Braudel, Fernand. The Identity of France. Vol. 1: History & Environment (London: Collins,
1988).
Brecher, Michael Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 
1974).
Brecher, Michael with Benjamin Geist, Decisions in Crisis: Israel. 1967 and 1973 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1980).
Brenner, Lenni. Jews in America Today, (London: A1 Saqi Books, 1986).
398
Brint, Michael. A Genealogy of Political Culture (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1991).
Bromley, David & Anson Shape (ed.), New Christian Politics (Mercer University Press:
USA, 1984).
Brown, Seyom. The Faces of Power: United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Clinton 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency 
(London & New York: I. B. Tauris, 1998).
Burr, William (ed.), The Kissinger Transcripts (New York: The New York Press, 1998).
Bush, George with Victor Gold. Looking Forward (London: The Bodley Head, 1988).
Hessing Cahn, Anne. “United States Arms to the Middle East, 1967-1976,” in Leitenberg, M. 
& Sheffer, G. (eds.), Great Power Intervention in the Middle East (New York: Pergamon, 
1979).
Califano, Jr., Joseph A. The Triumph & Tragedy of Lvndon Johnson (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1991).
Cannon, Lou. President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1991).
Lord Carandon et al. U.N. Security Council Resolution 242: A Case Study in Diplomatic 
Ambiguity (Washington D.C.. 1981).
Carrere D’Encausee, Helene. Lenin: Revolution and Power (London & New York: Longman, 
1982).
Child, Irvin. “Socialisation” in Lindzey Gardner (ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology, vol. 
II, (Boston: McGraw-Hill, New York: Oxford University Press, 1954).
Chomsky, Noam. “The Old and the New Cold War” in James Peck (ed.), The Chomsky 
Reader (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987).
Chomsky, Noam. World Orders Old and New (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
Churchill, Randolph S. & Winston S. Churchill, The Six Day War (London: Heinemann, 
1967).
Clifford, Clark with Richard Holbrooke, Counsel to the President: A Memoir (New York: 
Random House, 1991).
Cobban, Helena. The Superpowers and the Svrian-Israeli Conflict: Beyond Crisis 
Management? fNew York: Praeger, 1991).
Cohen, Avner. Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
Coker, Christopher. Reflections on American Foreign Policy Since 1945 (London: Pinter,
1989).
399
Crabb, Jr. Cecil V. American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age (New York: Harper & Row, 
1960).
Crabb, Jr., Cecil V., Glenn J. Antizzo & Leila E. Sarieddine, Congress and the Foreign Policy 
Process: Modes of Legislative Behaviour (Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 2000).
Cristol, A. Jay. The Liberty Incident (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s Inc., 2002).
Cruikshank, B. “Cultural Politics: Political Theory and the Foundations of Democratic Order” 
in Jodi Dean (ed.), Cultural Studies and Political Theory (Ithaca & London: Cornell 
University Press, 2000).
Danchev, Alex. On Specialness: Essays in Anglo-American Relations (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1998).
Davis, Moshe (ed.), With Eves Towards Zion (New York: Amo Press, 1977).
Dawisha, Karen. The Foundations. Structure and Dynamics of Soviet Policy Toward the Arab 
Radical Regimes (Ph.D. thesis: LSE, 1978).
Dayan, Moshe. Dairy of the Sinai Campaign (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966).
Dayan, Moshe Story of Mv Life (London: Sphere Books Ltd., 1977).
Deaver, Michael K. Behind the Se mes (New York: William Morrow, 1987).
Dickey, John Sloan. Canada and the American Presence (New York: New York University 
Press, 1975).
Dickinson. Kissinger and the Meaning of History (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 1978).
Divine, Robert A. (ed.), The Johnson Years: Vol. 3 (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of 
Kansas, 1994).
Dobryin, Anatoly. In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War 
Presidents (New York: Random House, 1995).
Donelan, Michael. “The Ideas of American Foreign Policy” in F. S. Northedge ed. Foreign 
Policies of the Powers (London: Faber & Faber, 1968).
Donelan, Michael. “The Elements of United States Policy” in F. S. Northedge, Foreign 
Policies of the Powers (London: Faber & Faber, 1974).
Draper, Theodore. Israel and World Politics: Roots of the Third Arab-Israeli War (New York: 
Viking Press, 1968).
Dumbrell, John. A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and 
After (London: MacMillain, 2001).
Durke, John. The Institutional President (Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1992). 
Eban, Abba. An Autobiography, (New York: Random House, 1977).
400
Eban, Abba. Personal Witness: Israel Through Mv Eves (London: Jonathan Cape, 1993).
Elazar, Daniel J. American Federalism: A View from the States. (New York: Thomas Y. 
Crowell Co., 1966).
Elazar, Daniel J. The American Mosaic: The Impact of Space. Time. & Culture on American 
Politics. (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1994).
Ennes, Jr., James M. Assault on the Liberty: The True Story of the Israeli Attack on an 
American Intelligence Ship (New York: Randon House, 1979).
Eveland, Wilbur Crane. Ropes of Sand (New York, 1980).
Eversen, Bruce. Truman. Palestine and the Press: Shaping Conventional Wisdom at the 
Beginning of the Cold War (New York, Connecticut & London: Greenwood Press, 1992).
Eytan, Walter. First Ten Years: A Diplomatic History of Israel (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1958).
Feingold, Henry L. Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt administration and the Holocaust. 1938- 
1945 (New Brunswick, NJ.: Rutgers U.P., 1970).
Fink, Reuben. America and Palestine (New York: Herald Square Press, Inc., 1945).
Fischer, Beth A. The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy at the End of the Cola War (Columbia 
& London: University of Missouri Press, 1997).
Flanzbaum, Hilene (ed.), Tne Americanisation of the Holocaust (Baltimore & London: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1999).
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992).
Frankel, Glenn. Beyond the Promised Land Jews and Arabs on the Hard Road to a New Israel 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).
Frankel, Joseph. National Interest (London: Pall Mall Press Ltd., 1970).
Frankel, Joseph. The Making of Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).
Friedrich, Carl J. Man and His Government (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963).
Gallup, George H. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion. 1972-77 vol. 4 (Wilmington Scholarly 
Resources, 1978), 4-7 April 1975.
Ganin, Zvi. Truman. American Jewry and Israel, 1945-1948 (London & New York: Holmes 
& Meier Publishers Inc., 1979).
Garrison, Jean A. Games Advisors Play: Foreign policy in the Nixon and Carter 
Administrations (Texas: Texas A&M University, 1999).
Gerges, Fawaz A. American and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests?
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
Geertz, Clifford. The Interpretation of Cultures (New York; Basic Books, 1973).
401
Gerth, H. H. & C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1948).
Geyelin, Philip. Lyndon B. Johnson and the World (New York, Washington & London: 
Praeger, 1966).
Gibbens, John. “Contemporary Political Culture: An Introduction” in Gibbens, J. (ed.), 
Contemporary Political Culture: politics in a post-modern age (London: Sage, 1989).
Gilboa, Etyan. American Public Opinion toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
(Lexington, Mass., 1987).
Glazer, Nathan. Ethnic Dilemmas. 1964-82 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).
Glick, Edward. The Triangular Confrontation: America. Israel and American Jews (London, 
Boston & Sydney: George, Allen & Unwin, 1982).
Golan, Matti. The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger: Step-bv-Step Diplomacy in the 
Middle East. (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1976).
Goldberg, Jonathan J. Jewish Power: Inside the American Jewish Establishment. (Reading 
Massachusetts: Addison Wesley, 1996).
Goldman, The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson (New York: Knopf, 1969).
Goldstein, Judith & Robert Keohane, (eds.), Ideas. Beliefs. Institutions. Political Change and 
Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
Gomolak, Louis. Prologue: LBJ’s Foreign Affairs Background. 1908-48 (Ph.D. thesis: 
University of Texas, Austin, 1981).
Gordon, Kermit, (ed.), Agenda for the Nation (New York: Doubleday, 1969).
Gowers, Andrew & Tony Walker. Behind the Myth (London, 1990).
Grose, Peter. Israel in the Mind of America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983).
Haig, Alexander. Caveat: Realism. Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: MacMillan, 
1984).
Halliday, Fred. Two Hours that Shook the World (London: Saqi Books, 2002).
Halperin, Morton H. Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, (Washington. D.C.: The 
Brookings Institute, 1974).
Halsell, Grace. Prophecy and Politics: Militant Evangelists on the Road to Nuclear War 
(Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill & Co., 1986).
Hamilton, Michael P. (ed.), American Character and Foreign Policy (Michigan: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1986).
Hammond, Paul Y. LBJ and the presidential Management of Foreign Relations (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1992).
402
Handel, Michael. The Diplomacy of Surprise, Hitler, Nixon. Sadat (Cambridge, MA: Centre 
for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1981).
Hartz, Louis. The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harecourt Brace & World, 1955).
Hastedt, Glenn P. (ed.), American Foreign Policy: Past. Present, Future (Englewood Cliffs:
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1997).
Heikal, Mohamed. Nasser: The Cairo Documents (London: New English Library, 1972).
Heikal, Mohamed. The Road to Ramadan (London: Collins: 1975).
Heller, Joseph. The Birth of Israel, 1945-49 (Florida: Florida University Press, 2000).
Hersh, Seymour. The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (New York: 
Summit Books, 1983).
Hersh, Seymour. The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy 
(New York: Random House, 1991).
Hiro, Dilip. Desert Shield to Desert Storm (London: Paladin, 1992)
Hobsbawm, Eric. “Introduction: Inventing Traditions,” in Hobsbawm, E. & Ranger, T. (eds), 
The Invention of Tradition. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
Hoff, Joan. Nixon Reconsidered (New York: Basic Books, 1994).
Hogan, Joseph (ed.), The Reagan Years: The Record in presidential Leadership (Manchester 
& New York: Manchester University Press, 1990).
Holsti, Ole R. & James N. Rosenau, American Leadership in World Affairs: Vietnam and the 
Breakdown of Consensus (Allen & Unwin: Boston, 1984).
Hook, Steven W. National Interest and Foreign Aid (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1995).
Horowitz, Sara R. “Cinematic Triangulation of Jewish American Identity” in Flanzbaum, 
Hilene (ed.), The Americanisation of the Holocaust (The John Hopkins University Press: 
Baltimore & London, 1999).
Hunt, Michael H. Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1987).
Hunter, F. Robert. The Palestinian Uprising: A War by other Means (Berkeley, Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1993).
Huntington, Samuel. American Politics in the United States (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1987).
Huntington, Samuel. The Common Defence: Strategic Programmes in National Politics (New 
York & London: Columbia University Press, 1961).
Hyman, Meryl. Who is a Jew: Conversion, Not Conclusion (Woodstock, VT.: Jewish Light 
Publishing, 1998).
403
Insdorf, Annette. Indelible Shadows: Film and the Holocaust (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 2003).
Isaacs, Stephen D. Jews and American Politics (New York: Doubleday, 1974).
Isaacson, Walter. Kissinger: A Biography (London & Boston: Faber & Faber, 1992).
Jawad, Haifaa A. (ed.), 2nd ed., The Middle East in the New World Order. (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997).
Jenks, Chris. Culture (London & New York: Routledge, 1993).
Jervis, Robert. Perception and Misperception in World politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1976).
Johnson, Lyndon Baines. The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency. 1963-1969 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971).
Jorstad, Erling. The New Christian Right. 1981-1988: Prospects for the Reagan Decade, 
(Lewinston, Queenston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1987).
Kalb. Marvin & Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (London: Hutchinson, 1974).
Kattenburg, P. M. The Vietnam Trauma in American Foreign Policy. 1945-75 (New 
Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1980).
Kellerman, Barbara & Ryan J. Barilleaux, The President as World Leader (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1991).
Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military 
Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London: Fontana, 1989).
Kennan, George F. American Diplomacy. 1900-1950. (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
1953).
Kennan, George F. Realities of American Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press,
1954).
Kent, George. “Congress and American Middle East Policy” in William A. Beling (ed.), The 
Middle East: Quest for an American Policy. (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1973).
Kimball, Warren F. (ed.), Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence Vol. 3 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).
Kimball, Warren F. The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease, 1939-1941 (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins Press, 1969).
Kissinger, Henry A. “Central Issues of American Foreign Policy” in Kermit Gordon, (ed.), 
Agenda for the Nation (New York: Doubleday, 1969).
Kissinger, Henry A. White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979).
Kissinger, Henry A. Years of Upheaval (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson & Michael Joseph, 
1982).
404
Korn, David A. Stalemate: The War of Attrition and Great Power Diplomacy in the Middle
East, 1967-1970 (Boulder. Colo.: Westview Press, 1992).
Langer, Lawrence. Versions of Survival (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982).
Laqueur, Walter. Confrontation: the Middle East and World Politics (New York: Quadrangle,
1974).
Larson, D. L. The Puritan Ethic in United States Foreign Policy (New York: D. van Nostrand 
Co. Ltd., 1966).
Larson, Deborah Welch. Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985).
Laufer, L. Y. “U.S. Aid to Israel: Problems and Perceptions,” in Gabriel Sheffer (ed.), 
Dynamics of Dependence: U.S. Israeli Relations (Boulder & London: Westview Press, 1987).
Lehman, J. The Executive. Congress and Foreign Policy (New York, Washington & London: 
Praeger Publishers, 1974).
Lenczowski, George. American Presidents and the Middle East (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 1990).
Lindblom, C. E. The Policy Making Process (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1968).
Little, Richard. “Belief Systems in th? Social Sciences” in Little, Richard & Smith, Stevr 
(eds.), Belief Systems in International Relations (London: Blakwell, 1990).
Lipset, S. M. & E. Raab, Jews and the New American Scene (Cambridge, MA. & London: 
Harvard University Press, 1995).
Lipset, S. M. The First New Nation (New York: Basic Books, 1964).
Lipstadt, D. Beyond Belief: The American Press and the Coming of the Holocaust, 1933-45 
(New York: The Free Press, 1986).
Little, Richard & Steve Smith, Belief Systems and International Relations (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1988).
Litwak, Robert S. Detente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit 
of Stability, 1969- 1976 (Cambridge, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, Sydney: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984).
Luckas, Yehuda (ed.), Documents on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Cambridge, 1984).
Lochery, Neill. The Difficult Road to Peace in the Middle East (Lebanon: Itaca Press, 1999).
Lochery, Neill. The Israeli Labour Party: In the Shadow of the Likud (Reading: Ithaca Press, 
1997).
Lucas, Scott. Freedom’s War: The US Crusade Against the Soviet Union, 1945-56 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).
405
Lyons, William, John M. Scheb II, Lilliard E. Richardson, Jr., American Government:
Politics & Political Culture (Minneapolis/St. Paul, New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco: 
West Publishing Co., 1995).
MacIntyre, A. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 1985).
Mansour, Camille. Beyond Alliance: Israel in US Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994).
Marshall, Jonathan, Peter Dale Scott & Jane Hunter, The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret 
Teams and Covert Operations in the Reagan Era (Montreal & New York: Black Rose Books, 
1987).
Mazlish, Bruce. Kissinger: The European Mind in American Policy (New York: Basic Books,
1976).
McFadden, John H. “The Strategic Arena” in Harry S. Allen & Ivan Volgyes, (ed.), Israel, the 
Middle East and U.S. Interests (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983).
McLellan, David (ed.), Political Christianity: A Reader (Wiltshire: Redwood Books, 1997).
McPherson, Harry. A Political Education (Boston, 1972)
Meir, Golda with Syrkin, Marie (ed.), Golda Meir Speaks Out (Jerusalem: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1973).
Meir, Golda. Mv Life (Lor don: Futura, 1976).
Menendez, Albert J. Evangelicals at the Ballot Box (New York: Prometheus Books, 1996).
Mervin, David. George Bush and the Guardianship Presidency (London: Macmillan, 1996).
Mills, C. Wright. Power. Politics and People (London, Oxford & New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1963).
Moore, Barrington. The Social Origins of Democracy & Dictatorship: Lord and Peasant in the 
Making of the Modem World (London: Allen Lane, 1967).
Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1993).
Neff, Donald. Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days That Changed the Middle East (Simon 
and Schuster, 1984).
Neustadt, Richard. E. Alliance Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).
Neustadt, Richard E. presidential Power and the Modem Presidents: The Politics of 
Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan (New York: The Free Press, MacMillan Publishing 
Co., 1990).
Nixon, Richard. RN (New York: Touchstone, 1990).
Nixon, Richard. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, vol. I (New York: Warner Books, 1978).
406
Northedge, F. S. The International Political System (London & Boston: Faber & Faber,
1981).
Novick, Peter. The Holocaust in American Life (Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1999).
Novik, Nimrod. The United States and Israel: Domestic Determinants of a Changing US 
Commitment. (Boulder; Westview Press/Tel Aviv: The Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies,
Tel Aviv University, 1984).
Organski, A. F. K. The $36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).
Packard, Vance. The Hidden Persuaders (London: Longmans, 1962).
Packenham, R. A. Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in 
Foreign Aid and Social Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1973).
Parrington, Lewis, Vemon. Main Currents in American Thought: An Interpretation of 
American Literature from the Beginnings to 1920 (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1930).
Parsons, Talcott. The Social System (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951).
Peres, Shimon. David’s Sling (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970).
Plato. Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921-22).
Pollack, Kenneth. “How Saddam Misread the United States,” in Micah Siffy & Christopher 
Cerf (eds.), The Iraqi War Reader (Touchstone: New York, 2003).
Polk, William R. The United States and the Arab World (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1965).
Price, Daniel. Islamic Political Culture, Democracy, and Human Rights: A Comparative 
Study (Westport, CT. & London: Praeger, 1999).
Prittie, Terence. Eshkol of Israel: The Man and the Nation (London: Museum Press, 1969).
Puschel, Karen L. US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era (Jerusalem: 
Jerusalem Post Press, 1992).
Pye, Lucian W. & Sidney Verba, (eds.), Political Culture & Political Development 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965).
Quandt, William B. U.S. Policy in the Middle East: Constraints and Choices (Santa Monica: 
Rand Corporation, 1970).
Quandt, William B. “Domestic Influences on U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The 
View from Washington” in William A. Beling (ed.), The Middle East: Quest for an American 
Policy (State University of New York Press: Albany, 1973).
Quandt, William B. Decade of Decisions: American Policy Towards the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict: 1967-1976 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1977).
407
Quandt, William B. Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since
1967 (Washington D.C. & Berkeley, Los Angeles; The Brookings Institute, & University of 
California Press, 1993).
Quandt, William B. “How Far Will Israel Go?,” Washington Post Book World. 20 November, 
1991.
Rabin, Yitzhak. The Rabin Memoirs (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1979).
Rafael, Gideon. Destination Peace: Three Decades of Israeli Foreign Policy (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1981).
Raphael, Marc Lee. Abba Hillel Silver: A Profile in American Judaism (New York: Holmer 
& Meier, 1989).
Reagan, Ronald. An American Life (London: Hutchinson, 1990).
Reich, Bernard. Securing the Covenant: United States-Israel Relations After the Cold War 
(Westport, CT. & London: Praeger Publishers, 1995).
Reich, Bernard. The United States and Israel (New York & Eastbourne: Praeger, 1984).
Rikhye, Indar Jit. The Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal of United Nations Emergency Force 
Leading to the Six-Dav War of June 1967 (London: Frank Cass, 1980).
Robert.4 on, David. The Penguin Dictionary of Politics (London: Penguin Books, 1993).
Roberts, Geoffrey. A Dictionary of Political Analysis (London: Longman, 1971).
Rosenau, James N. (ed.), Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (Free Press: New York, 1967).
Rosenau, James N. “Introduction,” in James Rosenau, (ed.), International Politics and Foreign 
Policy (New York: Free Press, 1969).
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract and Discourses, translated, with introduction by 
G. D. N. Cole, (London: Dent, 1955).
Rubinstein, Alvin Z. Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relationship Since 
the June War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).
Rubinstein, Alvin Z. Soviet Policy Toward Turkey. Iran and Afghanistan: The Dynamics of 
Influence (New York: Praeger, 1982).
Rusk, Dean. As I Saw It (New York: Penguin Books, 1990).
Ryan, David. US Foreign Policy in World History (London & New York: Routledge, 2000).
Ryan, David. “Asserting US Power, in Philip Davies (ed.), An American Quarter Century: US 
Politics From Vietnam to Clinton (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995).
Rynhold, Jonathan. Israeli Political Culture in Relations with the U.S. over the Palestine 
Question. 1981-96 (Ph.D. thesis, University of London, London, 1998).
Sachar, Howard. A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1996).
408
Sacks, J. Crisis and Covenant: Jewish Thought after the Holocaust (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1992).
Sadat, Mohamed Anwar a k  In Search of Identity London: Collins, 1978).
Said, Edward W. The Question of Palestine (New York: Random House, 1979).
Safran, Nadav. Israel: The Embattled Ally (Cambridge, Mass. : Belknap Press, 1981).
Sampson, Anthony. The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Made 
(Sevenoaks: Coronet Books, 1976).
Samson, Leon. Toward a United Front: a philosophy for American Workers (New York:
Faber & Rinehart, 1933).
Schiff, Ze’ev A History of the Israeli Army (New York, 1985).
Schoenbaum, David. The United States and the State of Israel (New York & Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993).
Seliktar, Ofira. Divided We Stand: American Jews. Israel, and the Peace Process (Westport, 
CT. & London, Praeger, 2002).
Sendoz, Ellis (ed.), Political Sermons of the American Founding Era. 1730-1805 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1991)
Shafer, Byron (ed.), Is America Different? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
Sheehy, Gail. Character: America’s Search for Leadership (New York: Bantam Books, 1990).
Shlaim, Avi. The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World. (New York & London: W.W. Norton 
& Co., 2000).
Shlaim, Avi. War and Peace in the Middle East (New York: Penguin Books, 1995).
Shribman, David. “Hosts Not Visitors: The Future of Jews in American Political Life,” in L. 
Sandy Maisel (ed.), Jews in American Politics (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: Lanham, 
Boulder, New York, Oxford, 2001).
Shultz, George P. Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1993).
Simon, Herbert. Models of Man (New York: Wiley, 1957).
Simpson, John. “Support for the Moral Majority and its Sociomoral Platform” in David 
Bromley & Anson Shape (ed.), New Christian Politics (Mercer University Press: USA, 1984).
Smith, Anthony. National Identity, (London: Penguin Books, 1991).
Spanier, John & Steven W. Hook, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York:
1975).
Spiegel, Steven L. The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, 
from Truman to Reagan (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1985).
409
Spiegel, Steven L. “Israel and Beyond: American Jews and US Foreign Policy” in L. Sandy 
Maisel (ed.), Jews in American Politics (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: Lanham, Boulder, 
New York, Oxford, 2001).
Sprout, Harold & Margaret. Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of 
International Politics (Princeton: Centre for International Studies, 1956).
Stephanson, Anders. Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1995).
Steven, Stewart. The Spymasters of Israel (New York, 1980)
Stem, Geoffrey. The Rise and Decline of International Communism (Aldershot: Edward 
Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1990).
Stem, Geoffrey. Leaders and Leadership (London: London School of Economics, 1993).
Stem, Geoffrey. The Structure of International Society (London & New York: Pinter, 2000).
Sullivan, Denis. “International Aid and the Peace Process” in Structural Flaws in the Middle 
East Peace Process (Hampshire & New York: Palgrave, 2001) in J.W. Wright, Jr., (ed.), 
Structural Flaws in the Middle East Peace Process (Hampshire & New York: Palgrave, 2001).
Summers, Anthony. The Arrogance ct Power: The Secret World of Richard Nixon (New 
York: Viking, Penguin Group, 2000).
Tanter, Raymond. Who’s at the Helm? Lessons of Lebanon (San Francisco & Oxford: 
Westview Press, 1990).
Tessler, Mark. A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana: Indiana University 
Press, 1994).
Thomas, Helen (ed.), The Nixon Press Conferences (London: Heyden, 1978).
Thompson, Kenneth W. “Ethics and National Purpose,” in Kenneth W. Thompson ed., (New 
Brunswick, New Jersey: 1984).
Thornton, Richard. The Nixon-Kissinger Years: Reshpaing America’s Foreign Policy (New 
York: Paragon house, 1989).
Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America J. P. Myers (ed.), and trans. George Laurence, 
(New York: Doubleday, 1969).
Travis, Jr., Martin. “The Control of U.S. Foreign Policy” in Control of Foreign Relations in 
Modem Nations Philip Buck & Martin Travis, Jr., (W. W. Norton & Co.: New York, 1957).
Trethewey, Richard J. “International Economics and Politics: A Theoretical Framework” in 
Bauer, Robert A. (ed.), The Interaction of Economics and Foreign Policy (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1975).
Trice, Robert H. “Domestic Interest Groups and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Behavioural 
Analysis”, in Said, Abdul Aziz (ed.), Ethnicity and US Foreign Policy, (New York & London: 
Praeger Publishers, 1977).
410
Truman, Harry S. Memoirs Vol. 2, (Signet Books: New York, 1965).
Turner, Fredrick The Frontier in American History (1920).
Uri Dan, Blood Libel (New York, 1987) and Renata Adler, Reckless Disregard (New York, 
1986).
Volger, John. “Perspectives on the Foreign Policy System: Psychological Approaches”, in 
Clarke, Michael & White, Brian (eds.), Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy 
Systems Approach (Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1989).
Wallace, William. Foreign Policy and the Political Process (London & Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1971).
Walsh, Lawrence E. Iran-Contra: The Final Report (New York: Times Books, 1994).
Weinberger, Caspar. Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years at the Pentagon (London: 
Michael Joseph Ltd., 1990).
Williams, Raymond. “Culture is Ordinary” in Ann Gray & Jim McGuigen, (eds.), Studying 
Culture (New York: Routledge, 1993).
Wills, Garry. Reagan’s America: Innocents at Home (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1987).
Wilson, Harold. The Chariot of Israel. (London: Weidenfeld & Michael Joseph, 1981),
Woll, Peter & Rockwell, Stephen J. American Politics and Realities (New York: Longman, 
2000).
Wright, Quincy. The Control of American Foreign Relations (London: MacMillan, 1922).
Yergin, Daniel, The Prize : the epic quest for oil, money and power (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1991).
Young, James E. “Memory and the Politics of Identity” in Hilene Flanzbaum (ed.), The 
Americanisation of the Holocaust (Baltimore & London: The John Hopkins University Press, 
1999).
Young, Stephen D. “Ethnicity and the Indo-China war: reasons for conflict” in van Home, 
Winston & Tonnesen, Thomas V. (eds.), Ethnicity and War (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin, 1984).
Youngs, Tim. Developments in the Middle East Peace Process 1991-2000 (London: House of 
Commons Library, 2001).
Newspapers 
Arab Report and Record 
BBC Monitoring Middle East 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
411
Congressional Quarterly 
Evening Standard 
Financial Times
Foreign Broadcast and Information Service
International Herald Tribune
Jerusalem Post
Jerusalem Report
Los Angeles Times
Middle East Policy
Mideast Mirror
National Journal
New Yorker
New York Times
Newsweek
The Economist
The Guardian
The Observer
Washington Post
Washington Post Book World
Abbreviations used in Notes 
DSB: Department of State Bulletin 
FRUS: Foreign Relations of the United States 
IHT: International Herald Tribune 
JOHI: Johnson Oral History Interviews 
PPP: Public Papers o f the Presidents
DSD: Department of State Despatch 
FT: Financial Times 
JP: Jerusalem Post 
NYT: New York Times 
WP: Washington Post
412
